MIFTAH
Sunday, 30 June. 2024
 
Your Key to Palestine
The Palestinian Initiatives for The Promotoion of Global Dialogue and Democracy
 
 
 

“National Unity” has been a recurrent theme in Palestinian political discourse for decades, particularly since the mid-1960’s and the launching of the PLO.

As such, its manifestation has taken different forms, the most prevalent being the “quota system” within the PLO and its institutions including the Palestine National Council, the Central Council, and the Executive Committee.

This system came into being as a result of the dualism of occupation and exile, and in the context of the factional politics of national liberation and armed struggle.

It also created a unique and improvised form of representation and institutional participation to maintain “unity” and democracy in spite of the prevailing adverse conditions.

Historically, the PLO served as an umbrella organization within which political (factional) pluralism was maintained while serving the purpose of representing the entirety of the Palestinian people through sectoral, political, and individual allocations of seats and resources.

Since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, and as a result of Israel’s banning of any PLO organization or membership in these areas, Palestinians under occupation were limited in participation to a mechanism of petitions and other forms of long-distance communication, or to sporadic individual clandestine attendance.

Since the breaking out of the Intifada in 1988 and the launching of the peace process in 1991, and with the increasing emphasis on nation building, social justice, democracy, and participatory governance, the Palestinian people have adopted a more critical approach to domestic issues and to a more inclusive decision-making process in particular.

With the return of some of the PLO leadership from exile following the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, and with the setting up of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994, the question of national unity became more pressing.

Its urgency was enhanced by the fact that some “opposition” factions had suspended their attendance of and participation in PLO institutions while rejecting any official role in the PNA and its structures. Thus the factional “quota” was suspended, and the more “mainstream,” predominantly Fatah, faction and its supporters dominated.

Hamas and Jihad Islami remained outside both PLO and PNA institutions, and joined with other “rejectionist” factions in a broad, and often uneasy, coordinating framework (not to be confused with the earlier, Damascus-based “Salvation Front” coalition).

Thus the DOP (or the Oslo Agreement) was instrumental in creating a major rift within the PLO, while opposition to it formed the rallying call of the new opposition.

The 1996 Legislative Council elections reflected this new political map, with the boycott of the PFLP, DFLP, and the Islamic movement. The People’s Party (formerly the Communist Party) participated but failed to win any seats, while Fida members ran individually on Fatah lists and won only one seat.

Consequently the PLC composition became predominantly Fatah (made up of both those who ran on official Fatah lists or outside them as Fatah independents), with some independents from the nationalist and the Islamic camps.

The PNC meeting of April 1996 also reflected this mainly monochromatic formation, particularly with the boycott of the PFLP and DFLP factions (the Islamic movement already being outside PLO institutions).

Calls for “national unity,” however became more frequent and vocal, and the instrument for achieving it was repeatedly advocated as “national dialogue.”

Despite tremendous expectations that PLC elections would generate a lively public debate, hence energize a new political discourse to be translated into new political parties, none of these transformations took place. Democratic, constituency-based norms of participatory governance did not materialize.

In addition, a state of multiple internal alienation began to manifest itself, particularly with the widening rift (and often confrontations) between the Legislative and the Executive branches and between civil society and the leadership. Thus a smooth operational system of participatory governance and democratic inclusiveness was undermined, and many effective political and professional institutional and individual capabilities suffered from marginalization or outright exclusion from the decision-making process.

The absence of such a partnership also contributed to the dualism that prevailed particularly in the transition or interim phase.

PLO institutions coexisted in parallel (and often merged) with PNA institutions—the PLO Executive Committee and the PNA Cabinet, the PNC and the PLC. The PLO, however remained as the embodiment of a comprehensive national system of leadership and representation, while the PNA in essence was defined by transitional arrangements as a temporary and partial system subject to the restrictions of time and place as stipulated by the interim phase agreements

Another dualism was expressed in the simplistic polarization (prevalent in many “third world” and Arab countries) of a nationalist regime or authority and a sole alternative in the form of an absolutist or religious political movement.

This emerged mainly at the expense of democratic voices and forces, primarily within civil society. It was also aggravated by the perpetuation of the mentality, structures, and political discourse of factional politics—in addition to their traditional leaderships.

The injection of a large number of security forces also formed a significant factor hampering the evolution towards democracy while introducing another dichotomy—this time between two cultures, civilian and military.

Given such a legacy, the public debate on national issues was initiated and sustained by civil society.

At no point, however, was the demand for “national unity” and “national dialogue” dropped from any agenda.

In addition to frequent bilateral meetings with specific factions, three major “national dialogue” meetings took place since the PNA was formed; these were held in Nablus, Ramallah, and Gaza.

Participants in these dialogues were primarily representatives of political factions and currents, as well as “national figures” or intellectuals and independent community leaders.

