The latest poll on the Palestinian public opinion prepared by Dr. Nabil Kukali revealed the following:

• (81 %) of the Palestinians do not – to various degrees – trust the commitments of Israel and its obligations to the agreements signed with the Palestinian Authority.
• (59%) oppose the return of the relations with Israel, (38 %) agree to it.
• (55 %) oppose the resumption of the security coordination with Israel, (40 %) agree to it.
• (52 %) oppose the resumption of the peace negotiations with Israel, (43 %) agree to it.

Beit Sahour –Public Relations’ Section:

The latest poll prepared by Dr. Nabil Kukali and conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (www.pcpo.org) during the period 19 – 22 November 2020 covered a random sample of (516) Palestinian respondents representing the various demographic specimens of Palestinians (18 years and above) living in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip. It revealed that the Palestinians are almost split between agreeing to and opposing the return of the relations with Israel and the resumption of the security coordination with it, albeit the opposition scale outweighs a little.

This poll, Dr. Kukali said, focuses mainly on the decision of the Palestinian Authority to resume the relations with Israel that are terminated since 5/9/2020

in response to the intention of the Israeli government to annex about 30 % of the area of the West Bank with full support of the US administration under President Donald Trump.

Dr. Kukali further noted that the motivation to take this courageous step by the Palestinian Authority was a letter from the Israeli government addressed to the PA confirming its willingness to abide by all the agreements signed with the PA.

Dr. Kukali added that the majority of the Palestinian people, in this poll, expressed however their mistrust of Israel’s intentions, as its actions on the ground speak another language. Nevertheless, the Palestinian people are still hopeful that they will have one day their own independent and sovereign State of Palestine with East Jerusalem it’s capital.

Dr. N. Kukali, President and founder of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, said the details of the key results of this poll are as follows:

Trusting Israel

Responding to the question: “What is the extent of your trust to Israel’s commitments and its obligations to the agreements previously signed with the Palestinian Authority?” (71 %) said “I’m not so sure”, (10 %) said “I’m not sure at all”, (9 %) “somewhat sure”, (6 %) “quite sure” and (4 %) said “I don’t know”.

Return of the relations with Israel

With regard to the question: “Do you agree to the return of the relations with Israel to their former status as they have been before 5/19/2020, or not?” (59 %) said “I oppose”, (38 %) “agree”, and (3 %) said “I don’t know”.

Reasons of agreeing to the return of the relations with Israel

In respect of the question: “What are the reasons that let you agree to the return of the relations with Israel?”, (5.6 %) said “crisis of the salary payment of employees”, (4.4 %) said “security stability and calm”, (26.9 %) said “improvement of the economic situation”, (9.4 %) “peace and stability”, (16.9 %) “permits and work in Israel”, (2.5 %) “the clearance funds”, (3.8 %) “permits to the hospitals and admission of patients for treatment”, (3.8 %) “facilitation of livelihood”, (8.8 %) said “lifting the siege from Gaza and opening the border-crossings”, (6.9 %) “due to the life connected with Israel”, (7.5 %) “for serving the citizens” and (3.5 %) “no reason”.

Security coordination with Israel

(55 %) of the Palestinians oppose the resumption of the security coordination with Israel, whilst (40 %) agree to it, and (5 %) declined to respond.

Resumption of the peace negotiations

(52 %) of the Palestinian public oppose the resumption of the peace negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel at present, whilst (43 %) of them agree to it and (5 %) declined to respond.

The economic situation

(61 %) of the Palestinian public assessed their economic situation at present as “bad”, (32 %) as “fair” (middle) and only (7 %) as “good”.

Survey overview

Dr. Nabil Kukali, said that the data for this survey has been collected by using CATI, an effective method for data collection in quantitative researches conducted by phone. By this method, questions are addressed to respondents from a previously designed questionnaire. The survey sample is randomly taken in accordance with a long experienced methodology applied by PCPO covering (516) respondents, (311) are from the West Bank and (205) from Gaza Strip.

Dr. Kukali has further indicated that the margin of error was (±4.38 %) at a significance level of (95.0%). The sample allotment with respect to the residential areas was as follows: (60.3 %) in the West Bank, incl. Eastern Jerusalem and (39.7 %) in Gaza Strip. The average age of the respondents was (32.4) years.

The overwhelming majority of the Palestinians views the decision of the UAE to normalize relations with Israel as a betrayal or abandonment of the Palestinian cause, one that serves only the interests of Israel. A similar majority thinks that Saudi Arabia and Egypt, by endorsing that normalization, have in effect abandoned the Palestinian leadership. But most Palestinians also place the blame on themselves because they are divided and have normalized relations with Israel long before others

9-12 September 2020

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 9-12 September 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a US announcement about an agreement between the UAE and Israel to normalize relations between the two countries. This normalization agreement stipulated an Israeli suspension or delay of the planned annexation of parts of the West Bank. The period also witnessed a rise in the daily number of coronavirus infections and continued stalemate in Palestinian-Israeli relations that followed a PA decision to sever all security and civil links with Israel which led during the past months to a significant financial loss to the PA. This PA decision came in response to an Israeli announcement about the intention to annex about 30% of the West Bank. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Finding of the September 2020 poll show a great Palestinian public anger with the UAE decision to normalize relations with Israel viewing it as serving only the interests of Israel and as a betrayal or an abandonment of the Palestinian cause and at the same time as a big failure of Palestinian diplomacy. Additionally, the overwhelming majority estimates that the Palestinian leadership has lost its Arab allies as Saudi Arabia will soon follow the UAE in normalizing relations and that Egypt, by endorsing the deal, has in effect abandoned PA president Mahmoud Abbas. Nonetheless, most believe that the majority of the Arab public is opposed to the normalization deal. Findings show that the public blames the Palestinians

themselves for this development: the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the fact that they had normalized relations with Israel before many others may have hastened the arrival of this day.

