



الأونروا UNRWA

providing humanitarian assistance
to palestine refugees since 1950

UNRWA Emergency Appeal 2006



Preface



2005 has been a year of momentous change in the occupied Palestinian territory: a new President was elected, municipal elections took place, and Israel withdrew its presence from the Gaza Strip and from parts of the Northern West Bank. There was a marked decrease in the levels of violence prevalent during the previous years. A sense of hope, although still very fragile, has reappeared in this devastated land.

However, the destruction of infrastructure, of agricultural land, the absence of freedom of movement of goods and persons, and the continuing lack of access by Palestinian labourers to the Israeli labour market have seriously depressed the Palestinian economy, and the effects thereof continue to be felt. Indeed, the World Bank reports an increase in poverty levels over those of 2004: this means that an already very dramatic socio-economic situation actually worsened during this period. Moreover, the expected improvements in the lives of Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip after disengagement will not affect the lives of the inhabitants of the West Bank: the latter are increasingly affected by the effects of the separation barrier, and the general lack of freedom of movement within the West Bank, let alone between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or the broader outside world.

The Palestine refugees in the occupied Palestinian territory constitute the most vulnerable section of the population. Many of them have lost their jobs and many have been wounded or killed, leaving their families bereft of a breadwinner. Coping mechanisms have been stretched well beyond their natural limits. In these past years, generous amounts of humanitarian aid, channelled largely through

UNRWA and UN sister organizations such as the World Food Programme, and coordinated through the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) have averted a major humanitarian disaster. Let me assure you that it has been money well spent.

All of us hope that the conditions generally acknowledged to be necessary for the revival of the Palestinian economy will soon begin to be fulfilled. In time, these will bring productive employment and sustainable economic growth to the occupied Palestinian territory. But it is essential that we now address the gap between the crisis of these past years and the anticipated future resumption of economic development.

UNRWA's Emergency Appeal for 2006 is thus before you as our contribution to the United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). It is consistent with the efforts of the Palestinian Authority to revitalize its economy. You will note that the overall amount requested is roughly half of that of previous years. I hope you will find that it focuses strictly on the most important elements which will ameliorate the suffering of the refugees in the short term.

I urge you to support this appeal with generosity. I am confident you share with me the hope that this may be the last year that such an appeal is required, and that by next year, Palestine refugees may once again be active participants in a vibrant Palestinian economy.

*Karen AbuZayd
Commissioner-General, UNRWA*

Introduction

For the sixth consecutive year, UNRWA is appealing to donors to fund an emergency programme for the occupied Palestinian territory. In spite of the disengagement of Israeli settlers and army from the Gaza Strip, and an overall significant decline in levels of violence and destruction of property during 2005, the Agency has yet to see any improvement in key humanitarian indicators. Poverty rates increased in 2005 compared to 2004⁽¹⁾, and the access regime, in spite of a short-lived improvement in Gaza during the second quarter of the year, remains largely unchanged with the exception of internal movement within the Gaza Strip as a result of disengagement. In some important respects, such as access to health for Palestinian residents of the oPt, conditions may even have worsened lately.

As the World Bank and others have repeatedly noted, increased donor spending within this policy environment cannot be expected to achieve long-term results. The maintenance of appropriate levels of humanitarian assistance is therefore crucial to sustain the population until developments in the peace process can hopefully bring about an easing of the closure regime. In this context, UNRWA's five-year old emergency programme has allowed refugees to concentrate their limited resources on other essential needs. Reducing humanitarian

assistance will put extreme stress on these already over-stretched resources and increase already serious poverty. Likewise, it is hard to see how a reduction in humanitarian aid can have positive consequences for popular support for further steps towards peace and stability, within a climate of law and order.

In order to direct fundraising energies on the most basic requirements of sustaining the refugee community in the interim, UNRWA has distilled its Emergency Appeal for 2006 to focus on measures which provide temporary relief to the poverty which the closure regime has wrought. This will be achieved through an emphasis on offering sources of income to refugee households through temporary employment opportunities, limited cash assistance and a programme of emergency food distribution to combat food insecurity.

This Appeal document provides a brief overview of developments during 2005 and sets out the humanitarian context to the programme. Project sheets provide an overview of interventions proposed in temporary employment, food assistance, cash assistance, mobile health clinics and operations support.

1 OCHA, Humanitarian Update, September 2005



Developments during 2005: Forward momentum coupled with retrenchment

The election of President Mahmoud Abbas in January, following the death of Yasser Arafat, infused momentum into a peace process which had been moribund for many months. Immediate impacts included a major reduction in violence on both sides, an easing of the closure regime around the Gaza Strip and a reduction in the number of fixed checkpoints across the West Bank. This was followed by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's unilateral plan to remove all Israeli forces and settlers from the Gaza Strip and to evacuate four small settlements in the north of the West Bank. To build on the momentum, the Quartet appointed former World Bank President James Wolfensohn as its Special Envoy for Disengagement, to assist in the revival of the economic dimensions of the peace process.

Both the PA and UNRWA have been quick to coordinate with the office of the Special Envoy, and have contributed to a three year framework of responses issued by his Office, based around maximizing economic opportunities and restoring physical assets destroyed over the course of the *intifada* to improve living conditions. The continuation of programmes of emergency assistance provide an essential backstop to these additional, medium term initiatives. Naturally, concrete accomplishments will require significant additional donor funding.

