MIFTAH's Special Interviews
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The Palestinian scene after the restoration of relations with Israel and Biden’s victory
Introduction: The developments that followed the Palestinian leadership’s decision to restore relations with Israel and after the Democratic Party candidate Joe Biden winning the US elections, have created a new reality on the Palestinian scene. This involves the impact of these developments on internal Palestinian conditions, the future of the peace process with Israel and the projected repercussions of the US election results on the Palestinian cause. At the same time, the Arabs are normalizing more and more with Israel without first resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a precondition for this normalization. Following is the full text of “Hosted by MIFTAH’s” interview with Dr. Shuaibi Restoration of relations with Israel Dr. Shuaibi believes the leadership’s decision to restore relations with Israel is linked to President Mahmoud Abbas’ desire to continue the political negotiating process with the Israelis in coordination with and support from Arab countries accepted by both Israel and the United States, especially Egypt and Jordan. President Abbas’ official position, which was announced by Fatah Central Committee member Hussein Al Sheikh, reflects a number of decisions associated with the president’s desire to be part of the Arab framework and alliance led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco. President Abbas’ decision to join this framework was made without any declared justification whether by the PLO or in his address to the people. No doubt, his decision was influenced by the US election results and the lack of any financial solutions in respond to the declining economic situation in Palestine, coupled with an increasingly disgruntled people. The economic and commercial sector in particular were hit the hardest in addition to certain areas such as Hebron, not to mention the PA’s inability to impose its authority in the Gaza Strip. In the past three years, the President has been seeking out Arab and international support, especially after the restoration of relations with Israel, in order to convene an international conference with the Quartet Committee, Egypt and Jordan. This would serve as an alternative to the sole role of the US as broker and based on international resolutions as its terms of reference. President Abbas was apparently reassured by Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia that they would help to convene an international peace conference with the support and consensus of France, Germany and the EU. This, he believed, would help ease into a return to direct negotiations with the Israelis in cooperation with the new US administration, regardless of the political makeup of the next Israeli government and ultimately reach a settlement he could accept. For the President, a return to negotiations, with a guarantee that Hamas does not oppose them, would be considered both an objective and an achievement at this stage. Israel is continuing with its land-grab policy in the hopes that at some point in the future, the time will be right for the realization of the Zionist dream of a full takeover of Palestine, granting the Palestinians limited autonomy. Consequently, Israel is not interested in eradicating the PA but at the same time, it continues to resist any efforts to end the division and restore official relations between PA institutions in the West Bank and Gaza. Reconciliation and putting the Palestinian house back in order What is the future of Palestinian reconciliation and putting our own house in order, in light of the return to relations with Israel? Dr. Shuaibi says: I don’t think President Mahmoud Abbas believes the most recent intra-Palestinian talks will necessarily lead to an agreement over a new national program that Palestinians will unite around and execute. He says Abbas wants to return to direct negotiations with the Israelis from the point where they were halted. He still thinks the PLO program approved by the PNC in 1988, is the appropriate program for the Palestinians. This program is based on UNSCR 242, renouncing violence and adopting direct negotiations with the Israelis in addition to the declaration of independence for Palestine on the 1967 borders on which the Central Committee approved the Declaration of Principles in Oslo. This is why the President has always specified his position regarding the future of national dialogues in relation to the need to integrate political Islamist movements into the PLO on condition that they accept this program at the practical level. That is to say, they already accepted the premise of the PLO being the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and of the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders. For example, several years ago, President Abbas supported internal talks when the peace process came to a standstill. Consequently, talks to end the division were halted when there was a sense that the leadership would return to negotiations. This does not mean Hamas was always in favor of ending the division. It first looked to secure its own interests at the expense of the overall national interests in addition to its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood at the regional level. Pressure from Arab parties led to President Abbas postponing the issue of internal dialogue and reconciliation with Hamas in order to make it easier to return to negotiations. This was when he acted in isolation of these countries and visited Turkey, Iraq and the Security Council. Shuaibi believes national unity will never be accomplished if we bank on the same approach of “waiting it out”, all while Israel continues with its policy of taking over the largest possible area of land in the West Bank, besieging Palestinian communities. Hence, he believes the return of the Democratic Party under the new US administration is an opportunity to restructure the internal situation and the President’s Arab relationships. The President still thinks he can continue with his old strategy in partnership with Arab countries and implement regional arrangements. From his point of view, this could lead to changes in the American position, which in turn would open up opportunities for a return to the “settlement process”. He also thinks the new US administration, like the old one, will try and build an alliance in the region comprised of Sunni Arab countries and Israel to guarantee stability in spite of Israel and some Arab Gulf countries’ goal of confronting the Iranian Shiite alliance, “from which the Palestinians and their cause have nothing to benefit.” General elections In regards to elections, the President realizes he cannot hold general elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip without Hamas agreeing to them in Gaza. He knows Hamas has complete control over Gaza and therefore, any decisions such as holding general elections, will require its consent. In this regard, these elections cannot be held in the shadow of the division, which means they must be held within the framework of reconciliation arrangements. Dr. Shuaibi maintains, “The President wants to coerce Hamas into joining him on the same path towards negotiations. He thinks Hamas will negatively impact his efforts if it remains outside of the PLO. This might be the best possible time for him to hold elections to secure and contain Hamas’ opposition and also to strengthen his own representation.” The future of the PLO and its institutions “President Abbas is banking on the continuation of the status quo; that is, no change to the legitimacy Fatah granted him as its president or to the support he gained in the last PNC elections in 2018, which further reinforced his legitimacy. From his perspective, the President believes he has legitimacy to continue leading the PLO in his capacity as the elected head of the largest Palestinian faction. This is further reinforced by recognition of this status at the Arab and international level. Shuaibi also maintains that Abbas believes the recent makeup of the Central Council will secure the legitimacy and support of his position at a later stage, which means PLO institutions will remain weak and even paralyzed. The fate of the PA Dr. Shuaibi maintains that the dissolution of the Authority is not likely, nor is it in the interest of any party, including Israel and Hamas. “The current alliances, which are partly backed by international parties such as the United States and even European countries, in addition to the presence of countries such as Turkey, Iran and Israel, are not keen on the departure of the PA. Neither do the Palestinians have any other option but to continue with the current status quo. The same goes for the Israelis, who would not benefit from the collapse of the PA; neither would Hamas, especially after its experience in administrating the Gaza Strip and ultimately failing to establish an alternative authority to the PA in Gaza. That is why the PA, in its current shape and program, is a comfortable option for parties and does not contradict with the PLO’s program in that its strategy is based on the ongoing transformation from the PA to a state and on pressuring countries to recognize Palestine in accordance with the Palestinian national program declared in 1988. The Arab condition and normalization Dr. Shuaibi addresses the recent Arab condition and how some Arab regimes are racing towards normalization, saying this is a ‘reordering” of the Middle East after the elimination of the roots of terror, Al Qaeda and ISIS mainly. It also comes after Trump’s plan, which was based on the idea of building an alliance in the region to confront anti-US and western forces, namely in Iran, Turkey and Russia, in addition to pushing back against the Chinese “Silk Road” program that passes through this region. This was why there was a desire to establish a regional alliance in the area, based on Arab Sunni-Muslim countries and Israel as a security and economic power on the ground. This kind of alliance requires a solution and elimination of the Palestinian cause within a framework solution and via Trump’s plan and would pave the way to build normal relations between Sunni-Arab countries and Israel. However, when the Palestinians derailed this solution by not participating and actively confronting it, some Arab countries showed their willingness to build on this alliance, even without a solution to the Palestinians and without a Palestinian presence. After the US elections, both Egypt and Jordan seemingly found an opportunity to rebuild a regional alliance with a Palestinian presence. They also found a way to rebuild the relationship with Israel via an Arab entry-point and not through the bilateral normalization of these two countries. That is, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are prepared to pressure the new US administration into accepting the convention of an international conference where these countries are willing to participate along with the Quartet Committee. That would make the Arabs a party in the negotiations and in pressuring the Israelis as an alternative to the current Arab project, which is based on the Arab Peace Initiative that calls for normalizing with Israel after the resolution of the Palestinian cause. The US election results and repercussions Dr. Shuaibi maintains there are domestic, regional and international repercussions to the US election results. He says the US administration will first focus on its domestic issues as a priority. “No doubt, the Trump plan is over, which is a good thing for the Palestinians, because this plan was being commandeered by the Zionist movement’s far right, which believes it can forcefully impose a settlement on the Palestinians. Such a settlement would give Zionism legitimacy over the majority of the Palestinian territories and relegate the Palestinians to fragmented minorities living in cantons. Such Palestinian entities would have no value unless they were linked to this or that Arab country or if they formed some weak quasi-state in the Gaza Strip, thereby dividing loyalties in the West Bank. Today, Trump’s plan may have been halted, but this does not mean Israel has changed is plans on the ground. This is because the foundation of the Zionist project is not based on American consent but on its support, while being a direct Israeli project in and of itself. This is why Biden will focus his priorities on US interests and the domestic situation. The Covid-19 pandemic has also been a clear point of contention, given how his predecessor, Donald Trump, handled the crisis and failed to adequately address it. It was also one of the reasons that helped Biden beat Trump in the elections, which means combatting the epidemic will be one of his priorities. We already know that at least the first year of his new administration will largely focus on this issue. The other issue he will focus on is the economic situation in the United States, because this is the ticket on which Trump was elected. That is why the new administration must offer some economic solutions to the domestic situation and to unemployment rates in particular, which spiked during the pandemic. He will then turn to improving American-European relations, which were rattled during the Trump era and which Biden and his Vice President described as a return to the world, a return to the UN and to international agencies. This means a reemergence of the US in these venues, but it also means there will be no real efforts or priority by the administration to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, we know that AIPAC and the Zionist movement voted for the Democrats, which means they could have an influence on improving Israeli-American relations, which were damaged because of the Netanyahu government’s bias towards Trump. This will require security and financial support to Israel in exchange for appeasing the Arabs by taking some measures that would effectively cancel out Trump’s previous decisions such as closing the PLO office in Washington, restoring financial support to UNRWA and resuming financial aid to the Palestinian security services and to charitable associations in Palestine, followed by a reopening of the US Consulate in occupied East Jerusalem. Nonetheless, Europe – France and Germany in particular – could be given a role in facilitating the convention of an international peace conference similar to the Madrid Conference. This would allow the Arab leadership, represented by Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, to be main partners in the conference alongside the Quartet Committee, comprised of the US, the EU, UN and Russia. After the conference, there would be a return to direct long-term negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis.
