Introduction

Palestinian women in Gaza are subjected to overlapping forms of violence by Israel that converge into a single, coherent structure of domination. Starvation, sexual and gender-based violence, and reproductive violence do not occur as isolated abuses, but as an interlocking system enacted simultaneously and reinforcing one another. These practices operate across psychological, social, and biological dimensions of harm. While Palestinian women’s bodies are the immediate site of this violence, its intended target is Palestinian society as a whole. By systematically targeting women, Israel undermines collective survival, erodes social cohesion, and attacks the continuity of Palestinian life itself. Taken together, these practices constitute a gendered architecture of genocide that must be recognized and addressed as such.

The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH) has documented these three crimes throughout Israel’s genocide in Gaza. Firsthand testimonies collected from the Gaza Strip and the occupied West Bank reveal the distinctly gendered impacts of these violations and their cumulative effects on Palestinian women.

I. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Sexual and gender-based violence is systematically instrumentalized by Israel as a means of humiliating and isolating Palestinian women while dismantling family and community bonds. These violations should not be understood as isolated or aberrational incidents, but rather as part of a broader historical pattern in which sexual violence has been deployed as a tool of terror and social control against the Palestinian population.

Historical records document that during the 1948 ethnic cleansing of historic Palestine, Zionist paramilitary forces including the Haganah engaged in acts of sexual violence alongside mass killings and expulsions of Palestinians. The Haganah later became the institutional foundation of the contemporary Israeli military. This historical continuity underscores how sexual violence has long functioned as a weapon of war, embedded within military practices aimed at terrorizing civilians and facilitating population displacement.

Testimonies collected by MIFTAH fieldworkers across the West Bank and Gaza Strip reveal recurring patterns. Arrests conducted in family homes routinely transform domestic spaces into sites of domination. Soldiers storm houses, often in the middle of the night, restrain family members, destroy personal belongings, steal valuables, and dictate all movement within the home. Male relatives are frequently forced to witness or participate in the abuse of female family members, a tactic designed to emasculate men and dismantle the household from within.

Sexual violence also functions as a form of psychological torture in Israeli detention and interrogation settings. Alongside sleep deprivation, starvation, and physical assault, sexual violence is deliberately employed to induce psychological breakdown and assert total control. Testimonies describe forced strip searches, removal of hijabs, invasive bodily touching, slut-shaming, and explicit threats of rape against detainees or their relatives . Testimonies collected by the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR) describe in detail the systematic use of secual torture in Israeil detention settings. Sexual violence is further enacted through blackmail, including the use of nude or indecent photographs taken during interrogation to coerce compliance or enforce silence. These practices aim to strip women of dignity, break them psychologically prior to or during interrogation, and inflict lasting harm that weakens their sense of self long after release.

The full extent of sexual violence against Palestinian women today remains difficult to quantify, as survivors rarely disclose sexual assault or rape causing underreporting to be widespread. This silence reflects structural, legal, and social barriers rather than the absence of abuse. Palestinian survivors of violence perpetrated by Israeli soldiers or settlers seldom pursue legal avenues due to the well-documented lack of accountability within Israeli law enforcement mechanisms, where investigations rarely result in prosecution or redress .

Social stigma also plays a role in silencing survivors. In a predominantly conservative social context, sexual violence carries stigma that extends beyond the survivor to her family and community. Israeli forces exploit this reality deliberately, using sexual violence and threats to women’s “honor” as mechanisms of coercion, intimidation, and social fragmentation. In this way, sexual violence operates not only as an assault on individual women, but as a strategic instrument of collective harm.

II. Reproductive Violence

Reproductive violence targets women’s capacity to give life through the systematic destruction of healthcare systems, maternity services, and the material conditions necessary for survival. It refers to deliberate actions intended to impair an entire population’s ability to reproduce and sustain itself. In Gaza, reproductive violence is not incidental to armed conflict; it is enacted through policy-driven destruction that reflects intentionality rather than collateral harm.

This violence is carried out through the systematic targeting of life-sustaining infrastructure, including hospitals, maternity wards, neonatal units, fertility clinics, and embryo preservation centers, as well as the blockade of medicines, medical equipment, and hygiene supplies. The consequences are visible in rising maternal mortality, increased miscarriages linked to malnutrition and extreme stress, untreated reproductive infections, and the repeated displacement of pregnant women seeking care within a collapsing healthcare system .

