



## NEC's monthly bulletin on Palestinian perceptions towards politics and economics

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
## I. Methodology

During the period 12-15 November, 2007, and immediately after the large Fateh rally in the Gaza Strip which ended in the death of seven Palestinians, Near East Consulting (NEC) conducted a phone survey of over 1200 randomly selected Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem of which 1057 were successfully completed.

It is worth noting that the margin of error is +/- 3% with a 95% confidence level.

Figure 1, below, outlines the demographic characteristics of the sample which correspond rather well with the overall characteristics of the Palestinian population/

Figure 1: Demographic distribution



## II. Main findings

- The internal security problem is becoming the main concern of the Palestinian people, more so than the economy;
- Feeling of insecurity dropped by 10% over the past six weeks. Whereas 53% of the respondents said that they felt insecure in Sep 2007, the feeling of insecurity reached 63% in November;
- The stabilization in the poverty figures in the oPt area consequence of the improvement of the economic conditions in the West Bank as opposed to the Gaza Strip which are probably related to the emphasis exerted by the international community to support the West Bank government as opposed to the Gaza Strip's government;
- Palestine TV is gaining more support at the expense of Al-Jazeera;
- Al-Quds newspaper is trusted slightly more than Al-Jazeera;
- 62% of the respondents now say that the legitimate government is the caretaker government as opposed to 55% six weeks ago;

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- Trust in Abu-Mazen reached the highest since the election of Hamas. Whereas 22% of the respondents gave their trust to Hanieh, 78% gave their trust to Abu-Mazen;
- Although the majority of the Palestinians do not think that any leader can ever take the place of President Arafat, the most likely choice is Marwan Barghouthi closely followed by Abu Mazen;
- The vast majority of the Palestinians believe that if Arafat was alive, the problems that exist between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would not have happened. They also believe that the political situation is much more difficult than it is during the time of Arafat.
- Support for Fateh is on the rise and it reached the highest level since Hamas won the elections in January 2006;
- As noted below, the majority of the Palestinians (79%) believe that the security situation in the oPt has worsened since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 94% think that the economy deteriorated and 87% believe that the general situation has worsened.
- Support for the Annapolis meeting is slightly less than it was in late September 2007. Today, 71% of the Palestinians support Palestinian participation as opposed to 76% in September.
- Still, only 43% believe that it will lead to some progress in the peace process. The only optimists are the supporters of Fateh where 65% of them believe that Annapolis will lead to some progress on the peace front.
- The majority (57%) believe that the main beneficiary will be Israel. Only 22% believe that it will be the Palestinians. Even among Fateh supporters, more of them believe that Israel will be the main winner there.
- 51% of the respondents say that the issue of Jerusalem is the most important issue in any final status negotiations (51%) followed by the refugee issue (24%).
- The majority of the Palestinians support a two-state solution and the right of return of the refugees to their place of origin. As for Jerusalem, 62% of the respondents want Jerusalem to be shared or split between Palestine and Israel. Only 38% want both parts of Jerusalem as a capital for the Palestinians state only.
- 72% of the respondents support a peace agreement with Israel. Even 38% of Hamas supporters support a peace agreement with Israel. The highest support for a peace settlement with Israel is among supporters of Hamas where 87% of them favor this view.



### III. The situation in general

#### A. Levels of concern

Over the past six weeks, there has been a significant increase in the level of concern over the internal security situation. As portrayed in figure 2, below, the proportion of Palestinians who said that the internal power struggle is their main concern jumped from 23% in the end of September to 34% by the middle of November.

As outlined in table 1, the main concern over the internal security is more pronounced in the Gaza Strip where 41% of the respondents stressed it. Only 24% of the Gaza respondents mentioned the economy despite the intensification of the closure regime there. Also noteworthy is that the concern over the internal security situation is becoming more of an issue to Hamas supporters who were more relaxed about the issue than the supporters of Fateh in the previous surveys.

Figure 2: Most important issue of concern




Table 1: Main issue that makes you feel concerned according to region and faction


	Region			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
The economic hardship	31%	24%	33%	24%	22%	31%
The absence of security	25%	24%	17%	29%	26%	24%
The internal power struggle	29%	41%	31%	33%	41%	35%
The Israeli occupation in general	6%	4%	7%	6%	2%	5%
Family problems	3%	1%	2%	3%	1%	2%
I have no concerns	5%	5%	11%	5%	7%	4%

#### B. Feeling of security

The concern over the internal security situation is also reflected in the increase in the percentage of people who say that they feel secure. Whereas 47% of the respondents said that they felt rather secure in September, the proportion in November fell to 37%.