The disengagement process itself began in June and was concluded on 12th September with the departure of the last units of the Israeli army, a mere four weeks after the distribution of eviction notices to settler families. Despite this promising start, progress was slow thereafter. It was not until mid November, with the personal intervention of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that provision was agreed between the parties for controlled passage through the Rafah Border, passage to Israel and passage between Gaza and the West Bank. Agreement was also brokered on the construction of the sea port. Israel agreed to produce a plan to reduce restrictions on

internal movement in the West Bank before the end of the year.

The promise of a successful disengagement from Gaza has not been echoed on the West Bank where work to complete the 670km barrier has continued apace throughout the year. In the Jerusalem area, as a consequence, over 50,000 Palestinians, legal residents of the city, will find themselves on the wrong side of the barrier. Their access to employment, education and health services in the city will be severely limited. A tightening of access restrictions to the so-called "seam zone," which lies between the barrier and the 1967 Green Line has also been noted, following the introduction of magnetic cards.

Regrettably, the root causes of humanitarian suffering and the structural constraints to development in the oPt remain unchanged. These form the context in which UNRWA presents this Appeal. They are the linked issues of access to employment and markets and the impoverishment which comes as about as a result.



context of emergency

Crisis of access

The West Bank closure system comprises a series of blockages placed by the Israeli army to control and disrupt Palestinian movement within the West Bank and between the West Bank and Israel. The Government of Israel has consistently maintained that the closure regime and restrictions on movement are necessary to prevent attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli citizens.

The closure regime consists of physical and administrative measures. Physical obstacles deployed include permanently and temporarily-manned checkpoints, road blocks, metal gates, earth mounds, earth walls and trenches. The impact of these measures is compounded by a permit system which requires Palestinians to request permission from the Israeli authorities, providing specific reasons for travel.

As of 1 August 2005, 376 closure obstacles were recorded in the West Bank - a decline of 37 percent compared with February this year⁽²⁾. This decline signals a significant improvement, particularly in access for villagers to nearby towns. Nevertheless, movement between the southern, middle and northern West Bank remains problematic⁽³⁾. Physical obstacles placed in strategically important locations - for example, near settlements, at junctions between Palestinian roads and Israeli bypass roads and at the entrances to West Bank urban hubs - remain in place⁽⁴⁾.

At the same time, access for Palestinians to Israel has become increasingly problematic with the continued construction of the barrier in the central and southern West Bank. The barrier is also adversely affecting communities in the seam zone and close to the barrier in terms of access to basic services (health and education), agricultural land and markets. As of October, approximately 243 kilometres had been completed and 166 kilometres were under construction - about 61 percent of the barrier's planned total length. The barrier's announced route places approximately 10

percent of West Bank territory⁽⁵⁾ and approximately 75 percent of settlers on its western side⁽⁶⁾.

In the Gaza Strip, improved access is also the key to alleviating humanitarian suffering. All movement in and out of the Gaza Strip is controlled by Israeli authorities, with the exception of travel through the Rafah crossing to Egypt, where the European Union acts as an independent monitor of movement on behalf of both Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Fences and a concrete wall surround the Gaza Strip and sea access is restricted for Palestinians. Movement in and out of the Gaza Strip is controlled through a number of crossing points:

- Erez crossing for Palestinian workers and merchants and medical referrals who have permits to enter Israel;
- Erez crossing for PA staff and international organizations;
- Rafah crossing, between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, for access to other countries, including for overseas medical referrals;
- Four commercial crossings, of which Karni is the largest.

2 This easing follows the Sharm al-Sheikh leaders' summit in February between Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas and the reduction in violence that followed. OCHA caveats this figure by noting that this does not equate to a 37% improvement in access.

3 The emerging pattern of closures indicates a more solid west-east 'line' at two points in the West Bank, which effectively trisect the West Bank. Tighter restrictions appear to be associated with crossing these 'lines' (OCHA, Humanitarian Update, August 2005)

4 Further, some checkpoints and crossings through the barrier have been upgraded, suggesting a more permanent presence. To facilitate movement, Israel is also constructing underpasses and bridges that link Palestinian areas separated from each other by Israeli settlements and bypass roads.

5 This includes East Jerusalem, the Ariel finger and Ma'ale Adumim settlement expansion plan.

6 OCHA, Preliminary Analysis of the Humanitarian Implications of February 2005 Projected Route, April 2005.

crisis of access

The extent to which Israeli exerts control over the economy in Gaza through these entry/exit points can be seen in relation to flows of both labour and goods.

There is only one passenger access point from Gaza into Israel; the Erez checkpoint. On the eve of the *intifada*, an average 29,865 workers passed through this checkpoint each day in order to access jobs inside Israel. The average daily figure for the period November 2004 until October 2005 was 1,083, largely attributable to higher figures in the second quarter which were not in evidence before and have not been repeated since (see Fig. 1 below).

As for the flow of goods to and from Gaza, Figure 2 (below) shows clearly how susceptible imports to and exports from the Gaza Strip are to Israeli control. Within the first ten months of 2005, truckloads of imports per month went from a low of 1,403 to 6,592 truckloads per month - a variance of over 450 percent. Unsurprisingly, this leads to shortages of basic commodities in the local market and a sharp fluctuations in prices of essential goods, depending on availability. During the same period, exports ranged from 240 to 1030 truckloads per month - again displaying a variance of over 400 percent.

