The American-cum-Quartet draft road map for a permanent two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has already come up against its major Israeli roadblocks.

Beyond Sharon's initial dismissive attitude, Israeli responses have ranged from a total rejection of the June 4, 1967 borders, to the negation of the establishment of the Palestinian state, to the refusal to cease settlement activities and dismantle any settlements, to the rejection of any binding timetables, to the elimination of any aspect of monitoring or third party involvement, to further demands and preconditions specifically designed to abort the initiative (including collection of Palestinian weapons, arrest of "suspects," the total cessation of "violence," the political "elimination" of President Arafat, comprehensive Palestinian "reform," among other dictates).

By now, Israeli tactics have become all too familiar. After sabotaging the substance, Israel proceeds to raise procedural and technical objections with the aim of prolongation and obfuscation. Thus with the parties totally bogged down in micromanaging the most obscure detail and side issue, Israel buys more time to create more facts to render the whole exercise entirely irrelevant.

In the meantime, the US would have bought the artificial "calm" it needs to carry out its regional designs (beginning with Iraq) and placating the Arab world by creating the impression of "engagement" and commitment to the implementation of the presidential "vision" of a two-state solution.

Meanwhile, Israel is off the hook, continuing its business-as-usual policy of studied cruelty against and systematic destruction of Palestinian reality and lives while voraciously gobbling up more land and feeding the settlers' insatiable appetite for intimidation, violence, and expansion.

Regardless of the motivation and/or obstructionism, the road map requires a serious Palestinian assessment and response from the conceptual, procedural, and substantive point of view.

Conceptually, the plan still assumes that gradualism in the form of a phased approach is capable of designing a process that can produce results. Past experience has provided us with sufficient evidence that the failure of the peace process was due in large part to its non-incremental gradualism that allowed for prolongation and stalling while giving the powerful party time and opportunity to create facts that would undermine the objective. Only an acceleration of the timeframe would prevent the negative exploitation of the time bought by Israel by deliberate obstructionism.

This is especially true of a process that is "Performance-Based" instead of relying on clear and objective criteria, requirements, and timelines. Given the asymmetry of power, Israel will continue to hamper Palestinian "performance" by using its unhampered military power to create insurmountable obstacles and to provoke extreme responses and reactions. A clear example is Israel's use of the policy of assassination to create further instability, violence, a sense of victimization, and a cycle of lawlessness and revenge. A performance- driven road map will lead only in the direction of an Israeli-driven disaster.

Combined with conditionality, especially as defined by the Israeli occupation, the process becomes subject to an endless reservoir of Israeli preconditions that are essentially impossible to fulfill, given the fact that Israel can pursue a policy of destroying precisely those conditions that would prevent Palestinian "compliance." The repeated assaults on the Palestinian leadership, and the presidency in particular, with arrogant attempts at "delegitimizing" or rendering "irrelevant" the elected leader of the Palestinians are the most blatant evidence of such tactics. Combined with the policy of siege, humiliation, and deprivation the conditions of "acquiescence" become entirely unattainable.

The disparity in conditions and lack of parity in framing the rights and responsibilities of both parties stem from ignoring the culpability of the occupation (hence the occupying party) in the first place. The unbridled use of force by the Israeli occupation forces and the inherent racism in the mentality of subjugation has rendered reciprocity completely inapplicable and unfair. Never before has the victim been held accountable for the conditions of his/her own victimization while the perpetrator's demands become the criteria for gauging the victim's behavior. "Self defense" for the occupation is an oxymoron, in the same way as "blaming the victim" is unjust and illogical. Violence against civilians is morally reprehensible and repugnant regardless of the identity of the perpetrator, but it becomes even more so when the act of commission is a result of official government policy in "defense" of an indefensible occupation and is being carried out against a whole captive and defenseless occupation. Thus demanding "normalcy" in the midst of a situation of abnormality becomes a flight of fancy.