Figure 3: Feeling of security



As indicated in table 3, the feeling of insecurity is higher in the Gaza Strip and among the non-Hamas supporters. Whereas, for example, 69% of the Fateh supporters say that they do not feel secure, the percentage among the Hamas supporters is only 40%.

Table 2: Feeling of security according to region and faction

		Region			Factional trust		
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Feeling of security	I feel secure	39%	33%	60%	31%	38%	35%
	I do not feel secure	61%	67%	40%	69%	62%	65%

### C. The economy

Although the internal security situation is the main issue that the Palestinians are concerned about, the economy is another major concern particularly the issue of poverty and unemployment.


#### 1. Poverty

Although the poverty level seem to be rather stable in the past months, it is important to note that while the poverty level is stable as a result of the apparent decline in the poverty level in the West Bank to the lowest level in recent months. This issue could be attributed to the apparent emphasis that the international community is putting in the West Bank while, at the same time boycotting the Gaza Strip. As indicated in table 4, below, the poverty levels in the Gaza Strip is 20% higher than in the West Bank. Whereas 69% of the former live in poverty, the proportion in the later is 49%.





Figure 4: Poverty level: March 2006 till November 2007



Also noteworthy is the increase in the poverty levels among the Hamas respondents as opposed to the Fateh respondents. Whereas recent surveys conducted by NEC showed that the level of poverty is almost similar between the Fateh and Hamas respondents, the gap seem to start increasing. While 44% of Fateh supporters live above the poverty level, the percentage among the Hamas respondents is lower by 9 points.

Table 3: Poverty levels according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Below poverty line	49%	69%	65%	56%	59%	51%
Above poverty	51%	31%	35%	44%	41%	49%

## 2. Employment

The situation is also the same with respect to employment. While 27% of the Gaza respondents who are part of the labor force said that they are not employed, the percentage in the West Bank is only 16T%.

Figure 5: Employment of the labor force




Table 4: Employment of the labor force according to region and faction

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


		Region of residence			Factional trust			
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None	
Labor force	Fully employed	73%	62%	67%	71%	66%	67%	
	Partially employed	10%	12%	10%	9%	10%	13%	
	Unemployed	16%	27%	22%	20%	24%	20%	

### D. Emigration

As a result of the increasing hardship on the Palestinian population, a significant proportion of the Palestinians started thinking about emigrating. As illustrated in figure 7, below, 32% of the respondents declared the willingness of some household members to emigrate

Figure 6: Do you or any of your household members think of leaving the OPT?



The highest proportion of the respondents who would like to emigrate are primarily Fateh supporters who reside in the Gaza Strip. Whereas only 15% of the supporters of Hamas said that they want to emigrate, the portion among Fateh supporters is 37%. This gap is most likely due to the challenges many Fateh supporters face in the Gaza Strip.

Table 5: Views about immigration according to region and faction

	Region			Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None	
Yes	29%	38%	15%	37%	29%	34%	
No	71%	62%	85%	63%	71%	66%	

### E. Freedom of expression

About 46% of the respondents said that they do not feel that they can voice their opinion. As outlined in table 7, the proportion of Palestinians who say that they can not voice their opinion is much higher in the Gaza Strip (56%) than in the West Bank (41%) and among Fateh respondents (47%) than among Hamas respondents (34%).



Figure 7: In the current circumstances, are you able to voice your opinion?





Table 6: Perceptions about the ability to speak freely according to region and faction

		Region			Factional trust		
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
In the current circumstances, are you able to voice your opinion?	Yes	59%	44%	66%	53%	52%	48%
	No	41%	56%	34%	47%	48%	52%

### F. The situation since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip

As noted below, the majority of the Palestinians (79%) believe that the security situation in the oPt has worsened since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 94% think that the economy deteriorated and 87% believe that the general situation has worsened.



### G. Trust in media

#### 1. Satellite channels

There is a sharp decline in the trust in Al-Jazeera as the main satellite channel that is used by the Palestinian people. As noted in figure 9, below, trust in Palestine TV jumped



to 24% while Al-Jazeera went down to 48%. Previous surveys showed that Al-Jazeera enjoyed much more clout before.

