

Rethinking the War on Terror

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The 2005 Princeton Colloquium on Public and International Affairs sought to rethink the War on Terrorism. A few months later, the Pentagon itself engaged in a parallel exercise. A July 27, 2005 New York Times article reported that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers had begun to speak of “a global struggle against violent extremism” rather than a “global War on Terror.” The Times quoted Administration and Pentagon officials as saying that the reframing from war to struggle has “grown out of meetings with President George W. Bush’s senior national security advisers that began in January” and “reflects the evolution in Bush’s own thinking nearly four years after the Sept. 11 attacks.”

At the National Press Club on July 25, 2005, General Myers said he had “objected to the use of the term ‘War on Terrorism’ before, because if you call it a war, then you think of people in uniform as being the solution.” Myers explained that the threat was violent extremists, while “terror was the method they use.” He concluded that in addition to the military, “all instruments of our national power, all instruments of the international community’s power” will be needed in this struggle, the solution to which is

“more diplomatic, more economic, more political than it is military.” Speaking at a retirement ceremony in Annapolis, Maryland earlier that week, Donald Rumsfeld described America’s efforts as waging “the global struggle against the enemies of freedom, the enemies of civilization.”

National Security Adviser Steven Hadley defended the new wording, “It’s more than just a military War on Terror. It’s broader than that. It’s a global struggle against extremism. We need to dispute both the gloomy vision and offer a positive alternative.” Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith added that, “ultimately winning the war” requires “addressing the ideological part of the war that deals with how the terrorists recruit and indoctrinate new terrorists.”

But, by August 4 the Bush Administration seemed to have returned to its original language. The New York Times reported, “President Bush publicly overruled some of his top advisers on Wednesday in a debate about what to call the conflict with Islamic extremists, saying, ‘Make no mistake about it, we are at war.’”

Addressing the American Legislative Exchange Council on August 3, President

Bush used the word “war” thirteen times in a 47 minute speech. Not once did he refer to the ‘global struggle against violent extremism.’

Secretary Rumsfeld also backed away from the new language he had been employing. “Some ask, are we still engaged in a War on Terror?” Mr. Rumsfeld said. “Let there be no mistake about it. It’s a war. The president properly termed it that after Sept. 11. The only way to defend against terrorism is to go on the attack.”

In April 2005, months before the Bush Administration publicly moved from the GWOT (Global War on Terror) to the G-SAVE (Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism) and back again, participants, panelist and keynote speakers at the 2005 Princeton Colloquium were rethinking the War on Terror and asking important questions. Is this a war or a struggle? Is it possible to wage war against a tactic? Is this also a struggle against instability? Is it a struggle for freedom or for modernity? Is this a struggle recognizing the threat of any and all non-state actors who use violence to inspire fear?

In the context of the debate over what to call the U.S. struggle against terrorism, Woodrow Wilson School Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter’s theme-setting questions opening the Colloquium on April 8, 2005 seem remarkably prescient. Noting how, in his second Inaugural Address, President Bush had emphasized the war for freedom rather than the War on Terror, Dean Slaughter asked: “Does it make sense to approach a struggle against terrorism as a war or as a struggle for the implementation of traditional American values of liberty, equality, justice, freedom, tolerance and humility?”

The Dean noted that the Colloquium was being held three and a half years after September 11, 2001. Quoting from the recent Presidential Commission on Prewar Intelligence, she compared the

past three and a half years to the three and a half years after Pearl Harbor, during which, “The United States had built and equipped an army and navy that had crossed two oceans, the English Channel, and the Rhine, and had already won Germany’s surrender and was two months from vanquishing Japan. That was clearly a war. We had no doubt it was a war, we had no doubt who the enemy was. Three and a half years into the War on Terror, where are we? And if you judge it by those standards, again, does it make sense even to think about it primarily as a war? Does the invocation of a state of war afford a reasonable or meaningful framework for thinking about American foreign policy?”

Rising to the challenge of rethinking the War on Terror, leading practitioners, academics and policy makers from a range of disciplines and perspectives transcended personal ideologies, politics and academic disciplines to engage in energetic discussions of the Patriot Act, the application of the Geneva Convention, the ethics of torture and detention, and the balance between homeland security, national security and human rights.

KEYNOTE PRESENTATIONS

Three extraordinary keynote presentations discussed the different transformations shaping our world. General Anthony Zinni, former commander of U.S. Central Command, declared instability the enemy, not terrorism – citing social, economic and cultural transformations that feed terrorist anger. Major General Giora Eiland, Israeli National Security Adviser, explored the transformation of conflict in the 21st Century from high- to low-intensity, from state-to-state war to conflict between states and non-state actors. Dr. Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, Secretary-General of the Palestine Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, traced the transformation of the human spirit from the end of the 20th

Century, when the world seemed to share an optimism marked by a belief in the universality of human rights and the global rule of law, to a post-September 11th world of absolutisms, fundamentalisms, and extremisms. The three keynote speakers did agree that whatever the role for a military solution in the War on Terror, any successful strategy must integrate military, political, economic, and social solutions.

Winning the War on Terrorism

General (ret.) Anthony Zinni

Almost every colloquium conversation that followed General Zinni's keynote on the first afternoon referred back to his address, incorporating and building upon his insights into who the enemy really is and how to strategically defeat that enemy. Zinni discussed the inconceivability of waging war against a tactic and the need to identify and confront the real enemy: instability and economic polarity in an increasingly globalized world.

In keeping with the title of the Colloquium, Zinni challenged participants to rethink just about everything.

On Jihad:

"When you go to Webster's dictionary, they have three or four definitions. Holy War is one of the lesser definitions. Jihad is basically a personal striving to be better, to do better, to be better and kinder to others, to give alms, to be a better person or human being."

On our on-the-ground capacity:

"We need a deployable capacity of people who will actually show up on the ground with their Save-the-Whales tee shirts and their sneakers next to our boots and flack jackets."

On how the new world works:

"It isn't a matter of an isolated part of the world being left to its own devices, the world doesn't work that way anymore, the diasporas, the migrations, the changes, the communication, the globalization, the idea that only the interaction of nations, states, sovereignty decides all and those are the only entities that society has interchanged with, that's all gone."

On a more broad minded strategy:

"At the strategic level, the anger has to be done away with. That can only happen if there is real reform and if the policies that aggravate the situation from outside—by us and others in the first world—are changed."

From Zinni's perspective the dramatically changing world contributes to the sense of conflict, "This is not a global war on terrorism. This is people trying to manage the change and transformation of a major part of the world. Our enemy today is not an ideology. Our enemy today is instability. We thought at the end of the Cold War we didn't have to worry about it. The Cold War kept a lid on every little country around the world, every little nation, every little society, because it was a zero sum game: they were all up for bid. Either the East or the West would buy them off and keep the lid on ethnic, religious, economic problems, all the sorts of things that exploded at the end of the cold war when nobody else was willing to buy the problems off. Now we realize these sanctuaries breed—especially in an era when we have instant communications—mass migrations and diasporas, globalization where we can move health problems, instability problems, environmental problems, violence problems, to anybody's shore. And the world is changing. The demographics are changing; the nature of societies is changing. The third world is bringing its problems to the first world, because the borders

can't hold them back anymore. And that's the issue, that's the war, it's the war against instability, it's the war against the economic polarity that is causing this. You know, if we don't share from the first world to the third world, they will share with us what they have."

According to General Zinni, it is absurd to even consider waging war against a tactic such as terrorism. To highlight the absurdity, Zinni suggested participants try to, "Imagine Woodrow Wilson saying, 'We have just declared war on U-boat attacks' or FDR saying 'We've just declared war on kamikazes.'"

