All eyes are on the new Kadima head Tzipi Livni. Do you think she will be able to form a coalition government or do you think Israel will go to early elections?

I think both Kadima and Labor and even Shas would like to avoid early elections despite their protestations because it is clear that there is a distinct shift to the right in the Israeli public and Likud has positioned itself to make maximum use of this shift and therefore is pushing for early elections. However Kadima and Labor understand that they are losing some of their seats currently and their support from the public and therefore need time to reorganize. So they might opt for maintaining a coalition government and avoiding early elections and try to create some system that will not rock the boat but will function for a while. So depending on what each constituent of the coalition wants for its own self interest there might be an agreement. That is, if Shas gets the money or the seat that it wants; if Labor gets again the agenda issues on the negotiations table or its own role in government. Shas of course wants guarantees on Jerusalem and negotiations. So it’s like serving the cake in ways that would serve the interest of each party and ultimately make it self negate and incapable of taking any decisions seriously or taking any decisive step.

After his resignation, Ehud Olmert recently said that Israel should return the West Bank and east Jerusalem to the Palestinians, something he did not offer during his time in office. Why do you think Olmert chose to make such a statement now knowing he could not make any deals?

As in the nature of all epiphanies in political power, people usually declare them when they have nothing to lose, so as usual, it is too little too late. He knows he’s no longer in office. He knows he cannot actively influence decision making but in a sense he can influence public opinion. It seems to me the value of such statements is in making them current, legitimate, and acceptable, and launching a public discourse or debate on issues where some taboos are broken. So despite the fact that it is too little too late, despite the fact that while he was in power he was pandering to the settlers and avoided any kind of confrontation, putting this on the record, at least in the public domain, may have some significance.

Do you think he was hoping Livni, assuming she becomes prime minister, would adopt these statements?

If he didn’t do it, and couldn’t, I don’t know whether he’s hoping that Livni will do it. But in some ways he’s hoping that his legacy would, in a sense, be vindicated. I don’t think he has much love lost for Livni, and he knows that she is going to face a tremendous challenge, even more than he did because added to all the backstabbing within Kadima and the coalition, you also have the added gender factor. So, she has quite a few battles on her hands and I doubt whether she will use this in order to move ahead and take daring, decisive decisions or whether this will serve only to curtail her freedom and to weaken her so that she won’t be able to make any decisions.

In general, how do the Palestinians view Livni, especially given that she has been heading the Israeli negotiations team since Annapolis? How much trust or distrust do the Palestinians have in her?

First of all, she hasn’t been negotiating with all the Palestinians. The only people who know her are probably two or three people in the [Palestinian] negotiating team. So it’s not a question of personal trust at all. It is a question of assessing her political position, her political record, and her public statements. And that’s how the Palestinian public as a whole judges a politician. I don’t believe you negotiate on the basis of trust. You negotiate on the basis of honesty and candor, representing your people and their best interests. So our negotiating team should have focused on that rather than on whether they like or dislike or trust their counterparts; it is irrelevant. For example, sometimes the best agreements are signed between those who do not trust each other because then you leave nothing to chance. Sometimes people who like each other or trust each other avoid certain issues or try to appease each other and so on. So they don’t sign airtight agreements. I think what we need now is not trust. What we need is a candid and courageous assessment of requirements for ending the occupation, of disengaging in a real sense after the ending of the occupation as a result of agreements that are based on international law and justice. That’s what we need. Whoever is capable of delivering that on the Israeli side – fine. But it is not a personal call or judgment.

If Livni does become Israel’s next prime minister, what kind of impact will this have on her negotiations with the Palestinians, if any?

Her public statements, and right now we judge only by her public statements, state that she’s going to proceed with negotiations, according to her declarations of intent, let’s put it that way. She wants to move, and she wants to move rapidly. But also within the public discourse are positions pertaining to the refugees and Jerusalem that are difficult and would formulate obstacles to negotiations. So if not for negotiations for their own sake, I’m sure she would proceed with them. The question is what is her substantive position on negotiations? If you exclude Jerusalem and you negate the refugees, you are not going to get anywhere. Within her coalition she might have to make some sort of compromise with Shas over Jerusalem. She might promise Labor that she will proceed with negotiations and on the other hand she might look the other way like every Israeli leader has before her on settlement activities and their expansion.

Do you connect with Livni because she is, as you are, a female politician working in a male dominated world?