The decline in the trust of Al-Jazeera and the increase in the trust for Palestine TV is highly influenced by factional affiliation. As noted in table 8, below, 42% of Fateh supporters trust Palestine TV as opposed to 32% that trust Al-Jazeera. Conversely, trust in Al-Jazeera by Hamas supporters is significantly more pronounced. The Hamas affiliated Al-Aqsa TV is primarily trusted by Hamas supporters who, nonetheless, trust Al-Jazeera more than their own station.

Figure 8: The satellite channel trusted most




Table 7: Trust in satellite channels according to region and faction

		Region of residence		Factional trust			
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Which satellite channel you trust most?	Al-Jazeera	57%	35%	55%	32%	56%	64%
	Al-Arabiah	11%	14%	3%	17%	12%	10%
	Abu-Dhabi	3%	2%	2%	3%	5%	1%
	Palestine TV	20%	30%	2%	42%	14%	11%
	Al-Aqsa	3%	11%	36%	0%	4%	4%
	Al-Hurra	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	2%
	Others	6%	5%	2%	4%	8%	8%

## 2. Al-Quds vs. Al-Jazeera

Al-Quds is the most trusted newspaper among the Palestinians with over three fourth of the respondents pointing to the oldest Palestinian newspaper as the one they trust most. However, when respondents were asked about whether they trust Al-Quds more or Al-Jazeera more, slightly more Palestinians said that they trust Al-Quds (46%) than Al-Jazeera (45%, as indicated in figure 11.



Clearly, support for Al-Quds is predominantly attributed to the strong support Fateh respondents have for this paper.

Figure 9: Comparison in trust between Al-Quds and Al-Jazeera




Table 8: Al-Jazeera vs. Al-Quds according to region and faction

		Region of residence		Factional trust			
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Who do you trust most: Al-Jazeera or Al-Quds?	Al-Jazeera	45%	44%	73%	28%	51%	56%
	Al-Quds Newspaper	47%	43%	20%	61%	44%	35%
	Neither	7%	12%	7%	11%	5%	9%

#### IV. Palestinian politics

##### A. The Palestinian government

##### 1. Which is perceived as legitimate?

There has been a significant increase in the level of support for the Caretaker government of Fayyad as opposed to the Hanieh government. As can be seen from figure 12, 62% of the respondents now say that the legitimate government is the caretaker government as opposed to 55% six weeks ago.

Even in the Gaza Strip, 61% of the respondents there said that the legitimate government is the Fayyad government. Only 26% of the Gaza respondents mentioned the Hanieh government.

Figure 10: Attitude about who is the legitimate government






Table 9: Attitude about who is the legitimate government according to region and faction

		Region			Factional trust		
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Which, in your opinion, is the legitimate government in the oPt?	Caretaker government of Salam Fayyad	64%	61%	4%	92%	48%	45%
	Hamas-led Hanieh government	16%	26%	87%	3%	23%	14%
	Neither	20%	14%	10%	5%	29%	40%

**B. Leadership**

**1. Abbas vs. Hanieh**

Trust in Abu Mazen as opposed to Hanieh has also increased in the past weeks. Whereas 73% of the respondents said that they trusted Abu Mazen, the proportion stands now at 78%: the highest in the past 18 months.

Figure 11: Trust in Abu Mazen versus trust in Ismael Hanieh




Table 10: Trust in Abu Mazen versus trust in Ismael Hanieh according to region and faction

		Region			Factional trust		
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None



Trust in Abu Mazen versus trust in Ismael Hanieh.	Mahmoud Abbas	81%	73%	10%	99%	59%	81%
	Ismael Hanieh	19%	27%	90%	1%	41%	19%

**C. Perceptions about Yaser Arafat**

The image of President Arafat remains alive in the minds of most Palestinians. The rally in Gaza few days ago attests to that and the reaction of the Hamas government to this rally further shows the impact the image of Arafat and the symbol that he created still has even three years after his death.

When asked as to who can fill the gap that has happened after the death of Arafat, more than one third of the Palestinians said that no one can fill that gap. The closest to that is perceived by the Palestinians to be Marwan Barghouthi followed by President Mahmoud Abbas.

As noted in table 11, the highest 'support' for Marwan Barghouthi is among those who do not trust any faction: an indication that those who are do not ally themselves with any faction see Barghouthi as the choice that can lead the Palestinian people, especially since a significant number of Hamas supporters also look for Marwan Barghouthi as a potential leader or successor.

