MIFTAH
Thursday, 28 March. 2024
 
Your Key to Palestine
The Palestinian Initiatives for The Promotoion of Global Dialogue and Democracy
 
 
 

The element of time is gaining new meaning for different players in the peace process.

For the US, the main sponsor, sand in the administration’s hourglass is running out as the November presidential election date looms closer and larger on the horizon.

The failure of the Geneva Clinton-Assad summit and the subsequent suspension of Syrian-Israeli talks deprived Clinton of the opportunity to achieve a breakthrough on that track and to claim a major diplomatic victory during his last days in the White House.

Any hopes of a quick resumption of talks were dashed with the death of the Syrian President Hafez Assad and the requirements of “succession” in a difficult phase of transition in Syria.

It is inconceivable that Bashar Assad would give precedence to negotiations with Israel as opposed to the most pressing domestic challenges he is facing.

Consolidation of his national standing and power, implementation of his domestic agenda for reform and modernization, and the liberalization of the severely constrained Syrian economy are all priority issues that demand his immediate attention.

It is also inconceivable that Bashar the son would stray far from his father’s policies vis-à-vis the peace process. Those in Israel who were quick to hail Bashar’s ascension to power as heralding a radical liberation from his father’s historical “luggage” fail to understand the imperative of maintaining the paternal legacy in the peace process as a major source of legitimacy and domestic support.

Thus the year 2000 will not, in all likelihood, witness any movement on the Syrian track.

Thus the US has decided to concentrate its energies and involvement on the Palestinian track with the hope of achieving a dramatic breakthrough (or at least a newsworthy spectacle) before the end of President Clinton’s term and in time for the Nobel Peace Prize award.

Already exhibiting signs of the “lame duck” syndrome, Clinton is expected to face serious difficulties in convincing a Republican-majority Congress to support his peace plans or to foot the indispensable bill.

Although a second term president, Clinton is constrained by the need to bring about a Democratic victory in the November elections and to improve the chances of victory for his V. P. Al Gore.

Hence he will not “rock the boat” or run the risk of putting any pressure on Israel (God forbid) that might in any way jeopardize his party’s chances by offending the powerful pro-Israeli lobby with its campaign funds and votes.

The US insistence on a trilateral summit in July is not only self-serving but could be potentially counter-productive.

Without a genuine implementation of outstanding interim phase agreements, including the third phase of withdrawal (which the US succeeded in delaying yet one more time) and the release of Palestinian prisoners, the required confidence will remain sadly lacking.

More importantly, the extreme hard line Israeli stance in negotiations does not provide any possibility of convergence or commonality of language to prepare for any type of substantive progress.

A summit is not a negotiations exercise, but more of a crowning (and official blessing) of success in preceding negotiations. Given the sad current state of affairs in both sets of talks (implementation of interim phase agreements and negotiations on final status issues), it would take a miracle to prepare the grounds sufficiently for such a summit.

If Clinton (in the form of his envoys Albright and Ross) seeks to put pressure on the Palestinian side in order to extract concessions that would convey the impression of progress within the American version of the calendar of accomplishments, he is sadly mistaken (or misguided).

The “moment of truth” deals with the vital issues on which the future of Palestine and the region hinges. No Palestinian has the will, ability, or mandate to compromise on such basic rights as the right of return for the Palestinian refugees and the restoration of all the land occupied in 1967 including Jerusalem.

Palestinian public opinion has become increasingly disillusioned and impatient with the conduct of the talks and with the painful realities on the ground. Any manipulation of Palestinian rights will lead to rejection and greater instability with severe consequences on Palestinian internal realities. It is no secret that in this domestic arena, time is running out.

Israeli Prime Minister Barak seems to have caught the American fever of summit mania. With a (not unexpected) serious crisis in his unwieldy coalition (Shas blackmail being a common phenomenon), Barak has become in need of a breakthrough himself. His government is beginning to exhibit symptoms of political weakness and dissolution.

Having transformed the process into a miserly and mean-spirited haggling and demeaning “good will gestures,” Barak seems to want to escape his present predicament by circumventing outstanding issues and rushing headlong into a summit on final status without laying the foundations for its success.

Barak’s calendar also seems to be running out of more dates to present as “deadlines” or “target dates.” Sympathetic to the American need as well, he is trying to preempt the November date. The two dates he had designated, however, are catching up with him—the long- (and oft-) delayed third phase of redeployment by June 23, and the September 13 deadline for concluding final status talks.

At the behest of Barak, Clinton succeeded in extorting from the Palestinian side a two-week delay for the redeployment, which would play into Barak’s hand of attempting to merge this phase with final status talks and to create conditions for unfair trade-offs and limitations on full withdrawal.

Barak is also trying to “finesse” the September 13 deadline by inventing the concept of a “temporary solution” that would sell the Palestinians an Israeli acceptance of the idea of a Palestinian state (without the attributes and powers of sovereignty) in exchange for maintaining settlements and deferring the focal issues of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and final boundaries.