The public does not show an appreciation of the fact that the UAE-Israel deal requires the suspension of the annexation plan. The reason for this is the fact that three quarters think that the suspension is only temporary and will soon take place, the normalization deal notwithstanding. Moreover, based on this assessment, the public is opposed to the restoration of PA-Israel security coordination despite the fact that half of the public wishes to restore civil and fiscal relations between the two sides.

Findings also show a significant decline in support for the two-state solution compared to the situation three months ago. They also show that the consensus in rejecting the Trump plan, the deal of the century, first documented in PSR’s February 2020 poll, remains unchanged. Similarly, the overwhelming majority remains opposed to a resumption of contacts with the Trump administration. Despite the majority expectation that Trump will lose the upcoming US presidential elections, only one fifth expects positive policy change if the Democratic candidate Joe Biden wins.

Domestically, findings show continued satisfaction with the PA measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus pandemic despite significant decline in the level of satisfaction, especially with the prime minister’s performance. Moreover, a majority is opposed to the severing of coordination and cooperation with Israel in the fight against the spread of the coronavirus.

Demand for the resignation of president Abbas rises in this poll. Parallel to this, satisfaction with the performance of the president has declined. As a result, if elections were held today, Hamas’ Haniyyeh would win a majority of the public vote. This development might have been boosted by the current economic difficulties in the West Bank resulting from the severing of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel and the resulting inability of the PA to pay the public sector in full. Findings also show a drop in the perception of safety and security in the West Bank and an increase in the desire to emigrate. Despite these developments, the popularity of Fatah in the West Bank is not negatively affected; to the contrary, the findings show a little improvement in its popularity.

(1) UAE-Israel normalization agreement:

• A majority of 63% view the normalization agreement between the UAE and Israel as a major event that represents a significant regional shift while 32% view as minor development.
• Findings show a consensus (86%) that the agreement serves only the interests of Israel while 8% think it serves the interests of both the Palestinians and the Israelis and only 1% think it serves the interests of the Palestinians only.
• We asked the public to pick one word that represents its sentiments toward the normalization agreement: the majority (53%) picked “betrayal,” 17% picked “abandonment” 13% “insult,” 9% “indifference,” 6% “sadness,” while only 1% picked words like “satisfaction,” “pride,” and “joy.”
• Most Palestinians (57%) believe that the majority among the Arab public is opposed to the normalization agreement while 20% believe an Arab majority supports it.
• A large majority (70%) believes that other Arab countries, such as Bahrain, Oman, Sudan, and Morocco, will sign similar agreements with Israel while 24% believe they will not do that.
• An overwhelming majority (80%) believes that Saudi Arabia has given the green light to the UAE to sign the normalization agreement and a similar majority (82%) believes that Saudi Arabia too will sign a similar public agreement.
• Similarly, an overwhelming majority of the public (78%) believes that the Egyptian position welcoming the agreement represents an abandonment of the Palestinian leadership led by Abbas while 18% do not share this view.
• A majority of 55% believes that Mohammad Dahlan was one of the participants in the making of the UAE-Israel normalization agreement while 24% do not share this view.
• Nonetheless, a majority of 53% believes that the blame for the normalization deal falls on the shoulders of the Palestinians themselves due to their division and due to the fact that they have recognized Israel and normalized relations with it long before the others; 42% disagree with this view.
• Also, a majority of 62% views the UAE defection from the previous declared Arab consensus on Palestine as a great failure for Palestinian diplomacy; 31% do not share this view.

(2) Annexation and the severing of relations with Israel in post UAE-Israel normalization:

• Three quarters of the public (75%) believe that the normalization agreement forces Israel to merely postpone annexation while 19% think it forces it to put an end to it.
• Now, after the normalization agreement, a majority of 62% is opposed to the restoration of security coordination with Israel while 32% are in favor of restoring it.
• But half of the public (50%) supports, and 45% oppose, the restoration of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel.
• If Israel conditioned resumption of civil and fiscal coordination with a resumption of security coordination, a majority of 59% will oppose, and 35% will support, the resumption of relations.
• In response to an actual Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories, the public is divided on how to respond. When asked to choose one of five possible responses, 28% favored resumption of armed struggle, 20% selected stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, another 20% favored return to negotiations with Israel and the US on the basis of a Palestinian peace plan, 19% preferred waging nonviolent resistance, and 6% selected the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• The public indicates great worries about the future in case of continued severing of relations with Israel.
• For example, 74% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 75% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 77% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel.
• 59% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 59% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 70% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 60% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.
• It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (63%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 30% believe it indeed did.
• A majority of 61% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (32%) expects Israel to do so.
• A large majority of 75% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 21% say they do prefer that.