Figure 12: Who can fill the gap after Arafat




Table 11: Perceptions about who can fill the gap after Arafat according to faction and region

	Region of residence		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Abu Mazen	30%	28%	0%	45%	22%	18%
Marwan Barghouthi	38%	37%	17%	40%	37%	48%
Farouk Qaddoumi	7%	4%	3%	4%	8%	10%
Ismael Hanieh	9%	14%	55%	0%	4%	7%
Khaled Mash'al	5%	6%	21%	1%	6%	3%
Salam Fayyad	0%	5%	0%	2%	10%	1%
Others	13%	6%	3%	8%	12%	13%



Figure 13, below shows the extent to which the Palestinians feel about the impact that the death of President Arafat had on Palestinian politics. As noted below, over 90% of the Palestinians believe that the situation would have been better if Arafat is still alive.

Figure 13: Perceptions about the impact of the death of Arafat



Table 12, below shows that Hamas supporters are in consortium with the Fateh respondents on the impact President Arafat had on the Palestinian life and Palestinian politics. It also shows the impact his death had on the deterioration of the situation here.

Table 12: Perceptions about the impact of the death of Arafat according to region and faction

		Region		Factional trust			
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Would the split between the West Bank and Gaza happen if Arafat was alive?	Yes	7%	8%	12%	4%	12%	8%
	No	93%	92%	88%	96%	88%	92%
Is the political situation better than it was during Arafat's time	Better	2%	7%	11%	2%	4%	4%
	Worse	94%	91%	82%	96%	93%	93%
	The same	4%	2%	7%	2%	4%	3%
Has Arafat remained faithful to the Palestinian people?	Arafat failed the Palestinians	4%	7%	14%	2%	9%	5%
	Arafat maintained their rights	96%	93%	86%	98%	91%	95%
Has the position of Fateh worsened since Arafat's death?	Improved	5%	9%	2%	11%	5%	3%
	Worsened	87%	83%	94%	78%	89%	91%
	The same	8%	8%	4%	11%	6%	5%





**D. Factions**

Support for Fateh is on the rise and it reached the highest level since Hamas won the elections in January 2006. As illustrated in figure 14, 46% of the respondents now trust Fateh as opposed to 13% who trust Hamas.

Trust for Fateh became significantly stronger in the Gaza Strip where the level of support there is equal to that in the West Bank. Also worth noting is that the recent problems that occurred in the Gaza Strip during the Fateh rally commemorating late President Arafat has polarized the population there to a level that led to a decline in the proportion of those who do not trust any faction to 26% there.

Figure 14: Factional trust: January 2006 till November 2007




Table 13: Factional trust according to region and faction

		Region of residence		Poverty all	
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below the poverty line	Above the poverty line
Factional trust	Hamas	10%	17%	15%	10%
	Fateh	46%	46%	46%	45%
	Others	8%	11%	9%	8%
	I trust no faction	37%	26%	29%	36%



**E. Elections**

The seemingly declining support for Hamas is also reflected on the preferences people have in case elections were held next week. As outlined in figure 15, below, the majority of the Palestinian people want PLC elections. However, as indicated in table 14, only 38% of Hamas supporters would like to see early PLC elections.

Figure 15: Support or opposition to early PLC elections




Table 14: Support or opposition to early PLC elections according to region and faction

		Region		Factional trust			
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Support or opposition to early PLC elections.	Support early PLC elections	77%	77%	38%	94%	75%	68%
	Oppose early PLC elections	23%	23%	62%	6%	25%	32%

Similarly, the majority of Palestinians support early presidential elections. Surprisingly, however, support for early presidential elections is higher among Fateh supporters (83%) than among Hamas supporters (54%).

Figure 16: Support or opposition to early Presidential elections






Table 15: Support or opposition to early Presidential elections according to region and faction

	Region		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Support early presidential elections	71%	74%	54%	83%	70%	65%
Oppose early presidential elections	29%	26%	46%	17%	30%	35%

The strong showing of Fateh in the recent polls also shows a very strong and unified position of Fateh supporters with respect to their voting preferences. As indicated in table 16, below, 95% of Fateh supporters said that they will give their votes to the Fateh candidate, something that was different during the elections of January 2006 when a large percentage of Fateh supporters crossed party lines.

Support for the Fateh candidates is also more pronounced among the respondents who do not trust any faction. Whereas 44% of the 'non-partisans' said that they will vote for a Fateh candidate. Only 8% of the non-partisan respondents said that they will cast their vote for the Hamas candidates.

