Weapons-related violence in the Palestinian territories seems to be on the rise. According to Police Department figures, the year 1998 alone witnessed 192 cases of death, murder and attempted murder, and 5205 incidents of assault and battery.

Although attempts were made to attribute this rise in criminal violence to the proliferation of illegally-obtained weapons, the facts would indicate otherwise. Only 28 incidents involving such weapons were reported in 1998.

The available evidence seems to point in the direction of the Palestinian security systems and the large number of armed personnel in their employ. In addition, the nature and background of the recruits, the inadequacy or lack of professional and legal training, as well as the weakness (or absence) of regulations, control and accountability all seem to be contributing factors.

The most notable instance is the shooting of the young student Wissam al-Tarifi on October 25, 1998. He was killed by members of Moussa Arafat’s Military Intelligence during a demonstration in which the Fatah organization (Tanthim) was protesting the vandalization of their offices and arrest of some of their members by the Military Intelligence.

Despite repeated calls and protests, asking for accountability at the highest level of that security service, no action has been taken.

During the month of March 1999, for example, a significant number of reported violent deaths involved violence by Palestinian security services, either among themselves or against civilians.

On March 6, Abdel-Fattah Shannan, an elderly man from Kobar, near Ramallah, was shot and killed by a family member who works for the Palestinian General Intelligence Service. Two 17-year old boys, Ala’ al-Hams and Khamis Mahmoud Salameh from Rafah, were shot to death by the National Security Forces on March 10; the two were participating in demonstrations protesting the death sentence passed by the State Security Court against Subhi ‘Attar from the Preventive Security Service for the killing of his colleague Rif’at Judeh on Feb. 1, 1999. On Sunday, March 14, Sa’ed Abdel-Mahdi Alawi, 20, from Deir Jreer village near Ramallah was accidentally shot dead by a relative who was a member of Force 17 in the course of a feud between two families. On the 15th, Ayman Zayed from Beit Iksa was shot dead by another resident of his village. On Saturday, March 20, Yasser Hamad, 23, from the village of Naqoura near Nablus was shot in the leg and stomach. He remained in intensive care until his death on Tuesday, March 23.

The Palestinian National Authority has repeatedly expressed its concern about the escalating violence. Its response was so forceful as to resort, in some cases, to the death penalty.

On August 30, 1998, two brothers, Muhammad and Ra’ed Kamal Abu Sultan from Gaza were executed following their conviction by the State Security Court of killing Muhammad and Majdi Ibrahim Khalidi. Both victims and perpetrators belonged to different branches of the security services.

The Khalidi brothers, however, were popular and active members of Fatah, and their murder led to a strike and widespread protests, demanding the death penalty for the Abu Sultan brothers.

The incident took place on the afternoon of July 27, 1998; the State Security Court convened on the night of the 28th-29th, passed the death sentence on the 29th, and the condemned men were executed by firing squad on the 30th.

Official justifications for the violation of due process and the lightning speed of the whole procedure, in addition to the deterrent effect, included the urgent need to prevent further unrest and protests and the preservation of public order.

The legal basis for the Court’s decision was the Palestinian Military Penal Code of 1979, or the Revolutionary Security Law that the PLO applied on its forces in exile. The relevant article in this case was 387a with reference to articles 120 and 124.

That same court handed down a death sentence in the case of Colonel Ahmad Atiyya Abu Mustafa (National Security Forces) having found him guilty of sexually assaulting a six-year-old boy. For the actual crime, the condemned man received a sentence of 15 years imprisonment with hard labor. His death sentence (and immediate execution by firing squad on Feb. 26, 1999) was for inciting the public against the Palestinian National Authority.

The Court based its deliberations on the same Revolutionary Security Law. Article 165 of that Code stipulates the death penalty for any crimes mentioned in the Revolutionary Security Law which besmirch the reputation of the Palestinian Revolution by means of inciting the public against it.

Subhi ‘Attar’s death sentence for his killing of Rif’at Judeh has not been carried out, currently being reviewed by President Arafat. The case had created such a public outcry, taking on political as well as family and tribal implications, that it polarized the population and threatened further confronatations.

The security services’ shooting of the two youths during the protests also provoked further protests, and led to the formation of a committee of inquiry. This, and the intervention of political, public, and family leaders—along with the direct intervention of the President himself—finally succeeded in calming the situation.

It is hoped that President Arafat will commute the sentence, and that capital punishment will be abolished once and for all.

The use of execution as a means of “quick” justice and in response to public pressure has not only encouraged the victims’ families and supporters to resort to exerting such pressure. It also rendered judicial proceedings into subjective and often capricious exercises, particularly those of the notorious State Security Court.

Thus a vicious cycle of public pressure and official response was generated, to the greater detriment of the work of the civilian judiciary and leading to further erosion of public confidence in the rule of law and institutional justice.

Family connections, community standing, and political affiliation became determining factors in the speed and the nature of both trials and outcomes.

This is reminiscent of the system of Palestinian “popular” justice that prevailed under full Israeli occupation. Israel, then, had transferred most criminal and civil responsibilities to its military courts, and directly distorted and politicized the existing Palestinian judicial system.

Palestinians, then, resorted to the more traditional norms of resolving disputes through family and tribal structures, or to the more political factional forms of arbitration. Both the communal and the popular/political tribunals violated due process. They tended to adopt either mediation, reconciliation, and compensation or harsh and instant retribution.

After five years of PNA rule, Palestinians have the right to expect a qualitative improvement in the new system of justice, not a regressive revival of unhealthy norms and patterns of behavior that exploit the worst impulses and traditions in society. Nor do they want to import or superimpose harsh and repressive laws and measures that prevailed at other times and in different places and conditions.

The legal system is in urgent need of unification and reform, to remove the unfair legacy of pluralism in the inherited laws and to apply uniform standards in all parts of the land. The Legislative Council has the pressing task of legislating new and just laws to replace obsolete and military or emergency laws.

These new laws must be consistent with international humanitarian law and with contemporary democratic and fair practices. Thus the death penalty must be eradicated, and the rights and freedoms of the civilian population must be protected.

Of equal urgency is the need to remove the distortions imposed on the Palestinian judiciary by the long and abnormal legacy of Israeli military occupation.

The judicial structure must be completed with new and professional appointments, and the system must be unified. The State Security Court must be abolished in accordance with the resolutions of the PLC and the persistent demands of Palestinian human rights organizations.

The integrity and independence of the judiciary must be assured, with no interference from any official bodies or individuals—be they security or civilian. Respect for the law and equality before the law must be unquestioned, and should not be challenged by any authority.

Only then will the public develop confidence in the legal and judicial systems, once they are assured of due process and recourse. Violence, thus, will not be countered with violations, but will be contained, diminished and punished within a legal and just system.

Justice cannot be served by an inflation in the security services or by the militarization of an essentially civilian society and its institutions.

MIFTAH maintains that the nascent Palestinian State must enter the 21st century on a firm footing of justice, democracy, and humanity.