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Antoine Shulhat: Disregarding the 'Deal of the Century' and supporting the two-state solution are the most important developments Biden can bring to the Palestinians
The Biden administration is looking to ‘heal the American spirit” “Hosted by MIFTAH”s guest is researcher and expert in Israeli affairs, Antoine Shulhat, who speaks about the scene in Israel in the wake of Joe Biden winning the US presidential elections and the restoration of relations between the PA and Israel following President Trump’s defeat. He addresses the dramatic repercussions of this defeat on Israel at the political and security level, especially given how the United States working to rebuild its previous alliances abroad. Shulhat expects Biden will not reverse Trump’s major decisions regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict such as moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem or his recognition of Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. However, he does believe he will move more towards restoring some sort of balance in American relations with Israel and the Palestinians. Biden and the two-state solution Shulhat indicated that Trump’s defeat will have dramatic repercussions on Israel given the considerable gap between Trump and Biden’s foreign and security policies. Based on statements made by Israeli government spokespersons regarding a possible cut in the US security budget, Shulhat expects this could lead to less pressure on the Iranian regime and a return to the “policy of compliance” that former US President Barack Obama adopted and which culminated in the 2015 nuclear deal, in parallel with the Middle East and the Palestinian cause. On this, Shulhat thinks that while there are many possibilities, it is unlikely Biden will cancel the major decisions Trump made such as moving the US embassy to occupied Jerusalem and recognizing the annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights but will likely try to regain some balance with Israel and the Palestinians. Reading into Israeli government statements, Shulhat believes the Biden-Netanyahu relationship (or any new Israeli Prime Minister) will not be as strong as the relationship with Trump, especially since Biden could disregard some of the components in Trump’s “deal of the century”, including giving a green light to the annexation of some areas of the West Bank. In addition to this, Biden has officially expressed his commitment to the two-state solution. Moreover, Secretary of State-nominee, Antony Blinken recently spoke about the vision of the new US administration towards the Palestinian cause, stressing on Biden’s endorsement of a two-state solution. Blinken said the solution would preserve and strengthen military and intelligence cooperation between the two countries, including Israel’s military superiority. He also said the administration would call on both Israel and the Palestinians not to take unilateral steps that could prejudice any chance of returning to the two-state plan, adding that they would restore funding to the PA and reopen the US Consulate in East Jerusalem. Blinken also noted that the administration would transfer humanitarian and economic assistance to the Palestinians but on condition that they halt stipends to ‘those involved in terrorist operations.” Obama’s third term Shulhat believes the Biden administration will focus on “healing the American spirit” in accordance with the perimeters of the Democratic Party due to internal divisions and racial tensions, which reached their peak during the Trump administration. This is in addition to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, which delivered a major blow to both American lives and the economy and which will take precedence over foreign policy. He also said it was plausible to interpret Biden’s strategic approaches through the lens of the Obama administration in which he was Vice President. The Obama administration supported Arab revolutions and worked on resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the basis of the two-state solution. The US even abstained on a UN Security Council resolution that condemns settlements in the Palestinian territories instead of its usual veto, contrary to expectations. This administration also economically supported the PA within its vision that a solution to the conflict will bring stability to the Middle East region. What’s more, the US signed the Iran nuclear deal, which Israel strongly opposed. Shulhat continued that he believes Biden’s win was a huge disappointment to Netanyahu, who was hoping for a second term for Donald Trump. Still, Netanyahu did not wait long to ensure that the incoming US administration would adopt a political line that adamantly defends Israel’s interests. In the end, most political analysts agree that even with the new Biden administration, the United States will continue to consider Israel an important, if not the most important ally in the Middle East. Based on this, Israeli interests depend on developing and strengthening the relationship with this administration, even if there are differences in opinion. Even though Biden stressed that his term in the White House would not be like a ‘third Barack Obama term”, given all the changes to the United States and the world since then, ample analyses have been based on the fact that Biden has appointed several people to key positions in his new administration who were part of Obama’s team. This, he says, prompts us to conclude there is a good chance that the Obama administration’s policies will continue rather than be any different. “It is important to remember the messages Obama conveyed during his first trip to Israel in March, 2013 during which he recognized a ‘national state for the Jewish people’ as a means of paving the way for the Israeli nation-state law, and two, as a means of legitimizing the basis of the Zionist narrative, which considers the colonization of Palestine as a realization of the return of the Jewish people to the ‘Promised Land.” “Liberation from Netanyahu” and banking on Biden Shulhat maintained that the official Palestinian position is something of a courtship, saying we cannot separate the PA’s return to all forms of civil and security coordination with Israel from the context of this wager or from the context of the pace of normalization by several Arab countries with Israel, adding that this normalization has given Israel extra power against the Palestinians. “I think Israel’s insinuation that it will postpone the ‘deal of the century’ is the best it will offer the Palestinians. I don’t expect we will see any Palestinian concessions for a return to the negotiating table except for the return to all forms of civil and security coordination, especially within this context of normalization, which coincides with Netanyahu’s mantra of “peace for peace” as an alternative equation to “land for peace”. This includes the premise that building and normalizing relations in the region is the way to reach a settlement to the Palestinian problem, not vice-versa.” The changes to the current political scene in Israel and the upcoming elections are basically aimed at “Israel’s liberation from the clutches of the Netanyahu government”. The most recent show of this is Gideon Saar’s split from the Likud Party and his establishment of a new party. Based on this, we must reiterate that whether Netanyahu stays in power or not is still the least important issue in the context of dealing with the specifics of Israel’s present situation and what this means for the conflict, Shulhat says. The more important issue lies in the changes this state and its political system are undergoing in light of its right-wing domination and how its foreign policies, both international and regional, will be impacted by these changes on the one hand, and how they are related to the sudden transformations in the world and region, on the other. “What I can say is that all eyes in Israel will be on the repercussions of the Saar break from the Likud Party. However, we must take into consideration that the current political condition, which has been the status quo for a long time, points not only to a lack of a political narrative counter to the rightist narrative towards the Palestinian cause but also to a lack of real opposition against this rightist trend.” Reigniting the international community in the service of the Palestinian cause Shulhat said the almost inevitable option given the latest regional developments vis-à-vis normalization and the coronavirus pandemic and based on UN resolutions that support the Palestinian right to establishing a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders is to “reignite the international community in the service of the Palestinian cause.” He said this could coincide with attempts to prompt other parties to assume their role at the regional and international levels, maintaining that these efforts should mostly be geared towards Europe, which is expected to regain its political weight in tandem with the new US administration. “At the Palestinian level, I must also point out the need to continue efforts to repair our domestic situation and to pull the rug out from under those who want to use it as a tool to derail the Palestinian cause” Shulhat maintains. What’s more, another ‘card’ is being taken advantage of, which is Arab normalization with Israel. “We must keep it in mind that this normalization is not limited to full diplomatic relations with Israel but also entails -- at a deeper level perhaps -- the normalization of its policies towards the occupation and settlements as a means of whitewashing them. Let us remember that this normalization took place in spite of the Palestinian cause and reflects an approach that considers the Palestinians as irrelevant to the political developments in the region. It also points to the beginning of the end of the Arab Peace Initiative, which stipulates that the normalization of any Arab relations with Israel cannot take precedence over a just solution to the cause of Palestine.” Biden and the West As previously mentioned, Shulhat believes the United States will move on the domestic front at the expense of its foreign policy. However, in this context, Shulhat pointed to some approaches the new administration will take, including restoring US participation in the Paris Climate Agreement and strengthening its alliance with its traditional allies in the West in general and with Western Europe in particular. According to a number of Israeli analyses, this alliance will have repercussions on Israel given that Europe prefers a conciliatory approach with Iran but a firmer one with Israel in regards to its policies towards the Palestinians. At the UN, some observers are expecting relatively quick changes regarding two of its bodies: a halt to the withdrawal from WHO and a return to the Human Rights Council just like [former President Barack] Obama returned to the HRC after his predecessor George Bush Jr. pulled out. There is a consensus that inside and outside UN bodies, the Biden administration’s behavior will be affected by the competition and rivalry with China, Shulhat says, adding that they also believe there is no real difference between the Democratic and Republican Parties regarding the perceived threat from China. The Democratic Party platform publically declared that under certain conditions “firm measures” must be taken against Beijing. At the same time, Biden declared that his policy towards Russia would also be firmer. Based on this, there are predictions that US policies towards China and Russia could impact on Israel’s bilateral relations with these two countries.
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US Presidential Elections: Reflections and Repercussions
Introduction: Political pundits say the recent US presidential elections and Democratic candidate Joe Biden’s victory, will have repercussions on the relationship of the new US administration with both Palestinians and Israelis. They also say these results will generate tangible changes to US policies, to the Biden administration’s international relations and to domestic American affairs. The observers predict that the Biden administration will shift priorities in handling several domestic and foreign files, including the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Birzeit University lecturer Dr. Ghassan Khatib says: “I think the results of the US elections will lead to tangible changes in American policies and in America’s international relations, not to mention at the domestic level. The reason for this is that the previous administration under President Donald Trump made unprecedented alterations to US policies, especially at the international policy level. Hence, the gap between the two parties in the elections has never been as wide as this time, which means any new party in power also means new changes. So far, they have already announced many of the changes to be made, including that the new administration will return to the climate deal, which the previous administration withdrew from, and that they would improve relations with their European allies. Other than that, there is the Middle East. This new administration has already said it would reverse some of the policies taken by the previous administration, meaning it will go back to traditional US policies in many aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict.” Reflections and repercussions Khatib continues, “I think some changes will be relatively fast, which is why I also think the new administration, if we are to go by its statements, will resume aid to the Palestinian people and possibly to UNRWA. This is important because it will encourage other countries to resume financial aid. There were countries that halted their own aid to the Palestinians because of pressure from the Americans. What’s more, the Americans may reopen the US Consulate in Jerusalem, which has symbolic significance. Most importantly is that the Democratic Party and Biden both feel strongly about the two-state solution which means we can expect them to be critical, even if only verbally, against Israeli settlement expansion. This will put a measure of international pressure on Israel regarding settlements because during the Trump era, these countries were prevented from expressing any criticism towards settlement expansion. On the contrary, the US ambassador to Israel used to encourage it and confirm that the United States has no problem with expanding settlements. This of course, weakened the international position opposing settlement expansion. The political process, on the other hand, is more complicated because the US administration was managing the conflict rather than trying to solve it. This is because everyone concluded that the possibility of resolving the conflict was too hard so they resorted to trying to finalize it completely in Israel’s interests. I expect the new administration will also return to managing the conflict rather than resolving it. While on the surface, this may not look very good or enough, it is still better than the Trump administration’s vision for resolving the conflict completely in Israel’s favor, otherwise known as the ‘deal of the century.” The leadership’s options Dr. Khatib says: “In my opinion, the American elections are an important shift in international policies towards the Palestinian question. These elections could hold within them opportunities and challenges, which really will depend on the Palestinian performance and the extent of the Palestinians’ internal cohesiveness and strength. It will also ultimately depend on how clever they manage the political file pertaining to their relationship with the United States. If our position is strong, smart and cohesive, we may be able to avoid some inevitable pitfalls that come with reopening the political process. This is somewhat concerning, because right now, the internal Palestinian situation and our style of managing political action and issues is not reassuring at all. Hence, it is the perfect occasion to call on the Palestinian leadership to maintain cohesiveness, unity and confidence in itself and in the people and also to assume wise approaches in dealing with these new changes given their importance.” Reconciliation and elections In response to the question about the fate of Palestinian reconciliation and holding elections, Khatib says: “Anyone who falsely believed over the past few months that reconciliation was possible and elections could be held will realize the connection between the failure to hold these elections and achieve reconciliation with developments in the United States. The truth of the matter however, is that we were never close to elections or reconciliation regardless of whatever happened, not to mention the external, regional factors pertaining to influences from regional powers on both sides of the rift. That is why I don’t think the US elections outcome will have any impact on our internal situation. As for external files, it does not look good, for internal reasons rather than because of the United States. Arab normalization with Israel In terms of the recent wave of normalization between Israel and Arab countries and how they may impact the recent elections, Khatib commented: the second Middle East file where we will see changes to US policies is the Gulf because the Democratic Party running the administration has a different approach for dealing with the Iranian file and this will reflect itself on the relationship of the United States with the Gulf. In my assessment, part of the change is that the new US administration will not be as enthusiastic towards the issue of normalization. While it will surely support normalization, there will not be the same amount of pressure to achieve it like before. This is why I think the pace will slow and this wave will end, especially since the next country the US was hoping to prompt into normalization – Saudi Arabia – is very hesitant and fears the potential backlash in the region. Hence, the retreat of American pressure towards normalization will be comfortable for Saudi Arabia, which was never excited about moving in this direction since it strives to lead the Muslim world. The “deal of the century” and annexation One of the most positive paradoxes to the US elections is that throughout it, Biden’s campaign announced it would not support annexation because it weakens the chances of a two-state solution in the future. I would like to note here that the elections divided the Jewish community in the United States. Public opinion polls on the US elections showed that two-thirds of American Jews voted for Biden because of domestic issues and because they were concerned about the racist atmosphere Trump propagated. The second reason is that there is a sense of anxiety and conviction among the majority in the American-Jewish community that Netanyahu’s and Trump’s policies are moving in the direction of total control over all the Palestinian territories in a way that would block any chance for a two-state solution and would constitute a threat to the democratic and Jewish nature of the state of Israel. This is concerning for the overwhelming majority of American Jews who by nature, are interested in a democratic and Jewish Israel more than they are interested in the annexation of occupied Palestinian land. The Biden administration and its relationship with the Palestinians “We will see a return to American policies similar to the pre-Trump era, which are neither fair nor friendly to the Palestinian people. They are biased to Israel and harmful to our interests but this administration will be less pronounced than the Trump administration in this bias.