Furthermore, the glaring lack of arbitration and clearly defined mechanisms of accountability would render the role of third parties largely symbolic, hence ineffective. The Quartet is given the role of facilitating Palestinian reform, elections, and Palestinian-Israeli security cooperation and coordination, while it is instructed to establish a "monitoring mechanism" (phase I, second stage) to be "enhanced" in "monitoring transition" in phase II. Both International Conferences (phase II and III) are to be convened by the Quartet; the first is for the purpose of supporting Palestinian "economic recovery" and to launch bilateral negotiations "on the possibility of a state with provisional borders"; the second is designed to "endorse" bilateral agreements and to launch further bilateral negotiations "toward a final, permanent status resolution in 2005."

Both the timing and the unspecified mandate of the "monitoring mechanism" betray a feeble effort at doing too little too late. The rapidly deteriorating situation on the ground, the entrenchment of violence and extremism, and the loss of confidence with an increase in hostility and distrust, all require immediate and effective concrete engagement in the field. With "occupation on the rampage" being reinstated as the norm, and with the "security fence" (along with feverish settlement expansion) creating an apartheid situation in the projected Palestine, the most appropriate separation and de-escalation mechanism becomes the deployment of fully empowered international forces in the occupied territory. The dual objective of devolution of occupation and evolution of statehood requires direct third party supervision and viable involvement with a mandate for arbitration and accountability.

Clearly, the logic of the previous peace process has proved to be a failure, not least in its insistence on bilateralism as a means of "conflict resolution" in a situation of such glaring power bias and disequilibrium. If multilateralism is the global mechanism for collective responsibility, particularly in peace-making and in ensuring a global rule of law, then the "monitoring mechanism" of the road map must embody such an approach both in form and in substance. Such logic requires rethinking the Quartet (and its selective partners in the "octet" and the Arab addenda). The UN must remain the reference to (not the partner of) state and multi-state actors; full Arab partnership must be ensured throughout (and not just in a perfunctory and occasional manner); and behavior on the ground must be subject to scrutiny and immediate intervention.

In this way, the micromanagement of and interference in Palestinian realities would become legitimate as a form of positive intervention in an ongoing conflict that is rapidly spiraling out of control and in engineering a workable and fair solution. Thus violations of Palestinian democracy and negative intervention in internal realities in such issues as ignoring presidential elections and insisting on an "empowered Prime Minister" would be avoided and left to the independent domestic agenda and requirements. Similarly (and without addressing all the minute details of Palestinian institution-building and reform), the narrow and specific focus on "legal reform," constitutional commission, Election Commission, restructuring of security forces, travel of Palestinian officials, etc. would be replaced with the more expansive approach of providing the proper conditions for the Palestinians to engage in a nation building process unfettered by Israeli impediments and sequential conditionality. The Palestinian constituency for peace and democracy must be empowered by democratic means.

Israel, on the other hand, and as the occupying power, must be held accountable in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Conventions and other relevant international charters and agreements. Means of enforcement rather than abstract questions of applicability are the real issue. Israel's implementation of UN resolutions (for example, withdrawal in accordance with UNSC resolutions 1402, 1403, and 1435) are issues of immediate compliance rather than persuasion and rewards. Selectivity in citing the Tenet work plan and the Mitchell report (however inadequate) will also become an encouragement for further Israeli contempt and non-compliance.

The most dangerous implications of this approach are in its handling of the Israeli settlement policy. Although numerous UN resolutions and international conventions and agreements (and even American statements) have repeatedly designated settlements as being "illegal" and an "obstacle to peace," nevertheless Israel has been allowed to pursue its settlement building, subsidizing and expansion unchecked. With the violence and lawlessness of the settlers and with the fragmentation of Palestinian territory and the extraterritoriality inherent in the "by-pass roads," Israel is not only escalating the conflict; it is making the solution impossible. By asking Israel to dismantle "settlement outposts erected since the establishment of the present Israeli government" (phase I, first stage), then to "freeze all settlement activity consistent with the Mitchell report (phase I, second stage), then to carry out "further action on settlements simultaneous with establishment of Palestinian state with provisional borders (phase II), the road map allows for sufficient prolongation to enable Israel to destroy any chance of a two-state solution or a just peace. The charade of disappearing/reappearing outposts attests to the inadvisability of beginning confrontation over isolated and minor locations when the massive settlements are the ones that should be addressed first. Any "freeze," of course, will be met with the same disdain disregard as sealed the fate of the Mitchell report. Finally, the vague language on "further action" certainly affords Israel the opportunity to abort any final agreement.

