The capture of Cpl. Gilad Shalit on 25 June 2006 opened a new chapter in the ongoing narrative of the Israel-Palestine question. Just days later, Hezbollah launched a surprisingly effective raid on Israeli military positions near the border, killing a handful of soldiers and capturing two more. Whether the succession of these events was purely coincidental or premeditated is ultimately of no consequence. More importantly, Israel was caught off guard, despite substantial intelligence reports indicating potential kidnapping attempts by resistance movements from both the Gaza Strip and Southern Lebanon.

Rumors of a prisoner exchange, involving Shalit and anywhere from 800 to 1000 Palestinian political prisoners, have circulated Israeli, Palestinian, and international news sources for the last two weeks. At one point, an Arab newspaper reported that an agreement had been reached and that Shalit had already been moved to Egypt as an initial step in the implementation of the exchange. These reports were quickly dismissed and just days later, news sources reported a complete breakdown in the negotiations for Shalit’s release. The most recent development involves a letter, written by Shalit, and transferred by a Hamas delegation from Damascus to Egyptian officials, who in turn delivered the letter to Shin Bet. On 20 September, after several lab tests, the authenticity of the letter was confirmed. According to Foreign Minister Livni, Abbas is a “partner” in ensuring the release of Shalit, and other Israel officials have confirmed that Egypt is mediating talks for a prisoner exchange that will include Shalit and a number of Palestinians.

The issue seems clear enough, as does the bilateral solution (a prisoner exchange), but implementation, like most aspects of Palestinian/Israeli negotiations, progresses very slowly.

Israel has conducted prisoner exchanges on several occasions since 1948. These have included a series of exchanges with the PLO in the 1980s, three exchanges with Hezbollah brokered over an eight year period from 1996 to 2004. In 1997, Israel was also forced to release Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder of Hamas, in exchange for two Mossad agents captured by Jordan after a botched assassination attempt of Hamas political leader Khaled Meshal in Jordan.

Despite the long history of captures and exchanges, Israel and the newly formed Olmert government were caught with their pants down on June 25. The breach of Israeli security mechanisms, by a simple tunnel of all means, did not sit well with the Israeli public. How could the Israeli army, one of the most technologically advanced and well trained in the world, succumb to a relatively unsophisticated attack by a handful of rag-tag militants? Olmert also faced one of his first real political tests as Prime Minister, as he set about trying to diffuse the situation without appearing ‘soft’ to the Israeli public. This would be a precedent setting moment for Olmert, whose lack of military leadership experience had led many Israelis to question his ability to lead the country in the right direction, especially in times of crisis.

More than a decade had passed since the last Israeli soldier had been captured. In October 1994, Hamas activists captured an Israeli soldier who was hitchhiking and unknowingly got in their car. Like Olmert, then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin refused to negotiate with Hamas, and instead decided on the military option. On the morning of 14 October 1994, Rabin, along with Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat, announced that they had received the Nobel Peace Prize. When a reporter asked Rabin about the 8:00 PM deadline given by Hamas for the release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Wachsman, Rabin remarked that the peace process includes "calculated risks." That night, an Israel commando raided the house where Wachsman was being held. The operation, located at a house in Bir Nabala outside of Jerusalem, was poorly planned and poorly executed, resulting in the death of three Hamas captors, an Israeli commando, and Wachsman himself.

The capture of Shalit brought the Wachsman affair back into the public dialogue for many reasons: Wachsman was the last soldier to be kidnapped prior to Shalit, Hamas had claimed responsibility in both situations, and the botched raid had stuck strongly in the minds of both Israelis and Palestinians. For Palestinians, it was a reminder of continued Israeli aggression and inability to negotiate peacefully, and for Israelis it symbolized poor government-military decision making an even poorer implementation. Even though the military raid failed, the impetus for a military solution is quite obvious. If the raid had been successful, Israelis would have lauded their Prime Minister for his hard-line stance on not negotiating with "terrorists" and his military savvy for launching a successful raid. In Israel, a militarized society that places tremendous importance on military might, the idea of "military strength" is in-fact a double edged sword; on the one hand, Israelis do not just hope for military success, they expect it and on a psychological level, they depend on it. Because of this militaristic chauvinism, military defeats or botched operations can have a devastating effect on the Israeli mindset. This of course became very clear after Israel's military blunders in Lebanon during summer 2006, but was also apparent after the Wachsman affair in 1994; when the military fails, it has tremendous political implications for the acting government.

