The traditional role of the media as reporters of the truth can play an important role in conflicts. A key function of the media is to provide the public with the information necessary to make good decisions. It is important to realize that decisions are not only based on events but also very much on how events are presented. The media can seek to confirm or question official accounts, reveal official deceit, and correct errors of omission. Recent advances in the field of information technology have enabled the media to have a much greater impact on public opinion than ever before. The media provide the public with an indispensable service. It is one of the pillars of modern society.

Since the 1993 Oslo Accords which brought limited autonomy to Palestinian society, the tasks of the Palestinian media have changed radically. On the one hand, the media is expected to contribute to nation-building based on the prospective that the endgame of the Accords will be an independent, free, and democratic Palestinian state. On the other hand, it must deal with the reality that most of the Palestinian territory that will be the territory of the future Palestinian state is still occupied, and that it would indeed be early to shift the focus of the media away from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the two missions should not have to contradict each other since an honest, authentic, investigative, non-biased and informative media will serve both goals.

The spirit of the Oslo Accords made confidence-building between Palestinians and Israelis an indispensable condition to moving ahead in the peace process, and it gave the media in Palestine and Israel a decisive role in the difficult process of creating this crucial common ground. However, the failure of Camp David negotiations in July 2000 and the eruption of the second Intifada soon afterwards proved both sides’ failure in achieving this mission.

Acknowledging the importance of the media in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular, MIFTAH-The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy and KESHEV-Center for Protection of Democracy in Israel agreed to launch a joint project monitoring media coverage and professionalism on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides. The project will ultimately facilitate the development of an independent media and a culture of moderation, tolerance, and understanding between the two peoples, through monitoring, research, advocacy, and lobbying activities without jeopardizing the freedom of expression. What follows is a report on the first stage of this research project, scheduled to continue through 2005 and 2006

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On April 15, 2010, the interior ministry of the deposed government in Gaza carried out the first executions issued by the higher military court in the Strip against two people charged with collaboration with the Israeli occupation. Another execution was carried out on the 18th of May against three men convicted of murder.

The executions, which took place without ratification by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, generated varying reactions from Palestinian factions, especially Fateh and also from human rights organizations working in Gaza.

These two incidents received varying coverage in the three newspapers. The editorial lines were clear for each newspaper towards internal events linked in one way or the other to the internal political split and the ramifications of this split on the local media.

In its coverage of the first execution, Al Ayyam gave it the lead headline (three lines) in its April 16, 2010 edition, appearing as the following:

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Introduction

In January, 2010, on the eve of the Viva Palestina Life Line convoy's arrival, which was carrying humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip from 17 countries, the Palestinian-Egyptian border became the scene of clashes and confrontations between the Egyptian security forces and Palestinian protestors. The Palestinians were protesting the ban on the convoy entering the Strip, which at the time resulted in the death of one Egyptian soldier and the injury of dozens of protesters. The two sides exchanged accusations over responsibility for the death of the Egyptian soldier and the ensuing clashes and injuries on the Palestinian side. At the time and until today, it has remained unclear which side was responsible for the unrest and the ensuing repercussions, especially the soldier's death. This event was chosen for its significance and its impact on the Palestinian arena including its ramifications regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, especially the Israeli siege on the Gaza Strip.

How did the three Palestinian papers cover this event?

There was a clear discrepancy between the three newspapers in their coverage of this event, whether in terms of where on the front page of each newspaper the news item about the event was placed and the choice of headline. There were also differences in the content and accuracy of the news material. The largest discrepancy was between Al Ayyam on the one hand and Al Hayat Al Jadida and Al Quds on the other.

In Al Ayyam, for example, the news item was the lead headline, placed on the right hand side of the front page, since it was the most significant event of the day. Its headline was comprised of three lines:

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Introduction

Nations embroiled in nationalist conflicts tend to adopt narratives that support the righteousness of their struggle and which accentuate the negative traits and intentions of the other side, as well as its responsibility for the ongoing suffering and for the absence of a solution. This is how the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is covered by media outlets on both sides, often in mirror images, with each side presenting an opposite story. For example, the Palestinian media narrative emphasizes the occupation—whose victims are the Palestinians—and paints the government of Israel as aggressive, opposed to peace and responsible for violent events in the region. On the other side, Israeli media outlets emphasize the violent and terrorist foundations of the Palestinians’ conduct and their unwillingness or inability to reach a solution. The Israelis, in this telling, are the victims of a conflict in which they are not to blame. Beyond these different perceptions and interpretations of reality, essentially similar patterns of coverage can be found on both sides, which de-legitimize and dehumanize the other. These patterns of coverage heighten mutual suspicions in both nations, fan the flames of the conflict and make it harder to find a solution.

