Introduction:

A changing regional and international climate over the past three years has induced a critical transformation on both the nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the interaction of the two sides. This transformation, along with its ramifications, has affected the internal Palestinian situation in terms of its political system and leadership as well as the viability of its programs and modus operandi.

As Palestinians continue to be subjected to the intolerable practices of an occupation that threatens their very existence, an increasing number are questioning the purpose of pursuing a seemingly endless battle, while their political system fails to alleviate their distress or respond to their aspirations for a different future.

The urgency for a concerted effort to examine and assess the prevalent conditions, with the purpose of breaking the ineffectual cycle that holds trapped Palestinian decision makers, on the one hand, and average citizens, on the other, is more pressing than ever. Consequently, this requires new and bold policy directions extending beyond analyses and evaluations of the political reality.
Such an approach would advance concepts and formulate effective solutions through unambiguous, applicable and practical programs, involving citizenry and advancing its sense of guardianship over change.

It is within this context that the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, MIFTAH, launched a collective effort towards the formulation of bold and innovative policies.

Throughout, the policy group has been cognizant of a genuine Palestinian need for change, the public’s right to unconstrained access to information, and the importance of the adoption of a participatory approach to internal political decision-making, in the service of good governance and freedom from occupation and oppression.

As a civil society institution, MIFTAH sought to develop and enhance constructive interaction between the public and their representative institutions with decision makers and the political leadership.

MIFTAH organized a number of consecutive and comprehensive sessions, entitled “Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Changing the Dominant Political Patterns.” The participants included intellectuals and professionals, leaders from various political factions, members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, ministers and security officials in addition to a number of specialists, who were invited to specific sessions to further augment the discussion. The variety and diversity of the participants’ backgrounds, opinions and skills were carefully considered.
Dr. Hanan Ashrawi chaired the sessions and all participants were provided with full minutes together with copies of the working policy papers.

The focal points of discussion in the policy sessions addressed four major aspects of the Palestinian political condition. The discussions were both focused and extensive, without applying any constraints on either the analytical or the creative components of the exercise. Explicitly, the purpose was to ensure that the papers would articulate key features of a forthright and effective political vision, while faithfully delineating the complexity of Palestinian reality and the various forces that affect Palestinian levels and decision-making.

Thus, the text combines analyses and recommendations pertaining to the current challenges and threats facing the Palestinian cause in addition to future developments and projected opportunities.

Area I: Options and Prospects Facing the PNA and the Political Leadership

First Option: Dissolution of the Palestinian National Authority

The suggestion of this option comes in response to the current paralysis of the PNA and with the aim of preventing its redefinition according to Israel’s security agenda. This option would help end one of the major causes of internal Palestinian discord and provide an opportunity to unite ranks and put an end to rivalries over rank and privilege within internal power struggles. The forceful argument here is for Israel to take full responsibility, in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention, without exploiting the PNA as an administrative contractor or a security sub-agent.

This option requires the PNA to take the initiative to dismantle itself before a projected collapse. Such an option would need to be carried out within an all-inclusive Palestinian initiative and preceded by efforts to activate national institutions, popular committees and civil society organizations, so as to successfully assume national responsibilities in the absence of a central authority. By necessity, different types of resistance to an immediate occupation would be redefined.

However, the risks of such an option would outweigh its advantages. In national terms, it would converge with Israeli objectives for the occupied Palestinian territories and would include the establishment of a subordinate authority or a collaborate regime that would undermine a national system of governance.
A major function of the PNA has evolved as the paymaster of 130,000 to 150,000 civil servants. The collapse or the dissolution of the PNA would lead to enormous economic hardships and/or to an internal situation of serious anarchy and internal strife. Additionally, the PNA has formed a political address for the Palestinian people and, in accordance with signed agreements, has functioned as the counterpart for social, economic and political contacts and agreements. It is highly doubtful that the international community would endorse self-negation by the PNA in favor of the older mold of PLO institutions or the more popular form of voluntary and community action and structures.
Finally, such a step will be seen as a setback to the nation building process underway to Palestinian independence and statehood.

