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Treating Schizophrenic Politics to Counter U.S. Policy on the Middle East Conflict
The following paper emanates from a policy meeting held at MIFTAH on May 19th, 2004. The participants in the meeting were Hanan Ashrawi, PLC member and Secretary General of the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH), Mamdouh Nofal, PLC and Fida member and Security Advisor for President Arafat, Muhammad Hourani, PLC and West Bank Higher Fatah Committee member, Jamal Shobaki, Minister of Local Government (PNA) and PLC member, Azmi Shu'aibi, PLC and Fida member and Director of The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN), Jibril Rjoub, National Security Advisor (PNA), Qais Abdul Karim Abu Leileh, Secretary General of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Daoud Talhami, DFLP Politburo, Mamdouh al-'Aker, former Madrid negotiator, Haidar Awadallah, Journalist and senior member of People’s Party, Muhammad Daraghmeh, Journalist for Al-Ayyam newspaper, Hani Masri, Political Analyst and Director General in the Ministry of Information, Lily Feidy, Deputy/ Program Design and Management (MIFTAH), Reem Atiyeh, Ministry of Women's Affairs, Wafa' Abdul Rahman, Director in the Governance and Democracy Program (MIFTAH). Evaluation of US Policy on the Middle East Conflict In assessing U.S. policy on the Middle East, consideration must be given to the U.S. Presidential elections taking place this year. In an election year, the incumbent administration tends to hesitate deviating markedly from the special relationship the US has historically shared with Israel. The two factors often cited, by way of explanation, for this reluctance is the power and influence of the Jewish lobby, namely AIPAC, and fear of losing the Jewish vote, whose importance is magnified by the fact that the Jewish community tends to vote en masse. It follows that over the next six months, both President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry will be courting the Jewish vote by trying to top each other in their unwavering support for the state of Israel. While the two presidential candidates adopt polar positions on all domestic and foreign policy issues, the striking exception is there mergence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The importance of US elections should not however be exaggerated, since US policy on the Middle East is not simply shaped by the White House, but is rather built on years of traditional support by both Congress and the Senate for the state of Israel. Whether or not a president leans fully behind Israel (i.e. George W. Bush, Ronald Reagan) or is more ‘neutral’ (i.e. Jimmy Carter), breaking from a history of US affinity towards Israel and affecting significant change in Middle East policy would take a long time and several presidents. The U.S. believes serving Israel’s interests is of strategic importance and has committed itself to such an analysis. In the wake of 9/11, America’s preemptive war on terror and the war on Iraq, U.S.-Israeli relations have solidified further. A shared bond has evolved with the U.S. perceiving Israel’s war with the Palestinians as part and parcel with its war on terror. This attitude has lead to a change in perspective, whereby any Palestinian violence, including the killing of Israeli soldier actively engaged in combat in the Occupied Territories, is no longer tolerated by Washington. With growing Arab anger over the occupation of Iraq (especially in light of the mounting civilian causalities and the Abu Ghraib torture scandal) and the unfair treatment of the Palestinians, and a devastatingly tarnished image in the Middle East, the US has its strongest foothold in the Middle East in its strategic alliance with Israel. Bush, the Neocons and the Conservative Agenda When the Bush administration took office they embarked on a strategic rethinking of the importance of the Middle East conflict. For tactical reasons, and in light of former President Clinton’s failure following eight years of intense diplomacy to resolve the conflict, the Bush administration concluded that it was not prudent to get heavily involved in the conflict, as this was deemed to be a waste of the time and prestige of President Bush. Following 9/11 and the US attack on and occupation of Afghanistan and later Iraq, the U.S. realized that it needed to reengage the international community, as it sought to form a “coalition of the willing” to help in the occupation and reconstruction of the two countries. To gain international support, in particular Arab and European, the U.S. was compelled to revive both the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and its role as a “fair and honest broker,” or at the very least give the appearance that action was being taken on this front. These circumstances led to the creation of the road map. Despite resuming the US role in the peace process, the events of 9/11 changed