TRUSTING THE OCCUPIER
“As a result of several superfluous [Haganah] operations which mainly hurt ‘good’ Arabs who were in contact with us. . . the [Arab] mass exodus from all places was continuing. The Arabs have simply lost their faith. [in our goodwill?].”
-Senior member of the Jewish Agency Political Department Ezra Danin
The three year anniversary of the most recent Palestinian uprising, known to the Arab world as the second Intifada has resulted in the destruction of an estimated 1162 homes and left 40,115 Palestinians homeless (MIFTAH, 2003). Such consequences of military occupation have been the case for Palestinians, and indeed other oppressed peoples for decades. Yet the experience of Palestinians is unique among groups in the refugee community. While the UNHCR calls for the repatriation of a displaced people at the end of a conflict, the Palestinians are denied this right, and at nearly 3,000,000 people, they are one of the largest (save Afghans), and certainly the longest running refugee populations in history. And this number is increasing daily, as provocations and retaliations stir the bloody brew that is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The following is an attempt to show the establishment of trust, and lack thereof, as well as the betrayals that have decorated Palestinian consciousness from the late 1940’s, to the present day, and consequently precipitated the flight of refugees. These issues of trust and mistrust will include but not be limited to the fledgling Israeli government and military, local and foreign Arab powers, and the international community. Finally, an examination of the effect of these cases on the psyche of Palestinian refugees will show the gradual rebuilding of trust, albeit a communal trust among refugees, which ironically serves to prolong their plight.
At the time of the Balfour Declaration Palestine consisted of a 6% Jewish minority. The Declarations call for “the establishment in Palestine of a national homeland for the Jewish people” was based on the ideals of modern Zionism , fathered by Theodore Herzl (Kazak, 2003). The nature of these principles planted seeds of distrust in the educated populace of Palestine at a critically early juncture in Arab-Jewish relations. Arab suspicions included, according to Israeli historian Benny Morris, that the Yishuv[1] was “bent on expansionism and, ultimately partial or complete displacement” (Morris, 1998 p. 23). In the Jewish camp, David Ben-Gurion validated these fears saying “after we constitute a large force following the establishment of the state- we will cancel the partition of the country [between Jews and Arabs] and we will expand throughout the land of Israel.” (Morris, p. 24) His sentiments were echoed by Yosef Weitz[2] who stated: “There is no room in this country for both peoples…if the Arabs leave it, the country will become wide and spacious for us….there is no way but to transfer the Arabs” (Morris, p. 27). Thus, it was under these fundamental principles, that a lasting peace and two state solution was rooted, and conflict erupted.
The UN partition plan, endorsed on November 29th, 1947 called for a two state partition. Israel immediately began a policy of expulsion of Arabs from the area partitioned for the Jewish state, (and later as we shall see the Arab state as well). Arab resistance took root. The Israeli military then consisted of three main factions, the Haganah, the IZL, and the LHI. The motives and tactics were similar at all levels of the Israeli military command, to intimidate the local populations into flight. In the words of Dr. Jeff Halper, professor of Anthropology at Ben-Gurion University, “The bottom line [was] to make life so difficult for the Palestinians that anyone who want[ed] a future for their children, anyone who want[ed] to get ahead, anyone who want[ed] a normal life, [would] leave” (Occupation 101, 2003). The tactics were quicker and more effective than anyone in the Jewish camp had anticipated, but they greeted the Arab exodus with jubilation, Yosef Weitz, “I think this [flight prone] state of mind [among the Arabs] should be exploited, and [we should] press the other inhabitants not to surrender [but to leave].” (Morris, p. 92). Indeed it was out of “fear of Jewish attack” (Morris, p.53) that increasingly large numbers of villages and communities fled, as IDL commanders put it, “the Arabs live in great fear of our ‘barbarity’ and it would take little inducement to persuade them to abandon their lands” (Morris, p. 248). Before the end of the conflict the “army” was responsible for 34 massacres (Kazak), the most ruthless of which occurred at Deir Yassin, on April 9th, and Ad Dawayima on the 29th of October[3]. Israeli officials made clear “there was no possibility of distinguishing between good Arabs and bad Arabs” (Morris, p. 41). Those who fled were met with “shots fired over their heads to speed them on their way” (Morris, p. 102), and for those who surrendered, the best case scenario was martial law and curfew, but in most cases the inhabitants of the villages were expelled (Morris, 1998). Attempts by Arabs to gain the trust of the Israeli military were futile, as was the case for the Caesara Arabs who “had done all in their power in order to keep the peace in their village and around it” and were subsequently conquered and expelled (Morris, p. 54). These moves by the army were the core of Plan Dalet[4]. The aggression however was not simply a security issue, it was aimed at expansion as sentiments pouring out of Tel Aviv confirmed: “Even if a certain backwash is unavoidable, we must make the most of the momentous chance with which history has presented us so swiftly and unexpectedly” (Morris, p. 140).
No single event in the history of the conflict served to develop mistrust as did Israel’s stance on refugees. Following the expulsion of some 78% of the Palestinian population (Kazak) the army pushed forward claiming settlements “on territory earmarked in the 1947 United Nations Partition resolution for the Palestinian Arab state. (Morris, p. 179). The refugees who were promised by the Haganah that “Jewish settlements would safeguard their property and allow them to return home after the war” (Morris, 119) were met later with vehement outcries by Israeli officials that “The abandoned lands will never return to their absentee owners…come hell or high-water” (Morris, 179, 277). Meanwhile, as the refugees lived in squalor in camps or on the road, Jewish immigrants flowed into Palestine to take up their former residences and possessions. In an address in 1961 Martin Buber[5] refers to “miserable Arab refugees, in whose towns we have settled from afar; whose homes we have inherited, whose fields we now sow and harvest; the fruit of whose gardens orchards and vineyards we gather; and whose cities we robbed…” (Lilienthal, 1978 p.168) In Arab discourse this robbery is known as “al Naqba” or ‘the catastrophe’ (Kazak). War in 1967 resulted in the occupation of the remaining 22% of Palestine and an additional 325,000 refugees.
Israeli Assault on Gaza By Numbers in 30 Days
Date posted: August 09, 2014
By Safa Agency