Today, Olmert and his government are already under intense scrutiny for the decisions they made in the recent war on Lebanon. The successful resolution of the Shalit situation is of paramount importance for Olmert, if he wishes to salvage what is left of his Prime Ministership. Immediately following Shalit's kidnapping, Israel began its largest scale military operation in the Gaza Strip since its unilateral disengagement in summer 2005. While the operation was presented as a "rescue mission," the Israeli army saw it as a valuable opportunity to destabilize the region even further. Since the cross border raid on June 25 that resulted in Shalit's capture, more than 215 Palestinians have been killed in the Gaza Strip. The densely-populated strip has fallen into the worst humanitarian crisis in years, with power shortages, lack of mobility, and ongoing military assaults. Olmert's ulterior motives are more than obvious---"shock and awe" is not a particularly effective method for rescue missions, which require small-scale, covert military operations, not 500 pound bombs and tanks rolling through residential neighborhoods.

The political reality is that negotiations for the release of Shalit began as soon as he was captured. This is, after all, why he was captured in the first place—to be used as a bargaining chip for the release of Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli jails. It is also likely that Israeli officials have known the whereabouts of Shalit since his capture. Even though Olmert would certainly prefer—and may still be hoping for---a rescue mission, the political and military risks are far too great, especially considering the legacy of the Wachsman affair. A successful military rescue could salvage Olmert's tarnished political career, but a botched raid and a dead Shalit would spell Olmert's end. So the political tug-of-war between Olmert, Haniyeh, and Abbas has taken center stage while Shalit and thousands of Palestinian prisoners hang in the balance.

Olmert is not the only one who faces political pressure to ensure the safe release of Shalit. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas also has vested interest in seeing Shalit released, because it would indicate to his Israeli counterparts that he is not a powerless figurehead, incapable of playing an effective role in any future negotiations. In 1994, Arafat faced similar pressure to control movements like Hamas, and the kidnapping of Wachsman by Hamas activists did not bode well for his relationship with Israel. As the shaky unity government emerges, Shalit's release could provide the necessary spark to jumpstart any new peace process between Palestinian and Israeli leaders. If Palestinian prisoners are released in stages, as Egyptian officials have proposed, the release of prisoners following talks between Abbas and Olmert could also be counted as a political victory for the Palestinian president. Of course, Hamas spokesmen have made it clear that the immediate release of prisoners is important to any agreement, because they too have a lot to lose—and a lot to gain—from the tenuous Shalit situation. In the face of economic entanglement, Hamas has faced dwindling support at home, and the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners would be a huge political victory for the Hamas government.

Countless Israeli officials have reiterated the standard government line that Israel does not negotiate with "terrorists." This is of course untrue, because negotiations are underway at this very moment. Time is key, as all parties involved maneuver to exploit the situation to their advantage. Ultimately, Shalit isn’t going anywhere and the demands for a prisoner release are clear, so it is up to Israel to decide how much they are willing to give in order to ensure Shalit's release. At this point, it is not a question of if, but a question of how much and when. Somehow, drawing out the negotiations process makes it less obvious that Israel is in fact negotiating at all. Also, the longer Shalit is held before he is inevitably released, the greater and more miraculous his release will seem, and Olmert and his gang will be sure to milk this emotional, hard-fought victory for all it's worth. Shalit is going to be released, this much is certain, but only once the critical point is reached, where all parties involved think they can maximize the political gain and minimize the political losses of compromise.

Nathan Karp is a student at Brown University concentrating in Middle East Studies. He is currently an intern for MIFTAH's Media and Information Programme. He can be contacted at mip@miftah.org