(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution declines to 39% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept.
• Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 45%.
• A majority of 62% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 31% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 27% of the public while 36% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 14% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 14% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 28% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 38% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 41% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 26% popular resistance. Three months ago, 45% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 92% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Three months ago, 88% expressed opposition to the plan.
• If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 55% think the chances are zero; 26% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.
• A majority of 71% is opposed and 19% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration.
• Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Three months ago, 69% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.
• A majority of 61% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 30% expect him to win it. Nonetheless, only 21% expect a positive change if Biden wins while 34% believe US policy will not change and 35% expect it to become worse.

(4) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• A two-third majority (68%) is satisfied with the measure taken by the PA to prevent travel between the various governorates in order to contain the Coronavirus pandemic.
• Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 64% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 57% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area. On the other hand, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stands at 48% today compared to 62% three months ago.
• The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 70% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 52% say they stopped working or became unemployed.
• A majority of 55% say that are dissatisfied with the PA decision during the past several months to stop cooperation and coordination with Israel in the health sector with the aim of combating the coronavirus, 42% are satisfied with that decision.

(5) Legislative and presidential election

• 62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 58% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 54% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 63%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 36% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 36% (44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 39% and the latter 52% of the vote (compared to 42% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh threw months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 46% (compared to 51% three months ago) and Haniyeh 42% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 41% and the latter 51%.
• We asked in an open-ended question about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 22% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 18% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip), Mohammad Shtayyeh is preferred by 5%, Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, Khalid Mishal by 3%, and Salam Fayyad by 2%.
• We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 61% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 46% (compared to 42% three months ago).

(6) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 16%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 71% and in the West Bank at 57%.
• 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 25% and in the West Bank at 24%. Three months ago, only 18% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%. Three months ago, 81% expressed a similar view.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 62% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, only 52% viewed the PA as a burden.
• A year and a half since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 60% expect failure; only 31% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 58% expects failure and 33% expect success.
• In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 61% expects failure and 32% expects success.
• An overwhelming majority of the public (80%) is opposed to the arrest by the PA security services of activists who were planning to demonstrate or were demonstrating against corruption in the PA while 17% support these arrests.
• 56% (66% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 36% (23% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial. Six month ago, 42% said it believes it will receive a fair trial.
• A majority of 64% (75% in the West Bank and 49% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary rules according to whims and interests; 31% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law. Six month ago, 41% said the judiciary and courts rule according to the law.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (13%), Maan TV at 12%, Palestine Today TV at 11%, Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen at 4% each, and finally al Manar at 2%.

(7) Reconciliation:

• 37% are optimistic and 59% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.
• Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 45% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 11% believe unity will return soon.

(8) Muslims in China:

• 80% of the Palestinians believe that if press reports about the treatment of the Uighur Muslims in China are true, Palestinians should condemn the Chines policy towards its Muslim community and 15% disagree with that.
• An overwhelming majority of 79% indicates that it does not believe the statement of the Chinese government that the camps built by China to allegedly detain the Uighur Muslims are in fact teaching centers aiming at eradicating extremism; 10% believe the Chinese statement.
• Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 83% believes that world Muslims should express solidarity with the Uighur Muslims against the Chinese government while 10% disagree with that.
• An overwhelming majority of 80% approves of the Turkish president Erdogan’s decision to transform the Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque; 16% disapprove.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; 13% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 25%, the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 24%, the continued siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 10%.

The latest poll on the Palestinian public opinion prepared by Dr. Nabil Kukali revealed the following:

• (55.5%) believe that the decision of the Palestinian Authority to end the security and civil coordination with Israel was a right decision, (49.1 %) are among the residents of the West Bank, and (65 %) residents of Gaza Strip.

• (52.3%) believe that the cessation of the security and civil coordination with Israel will negatively affect the economic and living conditions of the Palestinian people.

• (48.7%) believe that ending the security and civil coordination will negatively affect the restriction of the spread of corona epidemic (Covid-19). .

The latest poll prepared by Dr. Nabil Kukali and conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (www.pcpo.org) during the period from June 14-22, 2020 covered a random sample of (1250) Palestinian respondents representing the various demographic specimens of Palestinians (18 years and above) living in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip. It revealed that (55.5 %) of the Palestinian public believe that the decision of the Palestinian Authority to end the security and civil coordination with Israel was a right decision.

Dr. Nabil Kukali, President and founder of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, said that the suspension of the security and civil coordination came as response to the Israeli position, that is supported by President Tramp to annex vast regions of the West Bank that makes up around (30 %) of the area of the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley region, the region north of the Dead Sea and the settlements to its sovereignty, the matter that the Palestinians consider as ultimate undermining of the opportunity to establish their own independent state.

Dr. Kukali further added that the poll results unveil that there is a fear of deterioration of the economic and living conditions in the Palestinian Territories as well as the mutual cooperation in restricting the spread of the corona-virus (COVID-19).

Dr. Kukali said the details of the key results of this poll are as follows:

Cessation of the Coordination as a Right Decision

(55.5 %) of the Palestinian public believe that the decision of the Palestinian Authority to end the security and civil coordination with Israel was a right decision; (49.1 %) of them are residents of the West Bank, and (65 %) residents of Gaza Strip, whilst (44.5 %) of the Palestinians, (50.9 %) of them in the West Bank and (35 %) in Gaza Strip, believe that the decision was wrong.