"By defining this enemy as a tactic, and then treating it as a tactic, we fight it at a tactical level. Our emphasis is on going to the hills of Afghanistan and the hills of the northwest territories of Pakistan and killing or capturing as much of the Al Qaeda leadership as we can.... Once again we are about to fall into the trap that I lived through in two tours in Vietnam: the body count, kill enough of them, you defeat the enemy. Win it from the bottom up, tactically, because you don't understand the operation on strategic levels of what's going on and what their centers of gravity might be. We measure success on metrics in how much of the leadership we take down, kill, capture, detain. We measure success in the number of cells our law enforcement agencies, in cooperation with others around the world, break down, in over sixty countries. We measure success in the finances that we're able to cut off and remove. And yet this thing we're fighting is growing. We are damaging the organization, but, as a movement, it is actually growing. And we have to step back and ask ourselves why."

Zinni also analyzed the sources of new terrorists and their motivations, namely "an aberrant form of Islam, that twisted interpretation that goes unchallenged basically, that's the rationale, the justi-

fication, for strapping on an explosive belt, or driving that car laden with explosives into a street corner and blowing it up....The Osama Bin Laden's and al-Zarkawi's of the world need a continuous flow of angry young men who are angry enough to be willing to do that, and obviously motivated to do that because they can provide that religious rationale and justification."

If such anger is the fuel that drives terrorism, Zinni said, we have to ask where that anger comes from and decide what to do about it. "The anger isn't just religious fanaticism. The anger comes from some sort of sense of political, economic or social disenfranchisement, disconnection, sense of injustice. That's what drives the anger. Osama Bin Laden needs that anger to stay in power. What do you do about the anger? That's the real question."

As if anticipating the comments Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Myers would make four months later, Zinni said "If you call it a war, then you think of people in uniform as being the solution."

Zinni emphasized that the military alone could not end the War on Terror. "Our military has been the major element of power that we use to deal with this. Militaries are used to fight battles, fight wars, and that's what they're trained, organized and equipped to do. But now, because there is an absence in other government agencies and the absence of or lack of creation of international agencies, our militaries are responsible for political, economic and social reconstruction—not something that they are trained for, not something that they are equipped for, and something that, if we're going to require them to do, we've got to reshape and redefine our military.... If you're going to be serious about going around the world and cleaning up failed and incapable states, of reconstructing nations, then you need the capability on the ground to complement the military piece. The military can support it. It certainly has the lo-

gistics and the capability to provide security, but it doesn't rebuild nations....

"Prior to 9/11, this Administration, this Pentagon, was talking about transforming a military that was going to be highly technical.... Unfortunately, these are the kinds of problems that aren't solved by technology. Our military gets thrown into situations with no planning for the political, economic, social, humanitarian sides; no built-in mechanisms to cooperate with those on the international community; no development within our own government agencies of units on the ground that can handle that, to know how to redevelop a political system that's been crushed or to establish one from scratch that has never existed."

Not By Might Alone

Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland

Major General Giora Eiland, Israeli National Security Advisor, reinforced the idea that a solution to the War on Terror must be multi-faceted.

Eiland warned that, "Armed conflict can be won only if full efforts are used simultaneously—the military effort, the political effort, the effort in winning the minds and hearts of the people ... and the fourth effort is the economic one, because you want to solve problems not to cause more misery. Usually, traditionally, we make a mistake and we begin an operation only by using the military force and we begin to think about the three other efforts only later. But, the important thing is to synchronize all these efforts from the very beginning."

Eiland reminded the audience "that there is a strong limit to the effectiveness of the military force. In the ordinary war almost every problem could be solved by force and if the problem was too big then they

should have another force or you should deploy more forces and more forces and at the end of the day, if you have enough military capacity you can prevail. Now it is not only that force does not solve all the problems, but sometimes an excessive use of force is very counter-productive."

Eiland focused on the profound changes that have transformed armed conflict in the 21st Century — the transformation from total war to low intensity conflicts, and the transformation from war between states to conflicts between state and non-state actors or organizations. Eiland set forth six consequences, and subsequent challenges, resulting from this transformation: the new political, as well as military, rules of engagement; the new meaning of real time intelligence; the need for international legitimacy; the nature of weaponry; the appropriateness of traditional organizations; and the expectations of the public.

Eiland observed, "Democratic states fail to understand all the consequences of the changes in conflict. They either fail to respond correctly or, at least, they are late in their response....because the most important question is not where is the enemy, the most important question is who is the enemy. Now 'who is the enemy' is not only a military intelligence professional question, it is a political question. Who exactly do you want to define as your enemy? On one hand, you prefer that your enemy will be the smallest possible group. On the other hand, you don't want to ignore some others who might attack you if you don't include them in this definition. It is not only that this is a political question, but this definition of who is the enemy changes quite rapidly... Are all the members of the Islamic Jihad our enemies, including the teachers, and the preachers, and the Mosques? Well, not necessarily."

Thus, the rules of engagement have been compli-

cated. “Because the enemy doesn’t wear a uniform, doesn’t come with signs that say ‘I am the enemy,’ you have to decide who is enemy and who is not.”

The second challenge is the new meaning of real time intelligence. “The definition of real time intelligence is an intelligence or information that is available in a time can enable you to react in an effective way. In the ordinary world most or some significant part of this intelligence was about infrastructure, about physical assets, headquarters, locations of outfits, locations of certain army units, and, usually, all those assets don’t move very quickly from one place to another. Now in this new kind of armed conflict about 90 percent of the intelligence of the potential targets are people. Individual people have a very bad habit of moving quite quickly from one place to another. So, if you have certain important information, it is valuable only for a very specific time. Ten leaders of some organization are meeting and this is probably the most viable target that you have right now. If you respond immediately and you can hit this target while those people are still in the building, fine. Ten minutes later this building has no meaning because it happened to be a place where they decided to meet. So there is no value to the place itself if the people are not there. So you have to respond much quicker to the changes of the locations or the identity of the targets.”

The third challenge on Eiland’s list was the need to understand the international legitimacy for actions. “This legitimacy is on both sides. The international public opinion and the international political position can either support you or support the other side and, if you don’t understand correctly the importance of this, you might pay a lot of prices.”

The fourth consequence affects the very nature of weaponry used. “If the enemy only uses bombs

or hand grenades then why exactly do you need all those satellites and sophisticated airplanes and the computer systems and all other facilities that might be good against real states but have nothing to do with a primitive enemy?”

Eiland’s fifth challenge was organizational: Are the old agencies that were designed for one type of war relevant to the kind of new threats that we face? The United States faced such organizational introspection after September 11th in terms of both anticipatory intelligence and response. “Our answer (in Israel) is a little different than yours. We believe that basically the answer, or the modifications that are needed, is not in nominating someone to be above all the intelligence agencies, but rather to find a way to share information in a much more rapid way and in a way to destroy all the walls that separate between the different organizations and to make all the information available. But, even more important than to make this information available between the agencies, is to let the information flow down along the echelons to the lower levels because usually the one that really needs the information is the battalion commander or the brigade commander and, if he doesn’t have this information in real time, then the fact that some headquarters above him has the right information at the right time is not relevant.”

Last, Eiland addressed the challenge of public expectations: “There is a big gap, between the natural expectations of the public, the press and the politicians and the real capabilities of the armed forces to deliver what it is expected.”

The gap between public expectations and military capabilities can be seen in three different dimensions: “First, the duration of the operation. At the first glance you think that, since the enemy that we are going to confront is not a real strong enemy and is much weaker than the ordinary enemies that we knew in the past, why should we take so long to win

against this enemy?” Second, the public expects no casualties, especially since the conflict is not perceived as a real war. The public asks “Why should we have casualties when we have much better equipment, much better weapons, much better technologies. So let’s do it carefully, let’s do it from a distance.... The third expectation of the public is, no innocent victims. Because it is not only that you want to be on the strong side, you also want to be on the right side.”

***Beyond Rhetoric:
Toward a Palestinian–Israeli Peace***

Dr. Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi

Dr. Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, Secretary-General of the Palestine Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, addressed the transformation of language after President Bush’s declaration of a Global War on Terror and how language itself has helped to fuel the conflict.

Pointing first to post-September 11th rhetoric such as the label ‘War on Terror,’ Dr. Ashrawi noted how such labels “are like poetic formulae. They may seem like easy, economical handles on reality, but actually they tend to be very simplistic, misleading and quite often dangerous. They... tend to be absolutist and deductive and destroy coping mechanisms. Therefore they prevent the formulations of policies and the making of decisions that are necessary to dealing with complex realities, particularly complex conflicts. They create dysfunctional political systems and, of course, lead to the distortion of decision-making.”