	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct
Workers to Israel	0	72	49	390	1,451	3,200	2,067	3,588	1,767	281	128	0
Traders to Israel	n/a	n/a	17	70	158	224	103	362	175	168	140	0
Workers to EIZ ⁽⁷⁾	13	35	9	278	537	487	259	458	233	201	41	n/a
Total	13	107	75	738	2,146	3,911	2,429	4,408	2,175	650	309	0

Fig. 1 Flows of workers through Erez, November 2004 to September 2005. Source: OCHA, November 2005.




Fig. 2 Truckloads of Imports/exports, January to October 2005. Source: OCHA, November 2005.

⁷ Erez Industrial Zone. Note that Israeli businesses in this area were evacuated as part of the disengagement process.

Unemployment and Impoverishment

The impact of the *intifada* on the nascent Palestinian economy has been devastating. Tight restrictions on the movement of Palestinian goods and personnel within the oPt and across external borders since September 2000 have led to a sharp increase in unemployment rates, crippling the private sector and dragging the majority of the population below the World Bank poverty line of US\$2.10 per day. Per capita GDP and real per capita income have plummeted, falling by over one third since 2000⁽⁸⁾.

The economic effects of the *intifada* on the labour force and private sector have been severe. Soon after its start, businesses were hit by blocks on exports and folded within weeks, unable to reach markets or meet business obligations. Today, the sector is characterized by bankruptcy and closure, idle capacity and shrunken markets. Almost overnight, around 100,000 labourers (or almost one in five of all employed Palestinians at that time, and whose wages represented an even higher proportion of GDP) who used to work inside Israel found themselves out of work: the total number of Palestinians from the oPt working inside Israel and the settlements dropped from 127,000 in September 2000 to just over 20,000 by the end of that year⁽⁹⁾. During the third quarter of 2005, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) estimated that only 39,000 Palestinians were employed inside Israel and the settlements.

Today meanwhile, unemployment rates stand at 22.7 percent, up from 10 percent on the eve of the *intifada*⁽¹⁰⁾, according to ILO standards. Other estimates of unemployment are much higher. If discouraged workers, i.e. those who have given up looking for work, are added (relaxed unemployment rate), then the rate rises to 28.4 percent. According to PCBS statistics, 260,000 labour force participants were unemployed during the third quarter of 2005, representing 25.5 percent of the labour force in the West Bank and 34.6 percent of the labour force in the Gaza Strip; in 2000, this figure stood at 125,000.

Joblessness rates are highest amongst the 15 - 24 age bracket and those with few skills. In September 2000, the unemployment rate for 15 - 24 year olds stood at 14 percent, compared with 10 percent for the population as a whole: youth employment peaked at 50 percent in 2002 and now stands at around 35 percent⁽¹¹⁾.

The Palestinian economy, which needs to create tens of thousands of new jobs each year to keep pace with rapid population growth rates, is only being kept afloat by frayed social networks and substantial external support, mainly from donors.

The economy has suffered severe structural damage. There has been a marked shift towards informal work activities, casual labour and subsistence agriculture, with a corresponding contraction in the construction and manufacturing industries as Palestinian society has adapted to the prevailing conditions and economies have localized.

These trends are illustrated in recent macro-economic data⁽¹²⁾. The total number of persons in full time employment has only increased fractionally over the past six years - from 556,000 to 603,000 - despite a population increase of more than 600,000 persons over the same period. The number of those in part time employment has increased by 25,000, or 65 percent. Consequently, dependency ratios have risen from 4.8 % in 2000 to 5.8 percent in the third quarter of 2005.

8 World Bank Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian Economic Prospects, June 2004

9 World Bank, 27 months – Intifada, closures and Palestinian Economic crisis and PCBS labour surveys

10 PCBS Labour Force Survey Q3 2005.

11 World Bank, Four years – Intifada, closures and Palestinian Economic crisis and PCBS labour surveys

12 PCBS labour force survey, Q3 2005

unemployment and impoverishment

Low incomes and unemployment have led to high and worsening poverty⁽¹³⁾. According to regular studies carried out by the PCBS since 2001, rates have fluctuated between 58 and 70 percent over the past four years, reaching 85 percent in Gaza⁽¹⁴⁾. In 2004, the World Bank estimated that 47 percent of the population were below the poverty line (65 percent in Gaza), up from 20 percent in 1999,⁽¹⁵⁾ placing over 1,700,000 Palestinians below the poverty line⁽¹⁶⁾. Many of these are living in extreme poverty: the University of Geneva's eighth Palestinian Perceptions report issued in July 2005⁽¹⁷⁾ found that almost one in three refugees living in camps in the oPt were

surviving on less than US \$1 per day. Households are unable to meet daily needs, let alone respond to economic shocks such as loss of income, post-injury care, the loss of home or belongings.

One of the most serious impacts of the unemployment/poverty continuum has been the dangerous decline in people's economic access to food, i.e. their ability to earn sufficient income to purchase adequate nutrition. Again, according to the Palestinian Perceptions surveys, more than 1,188,000 Palestinians are spending less than is required to meet the minimum recommended calorific intake, set at US \$1.60 per person per day⁽¹⁸⁾. In addition to the unemployment and poverty indicators mentioned above, wage levels have not kept up with rising consumer prices. Since 2000, real wages have declined 3.8 percent in Gaza and nearly 15 percent in the West Bank⁽¹⁹⁾. Agricultural wages have been particularly affected.