I understand that she has an added burden; I understand that she has more challenges. I may disagree with her politically but as a woman, I know what it means to be a female in an exclusively male club where the attacks can be very vicious, where attempts happen at de-legitimization or exclusion or undermining the standing of a woman… It’s very easy to judge women by more stringent standards. It’s very easy to try to bring women down through cruel means and so on. So that is one area in the political domain that I do understand, and I know what she is facing. But I also know that to succeed you must not adopt the current or prevailing male ethos, or attitude, or politics of power and intimidation. If a woman is to succeed in politics she has to bring her gender with her. Attempting to be a watered down version of the male politician won’t get you anywhere because there are always male politicians who will be even more vicious, more cruel, more power driven, rather than [focusing on] consensus, good governance, justice issues etc. If she is going to make a difference as a woman she is going to have to understand that she cannot fight discrimination against women but allow for discrimination against Palestinians. She cannot fight injustice at home but allow for the occupation to continue. She cannot fight for self-determination for women but negate self-determination for a whole Palestinian nation. She cannot fight for her own terrain as a woman and then rob a whole nation of its territory. So these things have to be part of her. She must be true to her gender.

bitterlemons: President Mahmoud Abbas has called for early elections. Do you support the idea of early elections?

Ashrawi: I support the idea of elections. I think elections are an absolutely necessary instrument of democracy and therefore the only way to settle disputes and allow the public to elect representatives and hold their representatives accountable. Elections are an essential tool for the creation of a responsible system of good governance.

On the issue of early elections, clearly the situation in Palestine is one of tremendous crisis in which we have reached an impasse. Elections are a positive way out rather than resorting to violence. Going back to the public is much more constructive than attempting to resolve things by a show of force and confrontation.

The timing is essential of course, because if you do have elections at a time in which the conditions are extremely volatile or in which you have a lack of consensus, or you have one party, regardless of how big or small, refusing to participate, then that can easily destroy the process itself and its credibility.

So we need a new national consensus or agreement and we need to recognize the necessity to hold elections, but at the same time we must understand that tempers are running high. The atmosphere, not just the objective conditions but the prevailing atmosphere, will also impact the outcome.

bitterlemons: You mention the atmosphere. Is it at all possible to hold early elections with Hamas adamantly opposed?

Ashrawi: It seems to me sooner or later Hamas has to understand that this is one way out. There is no win-win solution here, there is a lose-lose situation. Hamas has to understand that one way to resolve the impasse is by resorting to elections and if it is confident of its public support then it has nothing to fear. But this is one way of resolving the situation.

Of course you cannot have elections with part of the people or on part of the land and you cannot have elections in installments.

bitterlemons: So elections would have to include Gaza and Hamas would have to be on board for that?

Ashrawi: I think you need to have comprehensive elections both in terms of geography and in terms of demography and all the different political components of the Palestinian political reality. The Palestinian political system is pluralistic and we must respect pluralism and allow for genuine engagement.

bitterlemons: But Hamas might argue that elections were recently held, it was legitimately elected and there should be no need for new elections at the moment?

Ashrawi: You cannot have elections once and for all and say, "that's it". Elections do not give you a permanent mandate or an absolute mandate. It is common practice in all democracies that when you reach a situation of deadlock or breakdown then you go back to the electorate and say "I've tried and failed, either give me a new mandate or elect somebody else." This is common sense.

bitterlemons: Do you worry that if Hamas again wins elections we will be returned to square one, or would this resolve issues?

Ashrawi: If Hamas does win elections, both parliamentary and presidential, then that would be a very decisive victory. It would clinch the matter once and for all. Fateh and everybody else would have to recognize that this is the will of the overwhelming majority of Palestinians without any of the previous excuses that Fateh shot itself in the foot, that the numerical vote is in favor of Fateh or they cancelled each other out. All these issues will be resolved and we need clarity.

bitterlemons: There is also a suggestion that there may be early elections in Israel. Could early elections there bring about a positive dynamic in terms of peace efforts, or is there already a positive dynamic and Israeli elections would disrupt this?

Ashrawi: It depends on who gets elected. If you have the more extreme components, if you jump from the Kadima frying pan into the Likud fire, then that would certainly not be conducive to any kind of confidence in a peace initiative or a commitment to a viable negotiations process.

Now there are moves--whether the Arab initiative, American, however flawed, or international--to create a momentum for negotiations. There is a call for an "international meeting". Let's see what can be done to expand this to make it into a conference and get the international community to adopt the Arab initiative, to hold Israel to the requirements of peace in terms of having viable, substantive negotiations that would include permanent status issues. This is what we need to do now. The issue of elections in Israel is domestic, granted, but at the same time it will have an impact on the peace agenda. Not that we think Kadima has a peace agenda, but there is in the international community right now some attempt to create a momentum or a drive for peace.

bitterlemons: So Israeli elections could disrupt this momentum?