Recognition of the media’s profound influence on the conflict has led the Israeli organization Keshev and the Palestinian organization MIFTAH to work together from both sides of the conflict in order to try to change how the conflict is depicted in the media discourse in both nations. This is done in the hope that such cooperation may lead to more balanced, fair and comprehensive coverage and, perhaps, as a result, a better reality.

This practical guide to teaching critical reading of news materials arises from a unique cooperative project that has been carried out continuously since 2004. In this joint project Keshev and MIFTAH each analyze news coverage in the major media outlets on their “own side” and attempt to influence journalists and editors to change patterns of coverage that are problematic and biased.

Two parallel goals have guided the creation of this guide. First, it is designed to instill skills for critical reading, in general. A second goal is to promote critical media consumption in the specific context of the Israeli-Arab conflict. As mentioned above, over the years media on both sides have played a complicated and not always positive role in the conflict’s development. The media has had a central role in defining the conflict and its significance for the Israeli and Palestinian public. Critically reading the messages contained in news coverage can neutralize to some extent the media's ability to shape consumers' perspectives according to short-term media interests and can also neutralize the influence of those elements that exert pressure on the media. It is our hope that this guide will enable media professionals to develop new means of self-criticism that will allow them, in time, to create news coverage that does not perpetuate the conflict, but which might actually contribute to its resolution.

The methodology1 that underlies this guide makes it possible to clearly present the systematic failings in news coverage on both sides. It is based on a distinction between two principal stages in the news-making process – writing and editing.

At the first stage reporters and columnists compose their texts and send them to their news editors. The editors receive other texts as well, from press agencies, public relations firms, and so on.

At the second stage, the editors produce the final product: They determine which texts will appear in the newspaper or broadcast. The editors determine the placement of the text (on the front page or on page 17, at the beginning of the broadcast or after a commercial break); they select the photographs that go with each item; they design the layout of the pages and determine the sequence of items in the broadcast; and they compose headlines (including sub-headlines and photo captions in newspapers, the headlines of television news broadcasts and the words spoken by the anchor).

In the view of most news producers and news consumers the second stage, the editing stage, is mainly technical. According to popular perceptions, the truly important work is done in gathering and writing news material. Editors merely "prepare" this material for print or broadcast. This perception is wrong, for two complementary reasons: First, editorial work determines news messages no less than the work of the reporters, and in some ways even more so. Second, in reading the news media consumers rely on material produced by editors much more than on material produced by reporters. The fact that an article appears on the front page and not on page 17; the specific phrasing of a particular headline; the appearance of a photo beside an article; the words spoken by a news anchor before an item is broadcast – all of these factors have a decisive influence on consumers' understanding of the news. Furthermore, many studies show that media consumers often limit themselves to reading headlines (or viewing the headlines of a news broadcast) and in many cases they do not even get to the texts of the news items (or the rest of the broadcast edition). In such cases, the perception of the news is determined almost exclusively by the work of the editors. This fact has far-reaching significance, since a meticulous review of news material at both stages of the process, writing and editing, reveals that the materials produced at each stage are not parallel. The headlines of newspapers and news broadcasts are not merely short neutral summaries of the news. In most cases, the headlines tell a very different story than that which is told by the reporters. Along with the placement of an item, its graphic saliency, the accompanying visuals, and so on, the headlines tell a story of their own and this significantly influences news consumers.

To be clear – the problem is not limited to the fact that once in a while the results of editorial work do not reflect the contents of the articles themselves. The point is that the discrepancies between headlines and texts are systematic. A meticulous review of newspapers and television news broadcasts reveals that certain components of reality, which appear in the articles themselves, are systematically marginalized by editors, while others are systematically highlighted.

The techniques that appear in this guide reveal these systematic discrepancies through attention to a series of key criteria.

Further in this guide each criterion will be explained through the use of examples culled from actual media coverage in Israel and in the Palestinian Authority. It is important to note that becoming familiar with these criteria is just a first step toward learning to read media items more critically. The research method employed here is based on attention to a combination of criteria in ways that reveal recurring editing patterns that bias the coverage.

This guide aims to help users identify the tell-tale signs of these patterns, to understand their significance and to learn from them how to read the news in a more profound way; in other words, how to "read between the lines".