The results in detail further reveal that the governorates with the positive attitude towards the decision are in the West Bank in the following order: Al-Bireh & Ramallah (81.8 %), Jerusalem (62.8 %), Jericho (55.6 %), Hebron (52.9 %), Salfit (52.2 %), Nablus (43.3 %), Toubas (37.5 %), Toulkarem (37.3 %), Jenin (34 %), Qalqilia (27.8 %) and Bethlehem with (15.9 %) the least positive attitude.

On the other hand, the governorates with the negative attitude towards the decision are in the West Bank in the following order: Bethlehem (84.1 %), followed by Qalqilia (72.2 %), Jenin (66 %), Toulkarem (62.7 %), Toubas (62.5 %), Salfit (47.8 %), Nablus (56.6 %), Hebron (47.1 %), Jericho (44.4 %), Jerusalem (37.2 %) and Ramallah (18.8 %).

In Gaza Strip, the governorates with the positive attitude towards the PA decision are in the following order: Rafah (78.1 %), followed by Deir al-Balah (75.9 %), Gaza City (63.9 %), Khan Younis (61.1 %) and North Gaza (54.9 %).

Cessation of the Coordination and the Economic Situation

Responding to the question:” Do you think that the cessation of the security and civil coordination with Israel will improve the economic and living conditions of the Palestinian people or rather worsen them ?, (18.7 %) said “will improve them”, (52.3 %) “will worsen them”, (15.8 %) “will have no effect” and (13.2 %) said “I don’t know”.

Cessation of the Coordination and the Restriction of Corona-virus (COVID-19)

With regard to the question:” In view of the coordination between the Palestinian Authority and Israel on restricting COVID-19, do you think that ending the security and civil coordination between them would negatively affect this COVID-19 coordination, or not ?, (48.7 %) said “will negatively affect”, (21.7 %) said “will remain unchanged” and (29.6 %) have no opinion.

Will the Cessation of the Coordination impede the Annexation of Jordan Valley and the Settlements ? In respect of the question:” Some people in the Palestinian Territories believe that ending the security and civil coordination between the PA and Israel will impede the Israeli annexation of vast areas of the West Bank (Jordan Valley and the settlements) by Israel, while others believe that it will boost the annexation of these areas by Israel. Which of these two opinions is closer to yours ?, “(28.1 %) said “it will impede Israel”, (35.1 %) “it will encourage Israel to annex these areas”, (26.5 %) “the decision of the PA will have no effect on the annexation” and (10.3 %) said “I don’t know”.

Seriousness of the Palestinian Authority

Responding to the question:”Up to which extent do you believe that the PA will adhere to its decision of terminating the security and civil coordination with Israel ?”, (12.5 %) said “to a great extent”, (37 %) “to a fair extent”, (35.3 %) “to a little extent” and (15.2 %) have no opinion.

The Need for Civil Coordination

With respect of the question addressed to the West Bank respondents:”If you were in need for a coordination or for getting a job, or going to a hospital in Israel, would you go to the bureaus of the Israeli civil administration or to the Palestinian liaison bureaus “, (22 %) said “I would go to the bureaus of the Israeli civil administration”, whilst (56.6 %) said they “would go to the Palestinian liaison bureaus”, and (21.4 %) said “ I don’t know”.

Methodology of the Survey Study in the Palestinian Territories

Dr. Nabil Kukali, said that all interviews of this survey were conducted inside the respondents' homes. The choices were randomly taken in accordance with a long experienced methodology applied by PCPO from a total of (180) sites, (135) are from the West Bank and (45) from Gaza Strip.

Dr. Kukali has further indicated that the margin of error was (±2.77 %) at a significance level of (95.0%). He added that the rate of the female respondents in this survey was (49.6%) against (50.4%) male respondents. The sample allotment with respect to the residential areas was as follows: (63.0 %) in the West Bank, incl. Eastern Jerusalem and (37.0 %) in Gaza Strip. The average age of the respondents was (31.5) years.

For following up the most recent polls of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, please revert to our website: www.pcpo.org

Section 1: Headlines:

The Mecca Agreement re-kindles hope, with increasing optimism and positive evaluation of leaders.

• Of the respondents, 47 percent state that they are optimistic about the future; 54 percent of Gazans feel optimistic.
• About 40 percent of the respondents view that Palestinian society is heading in the right direction, while 55 percent view that it is going in the wrong direction.
• Of the respondents, 59 percent of the respondents say that they feel insecure.
• As much as 44 percent believe that the Mecca Agreement will lead to an end in the factional in-fighting, while 45 percent believe that it will only lead to a temporary halt in hostilities.
• The results show that 68 percent of the respondents have no information on the substance of the Mecca Agreement, 9 percent of them have never heard of the agreement.
• Of the respondents, 56 percent are optimistic about the potential for forming a unity government.
• Around 27 percent believe that a unity government will proceed with peace negotiations, 34 percent believe it will be able to end the international boycott, and 43 percent believe that it will be able to bring about order and rule of law.
• When asked individually about issue concerns, 98 percent of the respondents said they view ending the security chaos, improving living conditions and promoting international relations as top priorities.
• Thirty-nine percent of the respondents believe that combining armed struggle with negotiations is the best means to end the occupation; 22 percent believe that the best means is to combine civil peaceful resistance with negotiations, and 21 percent said that only negotiations is the best means. Fifeteen percent of the respondents said that the best means is armed resistance.
• Of the respondents, 40 percent give President Mahmoud Abbas positive approval ratings (good), while 46 percent give Prime Minister Ismael Hanneyya positive marks (good).
• Seventy-one percent of respondents feel that Fateh and Hamas push all other factions outside of the political arena.
• Of the respondents, 22 percent are members of a political party or faction.
• If elections take place today, Fateh would win 45 percent of the overall votes, Hamas 33 percent, and independents and leftist parties, 13 percent.