Ashrawi: They would have a delaying impact. Whenever you have elections, whether in Israel or in the US, the Palestinians end up paying the price by being put on hold waiting for the result.- Published 6/8/2007 © bitterlemons.org

Hanan Ashrawi is a Palestinian legislator and a member of the Third Way party.

This essay is adapted from a speech Dr. Ashrawi gave at the Palestine Center in Washington, DC on April 24, 2007.

Everybody has been talking about crisis management and damage control and will the Palestinian realities hold up or not and who's doing what and so on without really getting back into the real issue of whether there is an opportunity for peace or not. Yes, we all agree that these are very difficult times indeed, and we all know that the terrible Ds or the dreadful Ds have come up again. We see in Palestine a process of de-development, deconstruction. We see devastation, deprivation and, of course, leading to the attitudes or the moods of despondency and despair. All these are not conducive to peace. But out of all these terrible Ds or dreadful Ds, is there an opportunity for peace? Is there a promise despite the difficulties, despite the problems? Now, that requires a confluence of several factors to come together, and they have to be crowned by the political will to intervene positively and to do something to change realities on the ground. So, I will try this afternoon to talk about what works and what doesn't work if we really are to pursue peace and place it in a different context: the Palestinian, the regional and the international or global.

Now, what doesn't work. Of course, we all know from experience that what doesn't work is disengagement or non-engagement. Like nature, any conflict resents, dislikes and abhors a vacuum. When there is a vacuum in any conflict, particularly a political vacuum, violence takes over and fills that vacuum. Extremism fills that vacuum. And this is exactly what happened given the fact that since the year 2000, there has been no peace process, the U.S. has kept its distance [and] there was no genuine intervention in order to re-legitimize peace. So, keeping one's distance is certainly quite counterproductive if not destructive. In cases of conflict, you do need the political will to intervene effectively.

What doesn't work also is selectivity. I will try to speak quickly to save some time for questions or discussion. Selectivity and exclusion or exclusiveness do not work. In Palestine, of course, the fact that the people decided that Hamas is not an acceptable interlocutor or not an acceptable result of the democratic process has led to serious ramifications, not least of which is the undermining of democracy in Palestine because there was a certain degree of hypocrisy-you can have elections provided you elect the people we like or you guarantee the outcome. We were, in Palestine, electing under severe conditions. We were under occupation, and of course a people traumatized and in pain and constantly subject to violence and escalation and ideology, they elected in kind-those who will respond in kind to this trauma and the pain. And I assure you that if we were in a peaceful, sovereign state, I'm sure you will find a very functioning, multi-party, pluralistic, enlightened system in Palestine. But anyway, regardless, we do have the results of these elections. Not only were they boycotted, the Palestinians were under sanctions-which is ironic again because for the first time in history you have a people under occupation and under sanctions at the same time-while for decades Israel has been violating international law, flouting the will of the international community and with no sanctions, sometimes with even full immunity. But because the Palestinians happen to elect the wrong people, now they are under sanctions. And now after the Mecca initiative and the forming of what is called the national unity government-sometimes I call it a coalition government-there is selectivity in the individuals: whom to talk to and whom not to talk to, who is worthy of dialogue and personal attention and who's not or who's Kosher and who's not. It doesn't matter. But certainly that has had, again, effects on the economy, on peace, on moderation in Palestine.

Throughout the region, it's the same thing. You cannot select a people to talk to whom you approve of and exclude others. You cannot say well Syria and Iran are outside the verbal realm, but everybody else is fit company. If you want to deal with the whole region, you deal with it in an integrated way, and we'll talk about it soon. The Baker-Hamilton study, of course, gave us several handles on how to move ahead. It may not be perfect, but at least it is much more insightful than other attitudes and studies. Syria has been saying, "Let's make a deal. We want to make peace. Talk to us. Let's negotiate." And Israel reacted with the utmost of horror, with awe. How dare Syria propose to negotiate? So in a sense, there are options, but are there takers? That's the real question.

Of course, conversely, what works is a comprehensive, integrated approach both to the region and to all the players [and] to the peace process itself, including all the major players in the region regardless of whether you like them or not. Unlike friends, interlocutors and negotiating partners are not people you have to love. And you don't have to choose them or marry them or whatever. So, you need to be able to talk to everybody. Again, the peace process has to be inclusive in terms of all the topics it addresses. You cannot deal with parts of Arab land. You have to deal with all of them. And when it comes to the Palestinians, you have to talk to all Palestinian interlocutors-those who were chosen by the Palestinian people. And fortunately right now, we all know that the PLO is the party in power to negotiate, and the presidency has the mandate to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people. There is no reason not to engage. To use the pretext that Israel has used for the last six to seven years-there is no partnership for peace-is entirely useless because there is a clear partnership and a properly mandated address for negotiations.