13 OCHA, Humanitarian Update, September 2005.

14 PCBS impact of Israeli measures on the economic conditions of Palestinian households, round 11.

15 World Bank, Four years – Intifada, closures and Palestinian economic crisis

16 Estimates of poverty levels have varied considerably in the oPt over the course of the intifada, due to differences in definition and methodology

17 IUED, Palestinian Public Perceptions Report 8, Executive Summary

18 According to the World Food Program, 'subsistence poverty' could be higher than estimated by the World Bank and PCBS. WFP estimates that essential spending on non-food items is higher than estimated by the World Bank. (WFP, Livelihoods, Shocks and Coping Strategies of WFP Beneficiaries in the oPt, Baseline Survey, 2004).

19 Idem, p. 13.

UNRWA's response: Emergency Programme

Emergency Employment Programmes

direct hire

Aim

To alleviate the poverty associated with high unemployment through the provision of temporary work opportunities to unemployed refugees.

Objectives

- Gaza Strip: To provide 2.4 million workdays through creating 8,000 short-term job opportunities for unemployed refugees from the Gaza Strip for a maximum contract duration of six months.
- West Bank: To provide 975,000 workdays through creating 21,000 one month job opportunities and 6,000 three month job opportunities for unemployed refugees in the West Bank.
- In both fields, to provide 30% of direct hire opportunities to female headed households.

Activities

The Direct Hire Programme covers the creation of job placements both within the Agency and in external organisations such as municipalities and NGOs.

The programme in both fields follows a well defined and controlled procedure. This differs slightly between the two fields but essentially consists of the following components:

- **Recruitment:** To ensure fairness, calls for applicants are made by public advertisement. UNRWA maintains a database of these applications.
- **Screening:** Applicants are first checked to ensure that they are registered refugees. Agency social workers in the Department of Relief and Social Services thereafter screen applicants on the basis of the eligibility criteria described below.
- **Placement:** In cases where the applicant is placed within the Agency, this is a direct process between Job Creation Programme (JCP) staff and the department concerned. Where applicants are placed in external organisations such as municipalities and

NGOs, a memorandum of understanding is signed between the Agency and the organisation concerned.

- **Termination:** Department heads are required to make requests for replacements to ensure the smooth transition from one cycle to another.

The majority of placements provided for under the direct hire programme are low skilled positions (labourers, cleaners, guards, clerks etc) firstly to ensure the high numbers required and secondly to ensure access for the target group. However the Agency also maintains a number of professional posts (medical doctors, dentists and engineers) and skilled contractors (tradesmen, book-keepers, administrators and IT staff under this programme.

Note that in the West Bank the standard contract period is three months whilst in Gaza the contract period is six months. West Bank maintains a three month rotation to increase coverage of the programme. In Gaza, the numbers of contractors will increase overall by 25% for 2006 over 2005 and the longer period has been adopted firstly to provide additional stability for beneficiaries.

In exceptional cases of hardship, petitions are considered to extend JCP participants or transfer them on to further placements. Eligibility for this facility is determined by the Agency's social workers. Professional staff may be extended with justification from the head of department. The extension of skilled contractors requires a higher level of justification.

Eligibility criteria for the intervention

The operational criteria for recruiting unskilled candidates are as follows:

- Refugee status (except in cases where a local resident is married to a refugee);
- Family size;
- Should not be employed by UNRWA or the PA;

emergency employment programmes

direct hire

- Should not be a relative of an UNRWA staff member or another JCP contractor hired at the same time (under the same refugee family registration card).
- Should not be in receipt of another form of UNRWA's regular humanitarian assistance, i.e. Special Hardship Cases
- Place of residence
- Gender (women are given preferential assessment for certain jobs)

In the case of skilled candidates, qualifications are also taken into account.

Timescale

The programme will run from 1st January to 31st December. A small carryover of funds in the West Bank will cover the programme costs into February 2006.

Impact on Beneficiaries

The primary benefit in any temporary job creation programme is a financial one. The programmes in both fields seek to alleviate levels of poverty for the contracted period by providing a basic and reliable level of income. This is deliberately set at a low rate of \$2.10 (the World Bank poverty line) per contractor and each direct dependent, equating to an average monthly wage of around US \$250 per month. In Gaza, the number of persons who will benefit from the programme has been estimated at 74,080 whilst the corresponding figure for the West Bank is estimated at 162,000 persons⁽²⁰⁾. There will also be spin-off benefits to local retailers and service providers.

According to the findings of a series of focus groups conducted on the Agency's behalf in the summer of 2005, the major part of the income

earned through the programme was spent on meeting basic needs. Most beneficiaries used their new incomes in the programme to increase expenditure on food, healthcare and educational expenses but clothing, home repair, the repayment of debts and payment of utilities bills also featured. Beneficiaries surveyed found that the programme had social and psychological as well as professional benefits.

External Linkages

The first level of external linkages for the programme is with regard to the placements in which contractors serve, such as municipalities, village councils and local NGOs. During the assessment of applications, the Agency shares applicant information with the PA Ministry of Finance to ensure that neither applicants nor their close family members are on the payroll of any PA agency.

Monitoring

A full-time team of monitors in both fields regularly visits each site to ensure that those hired are working in accordance with their terms and conditions and to verify attendance records.

²⁰ This equates to 8,000 six month contracts (16,000 persons p.a.) based on an average family size of 4.63 persons. In West Bank this equates to 27,000 contracts with an average family size of 6 persons.