These measures directly undermine women’s ability to safely conceive, carry pregnancies to term, give birth, and raise children. Women’s reproductive health is further compromised by the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian aid and the collapse of sanitation and water infrastructure. The destruction of healthcare facilities, combined with ongoing bombardment and repeated displacement, has rendered movement dangerous and unpredictable, making access to medical care nearly impossible and severely limiting the ability of humanitarian organizations to provide reproductive and maternal health services.

As a result, there has been a sharp increase in preventable reproductive health complications. Women report rising cases of fever linked to untreated vaginal infections caused by inadequate hygiene and the absence of feminine hygiene products, as well as unnecessary hysterectomies . Women using intrauterine devices experience prolonged bleeding and infections due to unsanitary living conditions, yet no options for safe removal currently exist in Gaza, posing serious long-term risks to reproductive health and bodily integrity . Women have also been forced to undergo emergency hysterectomies to control excessive post- partum bleeding that could not be managed due to the lack of healthcare.

Reproductive violence in Gaza is therefore both biological and symbolic. It constitutes an assault on the present population and on the possibility of future generations. The objective of preventing Palestinian continuity is further evidenced by the sustained and disproportionate killing of children, who have consistently been the most targeted demographic group throughout the genocide. This killing is reinforced by an ideological framework that dehumanizes Palestinian women and children. Public statements by Israeli political and military officials have repeatedly framed the killing of women and children as militarily justified . Within this logic, women are targeted not for their actions, but for their reproductive capacity and their role in sustaining Palestinian continuity. Such rhetoric has informed and legitimized military operations in Gaza. Throughout the genocide, civilian spaces including schools, homes, and hospitals, have been deliberately targeted as a matter of state policy. These are precisely the spaces where women and children sought refuge. The systematic killing and endangerment of women and children is not a secondary effect of warfare but a central component of the broader genocidal strategy.

III. Starvation as a Weapon of Genocide

Another grave factor to the reproductive health of women in Gaza has been starvation. Prolonged malnutrition, combined with physical exhaustion, repeated displacement, and lack of healthcare infrastructure, have contributed to increased miscarriages, loss of amniotic fluid, and heightened maternal mortality . Numerous women have reported using prenatal supplements distributed by humanitarian organizations as meal substitutes for themselves or their families, or exchanging them for food and essential supplies. Breastfeeding has become increasingly difficult due to suppressed milk production associated with undernourishment, while infant formula remains largely inaccessible, placing newborns at heightened risk. Chronic stress and nutritional deprivation have also resulted in amenorrhea, fertility complications, and potential long-term reproductive harm.

For women in Gaza, starvation functions not only as a form of biological deprivation but as a structural assault on familial roles, social reproduction, and dignity. It undermines women’s capacity to fulfill caregiving responsibilities, destabilizes family life, and produces severe physical, reproductive, and psychological consequences. Women disproportionately experience the embodied impacts of hunger while simultaneously carrying the emotional labor associated with sustaining children and dependent family members.

Testimonies collected by MIFTAH from displaced women subjected to Israel’s forced starvation consistently begin with descriptions of pre-displacement life, including homes, employment, family routines, and domestic spaces. The loss of the home, particularly the kitchen, emerges as a recurrent theme, reflecting the erosion of women’s agency and identity. The destruction of homes and domestic spaces traditionally associated with women’s autonomy has contributed to a marked erosion of dignity and self-perception. Reported symptoms include anxiety, insomnia, hair loss, emotional dysregulation, and post-traumatic stress, with many women suppressing their own distress to maintain caregiving roles.

Repeated displacement has further exacerbated women’s vulnerability. Multiple forced relocations have resulted in the loss of personal possessions, kinship networks, and community-based support systems. Overcrowded shelters lack adequate privacy, sanitation, and safety, compelling women to manage childcare and food preparation under unsafe and degrading conditions. Everyday survival practices are thus shaped by constant exposure to risk and instability.

For women who serve as the primary caretakers of their families, providing for loved ones often comes at great personal risk. They are frequently reducing or skipping their own meals so that their children can eat, often continuing caregiving responsibilities despite severe physical exhaustion . In displacement, they prepare rudimentary meals using limited ingredients and improvised methods, such as cooking lentils over burning toxic materials like plastic. These practices function both as survival strategies and as efforts to maintain a sense of continuity and stability for children amid profound disruption. In these contexts, women disproportionately bear the responsibility of caring for sick, injured, or disabled family members, despite acute shortages of medical care, clean water, and shelter. Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions contribute to widespread illness, while attempts to obtain food or humanitarian assistance expose women and children to ongoing risks of injury or death.