There is, of course, the Arab initiative that is ready. Again, it may not be perfect, but it is there. It's a comprehensive approach. It represents an opportunity for Israel and the rest of the world to have a comprehensive peace with all the Arab countries on board, and this is something they should pick up and run with instead of view with weariness and suspicion.

What doesn't work also is de-contextualization. This is particularly true when we address the issue of Iraq and Lebanon-the Iraqi quagmire and the Lebanese debacle, of course-and the lessons from those two experiences. The region is not a set of discrete, isolated entities or units. It is made up of a set of relationships and with an interactive public opinion that is quite open and easily influenced by events and highly politicized and highly critical. I'm sure you all know that. I don't believe there is any public opinion that is as political, as critical and as intrusive as the Palestinian and Arab public opinion. And, of course, they are easily affected by what's happening. The rise of violence and extremism is due to the failure of voices of moderation and a failure of will at producing a just peace that will work. Again, the lessons learned from Iraq and Lebanon should tell us that military power has its limits, particularly in the region when you are fighting against either irregular forces or a captive civilian population. No matter how strong your army is there is no way in which you can defeat the will of the people or defeat irregular forces. You may bomb, shell, destroy, kill thousands, but at the same time [if] there's a people bent on being free, they will be free ultimately unless you eradicate all of them. And if there are irregular forces, you cannot defeat them using a strong army, and that experience in Lebanon and Palestine has proven that.

The dangers of unilateralism whether in the withdrawal from south Lebanon or the withdrawal from Gaza-if you insist on negating the partnership for peace, if you insist on negating the other and claiming there is no partner to talk to and acting unilaterally. We all know how unilateralism is a recipe or a euphemism for power politics. It's the dictation of the will of the strong on the weak because only the strong can afford to be unilateral, and we've seen that in Iraq, particularly when unilateralism is translated as the strategic doctrine of preemptive strike which is negative military intervention. And returning to UN resolutions, for the first time, Israel and the U.S. had to go to the UN and ask for a UN resolution and at the same time, they asked for international troops on the ground. All these are precedents, and these have to be understood in context again. They can be in many ways not a blueprint but influences or indicators for how to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli issue.

Another thing that doesn't work is polarization and dualism in the region. Of course, those who insist on dividing the region into devils and angels or axis of extremists versus a quartet of moderates or the Sunni/Shi'a divide do not understand the very complex realities and the nuanced reality of the region. And, of course, that makes it all that more difficult to engage in a genuine way and to try to find solutions. The fact is labels may be very convenient and may give you instant sound bytes but they do not give you handles on reality. And we do not want to be, as Palestinians, frankly a part of any axis or any alliance. We want to be free to engage with everybody and to deal with the region in such a way also as one way of losing your grips or your handles on reality in the region.

Within Palestine, again, we see this dualism and polarization. The latest elections prove that Palestinian society is extremely polarized. And I am saying this as [Palestinian Finance Minister] Salam [Fayyad] and I are in the Third Way, as you know. Salam was here last week. But the polarization was very clear between Fateh and Hamas, between people who had militias, people who had extreme ideologies and so on. The third alternative, including the old traditional left, did not make it numerically significant. We may be qualitatively significant but quantitatively certainly not that decisive. However, this kind of polarization reflects a certain malfunction. I don't want to say dysfunction. Dysfunction is for the Israeli political system. We have a malfunction in the political system, and it did happen at the expense of the pluralistic multi-party political system. We have again polarization between the government and the presidency, which we had hoped to overcome with the new government.

Again, we have the extremes between Gaza and the West Bank. They're dealing with Gaza as though it's a different reality, not just a geographic entity, but as though this is the Palestinian state while the West Bank is open up for grabs, open for dispute. And this so-called national unity government instead of genuine power-sharing became, let's say, a coalition government or a divvying up of these points and benefits and privileges, and that again is detrimental to political development.

Also, what doesn't work is procrastination and further transitions as usual. The whole concept of a state with transitional borders or what was called a transitional state is a very bizarre concept. I don't think it's ever been applied anywhere. There's no such thing as a state with transitional borders, and I hope that this is now dropped from the lexicon of politics and the region. We cannot have a state with transitional borders and we cannot have further transitions, which would be buying time for Israel to create facts in order to continue with the settlement expansion, with the building of the wall, with the annexation and transformation and captivity of Jerusalem. All these things cannot continue because they are the foundations of peace. When Israel is given a free hand unilaterally to predetermine their fate and their outcome then you're destroying the very foundations of peace.

