*There must be focus on gender and social justice in drafting the Palestinian constitution
* The Tunisian constitution is a unique experience but it tells a completely different story
Introduction
Professor of Constitutional Law at Al Najah National University Dr. Sana’ Sargali, stressed on the importance of a constitutional court in the state- building process and in the separation of powers. She called for spreading awareness and a constitutional culture among citizens and various social sectors so as to have a broad-based participation in drafting the next Palestinian constitution, which expresses the convictions and beliefs of these sectors. She also said focus must be put on gender and social justice during the drafting process.
Following is “Hosted by MIFTAH’s” full interview with Dr. Sargali:
**How would you evaluate the constitutional situation in Palestine today?
I believe Palestine today has entered into what is called a “state of exception” even though Palestine is not an exception. This is important to differentiate: this state of exception is the state when something unordinary becomes ordinary; that is, the legal vacuum we live in today. This is a state that emerged with the continued “state of necessity” which we have lived in since 2007, which means that any constitutional development or building a constitutional phase must begin with addressing this state. The lack of convening the PLC has given the opportunity for the executive authority to become the sole legislator, which completely annuls the concept of the separation of powers in Palestine. Furthermore, the misunderstood overlapping between PLO institutions and the PA has paved the way for a constitutional overlapping as well. This necessitates a clarification of this relationship in any constitutional system so there are clear markers for the constitutional and political system in Palestine.
I think a Palestinian constitutional court and its laws provide the right for direct lawsuits in the case of a violation of citizens’ rights. In this case, the citizen can go directly to the constitutional court. The question is, how much is this right enacted. Hence, establishing a constitutional court in this current political situation leaves us with questions about the extent of this court’s independence, even though it is hard to judge these courts in the first five years of their establishment because, unfortunately, these courts are politicized from the beginning – or at least they are set up to support the system that created them. Thus, at this time, we do not know to what extent these courts can extricate themselves from under the cloak of the system that created them so we can see just how strong they really are and whether they work towards protecting and helping citizens, or will their purpose remain to serve the system. **What is your take on the subject of establishing the constitutional court? How will this reflect on the state of human rights in Palestine?
There were concerns about creating a constitutional court in the current constitutional situation, especially since courts are trying to separate themselves from the political system and prove themselves as a strong institution among all the others. Hence, I was not surprised by this decision. It reminded me of a position taken by the US Supreme Court in the famous Marbury case, where the court did not want to appear to be affiliated with the system, which would weaken it. Neither did it want to lose the system so it expanded its authorities through the judicial courts. That is why I want to stress the importance of taking it slowly until we see where this constitutional court will go.
**What are the most prominent legal loopholes in the procedures within the constitutional draft committee?
The Basic law, or the constitution in Palestine has routinely been made absent in dialogue in favor of more pressing interests such as the political division. As a Palestinian citizen, I feel the existence of independent and separate executive, legislative and judicial institutions is extremely important. However, from a theoretical and practical perspective, the constitutional court could play a political role – sometimes purely political – once established, which results in an overturn of political balances in the country. We all saw the role played by the Egyptian constitutional court in 2011, which persists until today. Hence, the establishment of constitutional courts can be a double-edged sword.
However, in spite of these concerns, I believe we must have a Palestinian constitutional court and we must give it the chance to prove its effectiveness before it becomes politicized.
For any entity that is striving to become a state, the answer is to draw up a constitution. However the solution may not be this; rather, this could be the start of problems. We must ask ourselves: when should the solution be to draw up a constitution? I think first this must happen in a calculated and correct manner. Unfortunately, when the constitutional draft committee was formed in 2016, I had hoped the discussion would be open and public. We have had a Basic Law for a long time, but this was supposed to be transitional. However, it has been postponed until today. The constitutional draft committee supposedly should have put the draft to a discussion by all the various social sectors and groups, which is why this should have been done in stages. We saw the flaws in the Basic Law; we should have worked on it before we drafted anything temporary so that afterwards the stage of drafting a permanent constitution could take place with the involvement of elected and not appointed committees. We should have ensured there was a kind of referendum over it where the people are involved in these discussions so it would not be something imposed.
**Can you explain the dialectical relationship between forming a constitutional court in the absence of completing the Palestinian constitution and the duality of its members’ roles?
There is not supposed to be any duality between the constitutional drafting committee and the members of the constitutional court. I believe this court should distance itself from being a legislating body and rather be a reference for the constitution to ensure that all the principles we want in it are there. This is a reiteration about the need for awareness among the citizens on this issue and agreement over the principles and foundations we want to have in the constitution, including the civility of the state. We may agree to this or not; we may agree on the nature of the political system or not; this is where the role of the constitutional court comes in after the constitution is written. That is, it will review it to ensure that the principles agreed on have been enshrined in this document.
**How can you ensure the identity of a civic state in the constitution, which is absent in the Palestinian Basic Law and the Palestinian draft constitution?
First of all, we must understand the meaning of the civic state. Do we mean a kind of separation of state and religion? Or the absence of a military state (military rule)? These concepts should be clear to us. If we mean the absence of a military state, we must be very careful that what happened in Egypt does not happen to us; that is, the military taking over authority. This needs foundations, procedures and precautionary measures mentioned in the constitution and stipulated in it. If, however, we want a civic state, does this mean we do not want the application of Sharia law, for example? Or do we want to emulate the Tunisian experience in terms of teachings on tolerance. What kind of Islamic Sharia do we want? Would it only be applied to the Personal Status Law?
We assume these things will be discussed at a broad- based level and will have a sort of popular, factional and political consensus over it, because this is not just a decision or a phrase thrown into the constitution. This is supposed to be a well- calculated phrase, one which we are aware of its impacts and meanings.