“The ‘War on Terror’ actually generated such a rhetoric—of politicization, of preemption—we all know the strategic doctrine of preemptive strikes, war by any other name, politics of exclusion, militarism and, of course, power. The discourse at its most extreme changed from paranoia, then to security, to blind pa-

triotic zeal, to megalomania, and, in some cases, to divine dispensation. Granted, most of these are knee-jerk responses, visceral responses. But wars have been waged and fought and rights have been violated, domestically and internationally, and lives destroyed and alliances disrupted in the name of such grandiose labels and clichés. Now that the dust has settled somewhat, slightly settled, perhaps it is time to take stock.”

Dr. Ashrawi discussed the impact of post-September 11th language on the Palestinian people. “Suddenly the Palestinians have found themselves—we found ourselves—labeled as terrorists, branded conveniently and dismissed while Israeli violence has been justified as self-defense, so there is instant forgiveness or justification and ultimately the term itself, the key term, occupation, military occupation, was totally absent from the discourse. Once you remove occupation from the discourse, you remove the cause of violence, conflict, and extremism.

“Furthermore, attempts at decontextualizing the conflict have also contributed directly to the misunderstanding and the mishandling of regional instability and the causes of violence and have contributed to extremism, the rise of fundamentalism, and the gaining of adherence to absolutist ideologies. Longstanding regional grievances and the buildup of an incremental fence of victimization and disenfranchisement were ignored in the pursuit of military solutions and misplaced realities.”

Ashrawi also addressed changes in shared priorities, reminding the Colloquium audience of a time at the close of the 20th Century, before September 11th and the Global War on Terror, when there seemed to be a shared global optimism—an era when we discussed at least the possibility “of the universality of human rights, conflict prevention,

and constructive positive intervention. We were redefining intervention at that time, the responsibility of power. Some of us, even in the jaded age of cynicism, talked about the morality of power, not just the responsibility of power. We talked about human security as redefining the nature of security and rights of individuals. We talked about a global rule of law that would address not the state but also non-state actors, individuals as well as collective entities. We had redefined enemies and allies, friends and foes on the basis of shared humanity and common good. We talked about poverty, disease, and literacy, the devaluation of human rights and lives, and the degradation of the environment more in terms of intrastate situations and conflicts rather than interstate conflicts. We talked about injustices and we worked towards human-based comprehensive development program of good governments, governmental and non-governmental systems of engagement, conflict resolution on the basis of multilateral responsibility, and, again, the rule of law.”

Ashrawi concluded, “We certainly had a tremendous commitment and we felt that we could forge ahead and establish new networks, new sets of relationships, new criteria to evaluate, process and, perhaps, formulate international relations beyond issues of sovereignty, beyond constraints of tribal or nation states or geographical boundaries. Now the paradox of September 11th has drastically transformed contemporary realities and created a tangential departure from what I felt was a more organic and natural development in the history of political thought and international or human relations. And this has had serious implications – for global peace and security as well as for the human, legal and moral substance of both domestic and international politics.”

Through Three Keynotes: The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

A vertical slice through the three keynotes raises issues from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

During the Q&A at the close of General Zinni’s keynote, Sara Wood, the Director of the Middle Eastern North Africa Program at Human Rights Watch, asked what U.S. policies needed to change in order to respond to the anger that Zinni had identified as fueling terrorism. Zinni responded with certainty: “The most important issue in this part of the world, and you could argue whether it should be or shouldn’t be, is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is the most significant problem. I often get into this argument with people in that region from all sides that say no, it isn’t; there are things that are more important. I don’t care. It is in the gut of everybody there, whether intellectually it should be or not; that’s a moot point.... The other thing we lack as a policy is multilateral approaches. International approaches. I mean we’re disavowing it. We want to be unilateralists now, preemptive unilateralists. It isn’t going to work. It’s not the nature of the world.”

Asked almost the same question at the close of his address, Major General Eiland responded: “I think that we have a little different perspective about the linkage between the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and some of the problems of our world. It is quite hard for me to believe that the poverty in Egypt is caused because of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and I’m not sure that the lack of human rights in Saudi Arabia is a direct result of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. And I’m not sure that the 19 people who participated in the attack on September 11th were highly motivated to solve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.”

Dr. Ashrawi’s conclusion aligned more closely with General Zinni’s: “Now the ‘Palestinian-Israeli con-

flict,' or what we like to call the 'Palestinian cause' from my perspective, has been the most emotive, the most focal and compelling expression of injustice and therefore has become the most fertile ground for extremism and ideological fundamentalism. It is the recruiting ground and the major reason behind the loss of U.S. credibility, influence, standing and interests both in the region and beyond. This conflict or the occupation was allowed to continue unchecked and to breed greater hostility and violence. Facile theories on the clash of civilizations or war among religions contributed to the mishandling of regional realities."

PANELS

In addition to the three keynotes, the Colloquium offered an array of panels ranging from impassioned debates on the ethics of torture to pragmatic discussion on preparing the next generation of public servants. Panelists challenged participants to rethink the War on Terror from multiple perspectives—securing the homeland, winning hearts and minds, measuring success, and assessing regional politics and ideologies.

U.S. Public Diplomacy toward The Arab-Muslim World: Winning – or Losing – Hearts and Minds?

"It's the policy, stupid," was the blunt summation of a distinguished panel on winning hearts and minds in the Arab/Muslim world.

Ambassador Theodore Kattouf, CEO of AMIDEAST, presented dramatic, though discouraging, results from polls conducted in 2003 and 2004 in six Arab countries: Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, UAE and Egypt. The poll asked one simple question, "Do you view the U.S. favorably or unfavorably?" The results were abysmal. "In Egypt, a country that has

enjoyed a tremendous amount of U.S. aid and interaction for decades now, the favorability rating was 2 percent. In Saudi Arabia, where we haven't been maybe as visible or as active, the favorability rating was 4 percent. The highest rating we got was in Lebanon where the favorability was 20 percent, the unfavorable 69 percent." These favorability ratings have all declined since 2002.

Kattouf explained that these results stemmed from U.S. policies: "When you go on and you ask these people what do they think of American education, what do they think about American science, what do they think about America's policy towards the Palestinians, towards Iraq, it becomes very, very apparent that it's not about our values; it's not that they hate freedom; it's not that they resist democracy; it's not that they look down on our way of life. They hate our policies."

Nadia Bilbasey, Washington correspondent for Al-Arabiya Television, reinforced Kattouf's conclusion: "When it comes to America's image in the Muslim and Arab world, the basic line is always, 'Why do they hate us?' And the simple answer is: 'They don't. They don't hate you. In fact, they love you. They just hate the U.S. policies.'"

Bilbasey summarized, asking rhetorically, "Why are you losing hearts and minds? Saddam Hussein, with all the atrocities he committed, comes out as a victim and people sympathize with him at the expense of the U.S. So where are they going wrong? ...Is it the message or is it the messenger? ... It is many years of policies that have been discredited so badly, whether it is the support of dictatorship, or whether siding with one side against the other, Israel and Palestine. But now people don't see anything good coming from the U.S. Every single thing that is done is interpreted in the negative, that there must be some sinister motivation for any-

thing the U.S. is doing in the Middle East, including introducing democracy.”

Hady Amr, Managing Partner of the Amr Group, concurred, “They love America as a place to emigrate to. They love American education in particular. They love American science and technology. They just hate our policies.”

“Before the 1950s, America was seen as the sort of guiding light of freedom and fairness. It was seen as a place where men and women could strive to excel to move forward and that was very much in tune with Islam. Not that the Arab world is a Muslim place, because it’s really a multi-cultural place with Muslims and Christians and Jews and all sorts of ethnicities, but it’s also very much in tune that an individual should strive to move forward and make the world the best place for himself and the people around him. And America was seen in a very positive light especially as compared and contrasted to France and England and other European colonizing powers which came over, took things over and did a lot of nasty things to a lot of people ... but America really was seen as the guiding light.”