the dynamics of US engagement, and following ‘Karine-A’,[1] the Bush administration imposed a conservative agenda on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that was openly biased in favor of Israel and harsh towards the Palestinians. Influenced by three vital pressure groups – Neocons, the Jewish lobby (specifically a hardened AIPAC), Christian fundamentalists (a powerful voting bloc for President Bush) – the Bush administration outlined a policy that aligned the U.S. with Sharon’s agenda. The U.S. became adamant that Palestinian politics needed to be “cleansed,” insisting on a significant change in the Palestinian National Authority’s leadership with the underlying principle that President Arafat is an “obstacle to peace” and must be shunned. “Mr. Arafat continues to take actions and make statements to make it exceptionally difficult to move forward,” Secretary of State Colin Powell recently said at a news conference before returning to Washington from the World Economic Forum. Another key demand, mirroring Israel, is that all acts of violence by the Palestinians must be halted before negotiations can resume. The U.S. administration wants to wrest control of the Palestinian security forces from Arafat and consolidate them under an empowered Palestinian prime minister to fight Palestinian militancy and are angered by Arafat’s lack of cooperation. On the other hand, the administration’s policy seems tailored to avoid any crisis with the Israeli government. While the administration wished to remain disengaged from the Middle East and avoid being embroiled in regional crisis, a change of policy has been necessary following the backlash the war and occupation of Iraq has brought. As a result the U.S. has been forced to engage with Jordan and Egypt and seek their advice and involvement in regional matters, including the Israeli-Palestinians conflict. In the run up to the US elections, the administration has adopted a strategy based on gaining time while appearing to be fully involved, but without breaking new ground that can place it at odds with Israel. Accordingly, the enthusiastic response the U.S. has given Prime Minister Sharon’s “unilateral disengagement” plan is tactical and comes as no surprise. While rejected by the Likud party, the Americans are confident that it will eventually happen, albeit in an altered state from the rejected proposal. The benefits of the plan to the administration are manifold. First, the plan feels like progress in the face of the embarrassing failure of the road map. The administration can lay claim to having been instrumental in encouraging Israel to dismantle settlements and ‘end’ the occupation of Gaza. It can further use the Gaza laboratory for an experiment in regime change and involve Egypt in Gaza’s security, helping to impede Palestinian militant groups – Hamas, Islamic Jihad – while relieving Israel of the pressure and distancing itself from any involvement. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the “unilateral disengagement” plan would buy the administration plenty of time given that its implementation would not start for at least one year. This would allow the administration to focus and capitalize on the potential benefits of the withdrawal during the election season, without dealing with the problems of implementation. U.S. Presidential Elections: Bush vs. Kerry The race for the presidency is shaping up to be a very tight race, with Senator Kerry facing intensive anti-Kerry ads, while Bush continues to suffer from world events - particularly the continuing conflict in Iraq – which have become a drag on the president's own popularity. While many voters may develop a dim view of Kerry from the president's campaign commercials, pollsters say, voters are adjusting their impressions of Bush based on the drumbeat of daily news. "The advertising effects are likely to be on Kerry," opined Ken Goldstein, professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and director of the Wisconsin Advertising Project. "What influences Bush is the world, and I think there is very little that George Bush can to do influence what people think of him." Nationwide, public approval of President Bush's performance has reached an all-time low. A poll by The Washington Post and ABC News, conducted between May 20- 23, found that Bush's job approval-rating had slumped to 47 percent. The Gallup Organization found nearly identical ratings in a poll released in mid May: 47 percent of Americans surveyed approve of the way Bush is handling his job, and 49 percent disapprove. With independent Ralph Nader included in a theoretical match-up, 47 percent of likely voters surveyed by Gallup over the weekend favored Kerry, 46 percent Bush and 4 percent Nader. Without Nader in the mix, it was Kerry 49 percent and Bush 47 percent. While Bush has the kind of economy any U.S. president would want in an election year –GDP is rising at a 4.4 percent annual rate