Abstract

Over the decades, the EU’s declaratory diplomacy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict crystallised in its support for a two-state solution and the respect for human rights and international law. Yet a closer look at the EU’s relations with Israel and the Palestinian Authority highlights an increasing divergence between rhetorical goals and conduct in practice. This working paper shows how the nature of the EU’s credibility problem in the Middle East stems neither from inadequate instruments nor from its internal divisions. Rather, it derives from the manner in which the Union has chosen to deploy the instruments at its disposal. The paper then turns to possible ways ahead to achieve greater consistency and credibility in the EU’s role in the region.

Introduction

The EU’s declaratory diplomacy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has evolved consistently since the early days of European Political Cooperation (EPC). Over time, it has crystallised into a well-defined position. On the one hand, the Union has supported the rights of both Israelis and Palestinians to security and self-determination. On the other hand, it has clearly and repeatedly condemned all violations of human rights and international law, viewed as an impediment to a just peace in the region.

To pursue these goals, the Union has deployed an important array of policy instruments, ranging from diplomatic resources, to aid, trade and cooperation measures, articulated through the EU’s contractual ties with the parties. Most recently, the EU has held out the promise of enhanced relations through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

However, a closer look at the EU’s relations with Israel and Palestine highlights an increasing divergence between rhetorical goals and actual conduct. The spiralling situation on the ground, particularly since the eruption of the second intifada, could have been neither halted nor substantially ameliorated by the EU alone. But the focus of this article is not on the EU’s overall influence on the conflict, reiterating the oft-heard arguments about the weakness of EU foreign policy instruments. The argument below shows how the nature of the EU’s credibility problem in the Middle East stems neither from inadequate instruments nor from its internal divisions, but rather derives from the manner in which EU actors collectively have chosen to deploy the instruments at their disposal. The objective of this paper is that of exploring how these instruments have been used and pointing to possible ways ahead.

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