Indeed, the U.S.’ actions used to generate this good will. “During that period, what did America do? One of the many things that America did prior to the 1950s was that American missionaries and American educational institutions went to the Arab world in the broader Middle East. They went to Cairo. They went to Beirut. They went to Istanbul. They went to Teheran. And they helped establish some of the leading academic institutions in the Arab world today. The American University of Beirut, Robert’s College in Teheran and the American University of Cairo. And America was seen in that light. It was judged on its foreign policy, it was judged on its actions, it was greatly respected and it was tremendously loved.”

Re-Securing the Homeland: Is the Patriot Act the Right Solution for Homeland Security?

What was intended as a panel on whether the Patriot Act is the right solution for re-securing the homeland quickly became a referendum on torture. Sponsored by the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, the panel did manage to engender some agreement. The three panelists, including Village Voice columnist Nat Hentoff, National Journal columnist Stuart Taylor, and John Yoo, Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law, were able to agree that, in Yoo’s words, “The Patriot Act is a symbol of this debate between national securities and civil liberties that we are having in this country...Both sides of the debate have an interest in exaggerating rhetorically what the Patriot Act actually does.”

Hentoff opened by calling the Patriot Act a “mysterious and serpentine piece of legislation.” Taylor then dissected each of the Act’s most controversial provisions, declaring them not as detrimental as many critics alleged, “There are some alarming things going on in the War on Terrorism as to civil liberties, but, in my opinion, the Patriot Act is not one of them... I think the hysteria over it is a massive deluded exercise in crying wolf.”

Declaring the Act evolutionary, not revolutionary, Yoo underscored Taylor’s conclusion that many of the most controversial aspects of the Act were already in effect before September 11. According to Yoo, the ‘library provision’ already existed under the Full Intelligence Surveillance Act. The ‘sneak and peak’ provision was already being used and upheld against drug cartels and organized crime. “The Act is a series of evolutionary changes in pre-existing law enforcement powers ...The Patriot Act may seem like this terrible thing, but the basic framework that the Patriot Act is working on top of is something that

was created during the Cold War to catch Soviet spies and has just been adapted over the years to fight terrorism.

“I think we’ve lulled ourselves into this strange debate fighting over these technical provisions. They’re not revolutionary. They’re not going to win the war on terrorism. They might just help us catch a few more operatives in the country, but they’re not going to defeat Al Qaeda, and I think we are deluding ourselves to think so.”

Nat Hentoff transitioned from a discussion of the Patriot Act to the subject of renditions, what he called, “the outsourcing of torture.” Hentoff set the bar for the ensuing debate on torture by quoting Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak when he ruled that Israel’s abuses of Palestinian prisoners were illegal: “This is the destiny of a democracy: not all means are accessible to it, and not all practices employed by its enemies are open to it.”

Hentoff made renditions real for the audience: “I want to put a face on the renditions. ... I want to do this in terms of a country that is one of our allies in the war on terror. One of the CIA’s jet planes ... that render purported terrorists to other countries where information is extracted by any means necessary made ten trips to Uzbekistan. On CBS TV’s ‘Sixty Minutes,’ (March 2005) program about these torture missions, former British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, told of the range of techniques used by Uzbek interrogators: drowning, suffocation, rape, and the insertion of limbs in boiling liquid. Two nights later, on ABC TV’s ‘World News Tonight.’ Ambassador Murray told of photos he received of a Uzbek interrogation which ended with the prisoner being actually boiled to death. Appalled, the Ambassador protested to the British Foreign Office in a confidential memorandum...[that] was leaked to The Financial Times last year. This is what they ran: ‘Uzbek officials are torturing prisoners to extract information about

reported terrorist operations, information which is supplied to the United States and passed through its Central Intelligence Agency to the UK.’ Prime Minister Tony Blair’s reaction to this whistle blowing, this undiplomatic whistle blowing, was to immediately have Craig Murray removed as Ambassador to Uzbekistan.”

Hentoff continued, “CIA Director Porter Goss also engages in what George Orwell used to call double-speak. Last month he said, ‘The United States does not engage or condone torture.’ Philip Stevens, a very forthright columnist of The Financial Times, wrote ‘Uzbekistan provides a vital base for United States operations in neighboring Afghanistan. United States’ financial aid to Uzbekistan provides a bulwark against Russian influence.’ And, an October [2004] Financial Times editorial emphasized that because the Bush administration supports the barbaric government of President Islam Karimov, the United States has given the Uzbek government the confidence to sell a long-running campaign against internal dissidence as part of the campaign against Al Qaeda.”

“Meanwhile, Porter Goss, whose CIA benefits from information obtained from Uzbek torturers, told the Senate Arms Services Committee on March 17 [2005] that one of the CIA’s own techniques, water boarding, is ‘an area of what I call professional interrogation techniques.’ Reed Brody, Special Counsel of Human Rights Watch, in a letter in the New York Times writes that, while Porter Goss says the CIA is not now using torture, water boarding...entails pushing a person’s head under water until he believes he will drown, and, in practice, he sometimes does. ‘Water boarding,’ said Brody, ‘can be nothing less than torture in violation of United States and international law.’ Mr. Goss, by justifying the practice as a form of ‘professional interrogation,’ ... renders dubious his broader claim that the CIA is not practicing torture today.”

Panelist Stuart Taylor expressed his concern about what he sees as the risk of tyranny. “President Bush has claimed, or his subordinates have claimed on his behalf, a power to declare anyone in the world, including everyone in this room an ‘enemy combatant,’ to lock us up indefinitely for incommunicado interrogation, to have us tortured without limitation, pulling fingernails, red hot pork pokers, anything. This isn’t an argument about the definition of torture. The administration has claimed the power to order torture, and not only in some extreme case. They basically said that if the President says ‘I want all the enemy combatants tortured,’ then he has the power to do that and Congress has no power to outlaw it. They have outlawed it, but the argument is that it would be unconstitutional to interpret the statute that outlaws it in that way.”

“Indeed, the sweep of the President’s claimed war-time powers seems broad enough, the way I read it, to empower the President to execute detained enemy combatants. Let’s suppose he thinks we need to free up Guantanamo for some more people, just execute all the ones that are there. There’s nothing in the way. The Administration’s written, and its most sweeping claim of this kind was the Justice Department’s so-called ‘Torture Memo’ of August 1, 2002. It basically said or it comes very close to saying, in matters of war, the President has absolute power.... If we had another attack on the scale of 9/11, let alone say a nuclear attack, the President has claimed powers that are infinitely expandable and very dangerous.”

“In addition, just to give a little bit greater scope to this, before the invasion of Iraq, although the President obtained a vote from Congress empowering him to invade Iraq, he had previously been advised by Alberto Gonzalez, then White House Counsel, now Attorney General, that he didn’t need a vote of Congress. For the first time in history, as far as I

know, the President was advised by his top legal advisors that he could launch a major invasion with no element of surprise against a nation that had not attacked us, without so much as asking Congress for its permission.... The irony, I think, is that by claiming powers more appropriate to Roman emperors, Russian czars, and King George III, I think President Bush has weakened the Presidency.”

Not all the panelists were in agreement. John Yoo began his discussion with a clarification of his position: “I don’t think Congress has the power to use the criminal laws to prohibit torture ordered by the Commander in Chief who also happens to be the Chief Prosecutor, by the way, for ordering torture, on the battlefield, as a tactic, in an ongoing war.... Congress has a lot of other tools. They can cut off funding; they can change military structure; they have a lot of things they could do, but what they couldn’t do is a criminal law.”