**Based on your study of constitutions, how would you describe the Tunisian constitution of 2014 and the Egyptian constitution in terms of the civic identity of the state?
Tunisia represents a wonderful experience in terms of the “best road to the destination”. That is, Tunisians arrived at their constitution in the best way; the Tunisian constituent association formulated it and all sectors were represented in it. Also, discussions over the constitution lasted a long time and the Tunisian people participated in its making, including through social media. However, if we look at the content of the constitution, this is a different story. While it does speak about the ‘tolerant spirit of Islam” and its language is gender-strong in that it reaffirms the term “Tunisian citizen (in the masculine)” and “Tunisian citizen (in the feminine form)”. However, if we look at the constitution holistically, we do not know what the Tunisians meant by the term “the civic- nature of the state”. This was not clear, especially when speaking about this state, the constitution conditions that the president must be Muslim.
د. سناء سرغلي أستاذة القانون الدستوري في جامعة النجاح الوطنية:
وجود محكمة دستورية أمر هام في عملية بناء الدولة والفصل بين السلطات
تاريخ النشر: 12/07/2018
بقلم: مفتاح
مقدمة
أكدت د. سناء سرغلي، استاذة القانون الدستوري في جامعة النجاح، على أهمية المحكمة الدستورية في عملية بناء الدولة والفصل بين السطات، داعية إلى نشر الوعي والثقافة الدستورية في صفوف المواطنين وشرائح المجتمع المختلفة، وصولاً إلى مشاركة واسعة في كتابة دستور دولة فلسطين القادمة ليعبر عن قناعات واعتقادات تلك الفئات والشرائح، مع أهمية التركيز على موضوع العدالة الجندرية والاجتماعية في كتابة الدستور.
وردت أقوال د. سرغلي هذه، في الحوار التالي معها ضمن زاوية "في ضيافة مفتاح"، ما يلي نصه:
** كيف تقيمين الوضع الدستوري في فلسطين الآن؟
برأيي أن فلسطين اليوم دخلت ما يسمى ب"حالة الاستثناء"، ولكن فلسطين ليست استثنائية، وهذا أمر مهم جدا للتفريق بينهما. حالة الاستثناء هذه، وهي الحالة التي يصبح فيها غير الاعتيادي اعتياديا، وهي حالة الفراغ القانوني الذي تعيشه حاليا. حالة نشأت من استمرار "حالة الضرورة" التي نعيشها منذ عام 2007، وعليه، فإن أي تطور دستوري أو بناء مرحلة دستورية لا بد أن تبدأ بمعالجة هذه الحالة. فعدم وجود مجلس تشريعي منعقد أفسح المجال للسلطة التنفيذية بأن تصبح المشرّع الوحيد، مما قضى تماما على مفهوم فصل السلطات في فلسطين. كما أن التداخل غير المفهوم بين مؤسسات منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية والسلطة الوطنية أفسح المجال للتداخل الدستوري غير المفهوم في هذه العلاقة، مما يستدعي توضيح هذه العلاقة في أية منظومة دستورية، حتى يكون هناك معالم واضحة للنظام الدستوري والنظام السياسي في فلسطين.
أنا أرى أن المحكمة الدستورية الفلسطينية وبالنظر إلى قانونها، فإنها تعطي حق الدعوى المباشرة في حال تم انتهاك حقوق المواطن، حيث بإمكانه التوجه مباشرة إلى القضاء الدستوري. ولو نظرنا إلى قانون المحكمة الدستورية فيما يتعلق بقابلية لجوء الفرد إليها، فإن هذا الحق متوفر وقائم، ولكن ما مدى تفعيل هذا الحق، وبالتالي، فإن نشوء المحكمة الدستورية في الوضع السياسي الحالي ترك تساؤلات تتعلق في مدى استقلالية هذه المحكمة، علما بأنه من الصعب الحكم على هذه المحاكم في السنوات الخمس الأولى لإنشائها، لأن هذه المحاكم وللأسف ُتنشأ مسيسة، أو دعنا نقول أنها تُنشأ لدعم النظام الذي أنشأها، وليس معلوماً في هذه الفترة إلى أي مدى تستطيع هذه المحاكم الخروج من عباءة النظام الذي أنشأها، حتى يتبين لنا بأن هذه المحاكم قوية فعلا، وستقوم بنجدة المواطنين وحماية الدستور، أم ستبقى فعليا مسخّرة لخدمة النظام.
** كيف تنظرين لموضوع تأسيس المحكمة الدستورية؟ وما انعكاس ذلك على حالة حقوق الإنسان في فلسطين؟
** كان هناك تخوف من إنشاء محكمة دستورية في ظل الوضع الدستوري الحالي، خاصة وأن المحاكم في محاولة الخروج من عباءة النظام السياسي، ومحاولة إثبات نفسها كمؤسسة قوية ضمن المؤسسات الأخرى، حيث لم أتفاجأ فعلا بهذا القرار، إذ أنه يذكرني بموقف اتخذته المحكمة العليا الأميركية في قضية ماربوري الشهيرة، حينما لم ترد أن تظهر بأنها موالية للنظام فتضعف نفسها، ولم ترد أن تخسر النظام أيضا، فقامت بتوسيع صلاحياتها من خلال الحكم القضائي، لذلك أؤكد على أهمية التروي لنرى إلى أين ستصل المحكمة الدستورية.
** ما أبرز الفجوات القانونية التي تحتويها الاجراءات التي سميت من خلالها لجنة صياغة الدستور في فلسطين ؟ وهل يعتبر العمل على دستور فلسطيني من الأولويات الملحة؟
** لدى الحديث عن القانون الأساسي، أو الدستور في فلسطين، فقد جرت العادة على تغييبه لصالح مصالح ملحة أكثر، كالانقسام السياسي، وما إلى ذلك.
