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Wednesday, 3 July. 2024
 
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Egypt’s Role in the Gaza Disengagement Plan

The head of Egyptian Intelligence, Omar Suleiman, is perhaps a man of some privilege, for he is the only foreign official to have met with both Arafat and Sharon (and their attendant retinue of advisers and ministers), in one visit, in one day (the meetings were, of course, held separately, in Ramallah and Tel Aviv yesterday). While Egypt’s potential role in Sharon’s unilateral “Gaza Disengagement Plan” is nearly as controversial as the plan itself, it has become harder for all parties to deny Egypt’s increasing relevance not only to the plan but also to the future resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This, perhaps, is a quiet triumph for Egypt, which has long been considered by both parties as an unsuitable and, worse, self-interested mediator. However, the path ahead for Egyptian diplomacy, yesterday’s high-level meetings notwithstanding, continues to be fraught with contention.

Ten Palestinian groups (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular and Democratic Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine; Fatah, notably, disassociated itself from this group) issued a strongly-worded statement prior to the meeting between Arafat and Suleiman rejecting any “security role” for Egypt or any other Arab party in the Gaza and the West Bank, on the grounds that “our people expect the Arab nation to act according to the logic of supporting the Palestinians and not the logic of ‘security.’” Any references to ‘security,’ according to the statement, are tantamount to accepting that the problem “is the Palestinian people and not the occupation.” Another charge leveled by these groups against the Egyptian proposal (that seeks, among other things, to introduce approximately 200 Egyptian security “advisers” into Gaza pending a full withdrawal of the Israeli military forces from the region), is that such a move would amount to a “guardianship that will turn the Palestinians into apprentices,” and that would eventually serve only to “further sinister Israeli goals in the West Bank and Gaza.”

Egypt’s intentions are particularly under scrutiny given the stern conditions and timeline imposed by Suleiman yesterday on Arafat: two months to “institute reforms” in all Palestinian security organizations, and two months to appoint senior officials to assume security responsibility for Gaza. The lack of precisely such reforms in the Palestinian security establishment has repeatedly been used by both Israel and the US as a justification to discredit Arafat and to thereby discontinue talks with him. Arafat, for his part, has openly praised what he calls “Egypt’s support for the Palestinians”, and responded to concerns about an “Egyptian security role” in Gaza by saying “we asked our Egyptian brothers to help us stop this destruction of our country by the Israeli occupation.” Despite these warm words, Palestinian sources said yesterday that the meeting was tense and confrontational, and it is unclear to what extent and by which time Arafat will instate the reforms demanded of him by Egypt. It is also clear that Arafat will continue to view Egypt not as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but rather as a party who is “on our side,” a role to which Egypt, it would seem, no longer wishes to limit itself.

Arafat’s dismissal of Egypt’s role as a mediator might, unsurprisingly enough, be the sole point of agreement between him and Sharon. For while Sharon has openly welcomed the Egyptian initiative, and while Israeli government sources have deemed it both “serious and ambitious,” Sharon himself has made clear that “while we attach vast importance to Egyptian activity in the Gaza Strip and along the border, I don’t intend to allow Egypt to become a mediator between Israelis and Palestinians.” He also said, after his meeting with Suleiman yesterday, that Israel would not allow Egypt to raise the issue of Israeli-Palestinian talks in Gaza, or of comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The disengagement plan, he confirmed, would remain unilateral. According to Sharon, “renewing negotiations with the Palestinians via Egyptian mediation would thwart the disengagement plan and endanger the internationally backed road map to peace.” (He did not, unfortunately, explain why this should be so). As is clear from these statements, Sharon, not unlike Arafat, sees Egypt’s role in Israel’s “disengagement” from Gaza as being far more limited than that envisioned by Egypt itself.

Just as the meeting between Arafat and Suleiman was criticized by several Palestinian factions for having sinister intentions and potentially damaging consequences, the meeting between Sharon and Suleiman was similarly criticized by several Israeli notables, chief among them Benjamin Netanyahu, who questioned the wisdom of allowing Egypt to play any role at all in Israel’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza. “I don’t think that any of us can promise that the Gaza Strip won’t be filled with rockets and other weapons that will threaten all the cities of Israel,” Netanyahu said, “I think that leaning on Egypt is very problematic, very questionable.”

While Sharon dismissed such criticism by announcing, on Israel Radio yesterday, that the Egyptians “aren’t speaking Palestinian anymore,” it remains unclear to what extent Israel will ultimately accept any Egyptian role in the proceedings, and if Sharon will accept any of the conditions placed on Israel by Egypt, i.e., that of a complete withdrawal of all Israeli military forces from the Gaza prior to the introduction of “Egyptian security advisers,” and the establishment of an international force (including Egyptian and Palestinian soldiers but excluding all Israeli soldiers) to control Gaza’s seaport and airport.

Another point of contention between Egypt and Israel that is unlikely to be resolved soon is Egypt’s opposition to the Israeli-planned construction of a ditch along the Philadelphi route. As far as Egypt is concerned, “If this is full withdrawal,” as Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Maher said yesterday, “then it is not logical to speak of a ditch or any other arrangements that are opposed to the principle of full withdrawal… After their withdrawal, what happens on the border will not be Israel’s business.” Israel, on the other hand, continues to maintain that such a ditch is essential to its security, and, as a senior diplomat in Jerusalem said yesterday, “we will not agree to any such conditions… if terrorism continues in the Gaza Strip, we will continue operating there and will not tie our hands.”

Despite this week’s determined shuttle diplomacy, thus, it is doubtful whether Egypt achieved much. While Suleiman was warmly welcomed by both Arafat and Sharon, he received no concrete assurances on his plans and conditions from either side, and the future of Gaza, and that of its suffering population, remains, at best, uncertain. Can Egyptian diplomacy ensure in Gaza a complete Israeli withdrawal (including the strategic Philadelphi route), a comprehensive reformation of the Palestinian security forces (which would include Arafat’s relinquishing of control), the introduction of 200 Egyptian “security advisors,” and the establishment of an international Egyptian and Palestinian dominated security force in full control of Gaza’s air and sea ports? Leaving alone for the strict timelines insisted upon by the Egyptians, will Israel and Palestine even accept these as legitimate goals? And will Egypt emerge, over the next few weeks, as the guarantor of a just and legitimate peace? Or has this week witnessed yet another fruitless attempt at creating timelines, plans and conditions that are not quite worth the paper they’re written on?

Only time will tell if Egypt can be accepted by both sides as the just mediator it seems to want to be, or if it will continue to be perceived by all concerned as a self-interested meddler who contributes nothing to a just peace. And time, it is hoped, will side with justice.

 
 
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