and jobs are being added at the fastest pace since early 2000 – only 29 percent of Americans polled by the Gallup Organization last month say the economy is in good or excellent condition, versus 43 percent in January. In a CBS News poll of 1,113 adults on May 20-23, 57 percent said they disapproved of Bush's performance on the economy, and 65 percent said the country was on the “wrong track.” “The news about jobs is not getting through -- it's that simple,” said Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Research Center in Washington. “In part it's because it's being crowded out by the events in Iraq and by soaring gasoline prices.” The Defense Department says 802 Americans have been killed in the Iraq war, 662 since Bush declared an end to major combat on May 1, 2003. Eighty-four percent of Americans said they opposed ``sexual humiliation'' of prisoners, such as that shown in photographs taken in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, according to the Washington Post-ABC News poll. A 36 percent rise in the average price of gasoline this year to $2.05 has contributed to the negative views of the economy, said Richard T. Curtin, director of the University of Michigan's monthly index of consumer sentiment. The index fell to 90.2 in May, a seven-month low, from 94.2 in April, the university reported on Friday. While overall inflation remains in check, other visible prices in addition to gasoline are rising. Milk prices jumped 4.9 percent in the 12 months ended in April, Labor Department statistics show. Medical care costs gained 4.7 percent, hotel prices 8.8 percent and the cost of tuition, school fees and child care increased 7.4 percent. These polls show the hurdle the Bush campaign team must overcome in order to remedy the disconnect between the economy and Bush's poll numbers. Accordingly, 54 percent of those polled say Democratic rival John Kerry would be better at handling the economy than Bush. Still polls change quickly and there is still time to turn around some of the disappointing figures the Bush camp is witnessing, especially given that Bush has the most money to run his campaign than any other candidate in U.S. history. Not since the Reagan era has the race for the White House offered such vastly polarized candidates with a stark choice between liberalism and conservatism. Senator Kerry is perceived as being too left-wing and was rated by the nonpartisan National Journal magazine this year as the most liberal member of the Senate. On the other hand, many have formed a passionate dislike for Bush and his far right agenda. Bush has certainly squandered America’s reputation in the international community, alienating close allies in the process. Relations with France reached an all time low during Bush’s tenure, though the differences, at least on the surface, appear to be slowly mending. Still, many remain dissatisfied with his lack of diplomacy and engagement, especially as the situation in Iraq drags. The Impact of the Election Outcome on the Middle East Conflict If Bush wins, in all likelihood, the constants set up during his first term will continue. An apprehension that during a second term, the President will ‘wake up’ and realize support for Israel was a mistake is nothing short of foolish. There will be no surprises for Israel, but a continued strengthening of America’s commitment to the well-being of the state. A concentrated and renewed focus on further isolating President Arafat from the rest of the world will be pursued heavily, taking the shape of a new constant in US policy on the Middle East conflict.[2] To move forward, the U.S. will insist that Palestinian reforms, including a change in leadership, are a prerequisite. Traditionally, U.S. presidents have been more daring, once they have secured their reelection, in handling the Middle East conflict. Bush, likewise, would want to make a difference, especially given the moral obligation he feels towards ‘enforcing’ peace. Bush has prided himself on being the first U.S. president to officially recognize the two-state solution, whereby a viable and independent Palestinian state would live side by side with a safe and secure Israel. However, Bush understands very little beyond this statement, faltering on the logistics necessary for such a solution to succeed. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to believe Bush is merely a clone of Prime Minister Sharon. While Bush has an abstract understanding of the two-state solution, he envisions a final settlement that is not identical to Sharon or the Neocons and is relatively ‘fairer’ to the Palestinians. What remains to be seen is how much influence the Neocons will continue to have on the incumbent president. Currently, the administration is split into two camps with Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld leading the Neocon charge, while Powell attempts to balance their hawkish agenda. While for the most part the Neocon camp managed to seize Bush’s presidency, they have taken several blows as troubles in Iraq rage on, no weapons of mass destruction have been found and abuse of Iraqi detainees continues to surface and grab headlines, as American taxpayers foot the bill. Though this suggests the Neocons may withdraw to the background during Bush’s second term, it is important to factor in the President’s noted characteristic of being unusually loyal to his people. Moreover, Bush is an ideological president, driven by his born-again Christianity and ‘morality’ that frame his decisions. Accordingly, his political savvy advisor, Karl Rove, reframed the war on Iraq, after no WMDs were found, in terms of a moral obligation to free the Iraqi people from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein. Should Kerry nab the presidency, his approach to the Middle East conflict will probably be the only thing that resembles the Bush administration.[3] Kerry has adopted a policy of “me-too-ism”[4] throughout his campaign whenever the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was raised. Bush has been the staunchest supporter of Israel, allowing the traditionally pro-Democrat Jewish vote to bleed into his corner and vote Republican. While Jews account for only 4% of voters nationwide, in some of this year's battleground states — particularly Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Nevada and Missouri — a few Jewish votes could make a big difference. It is paramount that Kerry halts this trend and to avoid aggravating Congress, the Jewish lobby, the Jewish vote and risk negative press, Kerry is likely to remain timid in formulating his own policy on the issue at least over the next six months.[5] Kerry has a solid record of supporting Israel, but early in his campaign he said that a resolution to the conflict with the Palestinians depends upon Israeli concessions in the territories. In accordance with this view, Kerry praised the Geneva Accord, despite the Sharon government’s outright disapproval of the virtual agreement. Still, it is highly unlikely that Kerry will jump to an endgame resolution of the conflict and push for negotiations on final status issues such as Jerusalem, water resources and final borders. However, Kerry has said he would consider appointing either Clinton or Carter as his special envoy to the Middle East, though more recently he has begun suggesting Dennis Ross instead. Whoever the appointee, under Kerry the U.S. will show more involvement, with a refocusing on the road map and a willingness to withdraw from quasi-exclusive American ownership of the peace process. While, like Bush, Kerry has stated that he believes Sharon is interested in peace, he also has said he would like to give more leverage to the Palestinian Authority "to be able to become stronger on the ground in the West Bank than Hamas is." However, both the Bush and Kerry teams are increasingly realizing that Hamas has become an undeniable force in the Occupied Territories commanding 30% of Palestinians. Consequently, an acquiescence to bringing Hamas – as a political party – into the equation is emerging. Any efforts to deal with Hamas, directly or otherwise, are likely to be more expedient under Kerry. The prevalent Bush camp ideology is that once the extremists are weakened, the moderates will gain power. By talking to Hamas, they would be negating their theory, and so despite the changing realities on the ground, they rather hear what they want to hear. Despite the U.S. insisting on a change in Palestinian leadership, enthusiasm from Bush and Kerry teams for national Palestinian elections is not high, with both fearing a Hamas victory and a strong showing of radicals. Further, neither team is interested in approving an international force, particularly given Israel’s clear opposition. That said both allow for a third party role, specifically if garnered towards reorganizing the Palestinian security apparatus or providing training for institutions. The Bush administration is excited about, and hopes to exploit, Egyptian involvement, especially to fill the security gap a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza would create. Taking Control to Treat Schizophrenic Politics The Palestinian people will not accept external intrusive influence on their domestic issues and would reject, as they have repeatedly, an imposed, tailor-made leadership fabricated to suit Israeli-American specifications. Accordingly, they have rallied in defense of the current leadership, which they do not support and whose record has been abysmally lacking on all fronts. However, it is imperative to point out that Palestinians would like nothing better than to have a democratic constitution, a commitment to their full independence, efficient and transparent institutions, a separation of powers, and a rule of law that would guarantee all rights and freedoms. In essence, support for an authentic, home-grown Palestinian agenda