أنا كمواطنة فلسطينية، اعتبر وجود مؤسسات تنفيذية، تشريعية، وقضائية مستقلة ومنفصلة شيء بالغ الأهمية، لكن المحكمة الدستورية نظرياً وعلمياً وتاريخياً قد تلعب دوراً سياسياً وأحياناً دوراً سياسياً بحتاٍ لدى بدء إنشائها، مما يؤدي إلى قلب الموازين السياسية في البلاد، وقد رأينا جميعاً الدور الذي لعبته المحكمة الدستورية المصرية منذ عام 2011 ولغاية اليوم. ولذلك، فإن إنشاء المحاكم الدستورية قد يكون سيفا ذو حدين.
بالرغم من هذه التخوفات، فإنني أرى أن المحكمة الدستورية الفلسطينية لا بد من وجودها، ولا بد من إعطائها المجال لإثبات فعاليتها قبل تقرير مدى تسييسها .
دائما في الدول التي تحاول أن تصبح دولة يعتبرون أن الحل هو في كتابة دستور. لكن قد لا يكون الحل في كتابة دستور، بل ربما يكون ذلك بداية المشاكل. وهنا نتساءل: متى يكون الحل في كتابة دستور؟ في رأيي يجب أولاً أن يتم بطريقة صحيحة ومدروسة، وللأسف، حينما تم تشكيل لجنة صياغة الدستور في العام 2016، كنت أتأمل أن يكون النقاش مفتوحاً وعلنياً. نحن لدينا قانون أساسي منذ فترة طويلة، وكان يفترض أن يكون انتقالياً، لكن تأخر حتى يومنا هذا، وبالتالي حين نتحدث عن لجنة صياغة الدستور، لأن وجود هذه اللجنة كان يفترض طرح المسودة للنقاش من قبل جميع فئات وشرائح المجتمع المختلفة، لأن شعبنا لا يملك الثقافة الدستورية حتى يستطيع أن يحاسب أو يناقش المواد المكتوبة بهذا الدستور، وبالتالي كان يفترض أن يتم العمل بهذا الخصوص على عدة مراحل، وقد رأينا العيوب الموجودة في القانون الأساسي، وتم العمل عليها، قبل أن نكتب شيئا مؤقتا، لتأتي بعد ذلك مرحلة كتابة الدستور الدائم من خلال إشراك لجان منتخبة وليست معينة، ولنتأكد من وجود نوع من الاستفتاء عليها، وإشراك الشعب وإدماجه في هذه النقاشات حتى لا يكون أمرا مفروضا عليه.
** هل بالإمكان توضيح العلاقة الجدلية ما بين تشكيل محكمة دستورية بغياب اكتمال العمل على دستور فلسطيني وازدواجية الأدوار بالنسبة للأعضاء؟
** يفترض عدم وجود ازدواجية ما بين لجنة صياغة الدستور، وأعضاء في المحكمة الدستورية، لأنني أعتبر بضرورة أن تنأى هذه المحكمة عن أن تكون مشرّعة، إنما يجب أن تكون مراجعة للدستور لتتأكد من أن كافة المبادئ التي نريد موجودة، وهذا يعيدنا إلى ما ذكرته سابقا بضرورة وجود توعية لدى المواطنين بها، واتفاق على مبادئ وأسس نريد أن تكون موجودة في الدستور، ومن ضمنها مدنية الدولة. قد نتفق على مدنية الدولة، وقد لا نتفق، ويمكن أن نتفق على طبيعة النظام السياسي، أو ربما لا نتفق، وهنا يأتي دور المحكمة الدستورية بعد كتابة الدستور، أي أن تقوم بمراجعته حتى تتأكد من أن المبادئ التي اتفق عليها تم تثبيتها في هذه الوثيقة الدستورية.
** كيف يمكن التأكيد على هوية الدولة المدنية في الدساتير، والتي غابت عن القانون الاساسي الفلسطيني وعن مسودة الدستور الفلسطيني؟
** بداية، يجب أن نفهم ما المقصود من مدنية الدولة؟. هل نقصد نوعاً من فصل الدين عن الدولة؟. أم عدم وجود دولة عسكرية (سيطرة عسكرية على الحكم). هذه المفاهيم يفترض أن تكون واضحة لنا. فإذا كان قصدنا عدم وجود دولة عسكرية، فيجب أن نحرص بشكل أساسي على أن لا يحدث لدينا ما حدث في مصر حيث سيطر العسكر على الحكم، وهذا يحتاج إلى أسس وإجراءات وتدابير احترازية تذكر في الدستور ويتم النصّ عليها. أما إذا أردنا دولة مدنية، فهل المقصود بأننا لا نريد أي تطبيق للشريعة على سبيل المثال؟. أم أننا نريد أن نأخذ من التجربة التونسية مثلا، من قبيل الحديث عن التعاليم السمحة، وأي نوع من الشريعة الإسلامية نريد؟، بحيث يطبق فقط في قانون الأحوال الشخصية.
نحن نفترض أن تتم مناقشة هذه الأمور على مستوى واسع، ويتم فيها نوع من أنواع التوافق الشعبي والحزبي والسياسي عليها، لأن هذه ليست فقط قرارا، أو عبارة يتم وضعها في الدستور، بل يفترض أن تكون عبارة مدروسة تماما، وواعين إلى آثارها وما المقصود منها.