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1 Introduction

The violent reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict exacts a very heavy blood toll from both sides. Since the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, more than 3,300 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli security forces. In the same period more than 1,000 Israelis have been killed by Palestinians.

The way the killings are covered affects media consumers’ ability to understand the complexity of the conflict, to interpret its varied contexts and to weigh the factors that contribute to its escalation. The conflict and the current circle of violence cannot be understood without knowing basic facts about reality on both sides. Israeli citizens are exposed to broad and intensive coverage of events in which Israelis are killed by Palestinians. One of the main questions that we seek to investigate here is whether Israeli media consumers receive basic information on killings of Palestinians by Israeli security forces.

The research presented in this report investigates media coverage of such events in December 2005, during which time, according to the major media outlets in Israel, 22 Palestinians were killed. In the framework of this study, we examined the daily editions of the three major newspapers, Ha’aretz, Yedioth Ahronoth and Ma’ariv, and the evening television newscasts on Channels 1, 2 and 10. Within these editions and broadcasts, we studied all items concerning events in which Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces as well as items that dealt with the subject more generally (for example, items that discussed the “liquidations” policy or dealt with the responses of both sides to these events). A total of 135 items were examined.

2 What is a “Liquidation”?

In this report, we define a report of a “liquidation” as one that describes a situation where a premeditated killing has taken place. This definition is based on a widespread understanding of the term. This meaning is also hinted at in the alternative formulation coined by the IDF to describe such events: “targeted prevention”. In other words, according to security forces, an act of “liquidation” is meant to thwart a combat action; meaning, it is an intentional act that is planned in advance.

A document submitted to the High Court of Justice in February 2003 by Shai Nitzan, deputy state prosecutor, clarifies that “liquidations” are intentional and pre-planned: “International law on the rules of warfare distinguishes between two categories of people: combatants and civilians. While combatants are legitimate targets for attack, intentional attacks on civilians are completely forbidden” (our emphasis).

In an article entitled TRAGIC DILEMMA, published in Ha’aretz on February 29, 2004, Asa Kasher, one of the authors of the IDF code of ethics, makes clear that the term “liquidations” refers to preventative actions that target “a person engaged in practical preparations for carrying out an attack in Israel,” –thus, not during combat. Another article by Kasher, written jointly with Gen. Amos Yadlin (currently head of military intelligence and at the time of the article’s publication commander of IDF colleges) underscores the basic meaning of an act of “liquidation”: “A person is defined as a ticking bomb not only when an explosives belt is strapped onto him and he makes his way to an Israeli site. But rather, also at earlier stages of the actual process – when the person provides his comrades with the means for carrying out the attack, when he arranges the means of equipment and transportation, when he plans the attack, and so on”.

The definition of the term “liquidation” that was put forward at the beginning of this section is based on both military and legal sources. In fact, with few exceptions, this definition is consistent with the way that the term is used in media coverage, which reinforces its validity.

“Liquidations” can thus be understood to be events that occur under a clear set of circumstances – attacks on Palestinian activists that are preparing or carrying out hostile acts against Israel. By contrast, when a Palestinian is killed under different circumstances by Israeli security forces the situation is more ambiguous and complex. For the sake of convenience, we shall call instances of such deaths “non-liquidation” events. This report examines patterns of Israeli media coverage of all events in which Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces during the period of investigation. The report also inquires whether “liquidation” events were covered differently from “non-liquidation” events. It asks: What was the scope of the coverage? Were the circumstances that led to the killing of Palestinians investigated? What questions were asked and who provided the responses? The following pages seek to provide answers to these questions.

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1. Introduction

The evacuation of the Gaza Strip settlements was one of the most extensively covered events in Israeli history. This wide coverage was severely – and to a certain degree, justifiably – criticized by the Israeli political right. The media did indeed convey a distressing, unfounded message of the dangers of civil war between Israeli settlers and troops, while systematically avoiding a critical examination of the disengagement plan. On a deeper level, the media chose to represent the disengagement as an internal Israeli affair, a human tragedy affecting only Israelis, a story of collective trauma – the settlers’ trauma, the soldiers’ and policemen’s trauma, the trauma of Israeli society at large.

Suffering and tears took center stage, along with the nostalgic longing for the settlers’ lost paradise. In its coverage of this trauma, the media unconditionally surrendered to a public relations campaign led by the settlers as well as by the security forces and sometimes actually coordinated between them. Voices that tried to suggest that the trauma may not be so severe, or that the disengagement could actually be a positive event, were marginalized.