Khalil Shaheen, political analyst, researcher and media expert, said this about the US elections: “The rise of “Trumpism” has been accompanied by transformations at the global level, which are also related to the rise of right-wing populism in many countries. Trump’s victory constituted a strong motive for the rise of populism and its intersection with the rising populism in Israel, clearly represented in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the right wing. This caused considerable damage to the Palestinian cause and to the rights of the Palestinian people, especially since Trump’s populism intersected with the most far-right religious and ideological camps inside Israel and overall adopted the Zionist narrative. Transformations from Trump’s defeat From another aspect, Shahin says, “It is not certain that Trump’s defeat will constitute a turning point or prompt a retreat of populism, whether in the United States or at the international level. What is certain is his defeat will have reverberations even outside of the United States, especially in some countries that populism fed on in tandem with the rise of Trump’s populism. I think we need more time before we can tell whether Biden’s win will constitute transformation regarding a retreat in right-wing populism including core values within it that impinge on the rights of the Palestinian people: that is, denial of international law and international humanitarian law and UN resolutions since populist trends are, by nature, contradictory to human rights. This means that the restoration of another ruling trend in the United States could mean at least a slight reconsideration that this new US administration will deal with international law and international humanitarian law in addition to the UN and its agencies. Some indications of this were apparent in Biden’s statements when he said for example that he would not take a hostile position towards UNRWA and that he would resume American support to the agency. To many, this is an indicator of how the Democrats deal with international institutions, which is applicable to some other international arenas such as its position towards the Human Rights Council, from which the US also withdrew. At the time, the US took several hostile positions towards HRC resolutions pertaining to the Palestinian cause and rights. This trend could be extended into transformations in UNESCO and other agencies and these policies, if adopted, could constitute a shift away from the methods of the Trump administration, which waged war on the rights of the Palestinian people in the various international arenas and forums. The Palestinian leadership and the relationship with the Biden administration Shahin believes we must take a step back until the relationship becomes clearer between the leadership and the Biden administration. “I think we need more time until we see just what policies the new US President will adopt in terms of its foreign policy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict including normalization between Israel and some Arab countries or the Trump administration’s actions regarding efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A big part of the Palestinians’ policy is going to depend on the behavior and policy of the new American administration. That is why I don’t think we need to start by offering more concessions, which the leadership thinks it can use to appease the Biden administration. This means we need to hold off until the new administration’s policies mature on several important junctures, including its position on the implications of the ‘deal of the century’ rather than the deal itself. The deal will be pushed aside as a framework for a dictated solution on the Palestinians; it no longer exists. However, there are some implications of the deal that are being implemented such as the Israeli annexation of Palestinian land, the position on refugees, the nature of the Palestinian state, its jurisdictions and the level of sovereignty it will have, in addition to settlements, all of which are important issues. If the new administration adopts the policies of the previous Obama administration, for example, we can conclude – especially since there are already signs of this in Biden’s statements – that it will take a position opposed to settlement expansion but will not actually take measures to reverse the previous approach of further entrenching settlements. Still, even this position requires us to hold off. We don’t know how Israel and Netanyahu will behave vis-à-vis the annexation process before Trump leaves the White House. In other words, there are Israeli positions pushing for tangible steps if not full annexation or at least the imposition of Israeli law or sovereignty over West Bank settlements. Their hope is that this would be a final parting gift from Trump before he leaves office. We will see how Biden deals with all this – will he consider settlements to be a reality on the ground? Or will he plan to take executive decisions down the line to cancel out the decisions made by Trump in this regard? These are all important questions because they will have an impact on the positions of the Palestinian leadership and the possibility of restarting any Palestinian-Israeli political process. The two-state solution Shahin believes the new US administration’s interests regarding the two-state solution will revolve around slogans. “I think the new administration will most likely be interested in the slogan of the two-state solution but not its implications like the previous administration. Still, it will be keen on relaunching this process between Palestinians and Israelis so as to avoid more confrontation on the ground, especially if Netanyahu takes more steps to entrench settlements and annexation. Nonetheless, this will not be a priority for the administration. There are more pressing domestic ones, especially pertaining to the coronavirus pandemic in addition to other issues such as the relationship with China and Europe and the climate, which the Democrats promised they would move on quickly. This means the new US administration may wait for a while before resuming efforts between Palestinians and Israelis but my guess is that it will be more interested in managing the conflict rather than resolving it given the wide gaps between the Palestinian and Israelis positions. We could be seeing a form of the conventional negotiations conducted by former US Secretary of State John Kerry – that is, shuttle trips between the two sides. Regarding Palestinian reconciliation, there were efforts to resume bilateral dialogue between Fatah and Hamas in addition to the meeting of the secretary generals of factions. It seems however, this file hit a speedbump, partly because they were waiting for the results of the US election. That is, will the Democrats once again return to a containment policy of Islamic trends, particularly the moderates and the existing groups in the Middle East? Will this apply to Hamas? Previous administrations, including the Obama administration, adopted this policy, but when it came to the Palestinian-Palestinian issue and because of Israel’s position, they used to constantly push for maintaining the conditions of the Quartet Committee, which placed conditions on Hamas’ participation in the Palestinian political system. This is important from the perspective that launching a political process—at least from the viewpoint of President Abbas – requires that he is portrayed as having political or negotiating legitimacy, if you will. And if no political process is launched, he at least would need a renewal of his legitimacy as a President whose term expired some time ago. The PLC would also need revamping in a way that would allow it to wage a political process with Israel with consensus on its legitimacy. I think this needs time as well to see how the new Biden administration will handle the issue of Palestinian reconciliation or Hamas’ participation in the political system, in elections and other issues. On this note, I think the Palestinian leadership is leaning more towards resuming relations with the United States. This was clear from the congratulatory letter President Abbas sent to Biden, the gist of which was the president’s hope of resuming the peace process without specifying terms or conditions. It was a short letter but it reflected the President’s interest in a future political process, which will manifest in different ways. That is, soon we will see mutual measures between the Palestinians and Americans that start with the resumption of contacts, something that may have already begun; we will see a reopening of the PLO office in Washington and a PLO envoy there; a decision to reopen the US consulate in East Jerusalem; a resumption of financial aid to the PA; a resumption of USAID projects in the Palestinian territories in addition to UNRWA. The Americans may get to these issues quickly as opposed to the peace process, which need executive measures by Biden, such as cancelling previous decisions made by Trump for which he has a majority at least in Congress. Hence, he does not need to pass new bills to make these decisions. Likewise, Biden can also make decisions on the laws passed during Trump’s administration, which impose restrictions on funding to the PA. In any case, this means we will be returning to the same place in terms of diplomatic, political, economic and security contacts with the United States. The question is how this will reflect on Palestinian-Israeli relations. I think in exchange, the new US administration will be keen on restoring the Palestinians’ relationship with Israel, even if gradually.