Starvation has additionally intensified gendered pressures within households. Men’s inability to secure food or protection has been associated with increased psychological distress, thereby expanding women’s emotional and caregiving responsibilities. For women whose spouses have been killed, detained, or disappeared, starvation enforces sole provider roles under conditions that systematically undermine the possibility of survival.

Conclusion

MIFTAH has documented violations of sexual violence, reproductive violence, and starvation at various points during the genocide in Gaza. These violations, however, do not occur in isolation; they operate simultaneously, reinforcing and amplifying one another as part of a single system of control. Sexual violence isolates women from themselves and alienates them within their communities. Reproductive violence deliberately targets women because of their childbearing roles. Starvation acts as both a biological and psychological assault. Taken together, these crimes compound one another, deepening harm and undermining the survival of Palestinian women and their communities. A single woman may experience all three forms of violence, being violated in detention, displaced and denied healthcare, and later starved while unable to feed her children. Together, these crimes transform daily life into a persistent site of punishment. They attack the Palestinian female spirit, disrupt women’s societal roles, and, in doing so, fracture society across generations, making recovery increasingly difficult.

The failure to confront these violations reflects a long colonial history, in which the rhetoric of “saving women” was used to justify empire while violence against women perpetrated by colonial powers was silenced or dismissed. To resist normalization and impunity, these crimes must be recognized and addressed as mutually reinforcing acts of genocide. Understanding these violations as an interconnected system of oppression is essential to grasp their full impact on Palestinian society. These gendered crimes are not about women alone; they aim to dismantle the foundations of Palestinian life. Women are targeted not only as individuals but as mothers, community anchors, and bearers of generational continuity, while Palestinian society is systematically weakened and broken at its core.

Sources and References

Executive Summary

On 17 November 2025, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, establishing a new governance framework for Gaza. The resolution endorses U.S. President Donald Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict (CPEGC) and the creation of a transitional international administration through a U.S.-led Board of Peace (BoP) and authorizes an International Stabilization Force (ISF). Rather than ensuring Palestinian sovereignty, this framework transfers control of Gaza’s civil administration, security, reconstruction, borders, and humanitarian aid to external actors, entrenching foreign oversight and further consolidating Israeli dominance over the occupied Palestinian territory.

This resolution raises grave legal and political concerns. It departs from foundational principles of international law and undermines the Palestinian people’s inalienable right to self-determination. By providing no mechanisms for accountability for Israel’s documented violations, offering no concrete safeguards for Palestinian rights, and presenting an undefined framework with no clear timeline or benchmarks, Resolution 2803 risks perpetuating systemic injustices, enabling a reconfigured form of occupation, and further entrenching the colonial-style control already in place.

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Executive Summary

The outbreak of famine in the Gaza Strip has been a deliberate, man-made policy pursued by the Israeli government as part of its genocide. In August 2025, famine was declared by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) for the first time in the region.

Evidence gathered by MIFTAH through sworn testimonies from women and girls demonstrates that starvation in Gaza is not an unintended by-product of war, but a deliberate and systematic policy used to subjugate and besiege the civilian population.

MIFTAH’s report, “Famine and the Violation of the Right to Food,” outlines the intersection of starvation, displacement, and bombardment, highlighting the gender-specific impacts these practices have on women. It situates the famine within the framework of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide under international law. Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute defines as a war crime the act of “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.” The report also shows how the militarization of humanitarian aid and the manipulation of financial systems have turned basic survival into a tool of political coercion against Palestinians, especially women.

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Jerusalem, April 20, 2009 -- The World Bank published a report today entitled Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development. The report is the Bank’s first on the issue of water in the West Bank and Gaza (WBG). Together with two other recent reports, examining access to West Bank land and to telecommunication frequencies, it provides comprehensive insight into a critical, but largely unaddressed component of the economic restrictions impeding Palestinian economic development -- limited access to natural resources.

Noting the complete dependence of WBG on scarce water resources shared and largely controlled by Israel, the report finds that the joint governance rules and water allocations established under the 1995 Oslo interim agreement, still in effect today, fall short of the needs of the Palestinian people. Because of the imbalance in power, capacity and information between parties, interim governance rules and practices have resulted in systematic and severe constraints on Palestinian development of water resources, water uses, and wastewater management. Furthermore, since 2000, the Israeli-imposed movement and access restrictions, consisting of physical impediments, but also of permitting and decision-making practices, have further impaired Palestinian access to water resources, infrastructure development and utility operations.