has never been stronger. Palestinians find themselves "governed" by an Authority that lacks all the powers and requisites of government, incapable of delivering services (let alone security) to its own people, yet in control of political decision-making as the official "address" of the Palestinian people. The beleaguered Palestinian Authority that the Palestinians are defending in the face of an American boycott or ostracism and an Israeli assault and dismantlement, is that same Authority whose survival and reactive/defensive decisions of self-interest are contributing to the further deprivation and suffering of the Palestinian people. Effectively, the Palestinian agenda has been suffering from diagnosed, but untreated, “schizophrenic politics.” With the polar demands of the Palestinian people and the American administration, the current leadership has slipped into a position of accommodating and then retreating. With the exception of a few sporadic, often incomprehensible, ad hoc decisions pertaining to partial and equally sporadic and arbitrary "reform" measure dealing with individuals, the Palestinians do not discern any coherent or effective policies addressing their needs and providing them with a clear future direction. There is a dire need for a political program with a clear and decisive policy leading to the end of the occupation and the establishment of the viable democratic Palestinian state.[6] This inevitably requires a firm and unapologetic strategy for achieving a just peace. Such a commitment must be bold and implementable, but clearly articulated in a consistent and candid public discourse capable of rallying solid constituency support and building a consensus for peace. The domestic dimension of this platform must be equally forthright in its plans to implement a democratic program for social justice and the rule of law without appeasement or concessions on principles. In light of the PA's failure to provide effective leadership both in nation-building and in peace-making, and given the inadequacy of factional politics, the Palestinian people are in search (and in need) of a new leadership that would be able to chart an effective course for a future of peace with justice and governance with integrity. Elections are, needless to say, desirable and indispensable tools of democracy and the Palestinian people have been yearning for the free and fair exercise of this democratic right. While the current conditions on the ground make the minimal physical requirements for national and Presidential elections impossible, this is not tantamount to wresting control to the prevailing state of affairs. A concerted effort must be made to prepare for local elections which are more malleable at this time. Further, they would allow the opportunity to combat the simplistic polarization of choice between a corrupt and inept nationalist regime on the one hand, and an extremist, ideological Islamist alternative on the other. Clearly, the militarization of the conflict has not yielded the intended results, but has conversely tainted the image of the Palestinians and equated resistance with violence in what otherwise is a justified struggle against occupation. This does not translate to halting resistance altogether, but rather initiating a transformation from violence towards widespread, popular and peaceful Intifada. Such a measure has the added bonus of enforcing the moderate voices in Israel. The Israeli public is also suffering from the current status quo, albeit in a markedly different way than the Palestinians, and it is important to appeal to them and bypass the ruling far-right government. A poll published by the Maariv daily showed that 55 percent of the general public back Prime Minister Sharon’s “unilateral disengagement” plan.[7] This alludes to the possibility that the Israeli public would be more open, at least relative to their government, to responding in kind to concrete Palestinian steps aimed at diffusing the current deadlock.[8] Responding to Sharon’s Plan and Reengaging the Peace Process To be clear, Sharon’s “unilateral disengagement” plan entails a phased evacuation of 21 illegal settlements in Gaza that house 7500 settlers among a Palestinian population that exceeds 1.3 million. In return, the plan intends to enlarge West Bank settlements to allow them to absorb the Gaza settlers and has requested American aid, presumably economic, in this endeavor, stating that it is necessary for the Gaza withdrawal plan to succeed.[9] Further, according to Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, the Israeli army would stay in the Gaza "area." Israel is already building a security zone in Rafah and it appears that while some settlers would be pulled out, Gaza would effectively remain under Israeli control, until, Mofaz has suggested, negotiations with the Palestinians result in a complete withdrawal. Naturally, Palestinians have viewed this plan as a ploy to permanently annex Palestinian land in the West Bank. These fears have been compounded by Bush’s letter of assurances to Sharon, where he unequivocally states that any final peace settlement should take account of the “new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers.”