Prejudicial and illegal Israeli measures in Jerusalem also require firm and immediate intervention pertaining to the siege and isolation, settlement activity, closure of Palestinian institutions, home demolition, withholding of building permits for Palestinians, and ID confiscation. By restricting all mention of Jerusalem to the reopening of "East Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian economic institutions," the road map makes sure that there will be no "East Jerusalem" to speak of once permanent status talks are launched in phase III and with the convening of the second International Conference. By that time, the historical, political, cultural, demographic, and territorial identity of East Jerusalem would have been distorted beyond recognition-and certainly beyond its designated role as capital of Palestine.

The state with "provisional borders," while a unique invention, still offers no promise and no guarantees that the interim would not become permanent. Sharon has openly "accepted" the idea of a Palestinian "entity" (call it what you will) on 42% of the West Bank (minus Jerusalem) and Gaza with a possibility of an additional 6-8% in final status. Unless the road map clearly spells out the June 4, 1967 borders as being the boundaries of the Palestinian state, the whole exercise runs the risk of generating further conflict and serving Sharon's plans of further land theft and expansionism.

While the preamble laudably refers to clear principles, criteria, UN resolutions, and agreements as the foundations of the road map, it is not clear that the mechanisms themselves are consistent with these references. "The settlement [that] will end the occupation began in 1967" may do so by restoring the land to its rightful Palestinian owners, by allowing for Israeli annexation of the land, or by a combination of both. However, taken in their entirety, the terms of reference as a whole must be translated to shape the conduct and outcome of negotiations. It cannot be acceptable to revert to the tired dictum that anything the parties agree to will be considered an implementation of the relevant resolution. Nor are resolutions to be interpreted and/or amended to suit the stronger party. The Arab initiative contains within it a comprehensive and legal formula for an acceptable settlement, and can thus serve as the touchstone for any solution.

The vast majority of the Palestinian people remain committed to a peaceful resolution and to the two-state solution despite the Israeli government's persistent attempts to destroy both. These options, however, are rapidly becoming unattainable if the current conditions are allowed to continue and to deteriorate. Already voices calling for the one-state solution, whether in the form of a bi-national state or a secular democratic state, are gaining support and credibility. If the current hard line government in Israel persists in its destructive policies and measures, such a solution will become the only option as the de facto outcome of its extremism. The other side of the coin of "Greater Israel" replacing all of historical Palestine (and more) is that of "One Palestine." In the meantime, the painful suffering and tragic loss of life will continue, while both peoples and the whole region are made to pay the price of Sharon's revival of Zionist fundamentalism.

To see the U.S. Road Map Draft click below:
http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=1220&CategoryId=10

DRAFT 10/15/02

The following are elements of a performance-based plan, under the supervision of the Quartet, with clear phases and benchmarks leading to a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli - Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented in President Bush's speech of 24 June, and welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the 16 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial statements. Such a settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and it other neighbors. The settlement will end the occupation that began in 1967, based on the Madrid Conference terms of reference and the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the Arab initiative proposed by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and endorsed by the Arab Summit in Beirut.

Phase I: October 2002-May 2003 (Transformation/Elections)

First stage: October-December, 2002

* Quartet develops detailed roadmap, in consultation with the parties, to be adopted at December Quartet/AHLC meeting.

* Appointment of new Palestinian cabinet, establishment of empowered Prime Minister, including any necessary Palestinian legal reforms for this purpose.

* PLC appoints Commission charged with drafting of Palestinian constitution for Palestinian statehood.

* PA establishes independent Election Commission. PLC reviews and revises election law.

* AHLC Ministerial launches major donor assistance effort.

* Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate end to the armed Intifada and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.

* In coordination with the Quartet, implementation of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S. - Egypt - Jordan).

-- Palestinian Security organizations are consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.

-- Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts begin phased resumption of security cooperation and other undertakings as agreed in the Tent work plan, including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials.

* GOI facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC sessions, internationally supervised security retraining, and other PA business without restriction.

* GOI implements recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions, including lifting curfews and easing movement between Palestinian areas.

* GOI ends actions undermining trust, including attacks in civilian areas, and confiscation/demolition of Palestinian homes/property, deportations, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction.

* GOI immediately resumes monthly revenue clearance process in accordance with the agreed transparency monitoring mechanism. GOI transfers all arrears of withheld revenues to Palestinian Ministry of Finance by end of December 2002, according to specific timeline.

* Arab states move decisively to cut off public/private funding of extremist groups, channel financial support for Palestinians through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance.

* GOI dismantles settlement outposts erected since establishment of the present Israeli government and in contravention of current Israeli government guidelines.

Second Stage: January-May 2003

* Continued Palestinian political reform to ensure powers of PLC, Prime Minister, and Cabinet.

* Independent Commission circulates draft Palestinian constitution, based on strong parliamentary democracy, for public comment/debate.

* Devolution of power to local authorities through revised Municipalities Law.

* Quartet monitoring mechanism established.

* Palestinian performance on agreed judicial. Administrative and economic benchmarks, as determined by Task Force.

* As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000. Withdrawal to be completed before holding of Palestinian elections. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.

* GOI facilitates Task Force election assistance, registration of voters, movement of candidates and voting officials.

* GOI reopens East Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian economic institutions in East Jerusalem.

* Constitution drafting Commission proposes draft document for submission after elections to new PLC for approval.

* Palestinians and Israelis conclude a new security agreement building upon Tenet work plan, including an effective security mechanism and an end to violence, terrorism, and incitement implemented through a restructured and effective Palestinian security service.

* GOI freezes all settlement activity consistent with the Mitchell report, including natural growth of settlements.

* Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections for PLC.

* Regional support: Upon completion of security steps and IDF withdrawal to September 26, 2000 positions, Egypt and Jordan return ambassadors to Israel.

Phase II: June 2003 - December 2003 (Transition)

Progress into Phase II will be based upon the judgment of the Quartet, facilitated by establishment of a permanent monitoring mechanism on the ground, whether conditions are appropriate to move on - taking into account performance of all parties and Quartet monitoring. Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends with possible creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders by end of 2003.

* International Conference: Convened by the Quartet, in agreement with the parties, immediately after the successful conclusion of Palestinian elections to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians on the possibility of a state with provisional borders.

-- Such a meeting would be inclusive, based on the goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace (including between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon), and based on the described principles described in the preamble to this document.

-- Other pre-Intifada Arab links to Israel restored (trade offices, etc.).

-- Revival of "multilateral talks" (regional water, environmental, economic development, refugee, arms control issues).

* Newly elected PLC finalizes and approves new constitution for democratic, independent Palestinian state.

* Continued implementation of security cooperation, complete collection of illegal weapons, disarm militant groups, according to Phase I security agreement.

* Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at creation of a state with provisional borders. Implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial contiguity.

* Conclusion of transitional understanding and creation of state with provisional borders by end of 2003. Enhanced international role in monitoring transition.

* Further action on settlements simultaneous with establishment of Palestinian state with provisional borders.

Phase III: 2004 - 2005 (Statehood)

Progress into Phase III, based on judgment of Quartet, taking into account actions of all parties and Quartet monitoring.

* Second International Conference: Convened by the Quartet, with agreement of the parties, at beginning of 2004 to endorse agreement reached on state with provisional borders and to launch negotiations between Israel and Palestine toward a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees and settlements; and, to support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.

* Continued comprehensive, effective progress on the reform agenda laid out the Task Force in preparation for final status agreement.

* Continued sustained, effective security cooperation based on security agreements reached by end of Phase I and other prior agreements.

