A real Palestinian-Israeli crisis is transpiring on the issue of timing and implementation of signed agreements. Its implications and dimensions, however, go well beyond technicalities or generalities.

Its public impact, as well as its significance, cannot be ignored.

Those who had expected instant solutions or miraculous breakthroughs from the new Barak government are undergoing a profound depression brought about by dashed hopes and dispelled euphoria.

Those who had basked in the sunshine of warm smiles and vigorous handshakes are beginning to feel cheated.

Those who had confused public statements of intent and repeated assurances of change with policy transformations and modified behavior are now themselves confused.

As their pendulum is now swinging to the other extreme, they are quick to protest that Barak is no more than a replica of Netanyahu, and the doom and gloom forecasts have become pervasive.

Those who had refused to recognize any change from the beginning and held fast to the distrust legacy now feel vindicated.

Neither extreme is the real issue at hand.

The significant impact is on the attitude of the vast majority of “reasonable” Palestinians who had suspended judgment in the hope of giving Barak a chance to prove that he was the awaited peace partner. These include some of the highest level of leadership.

Realistically recognizing the complexity and difficulty of solving both the inherited crisis and the pending challenges, they tried to explore the terrain and chart a course around the landmines.

Now this majority is finding serious cause for concern as it begins to reexamine its past “reasonability” as being misguided or unrealistic.

It is precisely this majority that Barak must not alienate. Ironically, his statements and policies during his first few weeks in office have not only undermined his potential partners among the Palestinians and any margin of trust and confidence that they had attempted to maintain, but have inflicted serious damage on the process as well as on his own credibility.

Following are some of the issues and arguments that deserve serious attention should Barak wish to rectify the situation:

Absolutist and unilateral statements on such permanent status issues as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, settlements and boundaries are certainly no indicators of a propitious beginning. Ill advised, ill timed, and in total contradiction with the letter and spirit of the peace process and previous agreements, such pronouncements provoked serious alarm among the Palestinians and poisoned the atmosphere for any future talks.

Adopting a stance of superiority and control by blithely making public statements on proposals and issues yet to be negotiated is entirely irresponsible. Barak should never take the Palestinian side for granted, nor should he take his Palestinian counterparts by surprise.

This applies also to his attempts at redefining the American role and imposing his criteria and perceptions for the coming phase on the rest of the world. Prior coordination with the US is no substitute for candid and serious discussions with the party most directly concerned. That is how partnerships function.

Again, statements of intent and broad generalizations are no substitute for direct action and concrete compliance.

While repeatedly asserting his willingness to implement Wye should the Palestinians insist, Barak has deliberately ignored Palestinian insistence on implementation and has pursued a single course of modifications, procrastination, and the issuing of ultimata.

As a further irony, official Israeli statements describe the Palestinians as “rejecting” Barak’s proposals and accuse them of being “rigid” or “inflexible.” The real situation is that the Palestinians are affirming their commitment to the legality of signed and binding agreements, while the Israelis are “rejecting” them.

This is the real test of commitment and seriousness of intent. Add the necessary amount of good faith and you have the ingredients of a process based on parity and mutuality, rather than on Netanyahu’s artificial “reciprocity” in a situation of asymmetry.

The Wye Memorandum is not the answer to any Palestinian dream. It is a flawed agreement, designed by the US to accommodate the previous hard line Israeli government’s preconditions and priorities. At that time, the Israeli opposition (now the government) used every means of persuasion to convince the Palestinians to accept such a prejudicial agreement, knowing full well that it was a diminutive reformulation of previous agreements.

The PNA not only signed the Wye Memorandum, it also paid a heavy price in diminishing its internal support and distorting domestic realities (particularly in the spheres of human rights and democracy).

Despite severe criticisms from its public, the Palestinian leadership persisted in fulfilling its side of the bargain and discharging its commitments.

Given the fact that Netanyahu reneged on his commitments while pursuing the policy of creating prejudicial and dangerous facts on the ground, the Palestinian “advance payment” became more painful and even futile.

For Barak to persist in procrastination or in reformulating agreements or in adopting unilateral positions is a form of willful blindness or crass exploitation of Netanyahu’s legacy.

