"The significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process . . . . Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with all that it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda . . . . All with a presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses of Congress."

- Dov Weisglass, Senior Advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon

Legal Analysis:

Israel’s proposed “disengagement” plan from the Gaza Strip states that once fully enacted “there will be no basis to the claim that the Strip is occupied land,”[1] even though the Plan envisages indefinite Israeli military and economic control over the Gaza Strip.

Israel’s eagerness to declare an end to the Gaza Strip’s occupation illustrates the strategy behind the Plan. First, Israel seeks to proclaim an end to the Gaza Strip’s occupation—ostensibly in order to absolve Israel of all legal responsibilities as an “occupying power”—while simultaneously retaining effective military control over the Gaza Strip and its inhabitants. Second, it hopes to garner international support for retaining and even expanding illegal colonies in the Occupied West Bank in exchange for a withdrawal from Gaza. This strategy’s success was most apparent in the April 14, 2004 Bush-Sharon press conference during which President Bush praised Sharon’s withdrawal plan and announced that “existing Israeli population centers” in Occupied Palestinian Territory would become part of Israel in any permanent status agreement.[2] Third, as Israeli Bureau Chief Dov Weisglass confessed, Israel hopes to indefinitely freeze the peace process.

Variations of this strategy are not new: during the interim period of the Oslo Accords, Israel similarly carved away Palestinian population centers while retaining control over Palestinian movement, economy, and natural resources. Although Israel maintained effective military control over the evacuated areas (“Area A”)—and was therefore legally bound by its legal obligations as an occupying power—some Israeli government advisors argued that Area A was no longer occupied territory and absolved themselves of all legal responsibility.[3] In public and even some diplomatic discourse the occupation disappeared, occupied territory became “disputed” territory, and the conflict was no longer one between an occupying power and an occupied population but rather a land dispute between two equal parties.

Notwithstanding the terms of the Plan, Israel will remain an occupying power under international law after disengagement from Gaza and is therefore bound by the obligations of an Occupying Power under international customary law and the Fourth Geneva Convention.

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