When combined with governance and capacity weaknesses in Palestinian institutions, these rules and restrictions have resulted in an underdeveloped Palestinian water sector. Even though the PA and many donors have invested in establishing a sustainable and equitable water sector, access to water resources, water infrastructure and institutions remain inadequate. The sector continues to operate in a very inefficient emergency mode, with far reaching economic, social and environmental consequences. Water-related humanitarian crises are in fact chronic in Gaza and in parts of the West Bank.

Indeed, availability of water resources is highly disparate, with fresh water per capita in Israel approximately four times that of WBG. Whereas Israel has established efficient water infrastructure and management, the PA is struggling to attain the basic level of infrastructure and service of a low-income country. Water investment in WBG has dropped to very low levels, is fragmented and inefficient, and perpetuates low utility performance. In Gaza, marginal water and sanitation investment is contributing to an unchecked water quality crisis with severe public health and environmental impacts.

To begin ameliorating the situation, , the study recommends the adoption of an agenda that clearly addresses identified shortcomings in water resource development and management, a low and declining investment rate, and weak management of water services. This would require formulation of effective solutions to the following existing problems:

1. A joint governance system asymmetrical in power and capacity, which does not facilitate the rational planning and development of Palestinian water resources and infrastructure;
2. An investment environment that creates huge costs and delays;
3. Implementation restrictions that can make the movement of a single pipe a logistical and administrative challenge;
4. Weak institutional capacity of the PA and of most sector actors (such as operators and municipalities) for planning, implementation and management of water infrastructure;
5. Development partnerships that move uneasily between the political context and the development challenge and are often stuck in emergency rather than strategic mode.

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About the Report

The report was initiated at the request of the PA. Its goal is to develop a balanced analysis and to create awareness of the factors restricting West Bank and Gaza’s water sector development as well as of the economic, socio-political, and environmental impacts of such restrictions. It was conducted during Sept. 2008 and Feb. 2009, by a multi- disciplinary team of international and local experts on water resource management, water supply and sanitation, sociology, public policy and conflict, and involved consultations on process and findings with Palestinian and Israeli stakeholders. The target audience includes Palestinian and Israeli government officials, as well as the donor community and all stakeholders engaged in the water sector, including Palestinian water providers and users. The findings are also expected to be of immediate interest to the donors’ Ad Hoc Liaison Committee when it convenes this spring.

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1. The Quartet has stated that the Hamas movement must meet a number of basic political conditions, and has connected Hamas’ response to levels and forms of future donor assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA)1. The Government of Israel (GOI) has also indicated that it is not prepared to conduct political relations with Hamas unless it modifies its basic stance towards the State of Israel2.

The Evolving Economic Situation

2. In mid-March, the Bank modeled the impacts of a possible combination of actions by GOI and the donor community—see the Attachment. Readers are referred to Scenario 4, which assumed for 2006 the following:

• continued GOI withholding of Palestinian tax revenues collected on the PA’s behalf;
• border trade restrictions comparable to those enacted in 2005;
• a 50 percent reduction in the average 2005 level of daily labor flows into Israel from Gaza and the West Bank; and
• a reduction in donor disbursements of US$200 million, or 15 percent, as compared with last year.

3. Even with these restrained assumptions, the economy would experience a dramatic decline over the coming eight months: by the end of 2006, average personal income would decrease by 30 percent in real terms, unemployment would increase from the pre-election figure of c. 23 percent to about 40 percent, and poverty levels would climb from 44 percent last year to 67 percent.

4. Based on evolving GOI and donor policies, these projections now appear too rosy.

• Palestinian revenues continue to be withheld, though GOI has decided to use a portion of them to reimburse Israeli public sector providers for electricity, water and health referral services supplied to the PA3;
• Border trade restrictions are proving more stifling than in 2005, particularly in Gaza (where the border has been sealed to imports and exports for over a half of the year to date)4;
• Donor disbursements could well prove lower than projected: the suspension of direct transfers to the PA by OECD donors is being implemented more rapidly than the Bank anticipated;
• Commercial banks in West Bank and Gaza have been reminded of their potential legal liability under US anti-terror legislation, leading them to withhold services to the PA; this is impeding the PA’s ability to receive transfers of funds from abroad (in particular, from Arab League donors), and to operate an internal payments system5. Similar concerns have also led two major Israeli banks to announce that they will sever their relationship with Palestinian banks, and other Israeli banks are considering their position6.