Moreover, the media chose to disengage the disengagement from the tangle of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, and to ignore its significance in terms of the peace process. The few items sent in by reporters about internal disagreement within the establishment; the security cooperation with the Palestinians (who were nevertheless considered “no partner”); the obstacles Israel was creating for the Palestinian Authority; the expansion of settlements in the West Bank; the ambiguous status of the Gaza Strip after the disengagement – all these never made headlines. Israeli media consumers now remember the sense of trauma involved in the disengagement, but they know even less about the conflict than they did before the disengagement.

This is the third in a series of comprehensive reports published by Keshev on the Israeli media and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The report analyzes the news coverage of the disengagement by Israel’s three main newspapers, Yediot Ahronot, Ma’ariv and Ha’aretz, as well as by the newscasts of the three public channels, 1, 2 and 10, from August 1st until the evacuation of settlements in Gaza and North Samaria was completed on August 24, 2005. The bulk of coverage was tremendous. Our research team analyzed more than 2,000 items published during this period, as well as a few relevant items published later, through the beginning of September. Our goal, as in our previous reports, was to examine the extent to which newspaper and television editors made reasonable use of the news materials provided by their own reporters: Which elements of these materials did they choose to highlight in headlines? What was systematically relegated to back pages and supplements? As we shall show, the reporters and analysts did occasionally try to raise truly important questions about the disengagement, but the headlines kept reporting on an isolated event, affecting Israelis alone, and occurring only amongst them selves.

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Introduction: On February 8, 2005, at the Sharm e-Sheikh summit, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) declared a ceasefire after more than four years of Intifada. Since the summit, the two sides have exchanged mutual recriminations on intentional and unintentional violations of the understandings that were reached. This report examines how the major Israeli media outlets covered the ceasefire, how they interpreted the actions (both positive and negative) of both sides, and how they dealt with each side’s pronouncements concerning violations of the ceasefire by the other side.

The report focuses on a period of 32 days, between April 9 and May 10, 2005, and examines patterns of coverage in six major Israeli media outlets: The newspapers Ha’aretz, Yedioth Ahronoth and Ma’ariv, and the nightly television news broadcasts on Channels 1, 2 and 10.

In a long and difficult conflict like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, periods of ceasefire and relative calm—like the one examined in this report—are no less important than more violent periods. The two sides arrive at a ceasefire when they are exhausted, injured and distrustful. Almost naturally, both sides tend to overlook cases in which they themselves violate the agreements that led to the ceasefire and to see in the other side’s violations proof that it intends to resume the circle of violence. Each side tends to see its violations as unintentional and the other side’s violations as the direct result of policy. Moreover, in situations like these, decision makers (in our case, Israeli decision makers) are likely to issue declarations that are not meant to strengthen the ceasefire, but rather, to prepare the ground for blaming the other side in the event that the ceasefire ends.

This is why it is important that media outlets, which provide their consumers with information on this unstable state of affairs, provide balanced, reliable and checked information that attempts to independently examine events in the field and critically interpret official pronouncements. As this report shows, the media outlets examined in this report did not perform their duty in this regard.

The first part of the report (Sections 2 – 5) concerns coverage of Israel’s actions and failures to act; the second part concerns coverage of the Palestinian Authority’s actions and failures to act. In both parts, this report does not attempt to determine to what extent each side fulfilled its commitments, nor how “justified” its accusations were against the other side. The report, rather, seeks to examine news coverage of these questions and to scrutinize to what extent the media outlets provided their consumers with information that was checked, investigated and complete on the complex reality of the fragile ceasefire—information that can enable media consumers to attain an informed outlook on the current stage of the conflict.

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Summary

This is the first report issued by Keshev in the project "Media Monitoring—Words Can Kill, Too". This unique project, carried out in coordination between Keshev, an Israeli organization, and Miftah, a Palestinian organization, examines media coverage on both sides of the conflict. The goal of the project is to change patterns of media coverage in Israel and in the Palestinian Authority that give expression to prejudice, incitement and defamation, misrepresentation, de-legitimization and dehumanization of the other side.

This report examines coverage of Arafat's illness and death in three Israeli daily newspapers (Yediot Aharonot, Ma'ariv and Ha'aretz) and in the main television news editions (Channel 1, Channel 2 and Channel 10), from the first reports of his illness on October 25, 2004, until November 19, a few days after his burial.

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