[10] Despite these concerns, Palestinians should not be passive, but rather attempt to turn Sharon’s plan to their advantage.[11] A prime demand for the Palestinians has always been the evacuation of settlements. Insofar as the plan meets this criterion, it should be supported. This does not necessitate applauding Sharon nor should the Palestinians oversell the plan as a huge peace initiative. It should be recognized as a means to an end at the least, alleviating the dire situation Gazans are facing daily, and a springboard for countering the cantonization of issues at the most. A paradigm shift has occurred in the Middle East conflict whereby bilateral talks are now implausible, leaving behind the alternatives of unilateralism and multilateralism. Sharon, realizing the potential benefits for Israel of pursuing a unilateral track, has seized the opportunity by introducing his so-called disengagement plan into the fold. Multilateralism is facing reluctance by the international community to become involved as a full partner in the peace process, which is undoubtedly reinforced by a U.S. rejection to openly dictate terms to the Israeli leadership. While presently the conditions are not ripe, still a multilateral initiative whereby the international community draws a plan and asks the Israeli and Palestinian public respectively to vote on it would, needless to say, present a fairer and more equitable outcome than a unilateral approach. Inevitably, such a scenario is perhaps overly utopian in nature and would require substantial political turmoil in Israel to open up the possibility. Long-term Effects of Washington’s Short-term Strategizing: An Introduction Perhaps unlike any other before it, the Bush administration has solidified the image of the U.S. as a partner in Israel’s illegal occupation, disqualifying itself as an evenhanded peace broker.[12] It has further inflamed Palestinian, Arab, Islamic and even global public opinion by adopting such irresponsible policies that betray total ignorance of regional realities, thereby undermining its global credibility and standing. Most seriously, the US has fed the flames of extremism, radicalization, fundamentalism and violence, hence contributing to the causes of terrorism rather than eliminating them. Perhaps the marriage of the Republican party – currently occupying not only the White House, but the majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate - with Christian Zionists has been an over exaggerated explanation of U.S. policy in the Middle East. That said there is sufficient evidence to warrant further in depth investigation. Recently, an article in the Village Voice, entitled “The Jesus Landing Pad” by Rick Perlstein,[13] revealed that the National Security Council's top Middle East aide consults with apocalyptic Christians eager to ensure American policy on Israel conforms with their sectarian doomsday scenarios. NSC Near East and North African Affairs director Elliott Abrams sat down with the Apostolic Congress[14] to alleviate their “theological concerns.” Three weeks after Abrams meeting with the Apostolic Congress, President Bush reversed long-standing U.S. policy, endorsing Israeli sovereignty over parts of the West Bank in exchange for Israel's disengagement from Gaza. “While the language of apocalyptic Christianity is absent from George W. Bush's speeches, he has proven eager to work with apocalyptics”[15] – with the White House supplying the Apostolic Congress with a weekly briefing by phone and frequent invitations to meet the President. Perlstein writes, “[t]he problem is not that George W. Bush is discussing policy with people who press right-wing solutions to achieve peace in the Middle East, or with devout Christians. It is that he is discussing policy with Christians who might not care about peace at all—at least until the rapture.”[16] With such religious ideology - compounded by an arrogance of owning morality – outlining strategies and dictating U.S. Policy not only in the Middle East, but elsewhere internationally and even domestically, it seems in the long-term the founding principles upon which the U.S. was established would crumble under the weight of an encroaching Christian fundamentalism. Endnotes
[1] On January, 2002, the Israeli navy intercepted the 'Karine A,' a cargo ship with weapons, believed to have sailed from Iran and was supposedly headed to the Palestinian territories. The 'Karine A' was exposed by the international media and affected US policy towards Palestinians and their leadership. The PNA was forced to claim responsibility, even though there were no direct links established.
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