Figure 17: Voting preference if early PLC elections are held next week




Table 16: Voting preference if early PLC elections are held next week according to region and faction

		Region		Factional trust			
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Voting preference if early PLC elections are held next week.	The Fateh list	71%	66%	4%	95%	38%	44%
	The Hamas List	12%	18%	89%	1%	10%	8%
	Another candidate	17%	15%	7%	4%	52%	48%

When asked about the candidate they will vote for if presidential elections will take place next week. 64% said that they will vote for the Fateh president. As for Fateh supporters, 96% said that they will vote for the Fateh candidate. Once again, very few of the non-partisans will give their vote to the Hamas candidate while, at the same time, a significant percentage (45%) will give their vote to the Fateh candidate.



Figure 18: Voting preference if early Presidential elections are held next week




Table 17: Voting preference if early Presidential elections are held next week according to region and faction

		Region			Factional trust		
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Voting preference if early Presidential elections are held next week.	The Fateh candidate	73%	67%	5%	96%	44%	45%
	The Hamas candidate	12%	18%	87%	1%	6%	9%
	Another candidate	15%	15%	8%	4%	50%	46%

Figure 19 and table 18 below indicate to the feelings that the respondents have with regard to the path that the Palestinians should follow to achieve their rights. The majority (80%) believe that the strategy of Fateh is more likely to benefit the Palestinian rights than the Hamas strategy. This feeling runs not only among the supporters of Fateh, but also the supporters of the other factions as well as among those who do not trust any of the factions.

Figure 19: Attitude about the best strategy that works for the Palestinian national interest.






Table 18: The best strategy that works for the Palestinian national interest according to region and faction

	Region			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
The Fateh strategy	82%	78%	8%	99%	80%	77%
The Hamas strategy	18%	22%	92%	1%	20%	23%

## V. Peace and attitude towards Israel

### A. The upcoming peace conference

Support for the Annapolis meeting is slightly less than it was in late September 2007. Today, 71% of the Palestinians support Palestinian participation as opposed to 76% in September. Surprisingly, as indicated in table 19, 29% of the Hamas supporters support Palestinian participation in the meeting.

Figure 20: Support or opposition to the Palestinian participation in the peace conference




Table 19: Support or opposition to the Palestinian participation in the peace conference according to region and faction

	Region			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Support	73%	68%	29%	92%	56%	61%
Oppose	27%	32%	71%	8%	44%	39%

## 1. Expectations about the conference

Although the majority of the respondents support Palestinian participation in the conference, only 43% believe that it will lead to some progress in the peace process. Still, 57% believe that it will not lead to any thing. The only optimists are the supporters of Fateh. As pointed out in table 20, 65% of the Fateh supporters believe that Annapolis will lead to some progress on the peace front. The others are overwhelmingly pessimistic about the meeting.



Figure 21: Perceptions about whether the conference will succeed in achieving progress in the peace process and reach the final solution to the Palestinian problem




Table 20: Perceptions about whether the conference will succeed in achieving progress in the peace process and reach the final solution to the Palestinian problem according to region and faction

		Region			Factional trust		
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Will the conference succeed?	Yes	43%	45%	14%	65%	28%	30%
	No	57%	55%	86%	35%	73%	70%

## 2. The likely beneficiary

When asked about the party that will benefit most from the meetings in Annapolis, the majority (57%) believe that it will be Israel Only 22% believe that the main beneficiaries will be the Palestinians. Even among Fateh supporters, more of them believe that Israel will be the main winner there than they believe it will be the Palestinians. While 42% of the Fateh supporters think that Israel will be the main beneficiary, only 36% of them believe that it will be the Palestinians. These results are overviewed in figure 22 and table 21, below.

Figure 22: Perceptions about the greatest beneficiary from holding this conference






Table 21: Perceptions about the greatest beneficiary from holding this conference according to region and faction

		Region			Factional trust		
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Who is the greatest beneficiary from holding this conference?	Israel	53%	54%	66%	42%	65%	62%
	US government	22%	16%	29%	15%	24%	22%
	PA	21%	24%	3%	36%	7%	15%
	Arab countries	4%	5%	3%	8%	4%	2%

### 3. The referendum

Figure 23 and table 22 show that all Palestinians, irrespective of their factional support or place of residence would like to see a referendum on any agreement that might be the outcome of any future peace conference that might be reached during the Annapolis meeting. The strongest support for a referendum is among Fateh supporters with 90% of their supporters calling for a referendum..