Dr. Honaida Ghanim, director of the Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies “Madar” had this to say about the US elections: “The election results coincided with the release of Madar’s most recent position paper, which was based on analysis of the development of these elections and the results of opinion polls conducted here and in the United States. Recently, several opinion polls were conducted in Israel addressing the difference between Trump and Biden. The results showed that over 70% of respondents support Trump and consider him Israel’s best friend. We think that if the elections were held in Israel, Trump would most likely have won by a landslide. In the United States, 20% Jewish Americans voted for Trump. Hence, the first repercussions are linked to this gap between American and Israeli Jews, whereby the second group claims they represent the first even though only 5% of American Jews consider Israel as their number one cause. Therefore, the outcomes of these tectonic shifts may not necessarily show today but they can be built on in the future in order to impact American policies towards Israel. Ghanim also says there are issues related to strategic matters. “America deals with Israel as a strategic ally, which means this is not about “mood swings” but about a persistent strategic alliance. Still, these shifts that are taking place beneath the surface will have a future impact on relations between the two sides; they will also impact strategic relations which do not change overnight. Still, the changes do not indicate any profound changes in terms of Israel remaining the US’s strategic ally in the region even if the relationship will not be the same as before. This relationship will gradually move into a discussion within the Democratic Party, which is a shift that greatly concerns Israel. Impact on the Israeli political party scene Ghanim believes the US elections will have an impact on the political party scene in Israel. “The impact will basically be moral support in that the possibility of Netanyahu’s defeat is plausible and achievable as long as everyone in the US came together to bring down Trump, which they succeeded in doing. This could be moral support. Also, it could allow more maneuvering room for parties in opposition to Netanyahu so they can rebuild themselves. Today, there is a bully-like alliance between “Trumpist/Netanyahu-ism” and populism in Europe, India and Brazil, which could also have an impact on the Israeli scene. However, the most dangerous repercussion is that the rising star on the Israeli scene is [Neftali] Bennet’s star, meaning that the political conflict in Israel is not between the right and left but between trends that are already right wing. There is obviously a huge shift in Israel towards the right, which means Netanyahu will try and go over and beyond it to the more extremist trends. The presence of Bennet means the propaganda he will use will be based on whoever is more extreme. What’s more, the main topic at the core of this competition between Netanyahu and Bennet will not be the coronavirus pandemic but the topic of annexation. This will turn into a key topic at the heart of the internal conflict between the right for which the Palestinians will pay the price. Meanwhile, confronting these extremist steps Israel takes against the Palestinians depends on how the new US administration reacts to them. How Palestinians can employ the election results There are a lot of ways in which the Palestinians can employ the US election results vis-à-vis their relationship with the Israelis, says Ghanim. “The election results proved the elections were between the white supremacist trend and other trends and groups such as minorities, blacks and women. This reaffirms the need for Palestinians to work at the grassroots level with these groups and movements in the US and Europe in general because the future is there, in this popular, grassroots relationship. Today, we have fertile ground to work with them and not necessarily with official circles because these circles are mostly impacted by their popular bases. The election results showed that Biden was supported by these groups and that the Democratic Party is no longer one bloc but several blocs combined. Hence, communicating with these blocs requires Palestinian diplomacy and formulating plans and organized action. It also needs the right discourse because we are at a dangerous crossroads in the United States; we don’t know which way things will go. It could take a horrifying turn but if we take into consideration that things really are going in that direction, we still have a lot of room for Palestinian action right now. The fate of the political process Meanwhile, Ghanim said the statements made by Blue-White Party leader, Benny Gantz and official spokesperson for the Palestinian presidency, Nabil Abu Rudeina, calling for a return to Palestinian negotiations is nothing more than public consumption. “On what basis will the two parties return to negotiations?” she asks. “Will they go back to dragging the Palestinians into 20 more years of negotiations that will end with the Palestinians living in isolated cantons like they are today? Or will there be new foundations for them? Or will there be a return to the same deceptive power formula Netanyahu employed before with the Palestinians, which he deems is the best way to eliminate the Palestinian cause. If the wager is on shifts in the Israeli arena, the Palestinians are betting on a losing horse. Therefore, any negotiations must have a new structure through adopting a new strategy as a bases for these talks. In addition, the Palestinians must speed up getting their house in order, including the situation of Palestinian institutions and the political system. Anything other than this is merely empty words. Local and global repercussions Ghanim also believes the US election results have reflected on the overall situation in the world, not just on Israel and the Palestinians even if the part pertaining to the Palestinians inside the Green Line and their relationship with the government in Israel are afforded a special analysis. “I am one of those people who says there is a huge difference between a death sentence and being sentenced to life. A death sentence means you are finished, which is what Trump was trying to do to the Palestinian cause. Right now, we are living a life sentence with the occupation but we have time to rebuild ourselves; the question is how to take advantage of this. Of course, this will have an impact on the Palestinians inside [the ’48 territories], with the knowledge that these changes produced by the US elections and the Democrats winning the presidency, are far-reaching changes. At the level of the refugee cause, the restoration of funds to UNRWA and the US rejoining the climate agreements which Trump pulled out from will all have an impact, but not anytime soon. Also, if we do not initiate the change, we will not feel it; we are the ones that must change the tools for maneuvering rather than wait to see what happens in the United States. What happened with Trump should be a big lesson to us, which is that we must build up ourselves and have internal strength, which is the basis for our strategic core. Arab normalization In regards to Arab normalization with Israel, Ghanem says: “We used to have strong Arab consensus and support [around our cause] but this has started to wane. For Palestinians, this is a big loss. The slogan that always said there would be no peace unless it is first achieved with the Palestinians and then with the Arabs, has been turned upside down. What is happening today only further weakens the Palestinians and will have very dangerous repercussions. What’s worse, not only is the UAE normalizing with official Israel but also with the settlers, which means it has gone over and beyond even the red lines set by the EU. We are facing a new and confusing scenario because building any relationship with regimes is like betting on a losing horse. The first wager should have been on the peoples; what happened in the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan is proof of this.
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Jerusalem personalities: the coronavirus pandemic exploited to further Israel's racist policies towards Jerusalemites
Ramallah – 23/9/2020 Jerusalemite personalities have accused Israeli occupation authorities of implementing racist policies towards Palestinian residents of the city through the preventative measures against Covid-19 by employing these measures in the service of the occupation. The personalities told “Hosted by MIFTAH” that almost every decision taken by the Israeli government negatively reflects on the Palestinians such as the massive deployment of Israeli police and army throughout the city, which did not help to raise awareness about the danger of the virus or the measures needed to prevent its spread. They said this was proof that occupation authorities deal with Jerusalemites as second-class citizens, reflected in the nature of the health, social, educational and judicial services available to them.
Hatem Abdel Qader, former Jerusalem minister and Fateh leader said, “Any decision made by the Israeli government at the public level has negative repercussions on Palestinian society in occupied Jerusalem. For example, when the government makes any decisions pertaining to health, it tries to make it sound as if it were for the public good. However, this decision often has negative repercussions on Jerusalemites. The government employed racist preventative measures to paralyze economic activity in the Old City and to prevent worshippers from entering the Aqsa Mosque while it allowed settlers to break into the compound without them abiding by public health measures in place. Abdel Qader said that Israeli police are also increasing the number of fines and violations against residents of East Jerusalem for not wearing masks or wearing them improperly. At the same time, he said, Israeli police do nothing towards violators in West Jerusalem where commercial activity is more or less the same. Israelis on that side of the city are not held accountable in the same way, he said. Abdel Qader continued that Jerusalemites are under the pressure of living in a distressful environment, especially for the hundreds of Palestinian families that include a family member with a West Bank ID. As part of its preventative measures, occupation forces have suspended permits for these relatives to enter and reside in Jerusalem, using the pandemic as an excuse.
Political analyst and journalist, Rasim Obeidat said that based on his daily monitoring of Israeli measures in Jerusalem, there was a clear racist nature to how Jerusalemites are dealt with vis-a-vis the pandemic. He explained that Israeli police and army units had been deployed throughout the city’s streets and alleyways of the Old City but without offering any guidance or awareness about the dangers of Covid-19 and how to mitigate its spread. Instead, he maintained, the police are constantly on the lookout for Jerusalemites not wearing masks or wearing them improperly so they can issue them a NIS500 fine. At the same time, Israeli police deal with the same situation for Israeli Jews in Jerusalem by merely warning them to wear a mask to ensure they do not contract or spread Covid-19. Obdeidat said the discrepancies in punitive measures based on location clearly shows the stark difference between how Palestinians and Haredi Jews in close proximity are treated, such as in “Mea Sherim” neighborhood where the Jews do not abide by precautionary instructions such as wearing masks, continue to attend temple and hold weddings and funerals. They are given mere warnings while just on the other side, Israeli police raid weddings and mourning houses held by Palestinians and issue fines up to NIS 5000 to the bride and groom and their families and NIS500 to the invitees.
Political activist and expert in Israeli affairs, Ismail Maslamani said Israel’s racist policies have not stopped since 1967, culminating in what he called the ‘soft expulsion” of residents to outside the separation wall. He added, “Israel treats us as if we are third-class citizens; one of the most glaring forms of discrimination is in its health, social, judicial and educational services. In the past year and a half, occupation authorities, through its Knesset members and some ministers, have tried to isolate Jerusalemites and prevent them from going to hospitals to receive treatment. Even Covid-19 testing was not widely available until Arab MKs intervened.” Maslamani pointed out that Israel’s racial discrimination goes beyond health care and has infiltrated service institutions such as the “Bezeq” phone company. It offers Palestinian Jerusalemites internet services ranging between 25-100 megabytes while offering Israelis in the city 1000 megabytes. This has posed a serious predicament for Jerusalemite students who have been forced into remote learning due to the pandemic.
Attorney Deeba said Israel “spares no effort to invest in and exploit the coronavirus pandemic to implement its racist policies against the Palestinians. Its primary objective of the lockdown was to isolate Jerusalem and empty it of its Arab Palestinian inhabitants, leaving it in the hands of settlers. For example, when Islamic Waqf authorities were prepared to close the Aqsa Mosque to Muslim worshippers at the height of the pandemic, Israeli police refused to close Dung Gate for settler break-ins into the compound. They also tightened the lockdown on Palestinian areas and meted out fines and violations of around NIS1.8 million in the first days of the lockdown.” He continued, “Israeli health inspectors even raided law offices and prevented lawyers from receiving clients,” adding that occupation authorities had taken advantage of the pandemic by closing off the Shufat camp in order to raid the youth and sports center building and arrest several of its members, in an attempt to prevent the opening of the biggest sports club in Jerusalem, which the camp residents had funded themselves after the UN provided them with the building.
Director of the youth development department in Jerusalem, Mazen Ja’abari maintained that Jerusalemites “had not expected the coronavirus pandemic to lead to such deterioration in their conditions. Since the Israeli government imposed a lockdown last March, hundreds of tourist shops in the Old City have closed because they did not receive any help.” He continued, “Israel offered emergency economic aid packages to Israelis, which Palestinian merchants did not benefit from, thus depriving thousands of Palestinian families of a steady income and pushing them into poverty and dependence on social and humanitarian aid.” Ja’abari said the major blow was when Covid-19 began to spread. Palestinians in Jerusalem found themselves hostage to their lack of knowledge on how to deal with the pandemic, compounded by the fact that occupation authorities did not provide them with the necessary information and methods to combat the virus, especially in terms of testing, health services and awareness campaigns. Then, when the Palestinians took it upon themselves to open a testing center in Silwan, Israeli forces shut it down, confiscated medical equipment and arrested the people in charge. What’s more, Israel did not open testing stations for Palestinian Covid-19 patients in East Jerusalem until the Adalah Center took the case to the Israeli High Court. That was when some primary testing centers opened, he said. Ja’abari pointed out that international law necessitates that Israel, as the occupying power, must fulfill its role in caring for the residents under its occupation. However, Israel does the opposite in clear violation of human rights, namely health care and medical, social and economic services. This is in addition to the clear discrimination in the distribution of medical assistance between Israelis and Palestinians, which has turned the coronavirus pandemic into multilayered oppression of Palestinians. Not only are they burdened with hefty fines, Palestinian neighborhoods are besieged and its residents constantly being accused of spreading Covid-19.
