Most recently, we have witnessed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in four different spheres or contexts. Simultaneously, Netanyahu was architect of the coalition deal with Kadima, the main Israeli opposition party. He was involved in negotiations with Egypt and in reaching the subsequent compromise that ended the hunger strike by Palestinian prisoners. He issued a response referring to “words and not deeds” to a letter addressed by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. And he has continued military operations against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, as well as settlement expansion in the West Bank, including Jerusalem.

Some of these acts sent out a lifeline, not only to the ailing Kadima party but also to Abbas’ Fatah faction, both of which thoroughly dread the prospect of elections in their respective parliaments.

The Israeli prime minister orchestrated the above as he faces far greater threats to his power than the recent emphasis on Iran would suggest. While Israel’s unemployment figures are running significantly below those in Europe and the United States (5.4 percent at the beginning of this year), 2011 saw hundreds of thousands of Israelis taking to the streets of Israeli cities as part of an emerging social justice movement, demanding lower housing and food prices for the squeezed middle classes.

Although the irony of an “Occupy Jerusalem” movement is not wasted on anyone, this is in fact a real possibility given the level of public disapproval for the backroom agreement between Netanyahu and the Kadima leader Shaul Mofaz, which effectively robbed Israelis of a chance to participate in the democratic process.

The benefits to Netanyahu of forming a new coalition are stark: The coalition reflex has become prominent among almost all European governments in the face of the ongoing financial crisis, and clearly Netanyahu believes that the coalition may act as a buffer for his own party against criticism on economic issues. Netanyahu is also far more competent in the field of neutering his political opponents than his predecessors and is happy for now to reap the benefits of a short-term commitment from which he can easily walk away.

However, to focus on the domestic in this fashion is to display a great naiveté toward the Israeli context. Here, the formation of a coalition carries far more sinister implications than it would in Europe. That is to say that this could well be a “war government,” in other words a government that brings together cross-party support to ensure unity during a military campaign against an external threat. The government now contains a number of military generals and faces possible targets beyond Iran, including the Gaza Strip, South Lebanon and Syria.

For now, however, perhaps the description of a “bunker government” would suffice. Israel is currently peering out to its southwest, eagerly awaiting the outcomes of two major elections in the region: the presidential election in Egypt (which is to be held this month), and those for Hamas’ highly secretive Shura council. Israel is notoriously far-sighted in all its foreign policy decisions and is waiting for the smoke to clear following the Arab Spring – and with it, the emergence of a new chapter in political Islam – before it can reassess its predicament and decide where to point the guns.

It must be said, however, that this new Israeli coalition was not formed exclusively to pursue a war agenda. It was also formed to maintain the status quo. Following the forging of the coalition, Israel has followed its longer-term strategic agenda of keeping the door open for dialogue with Egypt in order to maintain security along the shared Israeli-Egyptian borders, contain Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and prepare for relations with the future Egyptian president.

Moreover, Israel has acted to ensure the survival of Mahmoud Abbas’ authority in the West Bank by agreeing to the demands of hunger-striking prisoners. Had a prisoner perished during the hunger strike, Abbas’ legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians would have been dealt a killer blow, while Hamas would have benefitted from the public outrage against Israel. Therefore, in the name of continuity, the Israelis want to sail clear of open warfare with the Palestinians, while maintaining the peace process in its current state of deadlock.

Mahdi Abdul Hadi is chairman of Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs in Jerusalem and a political analyst. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons.org, an online newsletter that publishes articles on Israeli-Palestinian relations.