Figure 23: Level of support for referendum on any agreement reached in the peace conference




Table 22: Level of support for referendum on any agreement reached in the peace conference according to region and faction

	Region			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Support	86%	81%	68%	90%	86%	82%
Oppose	14%	19%	32%	10%	14%	18%

### B. Attitude about the final status issues

#### 1. Attitude about the most important final status issue

Since the meeting in Annapolis will primarily consider the most contentious issues, respondents were asked about the most important final status issue. As illustrated in figure 24, below, 51% of the respondents say that the issue of Jerusalem is the most important issue (51%) followed by the refugee issue (24%).



As reviewed in table 23, the importance of Jerusalem runs among all factions and in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Figure 24: The main final status issue that should be resolved as soon as possible




Table 23: The main final status issue that should be resolved as soon as possible according to region and faction

		Region		Factional trust			
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
The main final status issue that should be resolved as soon as possible.	Jerusalem	48%	55%	53%	50%	56%	51%
	Refugees	25%	23%	31%	23%	22%	23%
	Settlements	8%	5%	3%	9%	4%	6%
	Borders	13%	14%	9%	14%	12%	14%
	Water	6%	3%	4%	4%	6%	5%

Respondents were also asked specifically on the main issues pertaining to the negotiations. As indicated in figure 25, the majority of the Palestinians support a two-state solution and the right of return of the refugees to their place of origin. As for Jerusalem, 62% of the respondents want Jerusalem to be shared or split between Palestine and Israel. Only 38% want both parts of Jerusalem as a capital for the Palestinians state only.

As outlined in table 24, the issue of a two state solution is supported more by Fateh supporters. The least support for a two state solution is among supporters of Hamas where 52% of them support the idea of a one state solution on historic Palestine.

Regarding the refugee right of return, the majority of the Palestinians, irrespective of their political affiliation support the right of return. Very few opt for compensation or for the return to the future Palestinian state.

As for the status of Jerusalem, the majority of Fateh supporters (69%) want to see Jerusalem shared or split between East and West Jerusalem. This view is stated by 48% of the supporters of Hamas. As for the respondents who do not trust any faction, their views on the Jerusalem issue is half way between the views of the Hamas supporters and the views of the Fateh supporters.

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Figure 25: Attitude about the nature of the state, refugees, and Jerusalem




Table 24: Attitude about the nature of the state, refugees, and Jerusalem according to region and faction

		Region			Factional trust		
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Do you support solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the basis of ...	Two states for two people	53%	53%	25%	62%	46%	55%
	A one bi-national state in historic Palestine	14%	16%	23%	14%	15%	13%
	A Palestinian state on all historic Palestine	32%	31%	52%	23%	40%	32%
What is the solution to the Palestinian refugees?	Return to their original place of residence	60%	63%	68%	55%	69%	64%
	Return back to the new Palestinian state	26%	21%	25%	25%	24%	22%
	Compensation	14%	16%	8%	20%	8%	14%
The solution of Jerusalem issue is to be...	Jerusalem as an international capital	11%	30%	17%	20%	25%	16%
	East Jerusalem for Palestine and West for Israel	28%	32%	20%	34%	29%	27%
	A unified capital for both states	14%	13%	11%	15%	14%	13%
	A capital only for Palestine	47%	25%	52%	31%	33%	43%

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**C. Attitude towards a peace settlement with Israel**

Regarding the level of support for the peace process, 72% of the respondents support a peace agreement with Israel. Even 38% of Hamas supporters support a peace agreement with Israel. As noted in table 25, the highest support of a peace settlement with Israel is among supporters of Hamas where 87% of them favor this view.

Figure 26: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel




Table 25: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel according to region and faction

	Region			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Support	71%	74%	38%	87%	58%	71%
Oppose	29%	26%	62%	13%	42%	29%

**D. Hamas and the state of Israel**

As for the position of the Palestinian public on whether Hamas should maintain its position that reject the state of Israel, the results reveal that 69% of the respondents want Hamas to change its position, an increase by 7% in the past six weeks. Even among the supporters of Hamas, there has been a 2% increase in the percentage of Hamas respondents who want their organization to change its position on the state of Israel.



Figure 27: Palestinian perceptions about whether Hamas should maintain its position on the elimination of Israel




Table 26: Palestinian perceptions about whether Hamas should maintain its position on the elimination of Israel according to region and faction

		Region		Factional trust			
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Hamas	Fateh	Others	None
Should Hamas maintain its position on the elimination of the state of Israel?	Hamas should maintain its position on Israel	31%	31%	78%	16%	44%	29%
	Hamas should change its position regarding Israel	69%	69%	22%	84%	56%	71%