* Arab stats acceptance of normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region, consistent with Beirut Arab Summit initiative.

To view Hanan Ashrawi's comments on the Road Map click below:
http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=1195&CategoryId=1

Talk and declarations have more influence than facts and actions on the ground. This can be seen once again in the contradictory reactions - furious or welcoming - to the government's approval of the road map and to the fire-breathing statements by Ariel Sharon that it's wrong to rule over 3.5 million Palestinians, that occupation is not good, that there's no alternative but to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The facts on the ground, which don't create as strong an impression as the rhetoric, are established every day. The facts are called the separation fence and security fences around settlements, security roads and bypass roads that continue to cut off the Palestinian villages from each other and the villages from their land, and construction in the settlements that were already vastly expanded during the Oslo era to the point where they constitute about half the total area of the West Bank.

These facts are determining - and will continue to determine - the area where the road map will be applied, the area where the entity known as the "Palestinian state" will be established. A visit to the area, where the Public Works Commission, the Defense Ministry, Housing Ministry and the IDF bulldozers are busy at work, makes it possible to see why it's easy for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to talk about a "Palestinian state."

A consulting team from the Palestinian negotiations department has drawn up a future map, based on these facts on the ground. The team will give it to the ambassadors and envoys who are so enthusiastic about Sharon's statements.

According to the facts on the ground, the "state" will apparently be comprised of three enclaves cut off from one another inside the West Bank - in addition to the Gazan enclave, and with no guarantee the settlements inside the enclave will be dismantled. The "separation fence" has been described as "temporary," but it is a wall with hefty fortifications taking up a lot of land, and it has already scarred the Tul Karm-Qalqiliyah area, the most prosperous Palestinian farmland, thus sabotaging one of the cornerstones of Palestinian economic security.

The massive construction in Jerusalem and its environs, from Bethlehem to Ramallah, and the Dead Sea to Modi'in, has already ruled out any Palestinian urban, industrial or cultural development worthy of the name in the area of East Jerusalem. The southern enclave of the West Bank, from Hebron to Bethlehem, will be cut off from the central enclave of the Ramallah area by an ocean of manicured Israeli settlements, tunnel roads and highways. The northern enclave, from Jenin to Nablus, will be cut off from the center by the massive settlement bloc of Ariel-Eli-Shiloh.

Presumably Sharon's intentions for an eastern separation fence will also come into being - after all, his talk about a state is more persuasive to the American administration than the land Israel continues to effectively expropriate from the Palestinians. The Jordan Valley will remain outside the Palestinian state, and between it and the divided Palestinian "state" there will be settlements with tiny populations and enormous land reserves, like Itamar, Nokdim and Tekoah, as well as huge settlements like Ma'aleh Adumim.

Last Friday, Yedioth Ahronoth's weekend magazine published a useful report for all those who never go to the territories, detailing the long-term significance of the separation fence, accompanied by a map that bears a striking resemblance to the map prepared by the Palestinians.

There have already been many reports about how tens of thousands of villagers have been cut off from their lands, how some villages have been imprisoned between the two sides of the "fence," and how Qalqiliyah has been cut off entirely. There have also been reports about how the separation fence is constantly being moved eastward, by settler demand. But the Yedioth reporter, Meron Rapaport, went a step further, asking key people in the settlements about those facts.

According to the quotes from Ariel Mayor Ron Nahman, he has already seen the map of Palestinian enclaves being created by the fence: "That's the same map I've seen every time I've visited Arik [Sharon] since 1978. He told me he's been thinking about it since 1973."

A settler from Einav, referring to himself as "very right-wing," regards the fence as a disaster: "It's an economic death sentence for the Palestinians," Shmil Eldad told Rapaport. "There are people here who want to make a living and it's creating more hatred," he added.

But Moshe Immanuel from Salit justifies the fence: "The Palestinians lost in 1948 and 1967 and they will lose this time, too ... That's what happens, those who lose in war, lose."