** من خلال اطلاعك ودراستك حول الدساتير وآلياتها، كيف تصفين دستور تونس 2014 ودستور مصر، من حيث الهوية المدنية للدولة، أسس الديمقراطية والحكم، الحقوق بالنسبة للمواطنين من رؤية جندرية ؟
** تونس تمثل تجربة جميلة من ناحية "الطريق أجمل من الوصول". أي أن التونسيين وصلوا إلى الدستور عبر طريق جيد، حيث أن الجمعية التأسيسية التونسية التي وضعت الدستور، تمثلت فيها مختلف الفئات، واستمرت النقاشات حول الدستور مدة طويلة، واطلع عليها الشعب التونسي وشارك فيها بفاعلية، بما في ذلك وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي، لكن لو نظرنا إلى محتوى الدستور فهذه قصة مختلفة تماما عن الطريق، حيث يتحدث عن روح الإسلام السمحة، ولغته لغة جندرية قوية، من حيث أنها تؤكد على مصطلح "المواطن التونسي" و"المواطنة التونسية"، لكن إذا نظرت إلى الدستور بصورة متكاملة لا نعرف ماذا قصد التوانسة من كلمة "مدنية الدولة". لم يكن واضحاً، خاصة أنه لدى حديثه عن مدنية الدولة، فهو يشترط أن يكون الرئيس مسلماً.
التجربة التونسية بحد ذاتها تجربة جيدة، وصياغة الدستور هناك تركز على الأسرة، وهو أول دستور عربي يتحدث عن جزئيات تتعلق بحرية الاعتقاد، وبالتالي هو يحتوي على أشياء جميلة لم تذكر في بقية الدساتير العربية، لكنه مع ذلك يحتوي على ثغرات إذا تم استخدامها فستكون مصيبة. وإذا نظرنا إلى الدستور المصري، نجد أنه يحتوي على ثغرة متعلقة فيما سيحدث في حالات الطوارئ، في حين لا زلنا في فلسطين فيما يسمى ب"حالة الضرورة"، وانتقلنا إلى "حالة الاستثناء"، والسؤال المطروح هنا، كيف ننظر في فلسطين إلى هذه الدساتير؟ هل ننظر إلى هذه الدساتير على أنها جيدة، ونأخذها كما هي؟ في اعتقادي لا يجب أن نفعل ذلك. نحن في فرصة أفضل من غيرنا في هذا المجال، حيث بإمكاننا أن نطّلع على هذه الدساتير، وكيفية كتابتها، وعلينا في الوقت ذاته أن نكون حذرين جداً من أن نتبنى دساتير ما بعد الثورات العربية، لأن أخطر شيء في الدساتير هو أن تأخذها من بيئتها الأصلية وتزرعها في مكان آخر، وهذه مشكلتنا في فلسطين، حين كنا نطلع على تجارب دول أخرى ونأخذها كما هي، علما بأن وضعنا السياسي والمجتمعي والثقافي وحتى الديني مختلف تماما. ليس من الخطأ أن نطلع على دساتير غيرنا ونتعلم منها حتى نتلافي الثغرات، وأهم ما يجب تعلمه هو لغة الدستور، مثل ما ورد في الدستور التونسي.
** هل وجود قوانين حامية وعادلة للمرأة كافٍ لتأمين المساواة؟ أم يجب تضمين هذه القضايا بالدستور، لماذا؟ وهل مسودة الدستور (2015) تلبي الحد الأدنى لمطالب النساء الفلسطينيات بالمساواة والعدالة؟
** هذا سؤال مهم جدا ومحيّر في آن. لأن في الدستور يمكن أن تختار جهتين، إما دستور مفصّل مائة بالمائة، أو دستور بمبادئ عامة وتترك التفاصيل للقوانين.
أنا أرى أننا بحاجة إلى أمرين يجب أن يتوافرا، أولاهما، أن الدستور حين يكتب هناك شيء متعلق بجندرته، أو ما يعرف بالدساتير الحساسة للنوع الاجتماعي. أي أننا لا نريد أن نركز على المرأة فقط، بل يجب التركيز على العدالة الجندرية والعدالة الاجتماعية. فحين نتحدث عن المواطن الفلسطيني، فيجب أيضا أن نتحدث عن المواطنة الفلسطينية، بحيث لا يأتي تفسير الدستور مع اللغة في صالح الرجل، كما كان يحدث مع المواطنات المصريات المتزوجات من أجنبي، حيث كانت تفسر عبارة المواطن بالرجل فقط وليس بالمرأة.
الأمر الثاني الهام جدا في الدستور، هو أن هناك أناسا تعترض على وجود الكوتا باعتباره تمييزا غير إيجابي، وأنا أرى أنه في ظل المجتمعات التي تعاني من انتقال سياسي أو اجتماعي في التفكير من المهم التركيز على مثل هذه الأمور، وعليه، يفترض أن تركز الدساتير على المسائل الجندرية، ثم تترك بعد ذلك للقوانين المتخصصة. وبرأيي أن الدستور هو شهادة ميلاد المجتمع، وهو يفترض وجود تمثيل لكافة الفئات والشرائح.
Citizenship and Entry Law into Israel
Date posted: April 28, 2022
By MIFTAH
Dr. Munir Nusseibeh:
- The law is racist and has political objectives to counter Palestinian demographics
- The law fragments Palestinian families and undermines protection for women and children
Ms. Randa Siniora:
- The new law renders women victims of compound violence from the occupation and from their husbands in the case of divorce
- In 2021, we provided legal and social consultations and interventions to 252 Palestinian women
Introduction:
The Israeli Knesset recently passed the so-called “Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law”, which observers say is racist and has political and demographic objectives to combat Palestinian presence in Jerusalem, inside the ’48 territories and in all Palestinian areas. They also said the law falls under Israel’s policy of ethnic cleansing exercised by occupation authorities.