Section 2: Analysis of Results

1. Living conditions: Cautious Optimism

• Forty-four percent of the respondents describe the living conditions of their families as bad or very bad. This is compared with 51 percent during December 2006. In contrast, 20 percent describe their living conditions as good or very good, and 36 percent describe them as average.
• Of the respondents, 47 percent say that they are optimistic about the future, 25 percent are neither optimistic nor pessimistic, while 27 percent are pessimistic. This compares with 35 percent of the population rating their mood as pessimistic last December.
• Of the respondents, 59 percent say that they don’t feel secure about their own safety or the safety of their family and property. In addition, 22 percent feel somewhat secure, while 19 percent feel secure.
• Of the respondents, 59 percent feel that Palestinian society is heading in the wrong direction; this is compared with 77 percent in December 2006. In contrast, 40 percent believe that society is heading in the right direction, representing an increase of 23 points in the last two months.

• There is a 9 point increase in the positive evaluation of President Mahmoud Abbas – 40 percent evaluate his performance as good, compared with 31 percent last December. Thirty percent evaluate his performance as average; while another 30 percent evaluate it as weak.
• Prime Minister Ismael Hanniya’s positive evaluation increased five percent, rising from 41 to 46 percent positive marks (good) since last December. In addition, 29 percent of the respondents evaluate his performance as average, and 25 percent evaluate it as weak.
• Of the respondents, 50 percent believe that the actions and positions of Mr. Abbas are based on the best interests of the Palestinian people. In contrast, 43 percent believe that his actions and positions represent the best interests of his political party, Fateh.
• Fifty percent of the respondents believe that the actions and positions of Mr. Hanneyya are based on the best interests of the Palestinian people, while 44 percent believe that his actions and positions represent the best interests of his political party, Hamas.

3. The Mecca Agreement and Unity Government

• Of the respondents, 44 percent believe that the Mecca Agreement will stop factional infighting, while 45 percent believe that it will lead only to a temporary halt in the fighting.
• Fifty-nine percent have heard about the Agreement, but have no information on its details. An additional nine percent of the respondents have never heard about the Agreement. In contrast, 25 percent of the respondents say that they are familiar with the basic points of the Agreement, while 7 percent say that they know the details.
• Of the respondents, 73 percent feel that there is a real potential to form a unity government, while 23 percent feel that is impossible.
• Fifty-six percent of the respondents are optimistic about the success of the anticipated unity government, 25 percent are somewhat optimistic, and 18 percent are pessimistic. Expectations are higher on internal issues concerning the potential impact of the unity government in solving the problems that are faced by Palestinian society:
• Of the respondents, 50 percent feel that the unity government will be able to bring about reform and uproot corruption, while 46 percent feel that it will improve living conditions, represent all groups, and reinforce democracy and freedoms.
• Forty-three percent of the respondents believe that the unity government will bring about order and rule of law.
• Lower percentages of the respondents are optimistic that the unity government will bring about positive changes concerning the Israeli Occupation. Thirty-five percent say that the anticipated government will be able to organize effective resistance against the Wall and the settlements; only 34 percent believe that the unity government will end the closure.
• When asked if the following international actors will place obstacles in the way of the unity government, 88 percent believe that the United States will do so, 87 percent believe Israel will obstruct its functioning, and 52 percent believe the EU will do so. Fifty-five percent, however, believe internal obstacles will block the unity government.

4. Elections and Political Support

• Of the respondents, 65 percent state that they will participate in any upcoming elections.
• Of those who state that they will participate, and after taking into account undecided voters and their potential leanings, if an election were held, Fateh would garner 45 percent of the overall vote, Hamas 33 percent, while independents and leftist parties would capture 13 percent of the total votes cast.
• Twenty-one percent of the respondents say that they are members of a civil society institution – union, syndicate, or society.
• Of the respondents, 22 percent say that they are members of a political party or faction.
• Respondents (as opposed to voters) declared their support for all political groups as follows: Fateh 31 percent; Hamas 22 percent; PFLP 3 percent, Islamic Jihad 2 percent. All other parties receive 1 percent or less. Nine percent of the respondents say that they lean towards one of the listed parties or another, while 29 percent say that they don’t support any of these parties. These results confirm yet again that political support or affiliation does not necessarily translate into likely voter support on the day of the elections.

5. Best Means to End the Occupation When asked about their views on the best means to end the occupation, respondents answered in the following direction:

• 21 percent believe that negotiations are the best means to end the occupation.
• 22 percent believe that combining peaceful resistance with negotiations is the best means.
• 39 percent believe that a combination of armed resistance with negotiations is the best means to end occupation.
• About 15 percent believe that armed resistance is the best alternative.