David Levy, head of the Jordan Valley Regional Council, knows the fence will keep the area "inside," meaning inside Israel. He says he knows, on the basis of meetings with Sharon and maps Sharon has shown him.

The Palestinians are exhausted by the unequal struggle with Israel, which is a world-class military power. Maybe that's why, lacking any alternative, they might decide to accept the Bantustan state that is meant to absorb hundreds of thousands of refugees. The "closure camps" will nurture poverty and economic distress, without any room for development. Whether their children agree to continue living in "peace" in suffocating enclaves, is another question entirely.

Last week, Israel barred a UNESCO fact-finding mission from entering the country, charging that the Palestinians had ‘politicized’ the mission before it had even arrived. The mission was tasked with looking into conditions of historical sites in the Old City of Jerusalem, something Israel apparently found to be very threatening.

Looking at the state of Jerusalem’s eastern sector today, it is understandable why Israel would not want UNESCO or anyone else walking around the Old City, especially the Palestinian-populated parts of it. Because anyone who does, will see the devastation that Israel and its settlers have wreaked on one of the oldest and most beautiful cities in the world.

Excavation works are being conducted in and around the Aqsa Mosque to make way for more Jewish construction at the place where Waqf authorities say Ottoman and Abbasid artifacts have long been tucked away. A Muslim graveyard is being dug up just outside the Old City’s Jaffa Gate, to build – ironically – a museum of tolerance. Today, two stores were forcefully taken over by Jewish settlers in Al Hakari, one of the neighborhoods in the Muslim quarter and every day, it seems that more and more homes are either being demolished by Israeli municipality authorities or being taken over by Jewish settlers.

The “Judiazation” of Jerusalem is a term many Palestinians and Arabs use for what Israel is doing in the city. In a nutshell, it is the long-term plan Israel is gradually carrying out to change the Arab Palestinian character of Jerusalem. This means demolishing old and historical structures, displacing Palestinians, handing over their homes to settlers and trying to erase the Palestinian or Arab history of the city.

The sad truth is that, on the surface, Israel has succeeded in this to a large extent. Pockets of Jewish settlers now live in the heart of Muslim quarters and aim to take over more and more. Sheikh Jarrah, one of the more affluent Palestinian neighborhoods of Jerusalem, is now pierced with Jewish flags waving from homes that have been wrestled from their Palestinian owners, and Israel’s light rail train cuts right down through Palestinian neighborhoods outside of the city center. The train, of course, is not meant to service the Palestinian population but rather to connect Jewish neighborhoods and settlements in the city, but the area confiscated from Shufat and Beit Hanina for its construction simply fell into the plan.

What the UNESCO mission would not have seen even if they made it into the Old City is the overall humiliation that the Palestinian population of Jerusalem must endure on a daily basis because of Israel’s military occupation. Trips to the Israeli ministry of interior must be made just to prove that one lives in the city for fear that their residency rights may be revoked; young Palestinian men are stopped randomly by Israeli soldiers to check their ID cards or just to harass them, and settlers are always given the luxury of maximum security whenever they walk the streets. If settlers want to march through the city, the Palestinians are told to close their shops, are barred for hours from reaching their homes if they run along the path of the march and are always the ones blamed if any kind of confrontation between the two sides breaks out.

Jerusalem is being squeezed by these measures more and more each day. But there is always that glimmer of hope, that strength that shines through proving that all is not lost. On Shavuot, Israeli settlers and extremists poured into the Old City, singing loudly, banging on the shop doors and waving huge Israeli flags. The sight was disconcerting to say the least. However, the afternoon of that same day, at Damascus Gate, passersby were met with a completely different scene. Palestinian flags waved in determined Palestinian hands under the threatening eye of heavily armed Israeli police and soldiers. The youths were fearless, demanding freedom, with strong, unrelenting voices.

The sight of the Palestinian flag waving at the entrance to Damascus Gate was a breath of fresh air. All is not lost and never will be because hope is eternal and determination and strength come from a never-ending spring.