The new amendments to this law prevent the “reunification” of Palestinian families from living under the same roof. They also impose restrictions on marriage to Palestinians from inside the Green Line or who are citizens of a number of Arab countries in addition to Iran, all of which are classified as “hostile”. The law even includes Palestinians living in foreign countries.
A racist law
Dr. Munir Nusseibeh, Director General of the Jerusalem Community Action Center, an affiliate of Al Quds University, described the law as “racist par excellence”, aimed at shrinking the number of Palestinians in Jerusalem. “Israel uses security pretexts in regards to this law, but they have not been able to prove any of them in court. Since its ratification after the eruption of the Aqsa Intifada in 2000, Israel halted its review of family reunification applications. After that, the Knesset passed the so-called “temporary law” that prevents any Palestinian with a West Bank or Gaza Strip ID to obtain temporary or permanent residency in Israel or Israeli citizenship. The law was followed by additional amendments, including preventing any person from “hostile states” such as Iran, Iraq, Syria or Lebanon, who is married to a Jerusalemite or an Israeli citizen from even applying for permanent or temporary residency, which is renewable each year or two. Hence, “mixed” Palestinian families were thrown in the midst of an endless and complicated bureaucracy. They were made to continuously prove that their so-called “center of life” is in Jerusalem or inside the Green Line. Meanwhile, couples from the Gaza Strip were completely prevented from applying for even a permit to live in Jerusalem or inside the Green Line, leaving them only with the option of being separated from each other or living abroad.”
Exceptions
In regards to exceptions in the new law for some family reunification applicants, Nusseibeh says: “There are thousands of reunification applications at the Israeli interior ministry. This law doesn’t allow Jerusalemites and others to feel secure and have the normal, natural right to maintain their family unit under one roof. Recently, after a one-year hiatus in the renewal of the temporary law, the Knesset made some amendments to it, most significantly that any person from the West Bank and Gaza Strip over 50 who has had a family reunification permit for 10 years, is eligible for temporary residency. It should be noted that temporary residency is tricky because it can be easily revoked. As for Palestinian residents of Jerusalem or inside the Green Line, residency is basically only so they can benefit from Israel’s national insurance. They also automatically get health insurance and can drive a car without a special permit. These are really the only benefits of the latest amendment.
Still, some things became worse after this law was passed. Its prior version was created by a humanitarian committee that sometimes granted special residency permits in certain cases. However, the newly amended law minimized the ability of this humanitarian committee to grant permits. Today, no more than 52 people are being granted these special permits per year.
“This is ridiculous,” Nusseibeh says. “How could the law possibly predict the number of humanitarian cases in the future? This will make it much harder for Palestinian families in the future, especially for women married to Jerusalemites. In many of these cases, particularly when there is a divorce, women cannot maintain their ties to their children except if they live with their spouse in the same house, because if their children move with them to the West Bank or Gaza, they lose their residency rights. That means the only solution for a secure and stable life is for the mother and children to remain in Jerusalem. It is clear that women, in particular, are the biggest victims of this law.”
Mechanisms of protection for women and children
Dr. Nusseibeh touched on possible means of protection for women and children in this law, maintaining that it mostly effects women and children by separating Palestinian families. Protection for these women in Jerusalem, for example, is also undermined, he maintains, because their husbands must renew their family reunification application every year so they can continue living with their spouses and children. If they divorce, however, or the women become victims of domestic violence and the husband decides not to reapply for family reunification, they find themselves in an even more precarious situation. This is because their presence in Jerusalem is contingent upon the tedious and time-consuming reapplication of their permit. While the same applies to the non-Jerusalemite male spouse, women are more socially fragile and more in need of this permit, he says.
Meanwhile, Nusseibeh says his center is working with several families that have not been able to register their children in the Israeli population registry. Nusseibeh maintains their numbers are in the thousands; children not considered as residents of the West Bank or Jerusalem and do not have any official documents. This makes them ineligible, in the eyes of Israeli authorities, for any health, social or educational services. Some grow up without ever being able to secure an ID card, “which is rare anywhere else in the world,” he says. They cannot travel or open a bank account and constantly suffer from the fact that they have no legal status.
The Citizenship Law and the Nation-State Law
Dr. Nusseibeh believes this new citizenship law is an extension of the concept of Israel as a Jewish state. He says it this is a “constitutional law that determines constitutional concepts regarding Israel as a Jewish state, which is racist in nature and unacceptable under international law and principles.” Nusseibeh maintains that the last version of the law considered demography as one element in its creation, even though they avoided explicitly mentioning it and used security pretenses instead. However, with the latest draft of this law, they were unabashed in their racism and made this clear in the text and tone of the law, aimed at reducing the number of Palestinians who receive residency status or Israeli citizenship. “The fact remains,” he maintained, “that all Palestinians, whether in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, or the ’48 territories, live under Israeli occupation, which means no Palestinian should have to ask for a permit to live with their spouse; this is all occupied territory.”
Moving the battle to the international arena
On this topic, Dr. Nusseibeh states: “There is no way around dealing with Israeli law in this regard. We cannot avoid it since people must deal with everyday matters such as issuing ID cards and a drivers’ license and just secure living under one roof. That is why we must deal with Israeli courts in spite of their futility in many instances. At the same time, the Palestinian rights’ community is backed by its international and Israeli counterparts, which are active in international arenas in trying to prompt Israel into halting its violations. Still, working in international advocacy does not immediately pay off; it needs patience, especially since a major part of the international community is bias towards Israel. Just recently, we saw how the international community, especially rich countries, are firmly standing with Ukraine even though they are aware of the ongoing injustice against the Palestinians since 1948. The international community still has a long way to go; it is clear that this community, in its current structure, will not just hand us our rights without a struggle. But this does not make our battle in international arenas any less important.”