Director of the Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights, Ziad Hamouri, described Israel’s preventative measures in Jerusalem as retaliatory and racist, targeting the rights of Jerusalemites in general. He continued, “Israeli authorities have treated Jerusalemites harshly by employing double standards: the first are employed with a soft hand when it comes to the Israelis and the second are meted out with an iron fist when applied to Palestinian Jerusalemites.” Hamouri explained that the lockdowns delivered a serious blow to economic activity in Jerusalem, which he said was ‘on its deathbed” while other cities, including the western sector of Jerusalem or Palestinian cities inside the 1948 territories were not affected in the same way. He said economic and labor activity continued to operate to some extent in these areas such as restaurants and shops while in East Jerusalem this was not the case. He continued that this discriminatory approach affected the tourism sector as well, showing the clear discrepancy in this regard between East Jerusalem and other areas. “Billions of shekels were disbursed to various economic sectors in Israel while the Palestinian economic sector got nothing except some grants, loans or tax cuts.” Hamouri also said there were other repercussions from Israel’s racist measures that affected Jerusalemite families. “Even before the pandemic, there are always problems pertaining to Jerusalemite rights, whether social, economic or health rights. There is also the issue of family reunification that many families must deal with, coupled with Israel’s continuous pressure on Jerusalemites to leave their city as part of Israel’s demographic battle. Couples who reside in Jerusalem and whose residency rights are under threat are targeted in this policy. This also results in their health, social and economic rights being deprived, in exchange for increased settlement population density in the holy city.”
Member of the coronavirus task force in Jerusalem and director of the Beit Safafa medical Center, Fouad Abu Hamed said the coronavirus epidemic in Jerusalem was linked to political dimensions pertaining to the nature of Israeli measures. “It is all political,” he said. “When we talk about the pandemic, the Jerusalemites who are directly affected are those facing residency and legal status issues because they are the ones deprived of comprehensive medical services. Those who do not have these residency or family reunification problems do not have these same problems.” Abu Hamed continued that this is not limited to health services but also economic issues. “These families cannot benefit from the economic assistance or stimulus packages offered by the government. That is why these preventative measures have become such a sensitive subject and require special protection and care: this includes imposing measures on the ground against those not wearing a mask or for holding public gatherings or home visits are made to patients to ensure they are isolating. Israeli police do not consistently apply these measures in Palestinian neighborhoods of Jerusalem expect to impose heavy fines. Meanwhile, the awareness and guidance campaigns against the pandemic in Arabic for the Palestinian public is completely lacking and insufficient.”
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Zakariya Odeh, Coordinator for the Civil Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem
Legal and rights institutions are merely buying time in Israeli courts to postpone demolitions, confiscations and evictions 126 structures, including 83 homes were demolished since the start of this year Zakariya Odeh, coordinator for the Civil Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, said during an interview with MIFTAH that Israel’s policies on the social, health and economic rights of Jerusalemites, in particular towards housing, have escalated in the recent period, citing the spike in the number of demolished homes, whether by Israeli municipal teams or coerced self-demolitions. Odeh maintained that legal and rights institutions in Jerusalem are merely buying time in Israeli courts to delay demolitions, confiscations and evictions, especially since self-demolitions are carried out due to the threat of exorbitant fines that could reach up to NIS90,000 if the structure is torn down by the Israeli municipality. Following is the full interview conducted by “Hosted by MIFTAH”: **How do you explain the recent spike in home demolitions, especially “self-demolitions”? This policy is not only about residency rights but is linked to other matters. It is important to point this out given that the recent spike in demolitions is linked to Israel’s urban planning in occupied Jerusalem. After the occupation of Jerusalem, the Israeli government made decisions that were geared towards the annexation of the entire city. One of these decisions was to expand the borders of the so-called Jerusalem municipality from 5.5 square kilometers (during Jordanian rule) to 71 square kilometers through the annexation of land from villages around Jerusalem. Thus, a law passed in the Knesset in 1980 declared Jerusalem a “united city” and capital of Israel. This constituted a legal foundation for the annexation process, which was linked to the policy of land confiscation as well. Israeli authorities took control over 88% of land in the eastern sector of Jerusalem, leaving 12% of the land for construction purposes, whether residential or commercial. This had a major impact on residency rights in Jerusalem and the possibility to obtain building permits. It should be noted that land confiscation was all to the benefit of settlements; today there are 15 settlements within the so-called Jerusalem municipality borders in which 215,000 settlers live, comprising one-third of the overall number of settlers in the West Bank. What’s more, Israel’s urban planning includes three plans: a regional plan, which became the 2020 plan, then later the 2030 plan and finally the 2050 plan. It is clear that the central goal of the planning policy is to increase control over the land and multiply the number of settlements and settlers in the eastern sector of Jerusalem while also decreasing the number of Jerusalemite residents. These plans did not take into consideration the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem, which is clear from the underdeveloped and neglected infrastructure and roads in East Jerusalem’s neighborhoods. **How did this impact on the residency rights of Jerusalemites? What are the most significant challenges and hindrances in this regard? Israeli occupation authorities impose stringent restrictions on building licenses for Palestinian residents of Jerusalem to the point that obtaining a permit can take from five to 10 years in addition to the cost of the permit itself. The cost of a building permit for a 100 square meter apartment is $40,000 on average. One can only imagine how expensive this is for residents, given that 78% of Jerusalemite families fall under the poverty line, according to official Israeli statistics. The problem does not stop at this either. When someone puts in an application for a permit, the municipality also demands they bring a deed or proof of registry for the piece of land on which the house is to be built. The fact is, the land registry has always historically constituted a huge problem for Jerusalemites dating back to Ottoman rule and then the British Mandate, followed by Jordanian rule and finally the Israeli occupation. In the past, land registry in the owners’ names was never an easy task because the land was registered as collective property. Since 1967 and over the 53 years of occupation, the Israelis have never opened the door to land registry in Jerusalem, which made it very difficult to obtain building permits. Add to this Israel’s law of absentee properties and the people are left with no real options. They found themselves forced to build without a license, which, according to Israeli law, put their homes at risk of being demolished. In terms of statistics and numbers, there are currently 22,000 homes threatened with demolition in Jerusalem for lack of a building permit. **Are there any accurate statistics on the demolition process and its acceleration over the past three years, particularly home demolitions? It is important here to mention the considerable uptick in Israel’s demolition policy of Jerusalemite homes in the past three years, especially this year and last. According to available statistics, at the beginning of this year until August 20, a total of 121 structures were demolished, 80 of which were homes and 57 of which were torn down by the owners themselves. Unfortunately, self-demolitions have become more and more common; the families are forced to demolish their homes because if they do not, according to Israeli law, they would be forced to pay the demolition fees, including the bulldozers that raze the homes, the police and army expenses – they provide security for the demolition teams and close off the site – fees which reach between NIS80-90,000. That is why many people chose to do it themselves, which costs them at most, NIS3,000. The statistics also show that the year with the highest recorded number of demolitions was 2019 including the highest number of self-demolitions. A total of 238 structures were torn down last year, including 189 homes, of which 58 were demolished by their owners. As of August 2020, there have been 120 homes razed to the ground. What’s more, between 2004 and 2019, approximately 1,000 homes were demolished and 3,167 people displaced, including 1,704 children. Women and children are the primary victims of these home demolitions and therefore of the displacement policy, all of which leaves psychological scars on the entire family. One example of this is the Abu Sbeih family in Silwan, which was forced to demolish their own home just over a week ago. The owner’s young son looked at his father and said: “You are demolishing our house and not the Israelis?” This child stood and watched his father and uncle tear down their apartment so they would not be left with the demolition fees. It is my opinion that Israel’s demolition policy is part and parcel of its displacement and “silent transfer” policy, which has been ongoing since 1948. Back then, they applied it to our people inside [the ’48 borders] and today they are applying it to Jerusalem and the West Bank. Ultimately ,the goal is to completely change the demographic and geographic makeup of Palestine and of Jerusalem in particular in order to create a Jewish majority and a Palestinian-Arab minority. **How do self-demolitions serve Israel’s purpose and paint a prettier picture of its occupation? Do they exempt Israel from its legal responsibility as an occupier? The truth is, self-demolitions have more than one psychosocial impact on the family, women and children in particular, and on the entire neighborhood in general. The demolitions save the occupation the effort of demolishing Palestinian homes. But even beyond this, these demolitions give the impression that the person demolishing their own home has done something wrong because they built it without a permit and was therefore forced to tear it down. This serves Israel in that it gets the same result but at the same time gives the impression that the occupation is not the culprit. Still, in international law, this does not exempt the occupation from its legal responsibilities because it does not grant Jerusalemites permits, nor does it allow them to build and then it makes them pay the costs of the demolition. **How much is the demolition policy, both self-demolitions and those carried out by Israeli authorities, linked to other plans such as annexation, settlement and land usurpation? I think the demolition of homes, restrictions on building permits and the displacement of residents are all parts of a one policy of “transfer”. The confiscation of land and settlement building is one goal occupation authorities work towards nonstop. This racist planning policy is in the service of Israeli Jews, not Palestinians and does not reflect the needs of Jerusalemites or even take them into consideration. There is also the revocation of residency rights from Jerusalemites, the closure of the city and restrictions on movement. Moreover, a decision by the Israeli interior ministry in 2002 effectively froze all family reunification requests, which also falls within Israel’s strategic approaches. Statistics indicate there are approximately 8,000 Jerusalemite children who have no legal status in the city, which effectively denies these children of social, economic and health rights. They are not residents or even registered in the family records at the Israeli interior ministry, rendering them basically nonexistent in the eyes of the occupation. Imagine the social, economic and psychological impact this has on the victims of this policy. Then there is the Jerusalem ID revocation policy, which denies Jerusalemites the right to live in their own city. Since 1967 to today, around 14,650 ID cards have been revoked as part of an ongoing and systematic policy. Let us not forget how Palestinian education is targeted in Jerusalem. There is a systematic policy in place since the first days of the Intifada, which has only escalated in a bid to take control of the entire educational process. In 2011, Israeli authorities began to change and distort the Palestinian curriculum, which only increased throughout the years, culminating in 2015 with a move to implement the Israeli curriculum on Jerusalem schools. They are fully aware that education is one of the most important