MIFTAH's briefing of March 15, 1999 dealing with the issue of Palestinian statehood presented an analysis of the legal and national foundations for the establishment of the Palestinian State.

In addition, it addressed the issue within the context of the peace process, particularly the May 4 date which represents the end of the interim phase and the period allocated for permanent status talks.

During this month, President Arafat stepped up his intensive round of diplomatic consultations and global visits. A vigorous Palestinian internal discussion and public debate also characterized this phase.

At the same time, the Palestinian State increasingly dominated the election rhetoric of the Israeli right, with Netanyahu and other hard-line candidates insisting on imposing it on the agenda.

Their assumption is that by presenting the Palestinian State as a threat to Israel, they can generate a sufficient degree of insecurity and fear in the electorate as to improve their chances of election.

Historical precedent has established the fallacy of the concept of a "strong" leadership that first manufactures then exploits collective panic to maintain a grip on the people.

Simultaneously, the Israeli government is attempting to export fear beyond its borders.

Its first target is the Palestinians who have been systematically subjected to threats of doom and destruction. Netanyahu threatens to reoccupy Palestinian cities; the Israeli army is preparing for such military operations as "the field of thorns"; Palestinian areas still under Israeli control will be immediately annexed; a state of siege will be imposed to bring the Palestinian State to its knees.

None of these threats succeeded in intimidating the Palestinian people and leadership.

Unfortunately, some aspects of this political blackmail managed to reach some foreign capitals and members of the political elite.

First came a collective expression of concern about the actual measures that the Israeli government might adopt should we declare statehood on the fourth of May. The damage of these military adventures and collective punitive measures on the peace process would prove irreparable, they declared.

Equally fatal might be the re-election of the right wing government in Israel with the prospect of pressing ahead with its current destructive policies.

The logical inference is that the politics of fear will actually prevail.

But more disturbing is the implication that the Israeli government has succeeded in dictating its agenda well beyond its borders and in shaping the policies of others in response to its own politics of coercion.

Once again, the peace process has been hijacked by the Israeli right, and the prevailing discourse has been manipulated by threats and extremism.

The Berlin Declaration of the European Union (Key Issues, March 26) was a promising antidote to the "taboo" imposed by Netanyahu on the Palestinian State, mainly as a public international normalization and espousal of the project.

The question of the timing, however, remains unresolved in the minds of many in the international community.

The May 4th date is certainly significant in that it brings to an end a contractual relationship that has regulated Palestinian-Israeli realities since September 1993.

Clearly, the ensuing legal vacuum can be filled only by resorting to international law-a legal framework that has never been superceded by the interim arrangements, rather providing the foundation for such agreements.

All the previously stated reservations about entering an open-ended process, or allowing for a de facto extension, or for a unilateral Israeli control of the process and of realities on the ground, or for the features of the interim phase to become permanent still hold.

Ironically, several suggestions were made for a Palestinian unilateral extension of the transitional period.

Such a unilateral step would certainly be a violation of the process, particularly in view of the absence of any international initiative or agreement on a new phase with clear objectives, commitments or guarantees.

The public debate in Palestine has been quite clear about not confusing form with substance, or the procedural enactment with the right itself. Its overwhelming support for Palestinian statehood is unequivocal.

It has also been quite adamant about adherence to international law as well as to Palestinian legality.

Hence both UN Resolution 181 and the Palestinian Declaration of Statehood of November 1988 have dominated the discourse.

As such, it is evident that Palestinian Statehood has actually been declared by the highest Palestinian legislative body, the Palestine National Council, in 1988.

On May 4, this declaration has to take on additional steps of implementation to continue the process, with a clear reaffirmation of the PNC resolution.

Structurally, as the transitional institutions expire with the interim phase, the national institutions of the PLO are to take over.

This does not preclude, rather it requires, a thorough review and reform of these institutions to enable them to handle the requirements of the emerging realities of the new phase, and the embodiment of statehood on the basis of genuine democracy and inclusive governance.

It is thus up to the PNC (or its designated Central Council) to take the decision on behalf of the PLO on the necessary steps.

During its meeting scheduled for April 27 in Gaza, the Central Council is called upon to consider several announcements in addition to the reaffirmation of the PNC resolution of 1988.

Among them is the formation of a special committee to draft the constitution for the new state.

Also imperative is the replacement of the PNA executive with a new cabinet as the executive branch of government.

The elected PLC must be replaced with a duly elected parliament representing all Palestinians. This, of course, requires the passing of a new election law not subject to the constraints of the interim phase and capable of dealing with the complexities of Palestinian realities within and outside Palestine.

Along with the date and steps for parliamentary elections, the leadership must announce the date for local government elections.

So long as Palestinian territories continue to be under Israeli occupation, and so long as the Palestinian refugee question is unresolved in accordance with international law, the national representative institutions of the PLO must be maintained, though modified to meet new needs and realities.

The recognition afforded the Palestinian State that was declared in 1988 will naturally extend to cover the additional steps of implementation.

It is expected that more states will recognize the Palestinian State as it takes further institutional and substantive shape.

So far, the Arab and international response to President Arafat's diplomatic mission and extensive consultations has been encouraging.

The collective global will and consciousness have not only absorbed the concept, but have also adopted it as a necessary condition for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.

Those countries that have not done so will be expected to raise the level of diplomatic relations with, and representation of, the state of Palestine as it takes shape.

In addition, economic cooperation must be enhanced in such a way as to foster genuine integrated development and to enable the state to meet its obligations and challenges.

No one expects the miraculous emergence of a full-fledged state on the significant date of May 4. Statehood is a gradual, incremental process that requires the full utilization of all available resources and skills.

Palestinian statehood has already begun. The process is indeed irreversible.