And, of course, we talked about the U.S. dual approach. Now, the dual approach of the U.S. is the one plus one. Get [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert and [Palestinian President] Mahmoud Abbas to talk one on one, Palestinians and Israelis, on issues of security and conditions of freedom of movement and conditions of life and so on. Now we've tried that before. When you talk about conditionality, when you talk about conditions of life, when you talk about Israel determining whether its security conditions have been met by the Israelis, this is a recipe not just for paralysis but for regression. So far, these meetings have not produced anything. Remember how many meetings they had before, and issues like release of prisoners and so on were supposed to be resolved and have not been. So, you raise expectations, you do not meet them, the let down can be extremely dangerous. So, one plus one does not work. We talk about bilateralism as being, again, the will of the powerful over the week.

Now, there is a four plus two. Israel asked for the four plus two, which is what they call the Arab Quartet plus Israel and Palestine. This is another term for normalization. Israel then wants to be recognized, wants to be accepted in the Arab world-let's talk, let's adopt the Arab initiative as a basis and then change it because we have reservations about the right of return, about Jerusalem and about settlements but we'd love to meet Saudi Arabia, for example. So, the four plus two is another formula for normalization.

Then there is also the four plus four plus two, which is the regular Quartet with the Arab Quartet with Palestine and Israel. So, what's different from the international conference? In that sense, why not go straight to the international conference? Let's put together a coalition of the willing for peace this time and see whether we can make a difference. So what works? Rapid, bold, decisive steps straight into permanent status issues that we all know; we do not need to reinvent the wheel. We do not have much time.

Now in Palestine, everybody is asking, how long will this government last? The average lifespan of any Palestinian government has been about eleven months to a year, so far, since 1994. So, I think this government will be coming to its end very soon by the end of the year, probably if it is within the average. Now how would this government end? How long will it last? How would it end? It depends on other factors, but if there is agreement, this government could be in preparation for elections. Elections cannot take place without consensus, without the agreement of all parties involved, particularly Hamas and Fateh. So maybe between now and the end of the year, there can be elections if all parties are convinced that early elections can work or it can be a preparation for a new type of government which we had advocated earlier: a government of professional, independent nationalists and not a factional government because factionalism has been detrimental to the development of a national program.

So, let's have a government of professionals, of independents who do not put factional interest above national interest and who are capable of building a system of meritocracy. We don't want them to be, you know, brilliant politicians. We want them to start providing services to people. That's what we need, and we need institutions to be built. Now that's another option. The third option, of course, is a horrible option of a breakdown and violence, particularly given the fact that there are people who are stockpiling weapons- it's no secret. We should be very careful about that and notice it.

Now what doesn't work, of course, is violating the rule of law. In the peace process, you cannot violate international law and international humanitarian law. You cannot accommodate settlements and allow for settlement expansions and allow for the building of the wall and the annexation of Jerusalem. You cannot begin by negating [UN Resolution] 194 and the Palestinian refugees' rights and then say, "Well now that we've done all these things, let's start negotiating," because that would deprive this peace process of its legality, of its very foundations in international law. And again, the same thing in Palestine, we also need the rule of law. And the rule of law requires primarily security reform. We do not need to reinvent the wheel, again, but it has to be implemented.

The security forces cannot be political forces, they must be depoliticized and they must not be engaged in anything financial. They must be reformed in terms also of their numbers. The militias have to be disbanded, including the executive force. I do not see the executive force as a legitimate security service. It is a militia and it was given the title of a security force. All illegal weapons must be collected. The use of weapons must be regulated, particularly in Gaza. The security services must become law enforcement agencies rather than power centers for warlords and tribes. We must get rid of tribalism.

If you do not have rule of law, if people do not have recourse to justice, then what you will end up with is revenge because so many things have happened, particularly in Gaza. There are many families that have their own militias and as a result, again, of economic deprivation, militias have become a way of making a living for some of the young men. So if you do not have due process, if people do not have recourse to the law, then of course they will take the law into their own hands and revenge, within a tribal traditional system, will continue to be the main motivation.

The National Security Council has to be a credible and effective council and not, again, a combination of power basis and leaders. Lawlessness and kidnappings have to end. We cannot continue to say that we want to build a state and at the same time act outside the law and kidnap journalists and others. Now with Israel, of course, there has to be an upholding and an extension of the period of quiet to include also the West Bank. All these incursions in the last couple of days have killed nine Palestinians. The incursions are ongoing in the West Bank-the destruction, the abductions, this has to stop. And with Israel, we need to carry out an exchange of prisoners, and Israel has to stop the taking of hostages as well because the PLC [Palestinian Legislative Council] members and the cabinet members have been abducted as hostages. So, we do need a prisoner exchange that is rapid and decisive. Now again, what doesn't work is the logic of violence. We all know that, whether with assassinations; incursions; infighting in Palestinians or in the region; the Iraqi war and the so-called war on terrorism.