Yoo continued, “The public has had its referendum.... This was an issue that was heavily debated in the election. It rose in the summer before the November elections. Counter-terrorism policy and Iraq were the two central issues of the Presidential election. It seems to me, we had a full and fair debate. If anything, it seemed to me, Kerry thought Bush was not waging the war on terrorism effectively and aggressively enough. If you remember in one of the debates, Kerry kept saying over and over again, ‘I will kill the terrorists. I will kill the terrorists.’ He was saying Bush had made mistakes not going far enough. And that was our public debate leading into the election, and that’s the way the issues posed during the election. That’s why we have elections, to approve policies or reject policies that the government has in operation. I think the public was fully informed what was happening in this area, through our friends in the media managed to reprint every leaked memo that anyone in the government wanted to hand them. We had an election; are we not to take any

messages from the election?”

Yoo asked, “What is torture? Look, you know, I was a government lawyer and this is not a question that anyone rushes to answer or looks forward to answering, or even goes in the government to answer, but let me just describe to you the problem. There’s a Federal Torture Statute that prohibits torture outside of the United States. It has never been interpreted by any court; it has never been interpreted by the Administration of any party. There are very few aids to figure out how to interpret it. I think it’s a difficult legal problem and the Administration did its best to try to come to some kind of understanding of what the statute meant. You can say, ‘well, I think you got the wrong answer’ and I’m willing to admit that’s possible. The point of law is to have reasonable disagreements.”

Yoo defended the call to look at options: “Do we take the September 10th approach, which was to treat terrorism as a crime and to treat people who are captured in that war as criminal suspects, you know, use the FBI and use the federal district court system, which, I might add, was not successful, otherwise we would not have had September 11th and the problems we have had since. Or, do we think about other options in an unprecedented, unconventional war, which we are still trying to figure out, where the enemy still exists and we do not know exactly yet what works. It seems to me that in that kind of situation, the government would be derelict of its duty if it did not explore all permissible legal options.

“I’m not saying that we should engage in torture. The exercise was to find out what you shouldn’t do, to establish the rules of the game, but then to let the policy makers, who are elected through democratic elections, figure out what kind of policies we should or should not pursue, weighing all kinds of factors. And in my mind, I would say that I’m unconfident about what tactics succeed or not in the

war, and because of that I think that we should have this kind of debate and we should have this kind of discussion but we also should be willing to consider there are other options for interrogation of detainees that go beyond the criminal justice system and the Miranda warnings and lawyers and the habeas corpus proceedings, that we ought to think about other possibilities.”

A question from the floor furthered this debate: “As a civilized people we tend to believe in human rights. Now the keyword there is human. I think every human being has certain human rights, no matter how awful or horrible they are or what terrible things they have done. The people who sort of excuse torture don’t really address what are, maybe not Miranda rights, but the basic rights that everybody has as a human being and how does that define us as a civilization?”

Yoo responded: “You’re right, there are basic human rights. But I think the hard question is what is it, short of torture, that a civilized country should be willing to do that goes beyond what we are willing to do with our own criminals. Should we draw an absolute line that the standards that we use for the domestic crime—Miranda and lawyers—are going to be what we use with enemy combatants? We can have that debate. I think it would be extremely unwise. That is the approach we did use. It’s not a political matter; both parties have had the Executive Branch and used the approach that terrorism was a crime. I don’t think it worked. So, I want to give you some examples. Suppose we did the same things to terrorist detainees that we do to soldiers in basic training. Would that be a violation of basic human rights? A lot of the things that some people want to try ... are quite similar to what happens to soldiers in basic training: sleep deprivation, standing at attention for hours. Is that a violation of human rights? I think we ought to think about that

and consider those kinds of options. If you want to draw an absolute line and say we're never going to think about that, then I think we have to be willing to accept much more cost in terms of the violence that's going to occur in the United States in the War on Terrorism going forward."

Dean Slaughter then opened a dialogue with Professor Yoo: "John, you and I have debated before. Listening to your presentation I felt I like I was in an Orwellian world. I can't quite believe the fact that we are openly debating what you referred to as 'other options,' As an American, I just can't quite believe it. It's not 'other options.' What I heard you say was that the President could order torture without restraint from Congress, that Congress can cut funds, but Congress cannot prevent the President from ordering torture of combatants, illegal combatants held here, held outside, held on the battlefield. As far as I'm concerned, the President ordering torture of prisoners of war in any war, any time, contravenes absolutely everything this country is supposed to stand for. ... I simply can't believe that, as somebody who upholds the Constitution of the United States, you could think that it's all right for the President to order the torture of individuals anywhere in the world. I'm not talking about coercive techniques; I'm talking about the full implications of what you're arguing. I think the primary ground this ought to be argued on is who we are and what we stand for, and then we can talk about the instrumental justifications.

"I think you're losing this war. We heard Anthony Zinni stand up and say look, the real war that we need to be fighting is a war for hearts and minds. We can get every member of Al Qaeda and there'll just be 100 more; 1,000 more; 10,000 more in their place. ... We are telling the rest of the world that we're debating whether or not we can torture non-combatants at a time when we supposedly went in to dislodge the government of Iraq because, in part, of the torture practiced by Saddam at Abu Ghraib.

It is rank hypocrisy. It undermines everything we say we're for, everything President Bush says we're for; everything we're supposedly promoting around the world. And it is losing us this war."

Yoo responded: "Anne-Marie, you're certainly entitled to your policy views. Everything you just said was a policy view. My only point is that there's a serious Constitutional argument about whether Congress can force the President to wage war in certain ways. So let me give some hypotheticals: Suppose Congress said we're going to build you all these nuclear missiles and warheads, but we think that it's a violation of international humanitarian law, as many international human rights lawyers seem to think, to use nuclear weapons against civilian cities. So we're going to pass a statute, a criminal law that makes it criminal for the President or any member of the armed forces to use nuclear weapons near a civilian target. I think that is a Constitutional problem. A lot of the arguments you make about America's standing in the world and foreign policy and what we're trying to do, those are all fine arguments, but those are not Constitutional arguments. Those are arguments about how, as a society, we should exercise this Constitutional power, in what directions. And you should make those arguments. I'm not saying I'm in favor of torture, but I am saying these are options to think about and these are arguments you would make in trying to figure out what interrogation techniques to use. But to claim that your views about what we should doing in the world are constitutionally compelled, I think, is quite misleading."

Slaughter countered: "All right, we're both law professors, so let's spin a hypothetical. You're arguing about what Congress can't do. I'll grant you that we can debate about where Congress' power ends. But, as a government lawyer, you're supposed to advise your client, the Executive, about what he can do. It's not just about what Congress can't do; it's 'You may do this under the Constitution.' And, if I hear you correctly, you are telling me that you would tell your

client, the President of the United States, 'You may order pulling out somebody's fingernails. You may order having somebody's family member killed in front of them to extract information. That is Constitutional. You are empowered to do that under the Constitution? Are you really saying that our Constitution allows a President to order that?'

Yoo countered: "Is there any provision that prevents him from doing that?"

Fighting Fire with Fire? Assessing the Ethics of Torture and Detention

Charles Beitz, Princeton Professor of Politics, presided over an impassioned panel which some panelists renamed "Playing with Fire." Beitz opened, "The questions that we are mostly interested in here are really first order questions of political morality. They are questions about the kinds of government conduct that are permissible or impermissible in response to the threat of terrorist attacks on the territory of the United States.... Is it justifiable for governments to override individual rights...in the conduct of the War on Terrorism? ... Are policies of detention and rendition permissible in the War on Terrorism? What about preventive war and the relaxation of the conventional prohibition on the targeting of civilians? ... Is something morally special about the threat of terrorism, something about terrorism as a category of political threat that justifies doing things that ordinarily it wouldn't be justifiable?"

Panelist George Kateb, Princeton's Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics Emeritus, critiqued the major activities of the Bush Administration that have been defended as necessary to fight terrorism. "First, the erosion of certain rights, like Habeas Corpus, the right to counsel, and the right to confront witnesses, and the protection of privacy. Second, the war

against Iraq. Third, the use of torture or degrading treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and at a network of bases under U.S. control all over the world, as well as, in the process of so called rendition. All these activities in my judgment are not intended to advance the war on terrorism...Any effort by high-minded commentators, to see these activities as exercises of a policy of the necessary, but lesser evil, is, in my judgment again, either disingenuous or culpably naïve."