Budget

Direct Hire Financial Summary

	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Total
Operating Costs	25,040,282	17,318,883	42,359,165
Administrative Costs (11%)	2,754,431	1,905,077	4,659,508
Subtotal	27,794,713	19,223,960	47,018,673
Less available resources	0	1,000,000	1,000,000
Total	\$27,794,713	\$18,223,960	\$46,018,673

emergency employment programmes

indirect hire (West Bank only)

Aim

To alleviate the poverty associated with high unemployment through the provision of temporary work opportunities to unemployed refugees.

Objectives

- To provide Within UNRWA camps, 30,926 workdays, for 2,577 labourers supporting 15,205 dependents (average of six dependents per breadwinner); and
- Within other organisations such as Union of Agricultural Work Committees, Agricultural Relief and Palestinian Authority, 21,778 workdays, for 1,210 labourers supporting 7,238 dependents.

The sub-programme will therefore provide 52,704 workdays through 3,787 short-term job opportunities for unemployed refugees on a fortnightly and monthly rotation basis (depending on the task).

Activities

This sub-programme uses the infrastructure of the Camp Popular Committees (CPCs) to implement temporary employment contracts. Activities are as follows:

- **Project identification:** This is done by the CPCs in conjunction with the Agency which then draws up detailed specifications and criteria for the work to be executed.
- **Contracting:** A Memorandum of Understanding is concluded with the committee in each refugee camp detailing the responsibilities of the committee, the reporting requirements and the timing of payments as well as the specifications of the work to be implemented. Once the CPC submits a detailed work plan and schedule, the Agency makes a 30 percent advance payment against the estimated cost of the work to be executed.
- **Recruitment:** Vacancies are advertised in the camps and in UNRWA installations. Each CPC is in charge of recruiting the labourers based on UNRWA eligibility criteria. This is monitored closely by the Agency.
- **Implementation:** Works are carried out under the UNRWA's supervision.

Eligibility Criteria for the Intervention

The criteria for eligibility set for this programme are the same as for the direct hire programme above with the exception that family size is set at four dependents and above.

Time Scale

The sub-programme will run within UNRWA camps for a period of nine months (from April to 31st December); within other organizations, the sub-programme is planned to will run for nine months (from February to October).

Impact on Beneficiaries

For labourer positions which constitute the majority of the positions available, the daily wage payable averages US\$13.5 per day (as per direct hire, payment is based on numbers of dependents). For foreman positions the daily wage is US\$15.4 per day. This sub-programme also contributes to the improvement of the overall infrastructure of the camp, for example by providing wider thoroughfares, paving dirt roads rendered inaccessible in wet conditions by mud, upgrading drainage systems and repairing damage. All camp residents will therefore benefit indirectly. Other impacts of the programme are as per Direct Hire, above.



emergency employment programmes

indirect hire (West Bank only)

External Linkages

UNRWA cooperates closely with the CPCs to ensure a well managed implementation of the project and selection process. CPCs are effectively sub-contractors within this programme and are required to act in accordance with Agency regulations.

Monitoring

CPCs submit a biweekly report on work progress and breakdown of expenditure. Official receipts for materials and tools purchased and equipment rented are also sent to UNRWA's Field Sanitary Engineer who is

responsible for compiling a monthly report on the implementation of the project and conducts regular field visits.

Budget

Indirect Hire Financial Summary

	West Bank
Operating Costs	1,878,769
Administrative Costs (11%)	206,665
Subtotal	2,085,434
Less available resources	450,000
Total	\$1,635,434



UNRWA's response: Emergency Programme

Emergency Food Assistance Programme

Aim

To ensure food security for the most vulnerable refugee households through the provision of a food basket of basic food commodities to counter problems of economic access to adequate nutrition.

Objectives

- **Gaza Strip:** to undertake six rounds of food distribution to 135,000 families (625,050 persons based on average of 4.63 persons per family) in 2006 i.e., one round every two months.
- **West Bank:** to distribute two rounds of food to 75,000 households (450,000 persons based on average of 6 persons per family) in 2006 i.e., one round every six months⁽²¹⁾.

Activities

This differs between the two fields but essentially consists of the following components:

- Social workers from UNRWA's Relief and Social Services Programme Department identify those families eligible to benefit from emergency food assistance.
- The Procurement and Logistics Division in Amman issues a tender for the supply of required commodities to an approved list of international suppliers.
- In committee, staff of the Procurement and Logistics Division at field level analyse the bids and draw up contract proposals. Once the Agency's Headquarters Contracts Committee approves these, contracts are awarded.
- Materials and other supplies required for packing the commodities are procured on the local market in accordance with the Agency's standard rules and procedures (in all instances by means of competitive tender).
- Relief and Social Services staff prepare and distribute coupons to families to ensure that assistance goes only to those eligible.

- UNRWA takes delivery of the commodities through the Israeli port of Ashdod and arranges transport to its warehousing facilities in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
- Packing and distribution of the commodities is carried out by staff hired under the Agency's emergency job creation programme under the supervision of the staff of both the Field Procurement and Logistics and the Field Relief and Social Services Programme departments, in accordance with an established schedule and based on the distribution coupons held by beneficiaries.
- West Bank Field distributes a parcel for three persons consisting of 30kg flour, 6kg rice, 6kg sugar, 2kg whole milk, 4kg lentils and 4 litres of sunflower oil.
- Gaza Field distributes a comparable parcel of assistance, varying according to family size.
- Social workers carry out random sample checks on households' eligibility and their use of assistance.
- Relief and Social Services Programme staff provide monthly reports.