5. The Bank’s recent projections will be revised in the forthcoming Economic Monitoring Note #2 using updated macroeconomic data, and in light of evolving developments. At the time of writing, though, the key aggregates seem likely to decline by several additional percentage points; this would make 2006, by a margin, the worst year in the West Bank and Gaza’s dismal recent economic history.

6. The recession has already begun, with March and April’s public sector salaries so far unpaid and with signs of food and gasoline shortages manifesting in Gaza, the result of faltering supply (due to persistent closure of the passages into Gaza)7. In early April, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) conveyed to Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs its concern at the early emergence of a supply-induced humanitarian crisis8. GOI, which is calibrating the flow of commodities into West Bank and Gaza, remains confident said that the situation is under control, and believes such claims to be exaggerated9.

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Foreword – The Context for this Report

The Rationale for Periodic Assessments

• The World Bank presented to the December 8, 2004 meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) a report (Stagnation or Revival? Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian Economic Prospects) which argued that rapid Palestinian economic revival is essential to sustaining the momentum of a renewed peace process, but that it will only come about if there is
  1. A drastic improvement in the security environment;
  2. A dismantling of the various post-September 28, 2000 restrictions on the movement of Palestinian people and goods; and
  3. Dynamic progress on Palestinian governance reform and institution-building.
• If these preconditions for economic revival emerge, it was argued, a major increase in donor assistance levels could have a transformational effect. In furtherance of this premise the Bank identified an agenda of key measures “which, if implemented, will lay the basis for the economic revival of the West Bank and Gaza” (see Annex 3). These measures are consistent with the obligations of the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority specified under Phase I of the Roadmap. As a corollary to this virtuous sequence, the Bank noted that a quantum increase in donor financing would be hard to justify if meaningful progress in security, closure and reform policy was not made—both because the impact of these resources would be seriously muted, and because the private sector response needed to sustain the impact of the additional spending would not emerge.
• The Bank’s report was endorsed by the December 2004 AHLC Meeting. In its Summary, the AHLC Chair requested the Bank to work with the parties and donors to translate the report’s recommendations into a set of actionable measures, and to monitor progress towards their implementation; this would then help donors form a judgment on the extent to which the preconditions for economic revival are being put in place. At the London Meeting on March 1, 2005 donors and the PA agreed that the first Bank Economic Monitoring Report should be prepared as an input to the next AHLC Meeting.
• Integral to this report is a matrix of Indicators of Economic Revival (Annex 2). These indicators were developed by the Bank with assistance from the European Commission and the United States. They should not be considered a checklist or scorecard, and are not of themselves determinant: they merely help anchor a qualitative analysis of the extent to which the preconditions for robust economic growth are being re-established.

1 – Summary Assessment and Recommendations

I – The Need for Rapid Economic Growth

1. Sustained economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza is a vital part of the process of political normalization. As the World Bank wrote in December 2004, “While prosperity is no guarantee of tranquility, history teaches that the opposite is true: that destitution, political instability and violence are constant companions1”. Jim Wolfensohn, the Quartet Special Envoy for Disengagement, has continually emphasized the need to create Palestinian economic momentum, and its connection with Israel’s security. In his letter of October 30, 2005 to Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas, he writes “I believe that we have an opportunity….to see a peaceful period where Palestinians can develop a better life based on tangible and visible prospects and where Israel can be more secure precisely because Palestinians….have greater freedom and hope”2.
2. Employment, and particularly youth employment, must be the essence of any Palestinian economic revitalization strategy. The Bank in December 2004 calculated that it would take an increase in the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 10 percent per annum over the 2005-8 period to reduce unemployment to pre-intifada levels of around 12 percent—essentially a doubling of the 2003-4 rate of growth. Achieving this, it was argued, required a combination of four factors: a dramatic reduction in violence against Israelis, the restoration of Palestinian movement and access, Palestinian governance renewal and, on top of these policy preconditions, an increase in donor disbursements of about 50 percent per annum. The Quartet Special Envoy has underlined this same message on several occasions: “successful reconstruction requires four fundamentals—an absence of violence, a rolling back of the restrictions on Palestinian movement, vigorous Palestinian governance reform and increased foreign aid”.