Second Option: Cutting Losses and Salvaging What Remains

This option calls for the adoption of a “National Salvation Plan” for the Authority, through the establishment of a national unity government, with the widest possible political and civil society participation as well as the objective of minimizing Palestinian losses at the various levels.

Contextually this option emanates from the recognition of the absence or the unavailability of US intervention until after elections, the lack of change in Israeli political structure and ideological orientation, currently and in the foreseeable future, the impotence of the Arab world and the diminishing role of the Quartet.

Such a Survival Strategy would lead to internal deal making and exchange of favors, along the “piece of the pie” traditional attitude of the political factions, which would undermine the emergence of a genuine multi-party pluralistic democracy in Palestine, and further politically immobilize Palestinian society. The strategy, which by definition is short term and temporary, would ostensibly be more formalistic than substantive.

Third Option: Redefining and Regenerating the Authority

This option requires a form of active intervention, revitalizing the Authority and replacing the old leadership with a new and more professional and credible leadership that can garner the confidence and support of the public.

The only way to achieve this is through the holding of free and fair elections, commencing with municipal elections through to legislative and Presidential elections.

Given the current conditions however, the option could be seen as utopian. The option requires the full co-operation of all involved parties. The political elite and leadership themselves are required to let go of their privilege and their hold of power and authority and to accept the democratic process as a peaceful transfer of power – all-in-all a highly unlikely prospect.
As free and fair elections cannot be held, given the siege and fragmentation witnessed by the Palestinian areas and the overall restriction of movement and prohibition of political action, the option would require the international community to bring Israel into compliance with the requirements of such a democratic exercise. An international effort to force Israel to act within the parameters of international law has so far remained illusive and no signs of a change in this regard are noted.
Reinventing the authority would require a new role for the security apparatus and a new relationship between the legal and judicial processes, in addition to a structural and administrative reformulation of the security systems as a whole.

The Fourth Option: Continuing the Reform Process in Palestinian Authority Institutions

This modest option requires the maintenance of persistent efforts towards serious and substantive reform of the PNA and its institutions as a response to public demands and national requirement.

Although this seems to be the desirable option, in its being the most cost-effective and least problematic of options, it has so far faced serious obstacles. It is highly questionable that the Palestinian Authority, or at least the old guard, could commit to genuine reform and accountability as part of an authentic home grown agenda and within a comprehensive vision of integrity and accountability. So far, it has gone through the motions without much substance or behavioral transformation. It has also willfully resisted change until change became inevitable as a result of external pressure, or fear of loss of standing and privilege. One cannot foresee a change of heart or attitude in the near future, thus, the Authority will continue to pay lip service, while evading any serious transformations that might lead to the dislodging of power centers within it.

Conclusion:

All options require major third party intervention, in various forms and capacities, ranging from facilitation of elections through to the deployment of forces on the ground to provide protection to the Palestinian people and prevent possible anarchy. Moreover, the options require mechanisms and instruments for ensuring democracy and the rule of law within a pal political system. Finally, all options require the political will to affect substantive and effective change, and to prevent further deterioration and disintegration or possible internal collapse.

The one constant among the options remains that the current status–quo is untenable and that change is inevitable, whether it be in the form of a positive role in bringing about revitalization or the loss of will and a self-perpetuating collapse.

Area II: Internal Crisis and Means of Rectification

In addressing the causes and components of the internal crises in Palestine, several central issues emerged and were defined as potential avenues for rectification of the current conditions. The need to redefine the “national dialogue” and expand it to include civil society and political leadership on the one hand, and to reflect genuine pluralism and diversity on the other, has become imperative. A formalistic factional accommodation is no longer acceptable as a form of “collective leadership.” In re-defining the required mode of leadership, it is clear that the nature of the powers and responsibilities as well as the nature of the struggle has to be redefined, whether in nation-building and peace making, as mutually dependent processes, or in redefining resistance and national liberation through armed struggle or active non-violent popular actions. Neither straddling defense nor adopting mutually contradicting strategies can work. It is clear that the public demands and needs clear directions from its leadership along with basic services, protection, security and economic well-being.