What works is the logic of national building and reconstruction and peace. We need economic revitalization in Palestine if we are to engage in a genuine peace process. The international community is called upon to first lift the sanctions and the siege [and] two, return the funds, the Palestinian funds that Israel is withholding. The U.S. also has to lift the banking restrictions and the E.U. must end TIM. I don't know if you are aware of TIM-Temporary International Mechanisms. The E.U. adopted TIM as a way of sort of circumventing dealing with the government. So, TIM is a mechanism in which you give money directly either to the presidency or to the poor or whatever and you bypass the government. Now this has, again, wreaked havoc in the Palestinian national economic system because this way there is no transparency no accountability, and you have destroyed the Ministry of Finance and all the procedures of transparency and accountability. We need to go back to the developmental agenda, national building agenda rather than the agenda of relief and charity and welfare and emergency assistance and so on. The Palestinians have to return to a unified treasury account, restore transparency and accountability, meet the wage bill [and] end the paralysis in the public institutions.

They have just declared today another strike in the civil service. We need to provide the essential services. The health and educational services are really regressing in very drastic ways. We need to carry out serious reform measures, reduce the numbers both in the civil service and in the security. Reform requires a blue ribbon commission that is properly mandated, that is formed in accordance with the law and is properly empowered to carry out the reform. The last thing you need is a reform that is, again, a dividing of the spoils where Hamas will agree that it will have so many in the civil service, so many in the security, so many ambassadors, so many governors, and Fateh will have so many. This is not reform. That's why we call for a properly mandated, empowered blue ribbon commission for reform that has no vested interest [and] that will not have a conflict of interest.

Of course, we need internal empowerment and good governance. We cannot separate nation building from peace making, again. The international community must not think that exacting political concessions from Hamas is the only achievement; that this is one way they can get legitimacy for Hamas and get the peace process going, which is exactly what's been happening. The Hamas political agenda has really undergone some serious transformations. I don't know if you're aware of it, but they have accepted the two-state solution. They've accepted the long term period of quiet and ceasefire. They have accepted all these things. They recognized signed agreements, Arab legitimacy international legitimacy and so on. All the things we were asking them to do, they have done. But that is not the real issue. To me, the real question is what is the nature of Palestinian society? This is something that people ignore. What kind of society are we going to build? Are we going to build an open, pluralistic, tolerant society or are we going to go back into a closed ideological system? This is what we want to know. Is there a deal being made between Hamas and Fateh at the expense of the people? Now, I must say in all candor that Palestinians have always been quite protective and possessive of our fundamental rights and basic freedoms. And we will not condone-and I will say this again-we will not condone the destruction of books or folk tales. And we will not condone the banning of the dabkeh or music as being immoral. And we will not condone the blowing up of internet cafes or beating up of young women because of the dress code in Gaza or burning of schools. They just burned the American school in Gaza.

So what we need to do, which is what civil society is doing, is stand up to any attempts at capturing Palestinian society and transforming it by force into a closed regressive unenlightened ideological system. That's why we are calling, as another mechanism, the national council for culture, education and the arts. These are the legacies of the future generations. We cannot leave them at the mercy of one party or the other or the narrow concerns or petty ideologies of one party or the other. That council will be in charge of the curriculum rather than each party manipulating the curriculum to suit its ends. And for social justice, we need a women's commission and the information council.

Barely what works now is the two-state solution. What we need to do for the peace process, a rapid decisive and comprehensive peace process, is define the objectives and move rapidly within a binding timeframe with monitoring and verification mechanisms, with international assurances and guarantees and with a massive reconstruction and development plan. Without all these things together, using the Arab initiative as the focus, we will not get anywhere. The political horizon must not be what everybody talks about a receding line in the distance. Ultimately, it has to be a genuine landscape for peace.

Dr. Hanan Ashrawi is a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and founder and chair of the executive committee at The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, MIFTAH. She is a former Minister of Higher Education and Research as well as a Palestinian spokesperson.

political leaders, will have taken note of the unusually honest explanation of Israeli strategy that appeared in its pages on July 26.

Dani Dayan stated, with no diplomatic ambiguities, that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are an "irreversible fact" and claimed they are "not going anywhere." Mr. Dayan is a leading figure in the settler movement that is comprised of a half a million Israelis who have built cities, towns and villages on Palestinian land stolen and in some cases illegally annexed by Israel. He is at least candid.

This is in stark contrast to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu whose occasional statements are apparently in favor of two states, but which on close inspection are so heavy with pre-conditions as to make the Palestinian state impossible.