tools used to promote Palestinian nationalism, which is exactly why their efforts are nonstop to take over the entire system and “Israelize“ the curriculum. This is what can be called the ‘occupation of the minds” of Palestinians in Jerusalem. Israel also targets Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem. Since 2000 to today, 47 Jerusalemite institutions have been completely shut down while hundreds of activities have been banned in the city, including culture and art activities. Most recently, at the end of August, the Yabous Cultural Center and the Edward Said Music Conservatory were raided by Israeli security forces and computers and files confiscated. All of these measures are part of one policy, which targets Palestinian existence in Jerusalem. **What happens when people’s applications for building permits are denied by the municipality? What measures do Israeli authorities take against them? And what happens to the families that lose their homes? Many applications for building permits when the homes are built without them, take years in courts before they are rejected. By that time, exorbitant expenses and fines are meted out to the home owners. Our statistics indicate that the average number of permits issued to Palestinian Jerusalemites in East Jerusalem is just 100 a year in spite of the high population growth and density in the city, which has multiplied over the years of the occupation. The population of Jerusalem on the eve of its 1967 occupation was 67,000 while today there are more than 375,000 people and currently comprise around 40% of the population within the so-called Jerusalem municipal borders. The only thing they offer to these residents is demolition, displacement of families and deprivation of residency rights. In addition to this, there is no support for these families from official Palestinian parties in spite of their harsh conditions after their homes are demolished. All of their savings are usually depleted in order to obtain a building permit. As for self-demolitions, since these residents are not given ample support, they have begun to take on a new approach: to refuse to tear down their own homes on the premise that this is a criminal policy carried out by occupation authorities and for which they are responsible. This is in spite of the economic pressures that come with occupation authorities carrying out the demolition, which can cost between NIS80,000-90,000. It’s true there are some official initiatives and efforts by the PA, whether from the Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs or the Jerusalem Governorate, but still these efforts are not sufficient for supporting these families. In this regard, official parties have clearly fallen short in supporting Jerusalem and its people’ steadfastness. **What is the role of local and international human rights organizations and institutions? What role can they take in terms of legal aid or lobbying to halt the demolition policy? There are several legal and rights institutions that follow up on these violations, especially house demolitions, by raising awareness among residents of these measures and offering legal support for the affected. However, the problem is with the process itself whereby legal support is within an Israeli context. That is, the courts are Israeli, the laws are Israeli and the prosecutor is Israeli. It should be noted that there have been discussions about resorting to these courts during the first days of the occupation and whether this was right or even useful, especially the Israeli High Court. The fact is, the only thing these legal and rights institutions can offer is to buy time by postponing demolitions, confiscations or evictions. So, instead of their home being demolished within a year or two, it gets postponed for five or even 10 years. One example is the Sheikh Jarrah case, which has been in the courts for 40 years even though 13 families have been evicted so far. A similar case is the Bustan case whereby legal aid was able to prevent the eviction of the families. So there are legal services but few accomplishments because the judicial system and Israeli law are not objective but slanted to serve Israel’s own political end goals. The other thing these institutions do is to lobby and advocate with international parties, the UN and human rights organizations. It shares their reports and participates in conferences to speak about home demolitions. They also work with the EU, with various diplomatic missions and international organizations working in Palestine and Jerusalem because they realize the importance of international legal pressure. In the end, our problems are political and their solution is political as well, which is an end to the occupation. However, in spite of everything going on, the international community - -whether the EU or other countries – have not shouldered their responsibilities. The international community has fallen short as a result of Israeli pressure and policies. **How has Israel’s nation-state law impacted the steady increase in the number of demolished homes? Likewise, did the US administration’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel also have an impact? Both the nation-state law and the current US administration’s policies since 2017 have had a clear impact in this regard. The nation-state law says that a united Jerusalem with a Jewish majority is the capital of Israel and the capital of the Jewish state. Hence, the law confirmed the Israeli policy of annexation and control and also granted the right and self-determination for the Jewish people while not recognizing the right of the Palestinian people to their self-determination, in addition to considering settlements as having moral value. All of these provisions of the law reinforced Israel’s policy of control, annexation and settlement building, which is linked to demolitions of course. In addition to this, the US embassy moved from Tel Aviv to occupied Jerusalem, halted its support for UNRWA and funding to Jerusalem hospitals, closed its consulate in Jerusalem – which was historically America’s recognition that Jerusalem is occupied – thus giving the green light to the Israeli government to escalate its measures, increase home demolitions and build more settlement units. **How did the separation wall contribute to the accelerated pace of forced expulsion of Jerusalemites and to the escalated demographic conflict? Since the state of Israel was established in 1948, the goal of its demographic politics has been to maintain a Jewish majority and to continue the expulsion of Palestinians through reinforcing and increasing settlements, stripping Palestinians, namely Jerusalemites, of their residency rights and limiting their freedom of movement. Part of the challenges facing Jerusalem and its residents is the so-called Israeli plan for “Greater Jerusalem”, which they have been working on for years and which includes, within it, other plans pertaining to the expansion of the city’s borders so they encompass the Gush Etzion settlement bloc. This bloc alone is comprised of 13 settlements. To the east of this is the settlement of Maaleh Adumim and the EI project to build 3,600 settlement units, hotels, shopping centers and other services. This project is currently underway and is aimed at linking Maaleh Adumim to Jerusalem’s center, thereby dividing the northern West Bank from its south. To the north, there are the Givat Zeev and Kochav Yaacov settlements. According to this plan, immediately after the signing of the Oslo Accords, the Israeli government closed off Jerusalem by erecting checkpoints at its entrances. Then, in 2005 it began to build the separation wall until Jerusalem became completely encircled with this wall today. Three Palestinian residential areas have now been isolated from the city: Kufr Aqab and Samiramis to the north, Shufat camp, Anata and Dahiyet Barid to the east and Walaja to the south. There are now approximately 140,000 people behind the separation wall in communities that have been neglected for years and have no proper services or infrastructure. Israel is floating ideas for severing these communities completely from Jerusalem. In 2018, a bill was put to the Knesset that includes two provisions on the percentage of the vote needed to change the status of Jerusalem. According to this law, there would need to be 50% of Knesset members who vote in favor of the law in order to pass it. This has changed, however, to become two-thirds of the vote should there be any negotiations over Jerusalem. The second provision is to change the borders of Jerusalem, which were ratified in 1980 in a bid to change the law so the separation wall would become the so-called municipal borders. This would effectively mean the isolation of the three aforementioned communities. Several discussions were held on the parties that would govern these communities such as local councils or by the Israeli army’s “civil administration” and would ultimately result in their total isolation from Jerusalem’s borders. If this happens, Palestinians will comprise only 20% of the overall population of Jerusalem after being 40%. This is the strategic plan proposed by the Israeli government’s “Givani” committee in the 70s. At the time, the government formed the committee and then asked it to formulate a population strategy for Jerusalem. Their recommendations were that the Palestinians should not be more than 22% to 24% of the population of Jerusalem. This has been their goal for years – to make this change and this is what they are working on now through their tunnel and road systems that link the city center with settlement blocs in order to facilitate movement between them and also link these settlements with the Israeli municipality in Jerusalem. **In light of the negative impacts of home demolitions, especially on women and children, do you think we will be seeing a rise in the level of domestic violence? Most definitely. Israel’s policies, especially home demolitions, impact children and women more than others. According to studies, the increased pressure on men due to the occupation commonly leads to increased violence against women and children. This has also resulted in a rise in the divorce rate, especially in young couples. The problem of shortage in housing due to the difficulty in obtaining building permits in addition to the high rents in Jerusalem, which can reach up to $1,000 a month, put economic and psychological pressure on people and prompt couples to live outside the separation wall and therefore outside of the fabricated municipal borders of Jerusalem. In turn, this puts them at risk of losing their residency rights in accordance with the so-called “center of life” law. There are thousands of Jerusalemites who lost their residency rights because they live in neighborhoods on the other side of the wall or in areas in the West Bank such as Ramallah or Bethlehem. This has had an incredible impact on the social fabric and on civic peace in that there are more problems within the family including a sharp uptick in violence, to which Israel gives no attention. **What repercussions will this have on Jerusalemite youth in particular? One of the consequences of these conditions is their repercussions on Jerusalem’s youth. For years, it was difficult for Jerusalemites to be accepted in the Hebrew University or to get jobs at their workplaces. However, after the murder of Mohammed Abu Khdeir, the subsequent uprisings and unrest in most parts of the city and the rise in the level of resistance following the repeated attacks on the Gaza Strip, Israeli leaders realized that the services they had been offering Jerusalemites over the years had not succeeded in Israelizing them. Hence, they pushed back against these uprisings, which were all led by young people who had suffered from the accumulated measures of the occupation such as restriction on their freedom of movement and lack of job opportunities. Unemployment rates among youth were high, their education was targeted and drugs and other social ills prevailed, which Israeli authorities did not care to contain. In response, Israeli institutions resorted to the use of a strategy for improving the living conditions of Jerusalemites; they allocated budgets to this end, aimed in essence at annexing and controlling the eastern sector of the city and reinforcing so-called Israeli sovereignty over it. They aimed at integrating the youth into Israeli society through various methods, including making it easier for them to enroll in Israeli universities. This was one of the fundamental challenges facing Jerusalem, the contradiction between attempts by Jerusalemite youths to preserve their Palestinian identity and sense of belonging and their aspirations to live a dignified life. This converged with the absence of any role of national influences, whether at the level of factions and parties, or the role of official Palestinian parties which did not make any serious effort to close this gap by offering programs and projects, job opportunities and even entertainment venues for youths that promote this identity. The result was that many Jerusalemite youths turned to Israeli institutions, which increased their presence in most areas of the city through community centers, working under the guise of education in particular but also for mental health and social counseling for youth and children. At the same time, occupation authorities continue to target local Palestinian institutions and hinder their work or shut them down completely, often opening alternative institutions in their place. This is the biggest danger facing Palestinians in Jerusalem today.