Such exercises have neither generated a new consensus on issues nor resolved critical disagreements. They also failed to establish a sustained mechanism for substantive dialogue and cooperation.

Among the causes for the ineffectual nature of these meetings is the institutional possessiveness and defensiveness of the political factions (be they mainstream or opposition) that hampered any freedom for exploratory or innovative moves.

Another factor was the stilted, often frozen or formulaic, nature of the discourse that has remained captive to the slogans of a past era and of different circumstances. Inflexible positions were often presented by representatives who themselves embodied the rigidity of structural and leadership patterns incapable of grasping the imperatives and challenges of rapidly evolving conditions.

Thus a glaring lack of creativity, elasticity, and adaptability confined the “dialogue” to a recitation of set positions and precluded genuine and interactive engagement.

Some factions repeated their familiar preconditions to participation (including the nullification of the Declaration of Principles, or the reinstitution of the Charter) despite the impossibility of such demands.

The mainstream, confident in its numerical and power control, often dealt lightly with its opposition and avoided substantive engagement. It viewed the fact of the meeting as an end in itself, and did not commit to any modifications in its attitude or methods of political improvisation.

Moreover, the “slice of the cake” approach was maintained, which undermined the opposition further (reinforcing the cooption charges against them) and enhanced the power politics of the mainstream.

The ritualistic nature of the “dialogue” and the implicit collusion on the boundaries of maneuverability also confined the terrain of political exploration. No vigorous debate nor keen insights nor creative formulations emerged from such encounters.

The “constants” of the national consensus are not (and have never been) in question—the right of return for the Palestinian refugees, the right to self-determination and the establishment of the Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and the applicability of international legality to all aspects of the solution of the Palestinian question. The real issue remains in the translation of such cornerstones into applicable policy and operative mechanisms, whether in nation building or in peace making strategies.

It is time for the dialogue itself to be redefined, streamlined, and refined along with the concept of “national unity” as well as the participants themselves.

National unity has never been a synonym for unanimity or a monolithic political culture. Nor is it a tedious repetition of slogans “etched in stone.”

It has become abundantly clear also that a constant reactive negative response to the initiatives of others does not constitute a political platform.

Now that the coming challenges posited by final status issues and negotiations have superseded the traditional pro’s and con’s of the debate over Oslo and the interim phase, most factions are returning to the fold in search for a role.

They are also coming to grips with the strategic nature of the Arab commitment to peace (primarily on the Syrian track) and the very real transformative impact on inter- and intra-Arab politics.

This is neither capitulation nor cooption, but a recognition of the national and historical dimensions of the issues at stake.

Participation is neither a gift nor a concession. It is a national responsibility.

However, the time has come to commit to a hard and candid assessment of the manner of participation, the discourse involved, and the mechanisms of a sustained and productive dialogue.

The substance of the dialogue must also undergo a qualitative shift along with the mindsets and attitudes that had persistently ignored developments and relationships emanating from an interactive and ongoing peace process, in addition to contemporary global realities and imperatives.

The dialogue itself should lead to an informed and comprehensive decision-making system capable of reflecting a viable and operative national consensus and of maintaining the confidence and support of the public.

Political policy and decisions are not made in a vacuum or within the rarified atmosphere of closed rooms. Without their human dimension and constituency they remain futile or (at most) transient exercises.

They must also be buttressed by the comprehensive input and vigorous debate of a genuinely pluralistic society in an atmosphere of freedom, tolerance and openness.

While the Fatah Central Council meeting signaled a convergence within the mainstream, the meeting with the PFLP and the upcoming ones with the DFLP and Hamas must bring about a transformation and reinvigoration of the political discourse both within the factions and at the national level.

Nor should the dialogue be restricted to the “traditional” partners (or erstwhile adversaries) as defined by the habits of the past. And the bilateral must become inclusive.

New and emerging voices and visions within the rich fabric of Palestinian democratic realities, within Palestine and in exile, are indispensable partners in policy formulation and articulation.

Empowerment and democratic participation will empower not only the Palestinian national agenda but also the Palestinian negotiating strategies and positions. That can only lead to the achievement of just and credible agreements, hence to a firmer and more lasting peace.

With the end of the interim phase and in view of the gravity of the issues to be negotiated in final status talks, the Palestinian body politic is required to pool resources and to maximize its potential in the coming decisive engagement. Its performance must not be improvisational, reactive, or otherwise deficient. Nor can it afford to justify errors of judgment or misplaced priorities as being of temporary impact. The implications and the price to be paid are enormous and long term.

In the same way that all Palestinians have suffered the consequences of conflict and war, they must be made an integral part of the drive for peace. The Palestinian people ultimately will be the ones to reap the rewards of peace or pay the price for its failure, hence they are the ones to determine its viability and sustainability even while it is still in the making.

 
 
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