Is Shalit Really that Important to Israel?
By Joharah Baker for MIFTAH
October 17, 2007

Ever since the kidnapping of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit in June 2006, the young soldier’s name has ebbed and flowed in the media and in Israeli and Palestinian political discourse. At times, Shalit’s name was splashed across headlines for days, at others, months went by without the mere mention of him.

The sheer inconsistency of Israel’s so-called insistence on Shalit’s safety, brings into question his government’s real priorities regarding its captured soldiers. Recently, high ranking Israeli officials have expressed their concern over the hanging fate of Shalit. One unnamed official reportedly stated to the Hebrew daily Maariv that he was now concerned that Shalit would eventually share the fate of Ron Arad, an Israeli pilot who was captured in Lebanon in 1986. Attempts to release him though negotiations with Lebanese resistance groups have repeatedly failed and while there has been much speculation over the years about Arad’s death, there is still no proof.

In July 2006, two other Israeli soldiers were taken hostage by Hizbullah on the Lebanese-Israeli border. The two soldiers - Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser - are yet to be located.

The more time goes by, the more Shalit’s fate seems to be heading in this same direction. After his capture, the Israeli army carried out wide-scale military operations into the Gaza Strip in an attempt to locate and rescue Shalit, but to no avail. The armed groups, Hamas included, which claimed responsibility for the soldier’s capture, had hid him well and were in no hurry to disclose his whereabouts.

Israel must have realized this soon on in the game. After the initial devastating invasion, which resulted in scores of dead Palestinians, damage to several homes and infrastructure facilities including the major power plant, Israel seemingly decided on another tactic to try and secure Shalit’s release.

Rumors then ensued about possible prisoner swaps. The Palestinians have all experienced the highs of anticipating the homecoming of their long awaited loved ones finally free from Israeli prisons in exchange for this lone soldier. But time and again, deals would falter at the last moment, the hopes of those behind bars and outside of them crashing down.

Upon first glance, any onlooker might accept the Israeli rationale behind rejecting this or that prisoner swap with the Palestinians – the Palestinians were asking for the release of too many prisoners, Israel could never accept to release prisoners with “Jewish blood on their hands”, etc. etc. However, after the first, then the second prisoner swap went bust, no sane person would believe that Israel – contrary to its declared intentions – was really hell-bent on bringing Shalit home.

It has been one year and four months since Shalit was captured after his tank was bombed just outside the Gaza border with Israel. The Israeli government has had ample opportunity to secure his release, especially in the early stages when Hamas was more receptive to outside mediation, namely from Egypt. At one point, Egyptian mediators hammered out a proposed deal where 600 Palestinian prisoners would be released in exchange for Shalit. Again, Israel would not have it. Israeli government officials said a prisoner swap would only “encourage more kidnappings.”

Today, Shalit is barely mentioned, except in passing. The only logical explanation for Israel’s stalling on the matter would be that the kidnapped soldier is just not very high up on their priority list. There is sufficient evidence that Shalit is still alive and well – Hamas has vowed to that – so Israel most likely wants to hold back on making any deals until it can release Shalit “for free” and not be seen as kowtowing to any Hamas demands, however reasonable.

In a roundabout way, Israel is banking on the new Palestinian government to solve certain issues it failed to accomplish. One is that of Shalit. If the Abbas-headed government eventually succeeds in pushing Hamas out of Gaza, which seems the most likely scenario given the deposed government’s beleaguered status quo, Israel will find itself with a much more malleable Palestinian leadership to deal with. Once the more moderate Fateh government is securely in place in the Strip and Hamas has been cut down at the knees, Israel is betting Shalit will be as good as in the pocket. As far back as March, 2007 just before the national unity government was formed, Abbas made it clear that he would do everything in his power to secure the release of Shalit, even though he denied any connection between the formation of the government and the soldier’s safety.

For now, Shalit’s future remains in obscurity. While Israel would surely prefer that Shalit is returned home to his family, alive and well, if events were to take an unexpected turn and the young soldier makes his last trip home in a body bag, his family will only have their government to blame. Israel has proven it is more important that Hamas is completely shunned and vilified not only in Israel but in the international community at large, then to secure the safe release of one of its own. For Israel, the political sympathy summoned by the images of a lone Israeli soldier in the hands of militant Islamic terrorists is worth much more than his release, even if that release would only mean the freedom of a few hundred Palestinian prisoners.

For Israel, it is about this one soldier – and the few being held in Lebanon if they are to be added to the equation. For the Palestinians, thousands are forced to experience the anguish of not knowing the whereabouts of their son, husband, daughter or brother. The rationale behind the Palestinian groups holding Shalit is completely understandable if it means there is even a glimmer of hope his capture would secure the release of so many others. But for Shalit’s family, his continued captivity should have created an outrage, for having been lied to and placated into believing that their son’s safety would be secured by any means.

If Israel gets its way and works through the new dynamics being created in the Palestinian arena to secure Shalit’s freedom, nothing would have been gained for the Palestinians. However, if Shalit is sacrificed because Israel refuses to make concessions for its own soldiers, then perhaps it would have learned a valuable lesson in the process – losing your people’s faith can never be taken for political gain.

Joharah Baker is a Writer for the Media and Information Programme at the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH). She can be contacted at mip@miftah.org.

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