"I look at the TV screen and ask myself, Why are U.S. troops in Iraq? What right do they have to be there? What is the meaning of this imperialism? Is it Mussolini in Ethiopia all over again? ... It is not only that the policies are so appalling in themselves, it's also the case that they are misrepresented mendaciously and that these misrepresentations are nevertheless accepted as true or passed as allowable by both majority public opinion and establishment opinion."

Examining the Administration's short and long term motives, Kateb pointed to the Bush Administration's pattern of casting the United States as a new kind of global empire. "There is a fatal lack of moderation whenever every great danger is felt as an even greater opportunity. The long-term motives behind both the erosion of civil liberties and the practice of torture and degradation may now come into sight. A society in which civil liberties are abridged accustoms its people to put an inflated sense of safety or security above all other considerations.... The aim is to induce, by repeated violations, forgetfulness of the moral reasons for guaranteeing to all persons, the rights of due process, Habeas Corpus and other rights like privacy. The 'state of emergency' becomes the normal condition, the citizens' reflexes are altered; government becomes much less an object of suspicion, as it should be in a democracy, and much more an object of deference, a

profoundly undemocratic sentiment. The citizen is transformed from a citizen into a subject. What is the long-term motive behind torture and degradation of prisoners of war? It is to coarsen the nature of U.S. armed services and by indirect influence, the whole American people.”

Panelist Deborah Pearlstein, Director of the U.S. Law and Security Program at Human Rights First, stepped back to take a lawyerly look at two different kinds of questions conflated after September 11th : “Number one, what is the law now, what is right, what is possible? Number two, what should the law be, as a matter of policy?” In response to her own first question, Pearlstein responded, “The law now, although it has some areas lacking clarity, is astonishingly clear that torture by U.S. officials is illegal. So, is torture justifiable? I don’t know. It is illegal and there are criminal and civil remedies for the violation.”

According to Pearlstein, the question posed on September 12, 2001 was “How is it we, as a democracy, are now going to meet our most important challenge, which is how to balance the interest of security against the interest of human rights and law?” That was the wrong question, which, in fact, “lead us down the wrong road as a matter of policy development.” The questions that are really on the table are: “Should we change the law in order to make the practice of torture legal for certain identified policy interests? ... Is it in the interest of U.S. national security to engage in torture and other highly coercive practices?”

After addressing these two questions and presenting a chronology of documented abuse of detainees, Pearlstein concluded that changing the law to allow for torture or highly coercive interrogation would make for bad policy, even if it were determined to be in the interest of national security. Based on empirical evidence, she argued, “It is

impossible to pursue highly coercive interrogation techniques, broadly defined, without the likelihood of torture per se.” She also contended that, “To give advance authorization for this kind of thing puts incentives on the interrogator to err on the side of harsh treatment, rather than establishing incentives to avoid harsh treatment upon substantial penalty.” Pearlstein heralded the danger to U.S. Forces stationed abroad, cited in an extraordinary letter by 12 retired admirals and generals submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee in January 2005. Finally, torture may not be useful. “It has undermined—and this is now reflected in the Military’s Latest Interim Field Manual – U.S. Intelligence gathering in counter insurgency operations overseas while only occasionally and unpredictably yielding any accurate or usable intelligence.”

Panelist Heather MacDonald, a Manhattan Institute Fellow, gave a strong rejoinder of much of what had been said by her fellow panelists, maintaining that abuse of detainees has not been widespread or systemic. Noting that changes in interrogation practices started as a grassroots reaction to detainee intractability, McDonald countered, “I strenuously disagree with Pearlstein’s examples of approved policies. She mentions being hung by the armpits until somehow blood is produced. That is nowhere in any of the policies that were approved.” According to McDonald, from the moment the war in Afghanistan began, traditional methods of interrogation were not working. “In Afghanistan a fierce debate broke out among the soldiers. This was utterly at the grassroots. It had nothing to do with Jay Bybee or John Yoo or Doug Feith. The interrogators were under pressure to collect intelligence, no question, because soldiers were being blown up in Afghanistan, they had to find out where the bombs were planted... Every message they got from their commander said ‘treat the prisoners humanely, we are operating in a Geneva context.’ So the interrogators ... came up with the following rule of thumb: if the treatment is no worse than what we

go through, either currently or have gone through in Army basic training, by definition, it can't be torture. The most important technique that they developed was marathon interrogation sessions. This entailed keeping terrorists up past their bedtime, but the interrogator would be kept up simultaneously."

McDonald then presented a "real scenario" of a Saudi prisoner at Guantanamo whose "practice of assiduously chanting Koranic prayers during interrogations" had to be stopped. "So, what would you do? Well here is what the interrogators tried to do. They tried to break his concentration. ... Sometimes people would call out numbers, like a football play, just random numbers to try and break his attention; other times they would play distracting sounds, such as the Meow Mix jingle, to try and distract him.... The New York Times got wind of the fact that meow mix was being used at Guantanamo... This was presented as one of the more sinister techniques that the Bush Administration has used. If that's so, then much of modern life certainly constitutes torture. The Meow Mix gambit was one of a series of so-called 'stress interrogation techniques' that have been developed."

As the debate heated up and the audience joined in, Pearlstein rebutted: "The criminal prosecutors in DOJ or the Department of Defense are not prosecuting people for playing Meow Mix. They are prosecuting people for killing people in custody, committing homicide, and other abuse that's illegal.... I disagree with the idea that this is grassroots somehow, and therefore its okay. Grassroots violations of laws are still violations of the law."

Beyond Al-Qaeda: Terrorism in the Arab Civil War
and

Regional Fronts in a Global War?
Assessing the 'War on Terror' in Kashmir, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

Two Colloquium panels – one focusing on the Arab world and the other focusing on Kashmir, the Caucasus and Central Asia – grappled with the physical ambiguity of the War on Terror. Are the conflicts in Chechnya and Kashmir part of the War on Terror or are they regional independence movements? Are U.S. bases in Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan tools to fight the War on Terror? Is the war limited to Al Qaeda or are all violent extremists the enemy? Is the War on Terror being fought everywhere terrorism is employed, regardless of any link to September 11th or threat to the U.S. homeland?

Col. Thomas Lynch, Director of the Commander's Advisory Group at United States Central Command, reiterated the pervasive Colloquium theme that "Military solutions are never going to be a comprehensive or total solution to helping overcome the threat of terrorism in the Middle East and in the wider Muslim world," so we must "more fully understand the wellspring ideology that has given birth to Al Qaeda and must understand that Al Qaeda is largely a vanguard movement of, but not the sole source, nor the sole manifestation of that movement."

Lynch saw the conflict not as a clash between the civilizations of East and West, but rather as a civil war between moderates and extremists in the Muslim world. "While the most spectacular attack perhaps of this fight occurred in the United States and significant attacks have occurred in the Philippines and elsewhere, you really have the primary issues that have turned violent, transpiring and occurring

directly within the greater Islamic world, where 1.2 billion members of the Islamic tradition live, from North Africa through the region of the twenty-seven countries that I have identified, and then back down and through the sweep of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. In reality, that is kind of where this Civil War is taking place.”

According to Lynch, extremists are virtually everywhere, having “figured out how to leverage modern technologies. Even though they rail against the excesses of modernism (and that is a calling card of their ideology), they have been very powerful and effective in establishing a global, borderless, virtual network... Knowledge can be transferred instantaneously from Fallujah in Iraq over to somebody living in Miram Shah, Pakistan, who wishes to plant a bomb in Kandahar or in Queta.”

Lynch continued, “This group is very elastic, because it is an anti-status quo move, status quo defined as corrupt autocratic regimes that are in charge throughout the wider sweep of the region of the Islamic world. They latch very neatly and conveniently onto local movements that have grievances against the status quo, whether or not there is exact alignment.... While their network is not growing, it is metastasizing, changing names, changing operations, changing the ways that they flow money, they are very clever, they are very agile and they are very good at that, and most importantly, there is a lot of ungoverned spaces out there that have to be looked at and managed by a coalition of like-minded allies and groups in the region to be successful.”

