The new government in Israel is already enjoying the rewards heaped upon it by the international community for the simple fact of its election victory.

Subsequent to the global sigh of relief audible throughout the world at Netanyahu’s defeat, a warm glow descended upon capitals and policy makers in breathless anticipation of Barak’s magic wand.

Not only is he the “savior” of the peace process in international perceptions, he is also the “ally-friend-partner” of world leaders who had suffered a protracted period of estrangement as a result of the alien Netanyahu phenomenon.

Basking in the sunshine of Israel’s return to respectability and the world’s predisposition to look kindly on him, Barak is making the most of this love fest, usually described as the “honeymoon period” for a new government.

Barak’s first days in office witnessed a flurry of activities, most visible in the series of meetings held to signal a new era of relations in the region.

It actually started with a non-meeting, in the form of a public verbal exchange of compliments between him and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad as an overt signal of mutual admiration and a “willingness to deal.”

Thus both leaders ushered in the new era (or the new game in town) with a discourse of personal accommodation that has a distinctly political sub-text.

Barak then conducted a series of meetings beginning in Cairo with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, consistent with the appropriate protocol of priorities.

The visuals of that meeting were quite eloquent, setting the stage for the subsequent meetings. These included convergent seating and frequent eye contact, broad smiles, longer than perfunctory handshakes, recurrent nods of agreement, and occasional shoulder or arm patting.

The body language of amicability and acceptance was repeated in all other meetings as a recurrent signal of positive intent.

From the Mubarak meeting, Barak won more time to settle down in his new post and to put his house in order.

The Erez meeting Sunday, July 11 with Palestinian President Yasser Arafat was also more significant in the fact of its occurrence than in its substance.

The first of its kind in seven months, and the first since the formation of the new government in Israel, it served several purposes not least of which the heralding of a new era in Palestinian-Israeli relations and a new phase in the peace process.

The restoration of the peace partnership went beyond body language and symbolism to clear declarations of commitment.

A more realistic assessment of the meeting should temper the unbridled enthusiasm and euphoria of casual observers.

Barak cautioned that the path ahead will not be strewn with roses and that the coming phase of negotiations will be difficult and complex. His language on security, against the backdrop of his statements on Jerusalem and settlements, provided a clear indication of the difficulties ahead.

Arafat’s insistence on the honest and accurate implementation of all signed agreements also reflected the Palestinian consensus on maintaining the integrity of the process by refraining from renegotiating previous deals or carrying over interim status issues into permanent status talks. The “merger” approach clearly did not resonate with President Arafat.

Not only did Arafat insist on the agreed redeployments, he specifically alluded to the issues that the previous Israeli government had stalled including the release of prisoners, the safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, and the sea port as well as other economic issues.

Reiterating the Palestinian commitment to fulfill all security obligations, particularly on the issue of “terrorism,” President Arafat also made sure that cessation of all settlement activities is expected as part of the Israeli compliance.

While describing the Erez meeting as “excellent,” some Palestinian officials and advisers began hinting on the possibility of a simultaneous implementation of the Wye Memorandum along with the acceleration of final status talks.

Beyond the atmospherics and the joint commitment to achieve peace, the road map as well as the time frame are yet to be conclusively defined.

The July 12 meeting with King Abdallah of Jordan served to signal Jordan’s intent and Israel’s willingness to keep the Kingdom “on board” as a player in the process and as an intermediary (or even a mediator) on difficult issues.

This was of particular relevance to the Syrian track, with both an explicit and a subtle exchange of messages and innuendo.

Thus another part of the terrain for resuming the peace process was prepared, giving Jordan a direct role and inviting Syria to proceed while maintaining the centrality of the Palestinian track.

With all these preliminary steps concluded, Barak moved to his most significant meeting with President Clinton in Washington.

The July 15 summit in the White House achieved an instant warming up of the icy American-Israeli relations (both personal and political) brought about by the Netanyahu cold-shoulder policies. The sudden thaw resulted in a gushing emotional encounter, the visual parallel of the analogy of a “child with a new toy.”