Eligibility criteria for the intervention

Eligibility is based on the following criteria:

- Registered refugee families who have lost their income;
- Registered refugee families whose income has been seriously disrupted to the point where it has dropped below the poverty line.

21 Note that West Bank Field has decreased food assistance for 2006 in favour of increasing direct hire provision. Noting the lack of evidence supporting problems over physical access to food, during 2005, the field also re-evaluated the criteria for receipt of food, to be based on specific need for food as opposed to other forms of assistance.

emergency food assistance programme

Note these general criteria provide guidance for the programme but are reinforced by home visits undertaken by the Agency's social workers. Lists of beneficiaries are drawn up and closely monitored by Relief and Social Services Programme staff. Agency social workers pay home visits to families to ensure that they correspond to the stated criteria. Those who do not are dropped from the list.

Timescale

The programme will cover 1st January to 31st December 2006.

Impact on Beneficiaries

UNRWA's emergency food aid targets the poorest refugee households to improve levels of food security. As a secondary benefit, it also frees up scarce family income for the purchase of other essential household goods, including fresh food.

The focus groups on emergency food aid conducted during 2005 showed that for two thirds of those surveyed, the UNRWA's emergency food assistance was the number one source of food. Respondents agreed that food aid secures the minimum requirements for family food needs and in addition, enables families to save money on purchasing food items such as bread and labaneh due to the flour and milk powder provided. This translates into financial assistance which enables beneficiaries to repay debts to friends, relatives and shops and frees cash to pay utility bills, educational expenses, clothes, rent and other basic needs. The relief this brings is reflected in improved personal relations within the family.

External Linkages

UNRWA social workers regularly cross-check beneficiary lists with the Ministry of Social Affairs, World Food Programme, local committees, charitable societies and other NGOs to add or delete families according to the established criteria. They may also pay visits to the affected locations and check the lists with local mukhtars and traders. UNRWA regularly meets with WFP through local coordination fora and bilaterally, and will be participating with WFP in a revised baseline nutritional study in the course of 2006. The Agency periodically reviews lists of beneficiaries receiving food aid from the Ministry of Social Affairs through WFP to identify the registered refugees on these lists. Those identified by the Agency as registered refugees are removed from the WFP lists.

Monitoring

For monitoring, UNRWA Relief and Social Service use the following indicators:

- Percentage of households assessed/ reassessed each quarter and recommended for assistance
- Percentage of identified vulnerable households receiving food aid packages
- Percentage of households using food aid received for their own needs
- Number of calories distributed per refugee
- Number of days when nutritional needs were covered by UNRWA emergency food distribution
- Timely distribution, delays/disruptions to the distribution process

Budget

Food Assistance Financial Summary

	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Total
Operating Costs	25,318,677	8,626,791	33,945,468
Administrative Costs (11%)	2,785,055	948,947	3,734,002
Subtotal	28,103,732	9,575,738	37,679,470
Less available resources	0	4,997,166	4,997,166
Total	\$28,103,732	\$4,578,572	\$32,682,304

UNRWA's response: Emergency Programme

Emergency Cash Assistance Programmes

Aim

The aim of UNRWA's emergency cash assistance programme is to alleviate poverty among Palestine refugees through the provision of cash subsidies and household goods to the most vulnerable households.

Objectives

Gaza Strip:

- To distribute rental subsidies to 2,421 households each month
- To distribute emergency cash grants to 1,700 households each month

West Bank:

To distribute emergency cash grants to 1,500 households each month

- To distribute blankets (3,000), and kitchen kits (100) to a limited number of households
- To distribute school bags to 12,000 pupils from vulnerable households

Activities

UNRWA maintains well developed procedures for the issuing of cash grants in both fields:

- A Social Worker visits the affected family to study its socio-economic condition.
- If eligible, he/she prepares a social assistance report.
- The report is sent with a recommendation to the Camp Relief and Social Services Officer (CRSSO).
- CRSSO reviews the report and passes it to the Field Office for further review.
- Lists of approved families are sent to the Field Finance Officer for action with respect to transferring funds to the bank.
- The Social Worker notifies the family to go to the bank to collect the assistance.
- A file is maintained for every family assisted.

During 2006, the West Bank Field will use the forthcoming results of its Household Survey to review the criteria for assistance under this programme.

Eligibility criteria for the intervention

Eligibility is based on the following criteria

1. Rental Subsidies⁽²²⁾

- If two extended families rent one unit to live in, the monthly rental cost is paid to the principal family only not to the two families.
- Families who have moved to live in free accommodation are only provided with a one-off payment, to offset the costs of evacuation, transportation etc.

2. Loss of Income (One-time Payment):

- Families who have lost their breadwinner and are left with no one capable of earning any income.
- Families whose breadwinners have sustained serious injuries and as a result have become unable to earn income.
- Families whose breadwinner has lost his/her job as a result of the current crisis and for whom the Agency's emergency employment programme is unable to find appropriate work.
- Families in need of support to cover post-injury social care expenses for one or more injured family members.
- Non-refugee families where their need for cash is extremely pressing and no other avenues of assistance exist. Note that this is an extremely limited category of individuals.

²² Rental subsidies are payable to families who have lost their home due to Israeli military activity and are waiting on Agency lists to be re-housed. Note that the virtual absence of home demolition during 2005 means that these represent historic cases. No allowance has been made for projected demolitions during 2006.

emergency cash assistance programme

The size of the cash grant is determined by UNRWA's social workers after a careful assessment of the household's financial situation, taking into consideration income prior to the start of the current crises and assistance from other sources which might be available.

