Palestinian officials have repeatedly demanded the immediate implementation of the Wye Memorandum as proof of Barak’s seriousness of intent and good faith in the peace process.

Netanyahu’s non-implementation of an agreement that he had signed at the urging of the American President (himself) and in the White House (itself) proved to be disastrous both for the peace process and for Netanyahu himself. It widened the American-Israeli rift, increased Palestinian-Israeli distrust, and intensified Israeli-Israeli polarization. Ultimately, it contributed directly to Netanyahu’s downfall.

It is doubtful that Barak will commit the same mistake. In fact, it is almost certain that he will proceed with the implementation of Wye immediately. Why? He has nothing to lose and a lot to gain from such a step.

Wye is not only a minimalist agreement with maximum benefit and minimum cost for the Israelis. It is also a diminution of the peace process and a revision of earlier agreements.

It has set the dangerous precedent of reopening and renegotiating signed (presumably binding) agreements in response to American pressures that in themselves were a response to Israeli intransigence and non-compliance.

It has violated a set timetable in favor of an amended and prolonged timeframe.

It has established a “unique” method of implementation presupposing a false symmetry between occupier and occupied, the strong and the weak, the oppressor and the victim. How else can one describe the “gradual, parallel” approach advocated and adopted by the State Department and the White House.

More seriously, it has enhanced the “probationary” status of the Palestinian leadership that has been placed on “good behavior” to win the approval of the US and Israel at the expense of its approval rating with its own people. Why else would Netanyahu arrogantly employ the “They give, we give!” formula in his public rhetoric? Such a cynical exploitation of power as a flimsy excuse for his refusal to honor agreements was made possible by the Wye approach to negotiations. As Shulamit Aloni so eloquently responded, “We have taken away everything from them, so what do they have left to ‘give’? It is up to us to ‘give back’ what is theirs.”

It has added to the fragmentation of the Palestinian land, so that we no longer inhabit only the letters of the alphabet (Areas A, B, C, and H1-H2). We can now inhabit the new and improvised “nature reserves.”

It has effectively shrunk the areas of “redeployment” to 13% in order to fit within the parameters of the hard-line mentality of the Likud, while drawing out redeployments from “Areas C” to B and from “Areas B” to A.

It has adopted Israeli priorities particularly in the area of security and placed additional responsibilities and pressures on the Palestinian Authority to “deliver” Israeli security with no guarantees on Palestinian security.

It has prepared for internal Palestinian violations and distortions particularly in the areas of democracy and political pluralism, as well as human rights and the rule of law. The result also led to the undermining of the judiciary and the enhancement of the security forces.

With all these, and more, in mind why should Barak balk at implementing Wye immediately and unconditionally?

The genesis of the Memorandum alone is enough to demonstrate its diminutive nature.

Following the election of Netanyahu in 1996, the US repeatedly attempted to get him to implement the agreements. They ended up micromanaging the process to get him to sign the “Protocols on Hebron” as an implementation of the “Guidelines on Hebron” which were part of the Interim Agreement of Taba in implementation of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement based on the Declaration of Principles.

The “Protocols” were then implemented in fits and starts in a partial and unsatisfactory manner and with repeated violations.

Netanyahu clearly was backing away from his commitments and from the process as a whole. This was most evident in the FDR (further redeployments) and their timetable.

Unable to bring the Israeli government to compliance, the US administration then reopened negotiations and continued the process of reinventing signed agreements to accommodate Netanyahu’s increasing preconditions and decreasing compliance.

In 1997, Washington invented the “gradual parallelism” concept, changed the timetable, and exerted tremendous pressure on the Palestinian leadership to accept this approach along with the four-point agenda and assurances on settlements.

In 1998, US State Department officials pledged to renew the process and promised to produce Israeli compliance or else to declare publicly Israel’s responsibility for the derailment of the process. They also promised President Arafat that they “will not let him down.”

Thus when Netanyahu thumbed his nose at them, instead of carrying out their promise to lay the blame on him as the intransigent side, they turned their attention to the Palestinians and got the leadership to agree to the American “Initiative” (which later became “ideas” at the insistence of the Israelis).

Having obtained prior consent from the PNA who had accepted the American ideas “in principle and with severe reservations,” the US convened the Wye Plantation talks on the basis of their initiative which had already compromised the agreements in order to accommodate the Israelis.

With Palestinian compliance in hand, both the US President and Secretary of State were directly involved in again reducing the scope and substance of the process in order to persuade Netanyahu to sign by agreeing to his “security” priorities and other pressures and preconditions.

Thus, the Wye Memorandum came into being as a feeble, partial, and distorted reformulation of previous agreements that were in themselves a compromise and that contained some basic flaws and injustices to the Palestinian side.

Despite all the PNA spokesmen’s attempts at selling Wye to the Palestinian public, they failed, and the Memorandum could not muster any support or generate any rejoicing among the Palestinians.

True to form, the moment Netanyahu set foot on Israeli soil, he turned his back on this latest agreement and refused to begin implementation while inventing further excuses and preconditions.

Once again, direct American intervention and micro-management not only failed to produce actual results in implementing agreements, they also failed to bring Netanyahu to carry out his promises on cessation of settlement activities.

Once again, the price of keeping the semblance of a process alive was in destroying its substance, legality, and constituency among the Palestinians.

Once again, the process was reinvented to suit the strong at the expense of the weak.

So why should Barak not begin immediately (and even gleefully) to implement such a truncated agreement that will cost him nothing but will win him the approval of the world (and the US in particular) as a committed and genuine peacemaker?

The question is why should the PNA insist on Wye, knowing full well its limitations and distortions?

It is more constructive and befitting now to insist on international legality and on more concrete “confidence building measures” from Barak, particularly on settlements, Jerusalem, and collective punitive measures. Now is the time to insist on the rapid implementation of all further redeployments as originally agreed, albeit late.

Now is the time for demanding and expecting full compliance with the agenda of permanent status talks without any further reduction, diminution, or distortion—in the text and in reality on the ground.

Barak should have no problems whatsoever implementing Wye as tailored to fit Netanyahu’s size and ideology.

The question is whether he can rise above Wye and go beyond its constraints to restore some confidence in the possibility of a genuine peace. This requires addressing the real and unadulterated requirements of justice, parity, and mutuality.