On the peace process, however, Barak wanted to restore the long-standing pattern of reaching an American-Israeli agreement on issues before presenting them to the Palestinian and Arab sides.

In addition, he had already regained American a priori support for Israeli demands, as witnessed by the US call for the postponement of the High Contracting Parties’ meeting on the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The compromise of holding an opening session to be followed six months later with a “real” meeting was a clear political concession to Barak by the international community and by the Palestinian Authority as well. Thus the upholding of international humanitarian law became secondary to the politics of expediency.

Among the substantive issues discussed also was the time frame for the accelerated final status talks, with November 2000 emerging as a mutually suitable date for completion--American elections and Israeli campaign promises being served simultaneously.

The role of the US as sponsor was also being redesigned to take on the task of “facilitator” or back-seat driver as opposed to the direct participant or mediator of the Netanyahu era.

The direct, bilateral approach was advocated as the most effective, with the US participating only when needed and by invitation. The reduction of the CIA’s direct and intensive involvement in the Palestinian security forces and in negotiations on security arrangements was reported to be one of Barak’s requests.

The simultaneous implementation of the Wye Memorandum and negotiations on permanent status was another Barak request, with the third redeployment being moved to become a final status issue. Support for Israel’s implementation of Wye was also on the shopping list.

As for settlements, Barak indicated his commitment not to build new settlements while promising to discuss the previous government’s decisions in that area. “Natural expansion” still remains to be defined.

Within a year, and following intensive Barak-Arafat discussions, Clinton will convene a trilateral summit for the purpose of launching permanent status talks on the basis of a framework agreement on principles governing these talks.

The process as a whole is to be reinvigorated according to several suggestions.

The level of participation of all parties concerned has to be elevated to the highest leadership level in order to circumvent the bureaucracy of memo-happy underlings and to get rapid and clear decisions on issues, Barak was reported to have requested.

In addition, these leaders have to focus on issues and not on public posturing; thus they must establish direct and efficient channels of communication.

The Syrian track in the meantime showed clear signs of rejuvenation and enjoyed serious attention. A decision to resume negotiations on that track seems to be in the making, with an invitation to Syria to make use of the limited time frame to conclude a peace treaty without wasting time on preambles and formulae.

Regional realities were also addressed during the Clinton-Barak meeting, with developments in Iran and assurances toward Turkey claiming special attention.

With this review in mind, one must be cautious about harboring exaggerated expectations of the “miraculous transformation” type.

The path ahead is indeed complex, difficult, and even painful. The new political engagement will determine the future of the region and the fate of millions who have paid a heavy price for the absence of peace.

What is needed now is not the absence of war. Rather, all parties concerned must have the courage and foresight to translate their verbal and visual messages into concrete actions capable of solving and eradicating the causes of conflict.

Palestinian statehood, no longer being an issue, is now one of territorial integrity, contiguity, and viability. Settlements and Israeli extraterritoriality cannot be accommodated in the pursuit of genuine peace.

Human suffering cannot be exploited as a political tool. Hence, the release of Palestinian prisoners is a pressing imperative. It would also contribute effectively to the restoration of damaged confidence and trust.

All forms of collective punitive measures must cease immediately, including “closures,” house demolitions, and confiscation of Jerusalem ID’s.

If there are new attitudes indeed, then no permanent status issue must be predetermined unilaterally, including Jerusalem, boundaries, refugees, water rights, and external security. The rhetoric of “red lines” or the “four no’s” must be dropped in favor of the discourse of justice.

The whole peace process is a collective endeavor, with parity of rights and legality as the proper foundations. The “land for peace” formula remains operative, as do the relevant UN resolutions.

A collective investment in peace requires collective participation and responsibility in all areas of conflict resolution as well as peace building. It is to be expected that such a vision will be translated into reality through effective commitment and concrete involvement.

The new government in Israel may have won more time for the peace process, and good will on all sides may have averted a disaster. But to win peace, this government still has to pass the real test of confidence by implementing the necessary policies and taking actual steps towards a comprehensive and just solution capable of withstanding the test of time.