That day at Damascus Gate is what all Palestinians must keep in their minds’ eye in spite of the daily oppression of the occupation. No matter how many missions Israel bars from entering or how many houses it takes over, there will always be those brave souls who, despite the risks, will always raise Palestine’s flag.

Joharah Baker is a Writer for the Media and Information Department at the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH). She can be contacted at mid@miftah.org.

There is no point falling into the pit of countering the claims being made about the death of Mohammed Al Durra, the 12-year old boy from Gaza whose videotaped killing was seen around the world. The boy, crouching in fear behind is equally afraid father as bullets whizzed around them, was killed admittedly by the Israeli army. Later, the army recanted after investigating the tape, saying Durra was killed by Palestinian fire instead. Well now, Israel is changing its story altogether, saying he was not killed at all. In fact, he was probably not even wounded and the French channel that broadcast the footage and brought some pretty bad rap to Israel, had most likely filmed a charade.

The reason why I will not waste my time countering this claim is that even with the great lengths the Israeli government went to to prove that the boy was never killed, it could not provide any irrefutable proof that Mohammed Al Durra – who would be 25 now – is still alive. No pictures, no testimonies, no hospital or morgue officials giving statements to refute his death, have been provided. Only sketchy information about ‘poor quality footage’ and the fact that it seems as though the boy moved his arm after he had slumped over his father following the explosion.

My point is this: indeed, Mohammed Durra’s death was at least one of the catalysts that fueled the second Intifada, and thus, was an important event in the history of the Palestinians. However, more importantly – most importantly to me –is the fact that this is about a boy who died in sheer terror, with his distraught father futilely trying to shelter him from the barrage of bullets coming their way.

Mohammed Al Durra was a boy, with a life, a family and friends. He died a horrible death and now he is being made to die a second one. I did not know Mohammed or his family, but I can only imagine how awful it must be for them to read these claims now and feel the pain of losing their child all over again. If nothing else, this is disrespect for human life of the worst kind.

Some may postulate that the rehashing of the Durra case is a personal jab at the French cameraman who shot the footage, Charles Enderlin. Perhaps. But as a Palestinian who has seen the pain endured by numerous families who receive the horrible news that their sons or daughters have been killed by the Israeli army, my concern is for his family and for his memory. He should be left to rest in peace. If Israel has axes to grind with French journalists or with the international community for holding it accountable for its actions, then so be it. Israel is not lacking in the public relations department.

That being said, there is just one decent thing left to do. Leave Mohammed Al Durra and his memory alone.

Joharah Baker is a Writer for the Media and Information Department at the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH). She can be contacted at mid@miftah.org.

This week Palestinians will commemorate Al Nakba, the catastrophe that befell the Palestinian people when Israel was founded. Every year, Palestinians hang placards pointing to the right of return, they carry keys symbolizing the homes they were forced to leave and could not return to and remember the Palestine that was lost to them 65 years ago.

This year will be no different. Every May 15, Palestinian recall their catastrophe and demand justice. They demand that they are granted the right of return for those who were made refugees virtually overnight and were then relegate to a life they did not choose. But more than anything, they demand recognition of the tragedy that befell them rather than a denial that it ever happened, or worse, that it was of their own making.

It has been 65 years since Israel was established in 1948, which means those who were cast into exile are either very old or have long passed. Those who experienced the Nakba are now few and far between, clinging to those few precious memories of a small garden in front of their house in Jaffa or of the salty smell of the sea in their neighborhood in Haifa. The rest of us are either descendants of these refugees or ordinary Palestinians who feel their cause is our cause because we are one people.

But the Palestinians have made one thing clear. The refugee issue will not die with the last refugee. It is felt nationwide, the loss, the injustice and the fact that those who were forced from their homes have mostly passed, longing for their beloved homes.

We cannot turn back time. What was lost has been altered, destroyed, changed or taken over by Israel’s newcomers. What we can do is hold on to the right to be recognized, for the injustice to be rectified in word and deed and for Palestine to never be lost in our minds or hearts.

Joharah Baker is a Writer for the Media and Information Department at the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH). She can be contacted at mid@miftah.org.