Was the “sacred date” of May 4, 1999 merely a tactical ploy, a political maneuver, a rhetorical device, and—in the main—Much Ado about Nothing?

Or was it a significant turning point in the peace process and in Palestinian history as the date of no return for Palestinian statehood?

The Palestine Central Council, predictably, decided not to decide on declaring the state on that date, rather postponing its “open” meeting until June (see “Key Issues,” April 30).

In Ramallah and Hebron today, hundreds of young Palestinians have been demonstrating (and getting shot at by the Israeli army) in favor of the state.

Several PNA officials issued public statements reiterating the Palestinian right to statehood and the intention of the leadership to press ahead with its moves to make that state a reality. Palestinian media broadcasts have been conducting a verbal celebration of the date.

The constant refrain was that this is “no ordinary day.”

However, beyond the Palestinian protests and the renewed Israeli assault on Jerusalem and the Orient House (both of which have become common occurrences) the day has witnessed nothing out of the ordinary.

The Israeli elections campaigns are proceeding with tedious predictability. Netanyahu once again is claiming credit for the postponement and vows to prevent the state should he be reelected; the racist rhetoric and accusations, whether directed against Palestinians or as part of the hate campaign against ethnic minorities in Israel, are escalating. Settlements are expanding; and on the whole the day is exhibiting all the “business as usual” signs.

Nevertheless, whether dramatic or mundane, exuberant or subdued, May 4 actually signals the crossing of the Rubicon for most Palestinians.

With international (and even Israeli) duplicity, the threshold of legality has been crossed. And life goes on.

The interim phase, as defined by the signed agreements, is over. But both its institutions and constraints persist. It has not been officially extended, but it has not been concluded.

Permanent status talks, having commenced with one solitary meeting in May 1996, are legally over. But they are to begin, according to the US, within six months of the Israeli elections.

Many Palestinians, to their surprise, discovered that according to the PCC statement the Palestinian state already exists as a natural right. Never mind the Israeli-controlled crossing points, the state of siege, the confiscated land and resources, the dismembering of the land, the Israeli army checkpoints, detentions and torture, house demolitions, and the hysterical Israeli campaign to annex Jerusalem.

The state actually exists despite the absence of sovereignty, the disappearance of the basic law, the distortions in the judiciary, the undermining of the legislative, the non-accountability of the executive, the violations by the security, and the absence of economic and administrative transparency and professionalism.

The political and legal Declaration of Independence of 1988 is still binding, as is UN resolution 181. Have they actually gone into effect as of May 4 or do they continue to be legal foundations pending enactment?

If May 4 has not produced a state on the ground, has it produced a state of limbo—an Israeli-election-induced coma—pending the restoration of its vital signs at the appropriate time?

However, since the pursuit of daily life cannot be put on hold (or on suspended animation), there might still be time for constructive intervention to prepare for the post-comatose state.

The most immediate priority remains in the re-ordering of the Palestinian house:

--A serious and substantive national dialogue is essential for the consolidation of a politically pluralistic system and in preparation for an inclusive representative government. This dialogue must eschew the traditional formalistic factional quota system, and must represent a real engagement of diverse ideas and currents.

--Issues of social justice, rule of law, and human rights must be resolved both within an efficient institutional system and in the mindsets and attitudes of decision-makers and implementing bodies.

--The Basic Law and other ratified draft legislation must be approved and must enter into effect immediately. The Higher Judicial Council and other components of the judiciary must be completed.

--The drafting committee for the constitution must work within a specified deadline, with direct coordination between the local and the Arab advisory committees.

--Concrete steps for multiple elections must take place, beginning with the formation of the relevant committees and the passing of the appropriate legislation. Local and parliamentary elections have become pressing issues.

--Serious efforts at forming and declaring a credible national government as the state’s executive branch must commence. Considerations of regional, tribal, and political patronage must be discarded in favor of integrity, public confidence, and ability.

--Palestinian strategic, expert, and negotiating committees must be formed, and all necessary steps must be undertaken to ensure the highest quality performance in the pending permanent status negotiations. Clear policy and political reference must be identified.

--It is imperative that the Palestinian leadership regain the confidence of the people and revitalize their will to resist all Israeli settlement activities and illegal measures in Jerusalem. A Jerusalem agenda is a priority, with full economic, political, and institutional support.

--The PLO and its institutions must carry out the necessary reform and changes in order to accommodate the requirements of statehood and to delineate a clear division of powers and responsibilities.

--A strategic study and analysis of all alternatives and options pertaining to political developments in Israel (and in particular the results of the May elections) must be undertaken and contingency plans must be prepared.

Externally, the required measures include:

--Stepping up the diplomatic campaign to upgrade Palestinian representation both at country level and in international bodies. Seeking UN recognition and full status is essential.

--Preparing a comprehensive and integrated development plan consistent with the requirements of statehood, and coordinating this plan with the donor community.

--Reinforcing international relations and investing in the good will and support of the international community that had called for the postponement of the declaration of statehood.

--Launching a global information campaign to persuade the international community of the requirements of a just peace and to ensure prior understanding and support for the Palestinian negotiating positions.

--Carrying out sustained contacts with the Palestinian exile and refugee communities and bringing them within the decision-making framework of the state.

--Developing Arab relations, bilaterally and collectively, to cement Arab solidarity, protection and support. Preparations for a well-conceived summit must be under way.

If June is the new date (by default) for taking crucial decisions, the preparatory stages for all options should have already begun. While conducting a post mortem on past decisions may be an exercise in hindsight, MIFTAH wishes to urge everybody involved to engage in foresight. Those who seek to participate in shaping the future must be able to project ahead with the proper will to intervene and the ability to do so effectively.