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Minister of Jerusalem Affairs Fadi Hidmi: This is how the Jerusalem Affairs Ministry handled the coronavirus pandemic in spite of Israeli impediments
The role of civil society organizations is extremely important; they should not change their character or messages in society “Hosted by MIFTAH” conducted the following interview with Mr. Fadi Hidmi, Minister of Jerusalem Affairs in which he showcased the ministry’s work and developments in the city in spite of the huge challenges and impediments imposed by the Israeli occupation. **How has the Jerusalem Affairs Ministry dealt with the coronavirus pandemic? How have you addressed the needs of Jerusalemites? The Jerusalem Ministry is part of the government system and part of the state of emergency declared in Palestine in response to the pandemic. From the beginning, we had instructions on how to deal with this crisis at the health and social levels from the government. In terms of health, I am speaking about Jerusalem hospitals in particular. We all know the Ministry of Health’s limitations of handling the affairs of Palestinians in Jerusalem. We all remember when Israeli occupation authorities in Silwan shut down its center and prevented any intervention by the Ministry of Health physicians when they were sent to conduct testing. Of course, there have also been huge social and economic ramifications, to which the Ministry has responded in spite of the challenges it faces by the occupation. **Did the budget allocated for Jerusalem cover all of your needs or did it fall short? The ministry operated within the austerity emergency budget that resulted from Israel’s piracy of Palestinian money. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister [Mohammed Shtayeh] reassured us that Jerusalem was a top priority. There is an undeclared budget related to the PA’s intervention in Jerusalem; the entire official system operating in Jerusalem falls under the Ministry of Jerusalem affairs budget. Even though Palestine and its public treasury are going through a very tough financial situation and we know how much Israel is making deductions, Jerusalem is always at the forefront in this regard. **Has your ministry allocated special programs for Jerusalemite women? And are they part of the budget? Palestinian women are an integral part of our people and one of the ministry’s priorities. I have always said that Palestinian women are the whole society. How could they not when they are the mothers of martyrs, the mothers of prisoners. The role of Palestinian Jerusalemite women throughout history has always been very deep-rooted and substantial. We recall Hind Husseini, Zleikha Shihabi and others; the list is long. In this context, we developed the Jerusalem Development Plan (the capital cluster) in which we focused on two basic and intersectional components: women and youth. **How were you able to deal with the occupation while still having to respond to the pandemic? After the US embassy was moved to Jerusalem and after the announcement of the “Deal of the century”, Israeli occupation authorities were given even more ammunition to fight anything and everything Palestinian. Hence, what we are up against in Jerusalem is a systematic war on everything that is Palestinian, whether official, institutional, or at the popular level. Everyone is a warrior because they represent the battle for sovereignty over the Arab, Islamic and Christian identity of Jerusalem. There is a plethora of harassments we have to face. Throughout this pandemic, Israel does not want us to serve our people in Jerusalem, but in light of its blatantly discriminatory failure to do so, it disregarded its responsibilities towards East Jerusalem in terms of any real preventative measures against Covid-19 including delays in testing. Israel became increasingly obstinate that it did not want us to stand by our own people, which is a violation of every humanitarian norm and international law as a civilian population under occupation. The occupation does not want us to progress or develop and this has been the problem in terms of protection for our people. However, none of these policies will ever deter us from moving forward in serving our people, especially during tough times. **You have been arrested more than once along with other Jerusalemite officials. On what grounds are occupation authorities pursuing you? There is a political dimension to Israel’s arrest of Palestinian officials in Jerusalem, under a false legal guise. They fall back on the so-called “interim agreement application law” that prevents Palestinian presence in Jerusalem, but this is nothing but a cover in every arrest. I was arrested four times in the course of a year. The same happened to the Jerusalem governor and to head of the Popular National Conference for Jerusalem, Bilal Al Natsheh. In short, anyone who works officially, institutionally or at the popular level is pursued and arrested. The last time I was arrested I was charged with leading the fight against Covid-19 in Jerusalem. Their excuses are always bogus because this is always about targeting our identity and our existence as an integral part of the popular fabric in Jerusalem. Jerusalem is our city and Jerusalemites are our people. There is no law on the face of this earth that can prevent any Jerusalemite or any human being in general from standing beside their people at any time much less during a pandemic. **What is your relationship as a ministry with civil society institutions in Jerusalem? Have you been able to overcome the occupation’s obstacles together? Integrative action is key at this stage. One example is the cooperation we saw in responding to the pandemic. There was unprecedented cooperation between institutions and volunteers and between youth and the official establishment. They carried out concerted efforts in serving Jerusalemites, which is the one focal point where everyone came together. It was this harmony and concordance which Jerusalemites were banking on and which they saw being strongly applied on the ground. The truth is, Jerusalem is in need of this institutional interconnection; there can be joint action and clear plans for everything pertaining to the work of official institutions whether the ministry or governorate in terms of all official Palestinian action in Jerusalem. **Does the Jerusalem Affairs Ministry have statistical data on Jerusalemites in the various sectors including unemployment, poverty and Israeli violations? When we say that the ministry has a strategic cluster plan, this means we formulate our planning based on this essential data. We cannot talk about the housing sector without knowing the needs of this sector and without having the data on it. The same goes for all the other sectors. This is the method required for any strategic approach to succeed. The Ministry for Jerusalem Affairs works according to directives from the government and formulates its plans based on them. The Palestinian government is in a state of development. While it is true that it was affected by the coronavirus pandemic – we are currently working on data from this pandemic in terms of its emergency, relief, health and humanitarian aspects, but we are also not neglecting the developmental dimension on the ground. In Jerusalem, there are conspiracies being hatched along with increased settlement activity, which have imposed realities on us that we must address in terms of its current and strategic repercussions. We must also not forget the city’s international dimension since Jerusalem has a presence in the international arena. **From a political standpoint, how has the Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs dealt with the recent American positions on Jerusalem? We are up against Israeli-American vigilantism. The United States is taking the lead and Israel is following, which is contrary to what used to happen in the past. Israel and the US are in one basket and the world is in another. Of course there are countries that have not taken a declared stance on this American position but overall, EU countries and many other countries in the world are standing against the US position regarding Jerusalem and Israel’s annexation plans for the Jordan Valley. We cannot underestimate the dangers of the next stage but we have and will continue to combat these developments as they come along. That is why we called on the international community to provide us with the necessary protection for our people, including in occupied Jerusalem. What the United States and Israel are doing only serves the law of the jungle and is not in line whatsoever with international law, conventions or resolutions that confirm this is occupied territory and that the occupier must provide protection for all those under its rule. **In light of the current political situation and possible developments, are you concerned about the future of the PA and the possibility of its collapse? The PA is not disconnected to the overall Palestinian reality. Therefore I am not concerned about the people or PA because it is part of this people and all of its components are part of this popular structure. Jerusalemites have always proven they take the initiative and that they get stronger with every hardship. I am not worried. Palestinians will always prevail and our positions will never be replaced. We have always faced predicaments and crossroads but our national constants have never changed and never will. Nor will they ever be compromised by blackmail or pressure. **The Israeli Jerusalem municipality is trying to play a central role in citizens’ affairs. As a ministry, how do you see this sudden shift in the municipality’s position? This is ultimate naiveté on their part. Jerusalemites cannot be bought or sold with a handful of food or money. They stand in the face of Israeli bulldozers that come to tear down their homes. The Israeli municipality is the party that imposes exorbitant taxes on Old City merchants and is responsible for all of the policies aimed at driving them out. The collective memory of Palestinians is not weak and neither is their short-term memory. Israel has a plan that cannot be beautified; there are too many witnesses and too many tragedies. We are a people that was not born yesterday; the stick and carrot approach is something they know well. **How do you think the current political reality will reflect on the Palestinian narrative in confronting the occupation and in developing a global vision more supportive of the Palestinian people? The first and final lesson learned is that the coronavirus pandemic proved to the Palestinians, the Israelis and to the world that Jerusalem is not united and that Jerusalem is for the Palestinians alone. This was confirmed by the way in which Israeli authorities dealt with Jerusalemites during the pandemic. It was brazenly racist in a way that no one can deny in terms of their disregard and neglect towards the Palestinians. Another lesson learned is that the wager should always be on Jerusalemites. They have taught us for years that Jerusalemites are always on the ground and are always the ones that take the reins of initiative. They will never trust those who demolish their homes and exercise such brazen racism against them. I think after this pandemic is over, a new perspective will evolve in the world; there will be earthshattering economic repercussions. If we take into account the setback in economic indicators since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, we know we are up against a difficult economic impact. However, the Palestinians have prior experience in dealing with such crises, which has helped us avoid a lot of problems. Responding to the current crisis will be one of our biggest challenges. Success will be measured by how comprehensively we deal with the crisis and all of its sub-problems and this is what we are already seeing from the Palestinian leadership. **Will this crisis impact the role of civil society organizations which work on programs addressing the national narrative and identity? The pandemic may have an impact on this role at present and perhaps on its situation in the future but it will not impact the overall situation for these organizations. CSOs exist in order to serve a strategy that supposedly has clear markers and which are not changed or replaced. The only thing replaceable are the tactics of any given stage and the short and mid-term strategies of that stage. However, CSOs should not change their character, message or presence in society, only their interim approaches and tactics so they can deal with the reality, in this case one that has been imposed on the entire world because of this pandemic.