WCLAC Director General
Women’s and rights activist and director of the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling, Randa Siniora, showcased the most prominent repercussions of this law on thousands of Palestinian families. She also broached mechanisms for the protection of women and children and available legal options for holding the Israeli occupation accountable for its racist policies that exacerbate the suffering of Palestinian women and render them victims of complex violence, whether by the occupation or their husbands in the case of divorce or separation.
Mechanisms of protection for women and children
In regards to mechanisms of protection provided by the new law could for women and children, Siniora said there were none. However, she did say Jerusalemite rights and women’s institutions provide free legal, and social services to women and families in need of reunification. She explained that some of these institutions in Jerusalem are part of a coalition, which is headed by the Jerusalem Center for Legal Aid, in cooperation with St. Yves, WCLAC and the Land Studies Center. These, she explains, collaborate to provide individual legal services to counter the repercussions in the law, which has been in place since 2003 and renewed every year. Unfortunately, Siniora states, they expect the law to be renewed each year from now on.
Lobbying and advocacy
Siniora adds that these institutions also conduct lobbying and advocacy efforts by presenting on international platforms, including the UN. The most recent of these events was their input in the closing statement of the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, based on interventions regarding Israel’s report, submitted by WCLAC and the Jerusalem Center for Legal Aid and Human Rights. “Ours revolved around the impacts of Israel’s policies, especially regarding family reunification,” Siniora says. “The committee adopted our legal comments in Paragraph 44 on the topic of family reunification. The committee also confirmed the recommendations of the Center. Hence, we want to take advantage of our presence at the Human Rights Council, the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), with all contracting parties and platforms, and the fact-finding mission formed in May, 2021 after the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, on Israeli violations in the occupied Palestinian territories and inside Israel. From these platforms, we try to lobby and give evidence that the occupation’s policies are systematic, racist and discriminatory and we call for the elimination of all forms of discrimination against the Palestinians, including repercussions of the family reunification [citizenship] law on Palestinian families.
Case studies:
Siniora explains, “Most of our cases are victims of complex violence or violations against women, especially in the West Bank or those married to Jerusalemites. Many of these cases are of women who suffer from violence and continue to remain in its cycle. In turn, this means they are forced to stay silent in fear of losing their residency rights in Jerusalem because the application can only be renewed by the husband at the Israeli interior ministry. We have found a strong correlation between the violence of the occupation and the new family reunification law and the suffering of women in Jerusalem, which increases when they are in dispute with their Jerusalemite husbands. It becomes increasingly difficult for these women to maintain their rights if their husbands decided not to reapply for residency.
Facts and figures:
In regards to the number of cases the center handles, Siniora says: In 2021, WCLAC’s Jerusalem branch received 252 women for legal and social consultations and interventions. She said 70% of the women who came to the center were in cases to contest laws (176 women), 50% (126) of whom were by West Bankers married to Jerusalemites or from inside the Green Line. Another 20% (50 women) were Jerusalem residents married to a West Bank husband.
Systematic apartheid
Siniora maintains that the discriminatory nature of the new law gives opportunity to build on the Amnesty International report, which considers Israel a racist, apartheid state. “At the recent Human Rights Council session on combatting Israeli apartheid, we held sideline discussions where the special human rights rapporteur for the occupied Palestinian territories, Mr. Michael Lynk presented his report on the system of apartheid, which included the topic of family reunification. We also presented our oral statement on the topic to the HRC. The recommendations that day reaffirmed that Israel’s policies are indeed systematic apartheid. We are now seeking to make 2022 the year for combatting Israeli apartheid and reaffirming the absolute necessity to end the Israeli occupation and its policy of racial discrimination.
Hi-tech expert, Arees Bishara: the Silicon Valley project in Jerusalem is aimed at weakening the economic, social and political status of Jerusalemites
Date posted: March 14, 2022
By MIFTAH
Introduction:
Researcher in the high-tech sector in Israel, Arees Bishara, described the Silicon Valley project Israeli authorities are planning for the Wadi Joz industrial zone in East Jerusalem, as being part of the ‘modern Israelization” of Jerusalemites. She warned that if this project comes to fruition, it would undermine the economic, social and political status of Palestinians in Jerusalem.
Bishara, a woman’s activist and PhD student of sociology, spoke to “Hosted by MIFTAH”, calling on Palestinians to take advantage of ‘young minds’ in the field of high-tech, saying there are hundreds of brilliant young Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, including in East Jerusalem, who work on contract in Israel. There are others, she said, who were given entry visas into Israel and are employed by Israeli high-tech companies. Bishara recommended the formation of a Palestinian national strategy plan to elevate this sector and employ it in the service of the Palestinian global narrative, citing the experience of Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan in the last two years as an example.
Dangerous economic, social and political repercussions
Bishara believes this project is directly connected to the takeover of Jerusalemite properties, saying the objective is to take over land on which Palestinian industrial and economic facilities are built. Today, there are over 200 of these facilities, including auto-shops, which employ Palestinian workers, who will lose their livelihood once this project is realized.
However, the repercussions on the bigger picture, she maintains, is that the project will undermine and rattle the economic, social and political status of Jerusalemites in East Jerusalem, contrary to claims by the Israeli Jerusalem municipality that the project will provide jobs for them.
Recruiting Palestinian brainpower
Bishara points to other goals of the project, particularly recruiting talented Palestinians in the high-tech industry. “When we talk about Palestinians in the field of Israeli high-tech, we are talking about a specific narrative Israel has nationalized over the past few years, after it joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [COECD] and realized its need for skilled laborers. This involves a narrative of “recruitment or pluralism”, which is an American or western narrative. Israel is trying to adopt it in order to convince the Western world in particular that it is open to a model of pluralism, in both the ’48 territories and the ’67 territories including East Jerusalem, for the sake of economic peace and elevating the economic status of the Palestinians.”