And that is the whole idea behind the illegal settlements -- to put so many concrete facts on the ground that if there ever were an agreement of two independent states, the settlers in their fortress tower blocks and militarily-defensible hilltops would make it impossible in practice. At that point, Israel would become -- not by negotiations, nor by international agreement, but by force -- a single state governing a population in which a large Palestinian population could be held in subjugation only by denying them any democratic freedom.

Mr. Dayan has stripped away any pretense about the expansion of settlements, which are deliberately making a Palestinian state nearly impossible. The consequence of this must be that Israel ceases to be a democracy, since the permanent settlement of Palestinian land can happen only by one people subjugating another by force.

Is this the outcome that the United States, of all countries, wishes to support? Or will it at last wake up to the reality that the Israeli government is a willing hostage of the settlers, among whom are violent extremists who vandalize mosques, destroy olive groves, and beat up Palestinians with apparent impunity?

Surely successive U.S. presidents have been right all along to believe that the better way of ending this deadlock is to have two free countries living side by side in lasting peace. This outcome has many virtues, including that it is democratic, that it is moral, and that it guarantees everyone the political freedoms which much of the world has taken for granted.

The settlers' alternative can be supported only by abandoning the belief in political freedom. It must be stressed that one cannot believe in freedom without accepting that it applies to all. Freedom that applies only to oneself fits with something else: oppression and occupation.

This is not a theoretical argument about political philosophy. Palestinians are confronted by reoccurring brutal acts that would cause moral outrage if carried out anywhere else.

Take, for example, the recent decision by the Israeli army to extend its military firing range in the South Hebron Hills. There are eight Palestinian communities in the area --villages going back to the 19th century -- all of which are to be removed. There is no democratic right of appeal and no representation in parliament by which those communities can contest the decision. Home, community, family, and tradition count for nothing. This is the deeply undemocratic, anti-freedom nature of the Israeli occupation of which -- it has to be said -- Americans know too little.

It is rare to see anyone openly admitting to a belief that Israel must permanently hold Palestinians under occupation, showing contempt for other people's freedom, history, and culture. Where Mr. Dayan is not honest is in failing to admit that brick by brick the settlements are burying our freedom. He never explains how the settler strategy can be reconciled with democracy because it cannot. Surely, the United States must see that this is not a strategy it can support while proclaiming its belief in freedom.

Freedom must be for all, not just for the militarily strong.

Hanan Ashrawi is a PLO Executive Committee member and Palestinian lawmaker.

PLO Executive Committee member and member of the PLC, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi today expressed her support for the Libyan people in their demands for freedom, democracy and human dignity, saying: “Throughout the Arab world, ordinary people are confronting outdated and intransigent regimes that refuse to relinquish their grip on power, and demanding democracy, accountability and the rule of law in their place.”

“For far too long, such regimes have stood as a barrier to democracy in the Middle East. They have quelled the rights and freedoms of their own people, and exacerbated the myriad political, economic and social problems facing their people. This is as true in Libya as it was in Tunisia and Egypt.”

Dr. Ashrawi said that she was both alarmed and appalled by the way Libya’s ruler, Muammar Gaddafi, continued to taunt and threaten his own people, promising to wreak havoc, death and destruction in response to ongoing protests.

“In both word and deed, Gaddafi continues to show utter disregard for the welfare, rights and safety of his own people. He is threatening a civil war that will undoubtedly drag the country further into chaos and lead to more bloodshed. Libyans are well within their rights to demand reform and to protest peacefully. I call in the strongest possible terms on the Libyan government to cease all aggression against its own civilians.”

“Engaged in our own struggle for freedom and independence against Israel’s occupation and the daily violation of our rights, the Palestinian people stand firm in their support for our Libyan brothers and sisters in their quest for freedom, democracy and an end to tyranny,” Dr Ashrawi concluded.

Even as indirect peace talks start this week between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, Israel's Foreign Ministry has begun waging a negative campaign against President Abbas and other Palestinian leaders, accusing them of “incitement”. Rather than demonstrating his seriousness of intent by engaging Palestinian leaders positively, it appears that Prime Minister Netanyahu and his government would prefer to attack them by pursuing red herrings like incitement.

At a press conference last week, Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon appeared alongside Itamar Marcus, a right-wing settler and director of an Israeli NGO called Palestinian Media Watch, to receive a report produced by PMW. Later in the week, Marcus appeared on Capitol Hill to present his report to Congress. In the U.S., PMW has been running ads on major television networks of late echoing the accusations of incitement against President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad.



