It has been a remarkable few weeks for Hamas, which seems to be hovering at a crossroads between an entry into peaceful democratic politics and a continuation of violent resistance. On one hand, the party participated in the recently concluded municipal elections in the West Bank, thereby proving that it can attend to the normal business of politics and run a well-organized and pragmatic campaign focused on quotidian municipal matters like sewage and garbage disposal and road maintenance. On the other hand, the party also engaged in the worst intra-Palestinian violence the region has seen in weeks, launching attacks against Palestinian policemen and public infrastructure in Gaza. These contrary events indicate the extent to which there exists within Hamas an unresolved internal debate regarding the use of force, which is intensified and complicated by the opposing pressures to which the party is subject, both internally and externally.

The pressure to give up arms
Internally, the pressure on Hamas to relinquish arms comes from three major sources: the first is the Palestinian National Authority, dominated by the Fatah party, which seeks to represent all Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, and which has been trying to restore the monopoly of force to what it considers the legitimate institutions of the state. The second is Palestinian civil society and the weight of public opinion, which has been exhibiting rising irritation and anger at Hamas for its continued disruption of daily life. The third comes from relatively moderate members of Hamas itself, high-ranking men such as Saadeh Shalabi, who is in the running to be the next mayor of Beitunia, and who said yesterday that “we (Hamas) are not eager to have bloodshed,” and officials such as Mohammed Ghazal, who told a Reuters reporter recently that Hamas recognizes “reality” and the need for “political solutions,” i.e., negotiations with Israel.

Externally, the pressure on Hamas is exerted most obviously by Israel, which has repeatedly claimed that it will not permit Hamas to contest the upcoming Palestinian elections (scheduled for January 2006) unless it disarms and amends its charter (which calls for the destruction of the state of Israel). Similar pressures come from third parties such as the US, which have echoed, if less stridently, similar conditions, and from various human rights groups and international institutions which oppose the use of force. These external voices are unusually magnified by the fact that they carry essentially the same message -- disarmament, obedience to the rule of law, and an entry into peaceful politics -- of the internal Palestinian sources mentioned above.

The pressure to resort to arms
Hamas’ views on the use of force are complicated, however, by its need to distinguish itself as much as possible from Fatah, which is perceived by many Palestinians as corrupt, inefficient and ineffectual when it comes to furthering the Palestinian cause. Because Fatah has taken a public stance against violence, Hamas insists that such violence is not only just, but also necessary to defend the rights of the Palestinian people (which, it implies, Fatah cannot do). Hamas’ views on violence are similarly complicated by Israel’s insistence on disarmament, because such insistence makes any disarmament on the part of Hamas look like a caving-in to Israeli demands. Similarly, external pressures on Hamas to disarm from third parties such as the US and international human rights groups also weaken Hamas’ ability to disarm without losing credibility, for it has always insisted that no third party has a right to dictate to the Palestinian people their means of resistance. Lastly, Hamas’ reluctance to disarm is closely related to its fear that Israeli violence against Palestinians in general and Hamas members in particular will continue unabated despite disarmament.

The upcoming elections
It remains unclear what Hamas’ strategy will be for the upcoming Palestinian national legislative elections scheduled for January 2006, which are the first such elections Hamas will have chosen to contest (it boycotted all previous elections on the claim that the Palestinian National Authority was a product of the Oslo process, which it opposed). While it is unlikely that Hamas will agree to disarm before the elections, given all the pressures noted above, it is equally unlikely that it will continue to engage in acts of violence, given the likely backlash among the voter base such violence will engender, and the consequent boost to Fatah’s chances of victory in January. It is also unclear whether Israel will act on its threat to prevent Hamas from physically contesting the elections if it has not yet disarmed, given the backlash of sympathy such prevention is likely unleash, which would be counter-productive to Israel’s interests. And, lastly, it is just as unclear whether President Abbas will himself insist on such disarmament before allowing Hamas to contest the elections, and, if so, what means of enforcement he will have at his disposal.

Polls released recently by Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki indicate that Fatah currently enjoys only a slim margin (5% to 10%) of popularity over Hamas, that could well be eroded over the coming months if Hamas plays its hand well, and if it is able to convince the Palestinian public that it will be able to better govern them than Fatah. It is possible that Hamas will initially try to do both – emerge as a legitimate player on the national political scene and remain a militant group committed to armed struggle, but it cannot stand at the crossroads forever. Eventually the leaders of Hamas, who have in the past shown themselves to be more pragmatic than their counterparts in other such militant Islamic groups, will have to make a choice, and chances are that the internal and external pressures on them to disarm will outweigh, by that time, the pressures against disarmament. This can only be a good thing for the people of Palestine, who have suffered through years of internal and external violence, and for whom the use of force has thus far gained nothing.