Timescale

The programme will cover 1st January to 31st December 2006. Cash assistance is paid on a monthly basis.

Impact on Beneficiaries

Families eligible for relocation assistance receive US \$100 per month whilst families deemed eligible for one-off payments receive an average of US \$235 in Gaza and US \$200 in the West Bank. The provision of blankets (value US \$10), kitchen kits (value US \$200) and school bags (value US \$20) in the West Bank frees up scarce resources for other needs.

According to the Agency's focus groups on emergency cash assistance, almost all respondents (92%) stressed that finding work would allow them to come off the programme and support themselves once again. Israeli closure measures to shut down access for Palestinians to work in Israel were - unsurprisingly - cited as a reason for lack of work opportunities at the present time. Respondents felt that the contribution of the cash assistance programme was to allow them to meet pressing financial needs and to repay debts. Importantly, refugees felt able to approach UNRWA for this assistance "with dignity intact" rather than seeking charity from local NGOs and other welfare providers.

External Linkages

Eligibility for UNRWA's emergency selective cash assistance and the amount of the grant is determined by the Agency's social workers after a careful assessment of the household's financial situation. This is established through direct contact between the social workers and potential beneficiaries as well as coordination at the community level with refugee committees, local NGOs, charitable associations, etc.

Monitoring

For monitoring, UNRWA Relief and Social Service use the following indicators:

- Percentage of households assessed/reassessed each quarter and recommended for assistance
- Percentage of identified vulnerable households receiving cash assistance
- Percentage of households using received cash assistance for its purpose
- Percentage of households in special need for primary items (blankets and kitchen set) actually receiving these items
- Percentage of households in special need for school bags actually receiving these items
- Number of delays/disruptions to the distribution process



Budget

Cash Assistance Financial Summary

	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Total
Operating Costs	7,947,355	4,442,550	12,389,905
Administrative Costs (11%)	874,209	488,680	1,362,889
Subtotal	8,821,564	4,931,230	13,752,794
Less available resources	0	400,000	400,000
Total	\$8,821,564	\$4,531,230	\$13,352,794

UNRWA's response: Emergency Programme

Mobile Health Programme

(West Bank only)

Aim

To alleviate the effects of closures on the health status of Palestinians, maintaining the health status of refugees living in the West Bank through facilitating access to primary health care services.

Objectives

- To facilitate access to primary health care services, curative and preventive treatments through maintaining five mobile healthcare teams and establishing five fixed stations. An estimated 660,000 refugee patient consultations will be provided.

Activities

- In 2006, a new preventive care component will be introduced. The Agency's Health Department will establish five fixed stations in different areas of the West Bank; they will be located in Barta'a (Jenin area), Habla in (Qalqilia area), Ajjoul Village (Ramallah area), Al-Burj (Hebron area) and Arab Al-Rashaydeh (Hebron area).
- Recruitment of additional staff for the project will be organised by UNRWA's Health Department and the Job Creation Programme to cover the introduction of the fixed stations, ante-natal, mother and child health care and laboratory services.
- Schedule of regular visits established at field level, advertised in the areas and coordinated with other providers.
- Visits of the clinic will be announced through local mosques, in community-based centres, and through word-of-mouth.
- Procurement of medical supplies.
- Medical supplies will be procured locally if available or otherwise from international suppliers after competitive tendering.
- The emphasis of the service is on basic preventive and curative services including maternal and child health and family planning services, immunization and communicable and non-communicable diseases care, in addition to outpatient care. A range of curative treatments is

offered by the mobile clinics for a broad range of common communicable and non-communicable diseases.

Eligibility criteria for the intervention

UNRWA's mobile clinic and fixed station services will be offered to refugees and non-refugees otherwise lacking access to health services.

Timescale

In 2006, UNRWA mobile clinics will provide preventive and curative treatments throughout the year, on a monthly schedule of visits.

Impact on Beneficiaries

Through the programme, refugees isolated by the separation barrier, checkpoints and roadblocks have access to primary health care services in their own areas, avoiding the need for long and often difficult journeys by public transport. The programme also allows chronically ill patients in target areas to have access to prescription medication.

External Linkages

The schedule of the mobile team will be prepared in coordination with three non-governmental organisations: Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, Médecins Sans Frontières and a local NGO, 'Ard al-Insan. UNRWA also works closely with the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Health, the Palestine Red Crescent Society and local healthcare practitioners to avoid duplication of service provision.

Monitoring

Input from the operational areas, locations of mobile clinics will be sent to the Field Office Health Department. Field visits will be conducted by West Bank Field Office staff to monitor the project. The West Bank Field Office receives monthly reports from the Health Department which form the basis of quarterly reporting to donors.

mobile health programme (west bank only)



Budget

Mobile Clinics Financial Summary

	West Bank
Operating Costs	1,291,345
Administrative Costs (11%)	142,048
Subtotal	1,433,393
Less available resources	537,800
Total	\$895,593

UNRWA's response: Emergency Programme

Operations Support Officer Programme

Aims

To reinforce and facilitate the maintenance of UNRWA's education, health and relief and social services programmes in the context of the emergency situation in the oPt.

Objectives

- To provide logistical support, facilitate access to humanitarian aid, and enable the Agency to respond quickly and help alleviate any undue suffering in the current crisis.
- To ensure the integrity and neutrality of the Agency's installations and programmes.