What Ayalon and Marcus failed to mention is that PMW is closely connected to the New York-based Central Fund of Israel, which gives money to some of the most extreme elements in Israel’s settler movement, including a yeshiva in a West Bank settlement that is home to Rabbi Yitzhak Shapira, who published a book last year justifying the killing of gentile babies on the grounds they might grow up to pose a threat to the state.



Ironically, if PMW’s television ads were produced by Palestinians and aimed at Israelis, they would no doubt constitute incitement according Israel’s definition. Indeed, that definition seems to include any action or statement critical of Israeli policy. Thus, the encouragement of non-violent protest against Israel’s 43-year-old military occupation, the banning of goods produced in settlements by the PA, and attempts to make Israel respect Palestinian rights at international forums like the United Nations all qualify.



While Israeli officials spend their time sifting through the Palestinian media looking for objectionable content, the perpetrators of a string of arson attacks against mosques in the West Bank remain at large. In the villages of Yasuf, Hawara, and most recently, Luban, mosques have been desecrated and torched by settlers who have also set fire to cars and olive groves. In the Yasuf attack, the aforementioned Rabbi Shapira was arrested and questioned by Israeli authorities before being released.



According to the Fourth Geneva Conventions, Israel is legally responsible for the security and wellbeing of Palestinians living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), yet little has been done to reign in violent, extremist settlers who pose a threat not only to Palestinian life and property, but to the peace process itself.



Attacks such as these – carried out by armed settlers deliberately implanted in Palestinian areas by successive Israeli governments in contravention of international law – do more to incite Palestinian anger and frustration than any speech or television program ever could. They also increasingly threaten to turn the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into a religious rather than a political one.



Likewise, each new settlement announcement, like the one that derailed the Obama administration’s attempts to start proximity talks during Vice-President Biden’s visit to the region in March, also incites Palestinian anger, as we witness ever more of our land being by colonized by Israel. Just this past Sunday, Israel’s Peace Now revealed that construction has begun on new settlement units in the Ras al Amoud neighborhood of occupied East Jerusalem.

During Benjamin Netanyahu’s first term as Prime Minister in the 1990s, he made much of the issue of incitement while simultaneously dragging his feet when it came to honoring Israel’s obligations under previously signed agreements. The 1998 Wye Agreement called for a three way US-Palestinian-Israeli committee to limit incitement on both sides, but it fell into disuse after doing little work and the Israelis have refused our requests to reactivate it.



Despite the propaganda emanating from Israel’s Foreign Ministry and groups like PMW, President Abbas and the Palestinian leadership are committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Netanyahu government’s focus on incitement is a digression and an attempt to avoid discussing substantive issues and the implementation of previous agreements, such as the first phase of 2003’s Road Map. If Prime Minister Netanyahu prefers to play semantic games rather than engage in serious negotiations, talks will not succeed.

Final status issues like borders must be dealt with up front, and there must be clear terms of reference. We do not want to talk for the sake of talking, or engage in a process that leads nowhere. Instead of wasting time and energy attempting to discredit Palestinian leaders who are committed to peaceful coexistence, the Israeli government should be thinking seriously about the consequences of another round of failed peace talks.

Dr. Hanan Ashrawi is an elected member of both the Palestine Liberation Organization's Executive Committee and the Palestinian Legislative Council.

On March 13th at 7am, Ali Qa'dan was getting ready for another day in his eventful and demanding work as a senior producer for ABC.

At 44, he was at the height of his distinguished career as the first Palestinian to achieve such standards of professionalism and recognition.

At 44, Ali suffered a massive heart-attack that left him lifeless while engaging in the mundane task of a morning shave.

At 44, Ali is no longer with us, and his son Nadeem (13) and daughter Lina (11) are left fatherless.

At 44, Ali left a vacuum in the lives of all those who have known him, worked with him and loved him.

The night before, Ali had spent a whole night in a hotel in Ramallah besieged by Israeli tanks and troops, dodging bullets and fighting a fate of violent death.

Professional to the end, Ali among his many colleagues covering the massive Israeli incursion into Ramallah, insisted on continuing the coverage despite the Israeli shells and bullets that were raining down on them.

The next night, Ali had hoped to get some sleep in order to face yet another day of Israeli brutality and violence. He found eternal rest instead.

Rest in peace, Ali.

We will miss you, your boundless energy, your engaging smile, your contagious laughter, your warm friendship and your love of life.

We will miss your sense of irony and humor, your total immersion in your profession and yet the time you made for us as friends and members of the larger Palestinian family.

Your departure was sudden, unexpected and tragic. You left before your time, but you have made a difference in our lives and time.

Rest in peace, Ali, the peace you could never enjoy in your life as a son of the tormented land of Palestine.