Modern Israelization of Jerusalemites
Bishara describes Israel’s approach towards the Palestinians in this regard as a process of modern Israelization in East Jerusalem, which does not take any consideration to their status as residents and not citizens. What’s more, the Israeli labor market does not recognize diplomas from Jerusalemite institutes, which has resulted in a massive influx of students to Israeli academies such as Hebrew University and Hadassah College.
Meanwhile, the number of Jerusalemites working in high-tech companies in the West Bank and inside the Green Line was estimated at 1,000, while most Jerusalemites working in the Israeli high-tech sector work in global rather than local companies. Still, they suffer from racism on the job, especially when the company branches are in Jerusalem, which already have a very low employment rate for Palestinians, Bishara notes.
Palestinian initiatives
Bishara points to independent Palestinian initiatives such as tech incubators, which train Jerusalemites in the Palestinian ecosystem, such as the Jerusalem High-Tech Foundry. This institute trains Jerusalemites to become involved in the Palestinian high-tech market and connects them with high-tech companies in the West Bank and the Arab world. “We are finally seeing investments by major conglomerates such as Google, which play an important role in the technology sector. Recently, a financial grant of $10 million was secured as a donation, the first of its kind, which targets app developers, graduates and entrepreneurs in the technology field in East Jerusalem and the West Bank,” she adds.
Occupation obstacles
Still says Bishara, Israel’s Jerusalem municipality continues to place obstacles in the path of independent Palestinian tech initiatives, basically because it goes against the grain of its own logic of pluralism and the narrative of integration in the Israeli high-tech market. The narrative of pluralism, she explains, is only applicable to the Israeli tech market and under Israeli conditions. “That is why we cannot claim that the integration process or the model of pluralism is a success or that there are no hidden agendas of ‘modern Israelization’ behind it. Talk is one thing but implementation is another.”
Palestinian High-Tech
Bishara explains that the Palestinian high-tech sector started to rise in years after 2000 and included several important components: government associations, incubators, start-up companies, donators, investors and tech accelerators, all working in the Information and Communications [ICT] field. At the time, the percentage of employees was 3%, with a GNP of 8% and annual profits of around $500 million. She adds that 50% of high-tech companies in the West Bank and Gaza have partners outside the Palestinian territories, including: The Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency, Gaza Sky Geeks, Rawabi Hub and other startups and companies that play a major role in the Palestinian ecosystem. In addition, investment funds such as “Ibtikar”, which supports Palestinian and Arab startups and government institutions, play a major role as well. Between the Palestinian and Israeli ecosystem, there are three operation models: outsourcing (or contracting), training and direct employment.
Overlapping in Palestinian-Israeli economic relations Bishara points to several overlapping characteristics in Palestinian-Israeli economic relations within the technology sector, including: domination, integration, normalization and liberation. Domination, in this context, is in regards to the unequal power relations and the subordination of the Palestinian economy within a colonialist hierarchical sequence. Integration and normalization indicate to the diverse and complex relations between Palestinians and Israelis. That is, some Palestinians oppose partnership and normalization while others see them as an opportunity to gain expertise for the liberation project and economic independence. There are yet other voices that oppose Palestinian engineers working in Israel because it leads to Palestinian “brain drain”.
Bishara says Israel’s air, land and sea in addition to its digital and economic occupation is the main obstacle to Palestinian high-tech workers. This, she maintains, creates people with degrees but with no experience and very little job opportunities in a narrow labor market that depends on donors and not on investors. This, she added, is not to mention the low salaries they earn in the few Palestinian high-tech companies in existence.
Israeli High-Tech: colonialist military spaces
Bishara explains that the Israeli high-tech sector works in colonialist military spaces that defy every concept of pluralism and partnership. This was further exposed by the Israeli spyware scandal, which revealed that Israeli spy operations also included high-tech companies, namely Apple and Facebook. Both companies then filed lawsuits against the spyware company. The scandal also raised fears among Jerusalemites that such high-tech technology and surveillance in East Jerusalem and the West Bank would be used by Israeli security companies to further oppress the Palestinians and shrink their space even more to freely move and live.
The Wadi Joz Silicon Valley project and normalization with the Arab world
What is the relationship between this project and the recent normalized relations between Israel and some Arab counties? Bishara answers: ‘Right now, the objective in Wadi Joz, for example, is not only to establish a high-tech project, but also to link occupied East Jerusalem with West Jerusalem through establishing economic projects in the so-called Israeli ‘capital’. Hence, these normalization deals are exactly what Israel wants – for the UAE and Gulf countries in general to invest in East Jerusalem and in these tech projects in particular, so their governments can convince the international community that Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel. What happened, though, was that the UAE did not heed Israel’s call, fearing investment in an area with such high economic and political risk. This is because Israeli high-tech is relatively less developed in East and West Jerusalem than it is in inside the ’48 territories. Furthermore, the UAE has no interest in taking such risks in Jerusalem, which is still disputed territory. This is especially true of East Jerusalem, which is occupied according to international law. Instead, the UAE invested in startup Israeli companies that guarantee a profit for it without economic or political risks.
Position of international high-tech companies
Bishara explains international high-tech companies that own major shares in facilities and branches inside the Green Line did not want to establish companies in East Jerusalem on disputed land and especially not in Wadi Joz. “These international companies worry about their reputation in the global community. For example, companies such as Facebook, Google and Microsoft are not interested in waging this battle, so the dreams and aspirations of the Israeli government and Jerusalem municipality have been thwarted for now. These companies have been closely watching recent events in Sheikh Jarrah, Silwan and other Jerusalem neighborhoods in the media, including the May, 2021 uprising, which forced them to rethink their actions in Jerusalem and even inside the Green Line. In some cases, deals were cancelled and others postponed until the political situation settles.