6. Priorities for the coming 3 Years

• When asked to rate individual concerns, respondents rated nearly all issues as important priorities; the following issues were viewed of utmost priority by over 90 percent of the respondents:
  • Ending the security chaos
  • Improving economic conditions
  • Uprooting corruption
  • Consolidating national unity
  • Enforcing international relations and securing funds
  • Ending the occupation and achieving independence

• The following issues were perceived by the respondents as priorities, rated important by 80 - 90 percent of the respondents:
  • Preserving values and tradition
  • Achieving democracy and protecting freedoms
  • Proceeding with negotiations to achieve lasting peace
  • Improving the status of women

• Of the respondents, 82 percent believe that civil society and private sector could play a vital role in overcoming the ongoing tension.
• Seventy-one percent of the respondents feel that Hamas and Fateh are pushing all other political and civil society forces outside of the political arena.
• Of the respondents, 67percent agree that social services need to be transferred to civil society organizations to avoid influences of political positions.
• Fifty-three percent of the respondents believe that it is necessary to form an alternative democratic option to Fateh and Hamas.
• Half of the respondents (50 percent) opined that NGOs didn’t play a significant role throughout the ongoing crisis.

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Executive Summary

The Human Development Report ≠ Palestine (PHDR) covers the years 2003 and 2004. As it was being prepared, the Palestinian situation suffered numerous political, social, and economic setbacks that reflected two contradictory phenomena. The first was seen in systematic destruction and severe deterioration on virtually all levels, inflicted mainly by the practices of the occupation but magnified by internal structural faults in the political and institutional spheres. On the other hand, Palestinians have displayed hope, steadfastness, and perseverance throughout these difficult times, qualities which found expression in many creative initiatives that bore testament to the eternal endurance of hope for a better life characterized by liberty, equality, and peace.

The Palestinian people have been engaged for decades in dual endeavors: the work of national liberation on the one hand, and furthering development on the other. Within the framework of these endeavors, it is essential to activate and strengthen the role of the Palestinian people, who are at the same time the creators of the strategies to achieve these goals and the target of the goals. Therefore, the present report focuses on the empowerment of Palestinians as the basis for strengthening Palestinian society building, with all that this entails in terms of possessing moral strength as well as quantitative abilities, as two necessary components that are indispensable for reviving the spirit of human initiative and action.

The late President Yasser Arafat served as both symbol and leader of the Palestinian experience, with all of its achievements and differences. In his absence, there are new challenges for uniting Palestinians in action for national liberation and development. Perhaps the upcoming elections and the completion of the reform agenda are the most important opportunities to prove the collective Palestinian ability to safeguard their national aspirations and to ready them to achieve independence and freedom. This will require establishing internal Palestinian relationships based on the principles of institutionalization and the rule of law, complementary relations between governmental organizations and NGOs, and the synchronization of political, cultural, educational, and development visions and methods. In the Palestinian context, these foundations must be built upon first, as they are central to any empowerment effort.

The 2004 PHDR is an attempt to assess the various aspects of the Palestinian condition as a first step toward an integrated approach to the development of Palestinian individuals and society and to strengthen the social fabric needed to support our national liberation and development activities. To this end, each section of the report addresses these aspects from two perspectives. From the first perspective, the general Palestinian condition is assessed in order to gain an understanding of what exists, what is hoped for, and what is possible given internal and contextual challenges. The second perspective analyzes major forces influencing independence and development, such as occupation, external factors (especially international funding), and the role of Palestinian governmental organizations and NGOs. These lead to general and sector-specific recommendations for how efforts can be channeled in the most productive way possible.

The PHDR poses a set of essential questions. The answers to these questions—not only in academic terms, but also in terms of changes in attitude and behavior on the ground—can serve to move society from a state of fragmentation and disintegration to a state of empowerment that will preserve the Palestinian social fabric and consolidate its abilities and potential to achieve humanitarian and national goals. The PHDR poses the following questions for both Palestinian and international institutions:

• What is the role of institutions in empowering Palestinian society to achieve its legitimate rights as stipulated in United Nations conventions?
• How can institutions help strengthen the fabric of Palestinian society in order to preserve unity and commitment in the face of challenges?
• What is their role in attaining true empowerment of the individual, as well as groups that represent the individual and serve as advocates for individual human rights?
• What structural changes have development institutions achieved to further integrate marginalized groups into society and to allow them to participate fully in the development process and enjoy its benefits?

One of the most significant messages of the PHDR is that in order to answer these questions, local and international institutions will need to radically change the way in which they view their past and future roles in advancing the Palestinian agenda. Therefore, the PHDR aims to:

• Provide an objective Palestinian perspective of empowerment as a basis for achieving development and independence based on the cumulative experience of Palestinian society.
• Expand and deepen internal Palestinian dialogue on vital issues affecting the Palestinian present and future on a scientific and systematic basis and within the framework of the analyses put forth by a number of Palestinian experts.
• Establish an organic, studied, and evidence-based relationship between the tasks of national liberation and development-based institution building which fully incorporates an awareness of the Palestinian context.
• Increase active participation in policy- and decision-making at all levels of Palestinian society, starting with the approach adopted in preparing this report, which involved many Palestinian experts, institutions, and grassroots community members. Chances for success are increased by widening the framework of participation and the sharing of responsibility.
• Highlight Palestinian development initiatives by presenting experiences within the 101 Points of Light project and, in so doing, demonstrate the success of Palestinian development efforts and initiatives at the project level, affirming the necessity of strengthening that work and of development coordination to bring about the desired development changes on a general level.
• Offer a number of recommendations that may benefit decision-makers, such as general guidelines on future Palestinian work as well as program-specific policies. These recommendations must encompass work on two levels: the macro level, to include all parties concerned with the issue of Palestinian development, as well as the sector level, involving governmental institutions, civil society organizations, and others.