The Palestinians not only do not have any more price to pay, they also cannot be put on hold while Barak reinvents his side of the bargain.

The original timeframe of the whole peace process and Wye’s timeline have already been violated—stretched to breaking point. Reality and the peace process cannot tolerate any further delays or the invention of a new and modified unilateral timetable. Thus neither the September beginning nor the October redeployment is justified. Barak’s public espousal of a 15-month frame for permanent status “progress” plus other improvisational dates announced by some of his ministers only cloud the issues and increase suspicion.

In proposing to carry over the third redeployment phase to permanent status talks and to merge it with the agreed issues on the agenda, Barak is actually carrying out changes in substance. Thus instead of negotiating Jerusalem, settlements and specified military locations, these talks will end up negotiating areas C and even B as designated by interim phase agreements. The territory involved will become more than 70% of the land instead of the less than 10% as stipulated by the Declaration of Principles.

Any merging of partial or technical or functional issues from the interim phase with final status talks will lead to unfair and even ludicrous trade-offs. All interim phase issues are for implementation and not for renegotiation, and the Palestinian side cannot be asked to pay repeatedly the price of the same commodity. The proposal that Palestinian prisoner release will take place in exchange for the PNA’s agreement to postpone redeployment is not only an insult to Palestinian intelligence, but also a glaring example of a cynical manipulation of the process. If this becomes the negotiating strategy of the Israelis, then the Palestinian side may be asked next to relinquish the Palestinian refugees’ right of return (for example) in exchange for the safe passage! Final status issues must be negotiated in an integrated and comprehensive way, independent of any outstanding interim phase subjects that previous Israeli governments had refused to honor.

Barak’s reluctance (or refusal) to stand up to the extremist settler population is a fatal flaw. He cannot be all things to all people, and the settlers certainly neither voted for him nor do they constitute part of his actual or potential constituency. Ideologically opposed to peace, they will reject and protest any move in that direction. Rather than allowing them to hold his policy and the peace process hostage to their extremism and threats, Barak would do better to keep faith with the constituency for peace that elected him (and not Netanyahu) to move boldly ahead with his mandate for peace.

The “honeymoon” period for any government has a limited time frame. Instead of consuming it all in a global public relations campaign, or frittering it away on a trial and error experimentation exercise, or wasting it in a politically existential “do I dare” angst, Barak would do better to utilize every minute in a meaningful transformation of realities and attitudes. Now is the time to take the difficult and daring decisions to bring about the essential qualitative shift in the peace process. The first step is in the rapid and decisive implementation of agreements. Before the relief (at Netanyahu’s defeat) and the novelty (of the opposition being in government) wear off, Barak must use his “grace period” strategically to optimize the chances of genuine peace. Before the familiar and mundane set in, along with the mobilization of the opposition, Barak must adopt the creative and visionary leadership policies.

Otherwise, he is in danger of not only losing his bearings, but also his peace partners. Making peace with his own extremists and settlers is no substitute.

The tests and choices are clear.

The whole world may have been carried away by his dazzling victory, but when the chips are down, there are dues to be paid and decisive moves to be made.

At the risk of sounding tedious, once again we summarize: Emphasize the difference from (not the similarities with) the previous hard line government. Stop all oppressive and collective punitive measures against the Palestinians and put an end to the racist mentality of occupation. Unhesitatingly implement all signed and outstanding agreements and issues. Cease all unilateral measures and statements pertaining to permanent status issues (Jerusalem, settlements, Palestinian refugees, boundaries, etc). Acknowledge the agenda for final status talks and engage on the basis of parity and mutual respect. A comprehensive and lasting peace must be based on legitimacy, the politics of inclusion, and justice.

No one claimed that the task is easy. But the test of true leadership is in the challenge of the complex and often seemingly impossible. The politics of expediency, reluctance, manipulation, and evasion is the recourse of the weak. Resorting to power is the refuge of the powerless, and crisis management is a symptom of failure of will.

The crisis is real, but it must not be allowed to reach the proportions of a breakdown. The peace process needs a real breakthrough before it loses its credibility and its chance to change the course of history. So does Barak.