The Palestinian people have been left out of decision making by both an ineffectual and often perceived to be corrupt authority on the one hand, and by the unilateralism of a militant opposition that has defined resistance as legitimizing violence against civilians. The consequences of both poles have exacted a heavy toll from the public as a whole, on whose behalf such policies and actions are being taken without their consent. The Palestinian people are in need of a democratic alternative that could energize the collective will and act as an antidote to the two political poles that reflect the traditional bankrupt political culture of the Arab world. A democratic alternative with a clear bold and pro-active agenda is the indispensable requisite for resolving the internal crisis.

There is consensus that Palestinian society must accommodate pluralism and diversity, including various initiatives for peace, however, a clear distinction must be made between non-official non-binding tracks, backed through diplomacy, and between official positions and commitments that are adopted at a national level.

Third Session: Local Elections as a Means to Resolve the Crisis

Due to the complexity of adverse forces that have prevented progress on the domestic and political fronts, the holding of local government elections appears to be the most correct first step to effect change and begin the resolution of the crisis.

The absence of a viable peace process and the will to intervene by the international community as well as the deteriorating living conditions and humanitarian crisis faced by the Palestinian people as a result of the escalating Israeli measures together with the inability of the authority to cope, defend and provide the people with basic services, all require the injection of an active Palestinian agenda.
As such, elections could break the current stalemate, provide the Palestinian people with an active tool for change and hope, and begin a democratic process that could lead to constructive change at all levels. Such elections could be held as part of a rolling process which allows for non-simultaneous elections in the different geographic localities as not all parts of the Palestinian territories experience equal conditions. While conditions may not permit the speedy holding of presidential and national legislative elections, this approach circumvents the challenge these current conditions pose to the local government elections.

The holding of local government elections requires amending the elections law, empowering local democratic leadership, including women and youth, completing the registration process and other technical requirements on the ground, but above all, it requires the adoption of a political decision at the highest level, with a public commitment to launch the process and its timeline.

It is clear that the Ministry of Local Government is fully in favor of these elections and has gone a long way towards an effective plan of action. All efforts must be exerted to support and enhance its program of elections.

The most common reservation related to the holding of such elections include the lack of certainty about the outcome, apprehension at the prospect of Islamic factions emerging victorious and the decrease in support Fatah and other secular parties and currents would receive.

In addition, and given the state of siege and fragmentation imposed by Israel that has given rise to localized systems of authority, the emergence of tribalism and aggressive forms of loyalty may give reason for further serious concern.

Undue interference by the Israeli occupation is also cause for concern and will cast doubt on the outcome, both in terms of creating adverse physical condition and a negative political climate. These would play into the hands of extremists and undermine voices of moderation and democracy

A consensus already exists among political parties and factions within civil society and local communities that local government elections are imperative. Therefore, it is a matter of urgency to work out a complete plan of action within a rapid timeframe to get the process launched.
An inclusive national committee in cooperation with the ministry of local government must be set up in order to review conditions on the ground, address local issues of relevance, identify actual requirements and design a practical program. It is desirable that the Central Election Committee (CEC) should assume overall responsibility for the local government elections. Such an assumption will require a change in the law and the mandate of the committee. The international community must intervene to prevent any negative Israeli interference and to ensure the integrity as well as the smooth running of the process.

A civil society engagement, empowering credible and marginalized social segments such as women and youth groups, would go a long way towards minimizing adverse forces such as tribalism, traditionalism and other detrimental behavioral patterns, including the discrimination against women or any other vulnerable groups within society.
Civil society participation, lobbying and other concrete preparatory steps form a safeguard for genuine democracy in the face of extremism, exclusion and authoritarianism.

