The lethal clashes in Gaza and the ongoing demonstrations in Ramallah have left nine dead and scores injured in the worst case of infighting since Hamas came to power in January 2006. More than ever, it is time to reassess the political climate of Palestine, a quasi-state in constant transition, and steer it in a new direction. If Hamas and Fateh leaders are unable to quell the current confrontations, lethal clashes will increase, the prospect of civil war will become a frightening reality, and the illegal occupation will fade into the background as Palestinians fight themselves. The international community, in the form of the Quartet, has proven unwilling to provide any real assistance to the Palestinian cause, so Palestinians will inevitably have to diffuse this powder keg on their own. How will they do it? Abbas and other Fateh officials have already called for early elections in 2007 in an attempt reshuffle the political deck and put Fateh back in control of the government. Unfortunately, early elections will bring calm, but will eventually raise tensions and the probability of increased violence. If Palestinian political leaders have learned any lessons from the January 2006 elections, they will rebuff these hasty calls for a new electorate.

The reality is that Palestinian elections should never have been held in January 2006. After Arafat’s death in 2004, the Bush administration took this opportunity to promote their own political reforms by pushing for elections. After Mahmoud Abbas won the presidential election in January 2005, parliamentary elections were slotted for July. Given the growing insurgency in Iraq and the failure of American foreign policy there, it is not surprising that the Bush administration suddenly became a huge proponent of “democratic” reforms in Palestine. A foreign policy victory in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would certainly bolster American efforts in shaping a “new middle east,” and since Bush’s posse rarely ever learns from its mistakes, elections remained the order of the day. After several more months of unforeseen disagreements between various Palestinian factions, elections were finally held in January 2006.

As numerous analysts have pointed out, Hamas did not win the January 2006 elections so much as Fateh lost them. Poorly run campaigns (in which multiple Fateh candidates competed with one another in a district against a single Hamas candidate, for example) helped Hamas win a majority of the seats, and an increased frustration with party corruption turned many Fateh-loyalists in search of an alternative. When Hamas’ leadership agreed to participate in the elections, they did so as part of a measured and tactful method of slowly entering mainstream Palestinian politics. Hamas leaders understood that the transition from opposition movement to political party could not be made hastily, and so they hoped to win only a few seats in parliament in the hope that they could exert some small but noticeable influence on future legislation and presidential decisions. When Fateh’s poor performance in the elections propelled Hamas into the leadership position, Hamas leaders faced the exact problem they had hoped to avoid in the first place—making the 180 degree turn from resistance movement to governing body without sacrificing ideology and political aspirations.

Free elections are an integral part of any democratic system, but they do not in and of themselves bring democracy. Contrary to the opinion of US foreign policy makers, elections are a means, not an end; much more is needed to sustain democracy than the casting of ballots. Iraq is a case in point, where the United States orchestrated elections and waited for democracy to magically appear out of a vacuum. As the American government has painstakingly learned, elections and constitutions are meaningless if there is no degree of peace and security to nourish the difficult process of reform. If freedoms are not protected, the roots of democracy remain weak and fragile, easily uprooted by the smallest disturbances.

Democracy under occupation is a humiliating paradox. The world demands reform from the Palestinians while turning a blind eye to the very institution that has crippled Palestinian growth for nearly forty years: the Israeli occupation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In spite of international condemnation of Israeli policies in the occupied territories, and the myriad of international conventions/laws and court decisions broken repeatedly by the Israeli government, the occupation remains more lethal than ever. As soon as Hamas emerged victorious in the January 2006 elections, they faced economic strangulation from Israel and the international donor community. The unfortunate reality of ongoing military occupation is that the occupied population is rendered completely dependent upon outside forces, and the occupying power itself, for the delivery of necessary aid and services. Even though the United States had been one of the strongest proponents of the Palestinian elections, they were among the first countries to support Israel’s economic boycott. This outrageous hypocrisy only goes to show the frightening insincerity of the American government’s attempt to bring “democratic reforms” to the Palestinian people. Suppressing a government from exercising its democratically mandated authority does not set a positive example for future elections or political negotiations.

Of course Israel and the Quartet have justified their economic sanctions on the ground that Hamas is a terrorist organization, and is therefore barred from receiving any financial support. The fact that Hamas’ leadership decided to participate in the January 2006 elections is, however, a testament to the flexibility of the movement, and their ability to compromise and adapt to changing political realities. Since the unexpected victory, Ismail Haniyyeh has expressed willingness to accept a long-term truce and even a Palestinian state with 1967 borders—something that never would have happened prior to the elections. In the eyes of Israel and the West, however, Hamas remains a “terrorist” organization—an intransigent, hard-line organization that preaches violence and hate—undeserving of the political power granted to it by the Palestinian people.

The surprising outcome of the elections in January brought a newfound sense of optimism to many Palestinians and even some moderate Israelis. Fateh’s domination of Palestinian politics had finally come to an end, the people had spoken, and perhaps a real and meaningful dialogue could begin between Palestinians and Israelis. All hopes, however, were shattered when Israel and the international community announced that they would not deal with the Hamas government. The economic siege began and it has been ongoing for over seven months. Today, Palestinians are closer to civil war than they have ever been. The blame for the situation cannot be leveled solely at Hamas, or Fateh, or the occupation, or the international community; all those involved share some culpability for the infighting.

In an attempt to regain control of the government, Fateh officials have been calling for early elections. The Palestinian leadership, from Hamas and Fateh, must remember that Israel alone benefits from Palestinian disunity. Internal problems only serve the interests of the occupation, and allow the occupying forces to continue their racist and lethal policies in the occupied Palestinian territories. Unity and dialogue between Palestinians is essential right now. The situation, however, is far too fragile for new elections. Touted as a panacea by American foreign policy makers, elections may return Fateh to power, but the political transition could very well embroil Palestine in a civil war.

Nathan Karp is a student at Brown University concentrating in Middle East Studies. He is currently an intern for MIFTAH's Media and Information Programme. He can be contacted at mip@miftah.org