Perhaps the most important conclusion of the PHDR is that empowerment as defined in the Palestinian context means promoting the vast potential within Palestinian society so that it can maintain its presence on Palestinian land and evolve into a viable society, capable of preserving its cultural and national identity and of developing all its resources. This requires the activation of all of society’s dormant energies —residing in its individuals, institutions, and system of values—and developing them in order to accomplish its historic endeavor of self-determination and building an independent state. Therefore, the PHDR presents a number of general recommendations, which provide the basis for additional, more detailed recommendations. These general recommendations include:

• The need, in the work of Palestinian institutions, to link the national liberation dimension and the human dimension. The first dimension requires mobilizing resources and abilities to bolster people’s steadfastness, to enable them to stay on their land, to coalesce in the face of the policies of fragmentation and disintegration imposed by the occupation, and to validate and shore up the resistance while also negotiating political issues with Israel successfully and effectively. The human dimension requires mobilizing all resources at our disposal in order to create a climate conducive to the generation and restoration individualsك capabilities and skills, promoting a collective spirit of initiative, and protecting the basic rights and freedoms of all citizens. This will require the involvement of all society’s institutions, supported by a broad and organized grassroots base to keep them strong and to protect all achievements in the areas of empowerment and resistance.
• The need for the empowerment vision to arise from recognition of the negative effects of Israeli occupation, along with the need to seriously address internal obstacles and challenges.
• Ensuring the readiness of political will and necessary resources to convert development-empowerment visions into clear and specific goals.
• Aligning the development agenda with the priorities of Palestinian society by involving all sectors of society, especially the private and NGO sectors, in setting this agenda. The empowerment process is based primarily on the perspectives and interests of the general population as established through free and uninhibited public discourse.
  Encouragement of public debate will restore faith in the Palestinian individual’s role in the development process, not as a powerless and visionless recipient of aid and assistance, but as a proactive part of the empowerment process through intellectual and practical involvement.
• Viewing empowerment as cumulative and sustainable process linked to every sector of society rather than a temporary, separate, and independent process.
  The purpose of holding a public conference to launch the publication of the Human Development Report was to invite feedback from the greatest possible number of groups, organizations and individuals, thereby increasing the numbers of those who have contributed to its development, and enriching its contents with the views, suggestions, and recommendations of concerned local and international experts and institutions.

The conference also served as an additional guarantee of the report’s objectivity, neutrality, and richness in its quest to examine the Palestinian condition and striving to change it for the better. To this end, the discussions, suggestions, and recommendations of conference participants were incorporated into the final version of the report. Participants were drawn from local and international governmental organizations and NGOs, and the conference was held simultaneously in Ramallah and Gaza, thereby ensuring full participation representatives from all geographic areas within Palestine.

To viewThe Full Report as PDF File (1,10)MB

Date of Publication: 05 October, 2004 Field Research: 9-11September, 2004

The Results

1. Living Conditions: Economic conditions in the Palestinian Territories continue to deteriorate.

- The income of 42% of Palestinian households in the poll was less than $160 a month, and of these 8% had no source of income at all.

- In general, 78% of Palestinian households in the poll reported an income less than $385 a month. The results indicate that the economic situation is worse in Gaza , with the percentage reaching 89% for households in the Gaza Strip and 71% for those in the West Bank.

- 38% of the respondents described the economic conditions in their households as bad or very bad, 44% described them as average and 19% as good or very good.

2. Migration: Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza seek permanent or temporary opportunities abroad as a result of deteriorating conditions.

- 5% of polled households declared a member of their household had left the Palestinian Territories as permanent migrants during the period of the second Intifada.

- 11% declared that a member of their household had left the Palestinian Territories for work or study purposes during the years of the Intifada.

- A solid majority of those polled, 82%, declared that they would not leave the Palestinian Territories for permanent residence abroad, even if they were given the opportunity to do so. Yet 37% declared that they have the desire to leave temporarily for work and/or study outside the Palestinian Territories .

- The results indicate that those polled in the Gaza Strip demonstrated a higher readiness for permanent or temporary emigration than those polled in the West Bank .

- The desire for permanent emigration is highest among youth ages 18-27 (25%) and men are more willing to emigrate (24%), compared with women (12%).

3. Education: High satisfaction with performance of educational institutions, but concern about high costs

3-1: Assessment of Palestinian Education

- 52% of those polled expressed their satisfaction as to the educational process in Palestine , 29% said they are somewhat satisfied, while 18% expressed dissatisfaction.

- 58% of those polled believed that schools in Palestine perform the role required of them, and 59% of those polled said that Palestinian universities also perform the role required of them.

- 56% of those polled declared that they have some knowledge about school curricula, while only 49% of those who have some knowledge considered them to be good curricula.

- 70% of those polled believed that education in Palestine is developing in a good manner.

3-2: Material Resources and Education

- 55% of those polled declared that their households are unable financially to provide for the appropriate education needed for their children.

- 62% of those polled agreed to the following opinion: "The costs of school education are heavy for their households".