   II – Growth in 2005 – Encouraging but Inconclusive

3. Real GDP is expected to grow by 8-9 percent in 20053. It should be remembered that this is growth from a low base—at the end of 2005, real GDP per capita was still some 29 percent less than in 1999. Nonetheless, unemployment is expected to decline by 4 percentage points this year, from c. 27 to c. 22.5 percent, while nominal personal incomes are expected to rise by about 12 percent4.
4. This year’s performance reflects four key factors: an expansionary Palestinian Authority (PA) fiscal policy, which has raised public consumption by almost a quarter; solid economic growth in Israel and the demand this has created for Palestinian merchandise exports and Palestinian labor, along with a relaxation of border closures sufficient to permit Palestinians to take advantage of this; a 30 percent increase in credit to the private sector fuelling strong growth in the transport and construction sectors; and a 20 percent increase in donor disbursements. PA fiscal expansion, though, is unsustainable; unless checked, it will lead to functional bankruptcy (i.e. the PA’s inability to meet its monthly salary bill and deliver the most basic services). The drivers of growth also underscore the tight interconnections with the Israeli economy, and thereby the degree of dependence on Israeli closure management.
5. The Bank’s economic projections (Annex 1) show that such growth will not persist without good Palestinian governance, sound economic management and a continued relaxation of closure by GOI—including the maintenance of current labor 2 The Palestinian Economy and the Prospects for its Recovery flows. The scenarios compare the relative impact of a) an improving policy environment without additional funding (the Recovery, No Additional Aid scenario), and b) stagnant policy with c. US$500 million per annum of extra donor funds (Status Quo, Additional Aid). Neither of these scenarios delivers: good policies alone do result in positive GDP growth of about 5 percent per annum, but unemployment declines by only 2 percent over three years. Money alone is less beneficial: real GDP growth disappears by 2008, and unemployment increases by 3 percent in the coming three years5.
6. The only satisfactory way forward is to combine good policies by both sides with more money. The Recovery, Additional Aid scenario embodies continued easing of closures and stable labor access with strong Palestinian governance and the re-establishment of fiscal control, accompanied by generous donor assistance. This combination brings rapid growth and a marked decline in unemployment. By 2008, propelled by rising exports6, personal incomes increase by 20 percent7 and unemployment falls by almost a half, to 13 percent of the workforce8.

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WORLD BANK PAPER URGES MAJOR EASING OF ISRAELI CLOSURE MEASURES AND STEPPED-UP PALESTINIAN REFORM EFFORTS

WASHINGTON, June 24, 2004At the request of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the Government of Israel (GOI) and the international community, the World Bank has released a paperDisengagement, the Palestinian Economy and the Settlementswhich looks at the potential impact of Israel’s Disengagement Plan on the Palestinian economy.

Since the beginning of the intifada in September 2000, the West Bank and Gaza has suffered one of the worst recessions in modern history. GDP per capita has declined by almost 40 percent, and nearly half of the Palestinian population is living in poverty. This crisis has resulted from restrictions on the movement of Palestinian people and goods, or ‘closures’, which the Government of Israel regards as essential to protecting its citizens from attacks by militants. Without major changes in this closure regime, however, the Palestinian economy will not revive, poverty and alienation will deepen.

Of itself, Israel’s Disengagement Plan of June 6 will have very little impact on the Palestinian economy, since it proposes only a limited easing of closure..

“Disengagement alone,” says James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, “will not alter this dangerous, unsustainable situation. If disengagement is implemented with wisdom and foresight, however, it could make a real difference.”

The paper argues that a modernized border cargo regime should be introduced by GOI. Technologies and administrative methods exist that permit the orderly flow of cargo and the maintenance of security. Introducing such a regime would make a major difference to Palestinian welfare and commercial prospects. On its part, the PA needs to make credible security efforts and to commit itself to a reinvigorated program of reforms designed to create an investor-friendly business environment.

“If the PA shows firm commitment to security and economic reform,” adds Mr. Wolfensohn, “and if Israel seriously addresses closure, another major donor effort definitely would be justified. Under these circumstances an additional US$500 million each year could help the Palestinian economy turn the corner.”

With donor disbursements to the Palestinians currently amounting to approximately US$1 billion per year or US$310 per personone of the highest per capita rates in the history of foreign assistancedonors will need to perceive a fundamental change in Palestinian economic prospects if they are to make such additional efforts.

The paper also discusses how the settlement assets that Israel will leave behind in Gaza and the West Bank might best be transferred to the Palestinians. The PA is advised to take the opportunity provided by Disengagement to demonstrate that it can receive and dispose of the settlement assets in a fair and transparent manner. It is suggested that the PA create a special agency for this purpose. The international community, acting through the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, can provide the necessary advice and technical assistance to ensure that the asset transfer process goes well, and is acceptable to all parties.