Focusing on Syria and Lebanon, panelist Michael Young, Opinion Page Editor for the Daily Star in Lebanon, explained the paradoxical situation in which Syria has found itself. “Even as Syria was helping the United States on the issue of terrorism, it was also on the State Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism.... The fact of the matter is that after September 11th the Syrians failed to grasp American ambitions. They failed to un-

derstand that the United States had substantially changed its strategy towards the Middle East, that, in effect, the War on Terrorism had gone beyond terrorism, that it was something much more transformational.” Cautiously optimistic that “Lebanon will not find itself in front of the barrel of the gun in the War on Terrorism” unless America demands that the Lebanese government disarm Hezbollah, Young concluded, “Syria will continue to feel the brunt of the U.S. War on Terrorism...because Syria today is so weak that the perception is ‘if we can help that regime collapse, why not?’”

Focusing on the countries of Central Asia, Jason Lyaall, Princeton Instructor of Politics and International Affairs, posed critical questions about the use of the framework of a Global War on Terror: “Operation Enduring Freedom initiated United States thinking about the region as part of the Global War on Terrorism, but it’s not just Afghanistan. Central Asia—Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan – has now become a major destination for American bases and forces. What’s interesting now is that the regional governments have all come to share this understanding of this as a War on Terrorism as well. Pakistan, for example is now a key ally on the War on Terrorism, so we overlook its support of insurgents in Kashmir. Russia is now a key ally in the War on Terrorism, so we overlook human rights violations in Chechnya. These countries in the region are going to use the War on Terrorism card as a way of justifying their particular internal actions.”

Matthew Evangelista, Cornell University Professor of Government and Director of the Peace Studies Program agreed, “Sometimes it does hinder, rather than help, the prospect of solutions to associate these conflicts only with a global War on Terrorism.” He also addressed the situation in Chechnya. “The conflict between Russia and Chechnya predates the global War on Terrorism by about 200 years It’s not helpful for the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, to say

that incidents like the attack on the Beslan school-house are about international terrorism and nothing else and it's less helpful still for the United States to go along with that framing of the Chechen conflict because it ignores the context, it ignores the history and it makes solutions to the conflict much more difficult to find."

Sumantra Bose, Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science and author of *Kashmir, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace and Contested Lands, War and Peace in Israel, Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus and Sri Lanka* focused on Kashmir. He concluded that the history of the Indian/Palestinian conflict over Kashmir long predates the War on Terror and "The relationship between the Kashmir conflict and the Global War on Terror is tangential and possibly even marginal." "Since the year 1947 when both India and Pakistan were created as sovereign states, there has been a sovereignty dispute between the two countries over rightful ownership of Kashmir."

Ambassador Robert Finn is the Ertegun Visiting Professor in the Near East Studies Department at Princeton. Regarding Pakistan, Finn warned, while "General Musharraf might want to do certain things, there are other parts of the Pakistani political and military and intelligence establishment that have different agendas. My own personal greatest concern when we talk about the War on Terrorism is that you can have a sea change in Pakistan that has nuclear capability and that could lead to very, very dangerous consequences for all of us."

Regarding China, Finn cautioned, "The Chinese are happy to label any assertion of ethnic autonomy in Tsinjung as one connected with Islamic terrorism and there certainly are some connections, but that doesn't necessarily mean that that's all that's going on." Finn concluded, "What's going on in Kyrgyzstan

is not an Islamic movement, while Uzbekistan, on the other hand, has very, very serious problems and they are serious on the basis of Islam. The Uzbek Government is one of the most oppressive in Central Asia. There are thousands of people in prison. The political dialogue there is done on the basis of Islam versus a secular post-Soviet state."

Government Networks: Comparing and Coordinating Approaches to Terror

Dean Slaughter served as moderator on a panel that discussed the importance of networks in fighting terrorism, placing particular emphasis on two issues: practical power and division of labor.

"At this point in the Colloquium, we have heard about tools in the War on Terror. Borrowing from Joe Nye, we have heard a lot about the 'hard power' of military efforts and their shortcomings. We heard about the 'soft power' of winning hearts and minds through our public diplomacy and our values—the power of getting what you want by the power of attraction. Now we are presented with a quite different set of tools, a pragmatic set of tools, tools of 'practical power.' They are not at all the things you might think are tools in any kind of war, domestic or international. It is the ability to actually share information, get common rules, and then create the capacity to enforce them.

"The second set of issues is division of labor. You can't combat global terror alone; no nation can do this alone. The 9/11 Commission spoke about the criticality of international efforts. Frankly, neither can a lot of nations acting together do it if they don't have common authority, common organization and a comprehensive ability to reach to all the nations we need. However well the U.S. government can perform, however many resources we bring to bear on this problem, we just can't do it alone. It's

just not possible. I just simply submit to you that whatever the field is, law enforcement, intelligence sharing, border security, aviation, assistance efforts, diplomacy – anything we seek to do to deal with the question of terrorism, by definition, must be done in full cooperation with the international community. No matter how good our networks are, if the problem is in Kazakhstan and we don't have the individuals and the institutions to link with Kazakhstan, we are not going to address the problem.... You need local and state actors; you need federal government actors, or national government actors. You do also need some global capacity to organize and to coordinate. There is a critical role for the UN or other international institutions, but what is the division of labor? What can the UN do that only the UN can do? Equally important, what should the UN not try to do? What should we recognize from the beginning really has to come from national and sub-national government officials?"

Ambassador Thomas Stelzer, Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations, reminded the audience that the UN has been fighting terrorism since the terrorist attacks at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972. Stelzer noted major changes in that fight after 9/11: "One of the big changes was we recognized we cannot do it alone. We just can't build walls around the houses, around the cities. While we are talking about space based missile defense, we'll be defeated by terrorists who have turned civil aircrafts into objects of mass destruction, into intercontinental ballistic missiles. We heard yesterday in General Zinni's analysis that at 50 feet it is isometric warfare, box cutters destroying the symbols of western wealth and of the greatest military might in the human history. What happened? We turned to the United Nations. That's the regular procedure. If you can't do it alone, then you turn to the UN. Normally we do not only transfer the problems to the UN, but also the impediments for a solution. 9/11 was dif-

ferent. Within ten days the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, one of the most important resolutions adopted in the United Nations, a very powerful instrument of uniform mandatory universal counter-terrorist obligations and it established the CTC, the Counter-Terrorist Committee."

Panelist Sidney Casperson, the Director of the NJ Office of Counter Terrorism, presented the benefits of inter-governmental networks not only in the federal and state systems but also internationally. Even at the state level, "We have to dialogue with these people –whether they be Scotland Yard or MI5 or CESIT in Canada or the RCMP or the Toronto Police or the Israeli Masad or the Israeli Military—in order to understand every terrorist event that happens worldwide and every cell that is picked up."

Lee Wolosky, Partner in Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP, discussed the problem of terrorist financing and the need for transnational solutions. "It is a transnational problem because, as has been debunked by the 9/11 Commission Report and even earlier by the U.S. Government, the problem of terrorist financing, particularly Al Qaeda financing, is not one of a silver bullet approach. There is no pile of money out there that belongs to Osama Bin Laden such that you could go and seize the money and solve the problem. Rather Al Qaeda and most terrorist organizations depend financially on a continuous fundraising operation that takes place transnationally. It takes place on the Internet, in mosques, in many different places, in many different ways across many different borders. In that respect it is a lot like Al Qaeda itself; it's a lot like other international criminal organizations, drug cartels, because these networks are able to operate transnationally across the seams of domestic law enforcement and intelligence services. They require, by their nature, mechanisms of cooperation that are international or intergovernmental in scope."

Christopher Kojm, former Deputy Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission and John L. Weinberg/Goldman Sachs & Company Visiting Professor at Princeton, concluded, “We have a wonderful system of government in this country. We’ve got checks and balances, three branches of government... It’s protected our freedoms for 200 years. But, it just doesn’t work very well in the effort against terrorism. So the question for us is: How we keep this wonderful system of government and yet do precisely what this panel talks about, building networks across all these levels of government so that we can have a unity of effort in this critical cause, to protect our national security?”