- 74% of those polled supported the same opinion regarding university education.

3-3: Attitudes Regarding the Educational Process

- 93% of the Palestinian households polled considered education to be a main priority for their households.

- 72% of them expressed their agreement to the directives issued by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education prohibiting corporal punishment in schools.

- 66% agreed to the following opinion: "Had I the material capability, I would have sent my children to private schools".

- 77% considered university education to be expensive.

- 78% of those polled disagreed with the opinion that schooling for boys is preferred over schooling for girls.

- 54% of those polled declared they do not desire to educate their children in universities outside Palestine .

4. Performance of the Palestinian Government: Negative Public Evaluation

The general attitude of those polled regarding Mr. Ahmad Qurei and his government was generally negative, with respondents citing major shortcomings on a number of issues. They also indicated that the government has limited powers, and expressed their aspiration to have changes among government members and senior officials at the helm of government authorities.

- 40% of those polled evaluated the performance of Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmad Qurei as poor, representing a tangible increase in dissatisfaction (of about 7%) compared to those who evaluated his performance three months earlier in the June 7th, 2004 poll. In this round, 24% of those polled evaluated his performance as average, and 20% evaluated it as good.

- 47% of those polled evaluated the performance of the current government as poor (compared to 36% three months earlier, which means an increase in negative evaluation of 11%), 24% evaluated it as average, and 16% evaluated it to be good.

- When specific issues were raised, the results reflected an additional drop in the evaluation of the Palestinian public as to government performance, with the majority of those polled evaluating such performance to be poor.

- A government with no powers: About 55% of those polled believed that the current government does not have sufficient powers to solve the above problems, while 19% believed that it has sufficient powers to do so.

- The need to introduce changes in senior posts in the PNA: The majority of the Palestinian public (71%) believed there is a need to carry out changes in ministerial positions and among those at the helm of main government authorities.

- The PA is not serious in its anti-corruption measures: 68% of those polled believed that the PA is not doing all it could do to address the problem of corruption in its institutions.

5. Priorities

- The poll indicated that the main priority for the current government should be "improving the economic situation", as declared by 35% of those polled, followed by 18% "providing internal security", and 8% for "reducing unemployment". The results also pointed to other priorities.

6. Palestinian Internal Conditions: Lack of Security and Demands for Reform

6-1 : Attitudes of the Palestinian public on recent calls for reform : High support among the Palestinian public for demands for reform, despite suspicions as to how sincere the advocates may be.

- Wide-scale popular support for demands for reform: 72% of those polled support the calls for reform, launched by persons from the ranks of the PA, while 21% of those polled rejected these calls. Support for these demands increased in the Gaza Strip to reach 80%, compared to 72% in the West Bank .

- Concern as to the sincerity of such positions coming from personalities and forces from the ranks of the PA. The views of the Palestinian public are divided as to how serious the advocates of reform from inside the ranks of the PA are, as 38% of those polled believed in the sincerity of these calls, while 40% did not believe in their sincerity, and 22% did not express an opinion.

- 57% of those polled stated that the real motive behind the calls for reform launched from among the ranks of the PA reflect their personal interests, while 27% of those polled believed that these demands were in the service of the public good.

- The PA is not serious in its measures to introduce reforms: 52% of those polled said the PA is not serious in its reforms, while 37% believed otherwise.

- Within the same context, 40% of those polled believed that President Arafat is serious in the commitment he made before the PLC in August 2004 to implement comprehensive reforms, while 27% believed he was somewhat sincere, and 28% believed he was not sincere.

6-2 The attitudes of the Palestinian public towards the methods used to express the demands for reform : The majority of the Palestinian public opposed any resort to force to express demands or protests, and expressed the greatest opposition to any attempts to kidnap foreigners. On the other hand, peaceful demonstrations were the most acceptable method of protest. Those polled expressed their concerns over the dangers of resorting to force as an expression of differences within Palestinian society.

- The highest opposition was expressed to any form of injury to foreigners in Palestinian territories, with 85% opposing the kidnapping of foreigners working in Palestinian territories.

- 82% of those polled regarded the kidnapping of Palestinians close to PA circles to be an unacceptable method.

- 80% of those polled opposed any harm to public property or PA offices.

- 77% of those polled opposed armed demonstrations as a method of protest.

- The greatest support (90%) was for peaceful demonstrations as a method acceptable to express the demands for reforms.

- The majority of the Palestinian public believed that recent events pointed to internal strife: 68% of those polled said that recent inter-Palestinian events point to internal strife, while 27% believed these events can not be regarded as an indication of potential internal strife.

7. The Peace Process: Increased Support for Negotiations with Israel

Substantial increase in the rate of support for resumption of negotiations with Israel : The majority of those polled (63%) supported the resumption of negotiations, while 34% opposed it. It should be noted that there is a substantial increase in the percentage of those supporting the resumption of negotiations with Israel , compared to 45% of those polled in June 2004.

For more details, please see Poll # 19 at: http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/opinionpolls/poll19/

Or contact Dr. Nader Said , Director, mobile # 059-204527, Mr. Ayman Abdelmajeed, Research coordinator at the listed numbers: Tel: (972)-2-2959250 Fax: (972)-2-2958117 Ramallah P.O.Box 1878 Homepage: http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp e-mail: dsp@birzeit.edu