Activities

- Monitor rapidly changing humanitarian conditions in refugee camps, towns and villages.
- Report problems affecting the general welfare of the population and endeavour to ensure that UNRWA's emergency programmes respond adequately and efficiently to any perceived need for food, medicines, or essential services.
- Facilitate the delivery of food and medical assistance and negotiate the passage of UNRWA personnel, supplies and vehicles, including ambulances, through Israeli military checkpoints.
- Monitor issues relating to access of Agency personnel, vehicles and supplies into, out of and within the West Bank.
- Inspect UNRWA's installations and any assets that the Agency controls to assess any damages sustained as a consequence of hostilities and ensure that they are used only as intended.
- In their interactions with the refugee communities explain the purpose of UNRWA's mandate and neutrality.
- Gather data and prepare reports with a view to improving the services UNRWA provides to refugees and enhancing the efficacy of the Agency's humanitarian programmes.

- Intervene with Israeli military and police agencies to safeguard the immunities and privileges that UNRWA enjoys under international law and through prior agreement with the Government of Israel

Eligibility Criteria for the Intervention

N/A

Time Scale

The Emergency Operation Support Officers Programme will run throughout the year. It is funded under existing arrangements until the end of August 2006.

Impact on Beneficiaries

The expected outcome should be that both regular and emergency UNRWA programming should continue during the current emergency situation and that the rights of the refugee population to humanitarian access is respected

External Linkages

The OSO Programme coordinates closely with fieldwork teams of OCHA and other UN agencies. Information provided by the team is used by UNRWA and OCHA in external reporting.

Monitoring

The programme is in itself a monitoring tool. The teams submit daily, weekly and monthly situation reports to the Agency in addition to providing periodic reporting on particular topics or acute crisis areas.



Budget

Operations Support Officer Programme Financial Summary

	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Total
Operating Costs	658,133	1,775,432	2,433,565
Administrative Costs (11%)	72,395	195,298	267,692
Subtotal	730,528	1,970,730	2,701,257
Less available resources	487,019	1,313,820	1,800,839
Total	\$243,509	\$656,910	\$900,418

Coordination and Programme Development

Coordination

UNRWA continues to participate fully with other UN agencies and some NGOs in the development of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) coordinated by the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In preparation for the 2006 CAP, the oPt was one of six countries across the world chosen to pilot a new Needs Assessment Framework approach. The benefit of this was the consolidation of primary and secondary sources of information on humanitarian issues. Through this process, agencies were assisted in identifying priority humanitarian issues for the 2006 CAP and the contextual analysis for the CAP itself was set.

UNRWA participated in all seven CAP sectors:

- food security,
- health,
- education,
- psychosocial support,
- job creation/cash assistance,
- water
- and coordination/security.

UNRWA took the lead as focal point in the job creation/cash assistance sector and in a eighth sector, covering housing and infrastructure. This did not go forward to the CAP itself by common agreement amongst the agencies involved.

In addition to its involvement in the CAP process, the Agency continues to chair, at Field Director level, the two Operations Coordination Groups which meet regularly throughout the year in Jerusalem and Gaza. Within the OCG framework, the Agency helped prepare the two UN Contingency Plans for Disengagement in the northern West Bank and Gaza.

Coordination with the PA on emergency programming is set to continue for 2006 in close cooperation with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance

in both Gaza and Ramallah. MOLSA will be UNRWA's key counterpart in the alignment of emergency employment, food and cash assistance programming which forms the largest part of emergency interventions for 2006. Coordination with the Ministry of Finance assists UNRWA's assessment of beneficiaries and provides lists of PA employees to the Agency to ensure that those in employment with the Authority do not receive emergency assistance from the Agency.

Development of data collection, planning and implementation

Through the Geneva Conference in June 2004, the Agency committed itself to enhancing the quantity and quality of data held on beneficiaries as a key element of moving from a status-based to a needs-based approach to service provision within its regular programmes.

One of the vehicles which will be used to deliver on this commitment will be the survey work currently being carried out by the University of Geneva's Graduate Institute for Development Studies (IUED) in conjunction with the Catholic University of Louvain. This survey will provide detailed information on the living conditions of over 10,000 refugees across UNRWA's area of operations (an average of 2,000 per Field). A side benefit will be to provide strong baseline data for the planning of future emergency interventions. Likewise, a Household Assessment Survey being undertaken by West Bank Field will specifically target 85,000 households benefiting from the emergency programme and will provide very detailed information on this group.

In addition to these two important data gathering exercises, UNRWA has contracted the Overseas Development Institute's Humanitarian Policy Group to undertake a substantive independent evaluation of the Agency's emergency programming. This study

will review emergency programming since its inception and make recommendations for future planning delivery and monitoring systems.

This evaluation, together with results from both data collection exercises will become available during the first quarter of 2006.

Hopefully, it will also be possible by that juncture to make a preliminary judgement on the direction of Israeli access policy in the wake of Gaza disengagement. This new information and analyses will be used by the Agency during a mid-year review to examine the basis of the programme set out in this document and modify its thrust as required.





Emergency Appeal Financial Summary

Programme	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Total
Direct Hire	27,794,713	18,223,960	46,018,673
Indirect Hire		1,635,434	1,635,434
Food	28,103,732	4,578,572	32,682,304
Cash Assistance	8,821,564	4,531,230	13,352,794
Mobile Clinics		895,593	895,593
OSO Programme	243,509	656,910	900,418
Total	\$64,963,518	\$30,521,699	\$95,485,216





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