“I was struck very much by General Zinni’s remarks yesterday about how we rely so heavily on the military. The military is well funded, compared to other organizations within the U.S. Government. It’s highly capable and it gets called upon all the time to address problems. But, when you have a hammer in your hand, every problem in the world starts to look like a nail and I concur fully with General Zinni that we need to bring together all the elements of national power—diplomacy, law enforcement, economic policy, work on terrorist financing, working with state and local, utilizing foreign aid, pulling together all of our efforts on counter-terrorism. Really this was the animating spirit of the 9/11 Commission recommendations.”

Measuring Success in Combating Terrorism

As moderator, Alan Krueger, Princeton’s Bendheim Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, revisited the State Department Report, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, to share the official definition of the world terrorism: “premeditated, politically motivated by violence, perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”

Panelist Raphael Perl, Senior Analyst for Terrorism Policy at the Congressional Research Service, simplified definitions into metaphor: Terrorism is the “new ballot box for the frustrated masses.” Perl described how terrorism is evolving and what we can expect it to look like in the future. Tomorrow’s terrorism will be more widespread geographically; more like a global insurgency, less local; more violent, with more mega events; more decentralized; more anonymous; more religious; more technologically savvy; more self-supporting; more attractive to the disenfranchised; more attractive to non-Muslims and women; more likely to be among us, not over there, but here; and more systems focused, as more than half of senior Al Qaeda leaders have engineering degrees.

Underscoring his last point, Perl warned Colloquium participants, “We are dealing with engineers. They think in terms of networks. They don’t think like the lawyers we’ve had on this panel. It’s a very different kind of thinking. They think in terms of networks, and that is where we are vulnerable. We are an efficient, specialized, inter-dependent society and global economy. Redundancy and backup systems are costly; they reduce efficiency, so we don’t have them. The terrorists go after networks. They are going to do it more and more and they are going to get better and better at it.”

Panelist Peter Probst, a former CIA officer and international terrorism expert, emphasized that terrorism is played out on many fronts, including the political, making measuring success or failure extremely difficult. “How do you quantify influence? How do you quantify impact? We think from budget cycle to budget cycle, fiscal year to fiscal year. We think short-term, the Islamists do not. They use quite different criteria, and I think more reasonable ones, more accurate ones. They have increased their recruiting pool. They are extremely adept; they are very nimble...Terrorism is not just a gun, the bomb and the carnage, think in terms of psy-

chological warfare writ large, and once you put it in them terms, you realize that in order to counter it, we have to mount an equally effective counter campaign.”

When it comes to measurement of success, panelist Larry Johnson, CEO and co-founder of BERG Associates, LLC, emphasized that the U.S.’ reporting measures simply aren’t working. All that is known for certain, he said, is that, “the only thing that is rising in the world of international terrorism are the number of people claiming to be terrorist experts, and the number of government organizations claiming to combat terrorism.”

Preparing for the Road Ahead: How Do We Ready a New Generation?

To conclude the Colloquium, Dean Slaughter brought fighting the War on Terror home to students hoping to make a difference in a changing world. Opening the discussion on how to prepare a new generation of students to lead in a world shaped by the War on Terror, Slaughter reminded the audience of Zinni’s image of civilian deployment: “Yesterday General Zinni said we need kids in Save-the-Whale t-shirts and sneakers next to the ones in boots and flack jackets. He said very passionately at the end of his speech that, in addition to NGOs, we need a government civilian capacity to complement our military capacity. We need people in our government who, as he put it, are not just sitting in Washington writing one-page memos for others to implement. We need opportunities for the officials of our government, as well as governments around the world and people in international organizations to be in the field, to be building capacity, to be creating opportunity, to be addressing environmental and health threats and providing the entire panoply of services necessary if we’re all going to be secure.

“How do we prepare a generation of public servants who will need to address not just terrorism or terrorists, but the larger causes, the need to strengthen state capacity, the need to provide opportunity for millions of people around the world who don’t see a better future. How do we build not only military capacity, but, equally important, political, social, and economic capacity, deployable in this global struggle against extremism, against instability? What do they need to know? What kinds of jobs do they need in the summer and after they leave the Woodrow Wilson School to enable them to serve this country and countries around the world in facing all these issues in the future?”

Diane Castiglione, Director of Recruitment at the U.S. State Department, noted that “Secretary of State Rice has said more than ever America’s diplomats will need to be active in spreading democracy, in fighting terror, reducing poverty and doing our part to protect America’s homeland. We recruit for skills, not knowledge. Sometimes that seems counter-intuitive to people. But what we look for... are basically written and oral communication skills, judgment, initiative, leadership, information integration, skills that you can’t train people to do.... What we need are people with backgrounds in science and technology, with computer skills; we need engineers in a lot of our positions; we need people who can run our embassies, management officers. It’s not just the political science and IR people that we need.

Frederick Hitz, former Inspector General of the CIA and a lecturer at Princeton, expressed concern that his students see government as “a bureaucracy that will take their idealism and their willingness to work hard, swallow it up, and not really give them credit for being more than a small cog in a vast machine.” Hitz observed that his students’ views were borne out by recent government reports. “The Senate Intelligence Committee last summer talked about group think, when it was chronicling the efforts of CIA’s

Analytical Department in dealing with the weapons of mass destruction questions. The 9/11 Commission noted a failure of imagination, and finally this most recent commission, Silverman Robb, pointed to a bureaucratic inertia that seemed to inhibit its ability to get to the right answer.”

Joan Timoney, Vice President for Programs at the Partnership for Public Service, agreed with Hitz’ concern: “We have found that, while young Americans are unbelievably service oriented and volunteer in numbers that far exceed previous cohorts, they don’t necessarily make that connection between public service which is often viewed as community service or volunteer service, and government service. And, in fact, a couple of years ago Brookings did a survey of college seniors and something like only 20 percent said that government service was a form of public service. So all of the good things that are happening with younger Americans around public service are not necessarily yet translating into government service and that connective tissue isn’t quite being made.”

Michael Beckmann, Director of the Presidential Management Fellows Program, added, “Every federal employee takes an oath of office to support and defend the Constitution. And more and more when it comes to recruiting individuals for public service the focus is on that oath of office....The words and the meanings behind that oath are profound. We are the only group of servants that take this particular oath. The military takes a different oath, the President takes a different oath and so does Congress. We take a specific oath to support and defend the Constitution. We’ve found that it takes a different type of person not only to survive but thrive in the Federal Civil Service.”

“For the Fellows Program we’re much more into disposition. Princeton students did very well this

year. The reason they did very well is because they demonstrated two key behaviors: adaptiveness and predictiveness. They were adaptive. When we threw problems at them they responded well; they changed points of views; they could quickly link and respond to current trends, public policies, changing norms.”

The U.S. must also be forward-thinking when it comes to training leaders, Beckmann said. “The second key behavior is being predictive, getting ahead of the ball. You have to see what’s coming five, ten, fifteen, twenty years. Many of those who view us as the enemy have 100 to 200 year plans. So, when you think in that context, you’ve got to think how far ahead must we plan, must we think, to emerge the next generation of leadership.”

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The spirit of the Princeton Colloquium on Public and International Affairs is to debate and discuss important issues and to propose solutions to contemporary problems. In that spirit, several recommendations emerged from the keynote addresses and colloquium panels to re-think, and improve, the fighting of the War on Terror. Though certainly the speakers at the colloquium presented a wide variety of different views, and often disagreed, these themes achieved a level of consensus.

- Bring definition to the War on Terror's enemies, goals, and end points.
- Pursue non-military options including social and economic outreach to countries producing terrorists.
- Address the root causes of terrorism, including anger in Muslim communities, economic instability, and distrust of U.S. policies abroad.
- Create opportunities for public debate of what U.S. policy on the treatment of detainees ought to be.
- Increase the attention paid to policy networks that allow for the sharing of strategies and information in fighting terrorism.
- Make active attempts to train and reach out to students with the potential to serve in government, particularly in areas relevant to the War on Terror.

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