Economic neoliberal intersectionality
Bishara says there has been a relationship of economic neoliberal intersectionality between the Israeli government and the PA for years. That is, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip work in contracting for companies inside the Green Line, which are considered global, or they work in Israeli-sponsored local startups. Hence, this is not a new approach. If we look at the archives of deals signed between companies in Ramallah and Rawabi and Israeli companies, we find that this relationship is alive and well.
Employing high-tech in the Palestinian narrative and discourse
Bishara also pointed to current liberation and unification initiatives, whose objective is to convey a clearer and more accurate picture of what is going on in East Jerusalem. She said these youth initiatives work earnestly to convey the true picture of the Palestinian movement in confronting oppression, mainly through social media. Even if these are preliminary initiatives, they are key to building an internal economic liberation project, which would serve as a mirror to the world. There are also digital platforms no less important than these initiatives from which Palestinians can win over the sympathies of other peoples, in addition to the role individuals play, especially those working in Israeli companies. “People are not statues, they are humans who can take action, listen and see and have the capability to change the reality of their surroundings and make Israelis see that they have the capacity and ability to advance and develop themselves and their community irrespective of Judaization projects around them,” Bishara says.
A national strategy plan to revive Palestinian high-tech
In this regard, Bishara maintains that the first thing needed to revive and elevate the Palestinian high-tech sector is to establish a clear and unified project that serves Palestinian economic interests. “I don’t know if this should be under the PA’s auspices or not,” Bishara remarks. “But to be honest, I am not putting my bets on the PA right now, but on individuals, on competencies, universities, schools and already existing companies. Through these, we can build a network or a tech incubator that includes all private companies and associations. We must also work on a joint strategic plan that includes all Palestinians inside the ’48 territories, the West Bank, Gaza and the Diaspora. Public opinion and global companies, individuals and international governments that invest in the Palestinian economy will help formulate this plan, because involving them will offer an alternative, a new proposal and a unified economy.”
Israeli settlement proposal in Sheikh Jarrah: solution or evasion?
Date posted: October 13, 2021
By MIFTAH
Occupied Jerusalem: Attorneys for Sheikh Jarrah families have so far not taken a final stance on the Israeli High Court proposal to settle the case on the residents’ forced expulsion from their homes. The proposal includes consideration of the residents as protected tenants with ownership rights.
Attorney Sami Irsheid, who is part of the families’ defense team, said the Israeli court proposal involves both the residents of Sheikh Jarrah and the “Nahalat Shimon” settlement group to which the residents have until November 2nd to respond to.
According to the proposal, Irsheid explains, the eviction orders would be cancelled for the four families, who would be considered protected tenants with ownership rights to the land guaranteed if proven in future settlement procedures in the neighborhood.
Irsheid notes the High Court decision ‘does not include any acknowledgment from the Sheikh Jarrah residents of Nahalat Shimon’s ownership of their homes or land, leaving the issue of ownership open so the residents could prove ownership in future procedures.
Attorney Medhat Deeba, meanwhile commented: “No doubt the Israeli High Court verdict on the Sheikh Jarrah case, made on October 4 and which includes an important and comfortable settlement proposal for the residents, buys them some time in their homes and properties, especially given the previous permanent eviction orders against them.”
However, Deeba warned that decision was designed to take the heat off Israel in the eyes of the world. “This is a very important point. The settlement decision takes the pressure off of Israel to the world and also removes the immediate threat of eviction for the residents, at least for the next 15 years. Ultimately, however, the proposal includes the right of Nahalat Shimon to evict the residents in accordance with Article 131 (7) and (10). This could happen if the case is closed by the property being registered in the name of the settlers as owners or with the passing of 15 years from the date the settlement was signed – whichever comes first.”
He explains, “If the settlement is finalized within five years and the land is registered in the company’s name, then they could file for eviction in accordance with the aforementioned provision, and if the settlement procedures are not finalized within 15 years, the company could also file for eviction of the residents according to this article.’
“Our hearts are with the people of Sheikh Jarrah since the decision is ultimately theirs. Without a doubt, this is a tough decision; they must choose the less of the two evils.”
Meanwhile, spokesperson for the Sheikh Jarrah residents’ committee, Yaacoub Arafa said after the committee met with the legal team, “It is clear the Israeli court system is stalling and avoiding a final decision on the expulsion of Sheikh Jarrah residents. This is the reason for the momentum in the media and in international political arenas, which called on Israeli authorities to halt this war crime of trying to uproot us from our home and land. We know that justice for the rightful owners will never come from Israeli courts, which are by nature, colonialist courts established to serve settlers and to facilitate Israeli settlement measures.”
Arafa continues, “We, as the residents of Sheikh Jarrah, are studying our future steps carefully because they must help maintain our presence in Jerusalem. One thing is for sure: we will never recognize the settlers’ ownership of our homes.” He says they are still reviewing the proposal and would deliberate with their lawyers again before giving the court their final response.
Jerusalemite activist and resident of Sheikh Jarrah, whose family is also threatened with expulsion, Muna Kurd, reiterated their refusal to concede ownership of their homes or land. “Rest assured, we will never accept any settlement that involves concession of our rights to our land and homes. The court’s recent proposal to consider us protected tenants is all so they could show the world they are trying to reach a settlement that is satisfactory to all sides. But this is actually what they want. Our position will not change; we will not relinquish any of our rights.”
The settler group, Nahalat Shimon, alleges the Sheikh Jarrah homes are built on land owned by Jews prior to 1948, a claim the residents refute, confirming they have been living in their homes according to a 1956 deal between the Jordanian government and UNRWA.