Area IV: Internal Security Conditions

Palestinian internal security conditions have been undergoing a rapid and alarming deterioration and the almost total absence of any significant role for the Palestinian security services has led to unprecedented levels of disorder and lawlessness.

It is granted that internal Palestinian security conditions are obvious factors of Israeli occupation policies and measures, Arab regional security conditions and the prospect of, or the lack of, a credible and effective peace process, .
However, it has become a matter of absolute urgency that serious domestic executive decisions are made in order to restore stability and provide the Palestinian society with personal security and collective protection.

Precariousness of the internal security condition and the extremely destructive impact of any breakdown of internal law and order cannot be over-estimated. The most imminent and dangerous threat to Palestinian survival – let alone well being – emanates from internal chaos and disintegration.

It is undisputed that Israeli military assaults on the security services, including their headquarters, personnel and infrastructure, are the major reasons for the debilitation and almost near destruction of these services. However, this does not excuse the Palestinian Authority’s shortcomings in setting up multiple and often competing security services and the lack of clear procedures and administrative structures for security decisions and policies. Its inability or unwillingness to carry out genuine reform, the poor training and discipline among its members, the personal rivalry among its heads of services and the vested political and economic interests have all further aggravated the security condition.

In addition, the increasing weakness of the Palestinian Authority and the militarization of the Intifada are major causes for the internal disruption and instability and have contributed to the emergence of armed militias and localized gangs. In some instances, individuals and groups have taken the law into their own hands and have acted outside the sphere of legitimate political domain

Mechanism for the Restoration of Internal Security:

A. At the political leadership and security services level: Any attempt to restore order and the rule of law requires a firm political will and a serious commitment on the part of the political leadership. In addition, a security plan must be adopted based on the PLC’s reform plan and containing the following components:

• The adoption of bylaws and clear regulations consistent with the relevant legislation, and fundamental restructuring with clear job descriptions and lines of responsibility and authority,

• Fixed term appointments and a clear mandate for all heads of security services, along with a total ban on any interference in political of financial matters,

• Reducing the number of agencies and defining their tasks and relationships in addition to their streamlining to minimize conflict and rivalry,

• Defining the relationship between services and citizens to ensure basic rights, freedom, and the rule of law as well as to enable these services to perform their legally defined tasks,

• Re-educating the security services as to their role or responsibility in law enforcement, public safety and the upholding of law and order, while empowering them to withstand pressure or threats from armed individuals or militias,

• Implementing the law governing the legal use and display of weapons,

• The fulfillment of Palestinian regional and international security obligations, as undertaken by the PNA,

• The subjecting of all security services to the oversight of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and ensuring the promulgation of all necessary laws to regulate and monitor all of the security services.

B. At the level of factions and militias:

Beyond the PNA, all political parties and factions are called upon to refrain from any public display of arms and to expose all pseudo militants who under the guise of resistance carry out assaults on citizens and public order.

Any national dialogue must include a consensus on redefining the various means of resistance including armed resistance. No targeting of civilians must be allowed, nor should acts of resistance be carried out outside the lines of the 1967 occupied territory. Should the national policy require a comprehensive cease-fire or truce, then such a decision must be binding on all military wings, without exception and in full recognition of the legitimacy of one system of authority.

All sectors within Palestinian society are called upon to undertake their responsibility in effecting genuine reform and ensuring public order and internal security. The pal reform plan must be pursued as a home grown initiative towards self-empowerment and nation building.
Civil society, the Palestinian Legislative Council, members of the security services and most urgently the Palestinian executive authority must carry out their respective responsibilities immediately and without rationalization or procrastination. Power systems within the security forces must not be allowed to continue, nor can Palestinian society accommodate the equally dangerous fragmentation and dissolution of authority into militias and undisciplined militant groups, regardless of any external pressures or requirements. The matter is one of utmost urgency and need for the Palestinian people.