Such a “temporary solution” is a euphemism for another transitional phase with Palestinian approval and for maintaining Israeli control and unilateral measures while simultaneously circumventing the major issues on the agenda.

The Barak calendar introduces a whole new timeframe with built-in contradictions.

Both Israel and the US had insisted on reaching a framework agreement (FAPS) and on specifying “ending the conflict” as its major objective. At the same time, they want to postpone or avoid addressing all the issues that are the cause of the conflict hence the essential requirements for ending it.

Thus they are seeking the Palestinian “golden signature” on a historical reconciliation to grant Israel legitimacy and normalization while putting on hold and jeopardizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and the imperatives of a just solution.

A fragmented, non-viable, and non-sovereign “statelet” does not constitute the fulfillment of international law and Palestinian rights and aspirations. Regardless of formal recognition, it would not be recognized by the Palestinians themselves as the embodiment of their right to self-determination, freedom, and dignity.

A “coordinated unilateral declaration of statehood” is no more than another sleight of hand—a grand deception to “indulge” us in a “pseudo state” while the Israelis maintain their very real land acquisition and control and gain international approval and legitimacy.

Then they launch a public campaign of “scare tactics” on the inevitability of violence should the Palestinians declare a state on Sept. 13 without gaining Israeli approval.

The apocalyptic pronouncements of Israeli Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz on deploying “tanks” and “combat helicopters” with “open-fire instructions” and anticipating “heated incidents” in the next few months are a combination of public posturing, provocation, and panic politics.

Rather than “terrifying” the Palestinian side, these threats only increased Palestinian determination not to be intimidated.

Responses such as those of the Palestinian Minister of Justice on willingness to sacrifice thousands of lives are also reprehensible—every single life is valuable and deserves the utmost effort at safeguarding it.

Every effort should be made to avoid violence and to resolve differences peacefully. The Mofaz declarations, however, are serious indications of a mentality that betrays bad faith, militaristic brutality, and racist coercion. Such a confrontational stance is a grave violation of the requirements of peace, provoking extreme responses and poisoning the atmosphere further.

The Palestinian calendar is not as amorphous or ominous. September 13 marks the date of the latest extension of the interim phase and the conclusion of final status talks. Having demonstrated patience, flexibility, and a positive attitude even beyond the endurance of its public, the Palestinian leadership is being called upon to signal a qualitative shift in its policies and practices—both in the peace process and in nation building.

We have repeatedly reiterated that the Palestinian state is a right not subject to negotiations or to Israeli approval. It is also not a political maneuver or a threat.

Rather, the state should be embodied concretely with sufficient preparation including drafting a constitution and preparing for free and fair parliamentary elections. Democracy and the rule of law are the indispensable requirements for a state that seeks to be viable and to engage as an effective regional player.

Just as important is the territoriality of the state that must encompass as a minimum all the territory occupied in June 1967 including Jerusalem. Thus Israeli attempts at diminishing and controlling the geography of the state would undermine its viability.

The prevailing rhetoric on an “outbreak of violence” or “bloody clashes” and instability runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy if Israeli officials persist to exploit fear as a political tool.

Within Palestinian civil society, on the other hand, the debate is centered on whether the declaration of the state would serve national interests should Israel use it as a pretext to make the status quo permanent.

Another concern is the creation of a misleading impression that the Palestinian question has been solved despite the fact that major issues, including refugees and Jerusalem, remain unresolved and much of the territory remains under occupation. Such an impression would render their future solution even more difficult.

The absence of real sovereignty remains an enormous obstacle and a genuine concern among all Palestinians.

A state, however, is also perceived as a qualitative shift in Palestinian standing and international relations. Using the example of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, many aspire to negotiating a lasting peace as a state some of whose lands remain under occupation.

A majority position recognizes that a Palestinian state is a major requirement for stability and peace. Within Israel as well, many would prefer to sign a binding agreement with a government rather than with an organization (to guarantee a real and binding “end to the conflict” and to ensure that “no further claims” persist).

Unquestionably, September 13, 2000 is no ordinary date.

With support for the peace process (and for the PNA) eroding among the Palestinian public as a whole, and with the recurring and debilitating crises within the ruling coalition in Israel, it is extremely doubtful that a genuine resolution is in the making—despite American wishful thinking.

The real question is whether Israel has undergone the necessary transformation from an occupying power to a neighbor. From all indications, the mentality of domination and force seem to prevail, and the distortions generated by decades of an unaccountable military occupation have not been rectified.

With all that in mind, the only certainty is that between now and Sept. 13, the region is in for a long hot summer.

The cooling effects of rain and revitalizing the peace process are matters for the future.

While not much can be done to influence the former, the latter is in urgent need of concentrated effort and serious action.

Peace will not descend from the heavens, nor can it be artificially manufactured or fraudulently constructed to comply with external requirements and timeframes.

 
 
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