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Daoud Al Deek, Deputy Minister of Social Development and Basri Saleh, Deputy Minister of Education: our emergency plan and procedures
Daoud Al Deek, Deputy Minister of Social Development:
**How has the Ministry of Social Development dealt with the impact of the Coronavirus pandemic? Since the start of the Coronavirus crisis, the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) realized the possible impacts of the pandemic would not be limited to health repercussions. We knew it would impact economic and social aspects and on people’s everyday lives, especially the most exposed. This pandemic constitutes a real threat to global security and economies, societies, families and individuals. In addition to the financial pitfalls pertaining to health care costs whereby countries have put in place regulations to contain the virus, families have begun to face difficulties from within. The standstill of most economic activity in most countries has resulted in a halt to sources of income for many families and individuals and therefore has increased their risk of exposure. Some countries addressed these disruptions in income for families and individuals by providing direct assistance to their citizens and to the business sector. Meanwhile, families and individuals remained vulnerable to exposure during this crisis in countries that do not have the necessary resources to provide support and assistance to their citizens and businesses. That is why we can expect an increase of marginalization and an escalation of the crisis among already marginalized and poor sectors. This calls for quick responses to this crisis that would improve systems of social protection for families and individuals and to provide fast assistance to them during states of emergency. **What has the MoSD done to improve social protection systems? Improving social protection systems during such crises is extremely important; effective responses to this crisis will play a crucial role in the protection of families and individuals, especially the most vulnerable and marginalized sectors such as women, children, the elderly and people with special needs. Hence, we are aware of how imperative it is to take action and formulate plans to provide protection for these sectors in addition to the sectors that could emerge as vulnerable as a result of this crisis, especially if it is protracted. At the forefront are limited or low-income families, the elderly, people with disabilities, employees of now-closed daycares and kindergartens, day laborers, families in quarantine, families of Covid-19 patients, assisted living facilities for the elderly and the disabled and juvenile centers. From day one, we were in cooperation with humanitarian institutions such as “Wafa” and the UAE Charitable Commission to provide food packages and disinfectants to shelters. We have been able to deliver food aid to many families, especially in Bethlehem **Has the Ministry prepared an emergency plan? Even though the MoSD is involved in emergency committees in the various governorates, it still prepared a rapid intervention plan in response to the Coronavirus, both in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The plan basically aims at improving conditions for poor and marginalized sectors to avoid any deterioration of their situation and also to guarantee food and health security for them. Moreover, this plan is aimed at meeting the emerging needs of the most affected sectors, with special focus on vulnerable sectors of priority such as those registered with the MoSD who live in extreme poverty, women working in daycares, day laborers in the local economy whose income was halted because of the crisis, women beneficiaries from the alimony fund and their families, the elderly and special needs persons who receive MoSD services and still open assisted living centers for the elderly, people with disabilities and other vulnerable sectors. **What are the priorities for intervention in the Ministry’s emergency plan? One: To help poor and marginalized families by offering financial support, e-coupons, food packages and basic cleaning products while taking into consideration that the needs of these families could change with time, depending on the duration of the crisis. This requires the development of a system responsive to the needs of these families. Two: Offering financial assistance/income support to women working in daycares who were forced to stop working and therefore lost their livelihood because of the government’s preventative measures, especially in the West Bank. Three: Offering financial assistance/income support to women working in kindergartens who were forced to stop working because of the government’s preventative measures. These women lost their income after kindergartens were closed, especially in the West Bank. Four: Supporting centers (for the disabled and elderly) by providing cleaning products and food. Five: Providing financial assistance/income support to day laborers in the local market who lost their incomes because of the government’s preventative measures, including the closure of markets and workplaces. Six: Helping persons with special needs registered in the social assistance portal by providing them with basic cleaning necessities to protect them from contracting Covid-19. In order for this plan to work, the private sector, civil society and international organizations need to support the ministry and help it provide sufficient financial resources to carry out this plan, which costs approximately $34 million. **Which sectors do you think are the most impacted? How is the ministry meeting their needs, women in particular? The ministry affords special attention to households headed by women. There are over 40% of families that benefit from the cash referral program, which are headed by women. This is why we developed an emergency response plan to confront the impacts of the pandemic, especially for poor and vulnerable sectors. We are working to mobilize funding for this plan, which focuses especially on women working in daycares and kindergartens, female heads of households, elderly women and those with disabilities. Basri Saleh, Deputy Minister of Education: our emergency plan and procedures Deputy Minister of Education, Basri Saleh talks to “Hosted by MIFTAH” about the most significant measures taken by the ministry in response to the Coronavirus pandemic: In response to the pandemic, the Ministry closed all schools in Palestine and enacted its emergency plan. It took the following steps to guarantee continued communication between students and teachers regarding their syllabus so they could best invest their time throughout this period:
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Review of the financial and budgetary situation and economic repercussions during the emergency situation
“Hosted by MIFTAH” interviews economic expert Muayyed Afana on the economic repercussions of the Coronavirus pandemic **What does it mean to operate within the recently announced emergency budget? How does this impact economic sectors? The emergency budget ratified by President Mahmoud Abbas is, in effect, the 2020 public budget with consideration to the current state of emergency due to the Coronavirus pandemic. This is a budget with a sizeable funding gap estimated at approximately NIS5 billion due to the expected setback in general revenues. In addition, there is the drop in foreign aid, which will certainly reflect on economic sectors given that the budget’s expected revenues are far less than its projected expenditures. Hence, there is a financial deficit that will be reflected in the PA’s ability to meet its obligations. **Do the current circumstances call for operating within this type of budget? There is no doubt the current situation is a state of emergency. However, we can still operate in accordance with the budget law by enacting Article 37 of the Public Budget Law. **How much will this impact the private sector? How much should we invest in foreign aid under these circumstances? There is no doubt that this state of emergency and the required budget for health purposes in addition to the drop in revenues will all cast a shadow on government priorities. Prime Minister [Mohammed Shtayeh] basically said this when he announced that the priority would be the health sector, support for the poor and employee salaries. All of this will impact the private sector. We should invest in foreign aid to support these priorities, especially with the economic downturn and the sharp drop in revenues. **What are the direct economic impacts of the Coronavirus pandemic? Will we feel these impacts in the next phase? There will be huge economic repercussions even though so far, the direct impact is not completely tangible. It will impact the economic cycle in general. What’s more, we expect a severe global economic recession to take place. The next phase will be characterized by economic downturn. **How will our economy be impacted because of this crisis and which sectors will be hit the worst? The Palestinian economy is fragile, largely due to the occupation, which is why it will be considerably impacted by the pandemic. It is too early to talk about which sectors will be most impacted given that the repercussions of this crisis are still ongoing; we cannot predict the outcome of this epidemic yet. However, our first prediction is that the tourism, commercial and small business sectors will be hit the hardest by this along with the poorest and most marginalized social sectors. This is because a large number of people in this sector lost their livelihood and have no alternatives, such as day laborers, workers in tourist facilities, in the trade and private sector, retail workers, vendors and outside markets. There are also the laborers who work inside the Green Line who will be equally as vulnerable if a complete closure is imposed, in addition to small business such as daycares and training and educational centers. **What is the role of the state in protecting these sectors? In the Palestinian context, does this call for other kinds of intervention? State interventions in Palestine take place through the Ministry of Social Development. The needs of poor and marginalized families have always been more than the available resources and budgets, even before the coronavirus crisis, especially since the poverty rate, at 32%, is so elevated. In the Gaza Strip it is even higher, reaching 53% according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics [PCBS]. This is why we need additional interventions by the state. The private sector must also be obligated to contribute, especially companies that are least impacted. The state needs to work towards providing the minimum requirements for families and not only use the database of poor families before the Coronavirus pandemic. Interventions must include all families who lost their source of income because of this. **What are the projections for local taxes? How will this impact the role of the PA in securing the costs for managing this crisis? Projections indicate to a sharp drop in revenues from local taxes given the halt of daily life and the paralysis of public and private facilities. This will greatly impact the provision of financial resources for the public treasury in Palestine. That is why the ratification of an action plan is imperative to manage public funds, which take these variables into consideration. **What are the predictions for clearance tax money in the current crisis? Clearance tax money will also be impacted by the downturn of the economic cycle. At the same time, Israel still deducts from these funds. My prediction is that these deductions will increase in the next stage. For example the [Jerusalem] Electric Company is finding it increasingly difficult to pay its dues to the Israel Electric Corporation. Israel will likely respond by directly deducting these dues from the clearance tax revenues. **Will the PA’s ability to pay its civil servants be impacted? Right now, I don’t think so, but if this crisis continues for a prolonged period of time, I expect it will. **Which programs are most impacted in ministries? Development programs **What kind of future situation is the private sector looking at? In general, the private sector will be affected by the Coronavirus pandemic, but the degree of damage will vary according to the individual areas in this sector. For example, the tourist sector (hotels, restaurants, parks…) will be the most impacted while others will incur less damage. **How do you evaluate the ability of donor countries to continue supporting the PA under these circumstances? In general, there has been a huge decrease in international funding and support for the PA during the pandemic, however there are still countries that continue to meet their commitments such as the EU and Saudi Arabia. We do expect that some types of funding, especially for development projects, will be halted in this crisis. This is due to the impact it is also having on the donor countries themselves in addition to the complicated logistics involved in making the payments. **Will there be real changes at the level of global economies? Yes, I believe there will even though we are still in the transitional stage, which means it is difficult to predict the future course of these economies. **Which sectors may be able to survive the Coronavirus pandemic? In general, the economic cycle will be impacted but there are areas that will receive more attention than others such as the health, technology and distance learning. **What will economic approaches look like post-Coronavirus? It is too soon to tell but there will definitely be new approaches. **If the crisis drags on, do you expect changes in the current global balances of power? Yes, but this depends on how long the crisis continues and how extensive its financial and human cost will be. Coronavirus and the civil society crisis Refaat Sabbah, head of the Palestinian Education Coalition: Beyond the state of emergency– the shortcomings On the subject: “Beyond the emergency system—the shortcomings” Reefat Sabbah spoke with “Hosted by MIFTAH’ and posed several questions: “On what grounds are we standing? Were we really prepared for emergency crises? We have always spoken about emergency plans but did we actually have such plans in place?” Analysis and Data Sabbah maintained, “These are questions that require us to analyze the situation and data at hand to determine if we, as civil society organizations, are standing on solid ground or not. This current Coronavirus crisis has forced us to contemplate the reality of our situation and has revealed facts that may not be shocking but are still real. We became preoccupied with developing long-term strategic plans and were distracted from the task of developing scenarios for any imminent danger. The pandemic has made us take a hard look in the mirror. We did not give enough attention to self-evaluation, which is our best judge as CSOs, whether as individual institutions or as a whole. Points of weakness In reference to civil society’s weak points, Sabbah says, “We can’t deny that this crisis was sudden, but this does not absolve us of our responsibilities. Any sudden event requires a quick response; this is why we need to identify the weak points that created these gaps. Other weak points require us to review our way of thinking, our working methodologies and even our guiding spirit. Based on this, the most significant diagnoses of the current crisis pertaining to CSOs are as follows: One: Even though we are used to living through crises and states of emergency, still the most pessimistic among us could never have predicted a crisis of this magnitude, both in term of is temporal and geographic scope. We have lived through arbitrary quarantine before, but this is the first time we are living under voluntary quarantine. Two: Anyone who believes we were prepared for this is mistaken. In reality, we were not prepared for this kind of crisis where everyone is in quarantine. Even in the midst of military Israeli incursions, we did not stop moving and we were always able to overcome tough times, whether during the first Intifada when schools were closed, or the second Intifada when cities and towns were closed off by checkpoints; even during Israeli army incursions when we were prohibited from leaving our houses, there was still space for movement. Three: This time around, there is a lot of ambiguity surrounding the situation. We are in a time in which we don’t know how things are going to pan out, for two reasons: the first is because of the nature of the crisis and the second is because we are consumers of knowledge, technology and information. We wait for information from those in control of the internet. In both cases, we are content with being the receivers; we are not partners in the action like during the Intifada when we had the ability to make things happen. Four: There is an overall feeling of confusion among all of us. We were forced into this against our will. Mingled with this feeling is one of global fear, which has begun to affect us too. Everyone is experiencing ‘frustrated hibernation” if you will. We were hardly out of our winter hibernation when we were railroaded by the reality of the Coronavirus. Five: The overwhelming amount of information we receive from every direction has become a burden; it confuses and casts a shadow over us all. Six: Because of this lack of clarity around us, speculation on matters has increased, which has also increased the proposal of random and improvised solutions. Some people feel they are contributing merely by proposing a solution only to realize that these speculations need closer review. Seven: Technological capabilities, whether at the level of skills and knowledge or in terms of how prepared the infrastructure is: the crisis revealed that we actually were not prepared; plans at the official level revealed how unfamiliar they actually were with the data and information at hand. This begs the question: How many institutions took the time to familiarize themselves with data provided by the PCBS? And how updated was this data in the first place? Eight: Many CSO’s were moving along parallel lines with no intersectionality. This means that civil society for the most part, was not constructed in a harmonious way. Hence, this crisis has prompted CSOs to contemplate their strategies, plans and programs. Nine: Civil society does not have the expertise capable of regaining momentum. Much of this was depleted after CSOs could not maintain their pool of expertise because they were unable to afford higher salaries for this. Ten: The structure of various NGO sectors and the mechanisms for coordinating between them are weak. These sectors, whether educational or otherwise, still suffer from a lack of a unified position in responding to risks. Eleven: As we mentioned before, there is an apparent state of confusion, which perhaps stems from the fact that this crisis was so sudden and all-encompassing. However, the question is: hadn’t CSO’s adopted emergency plans? Twelve: The crisis revealed this lack of preparedness and also the government’s failure to champion the slogans it touted about strengthening the relationship with civil society. Therefore, no one should be surprised if the interventions, which were superficial and fleeting, do not touch at the core of this crisis. These have been interventions limited to releasing statements or conducting radio talks and spots. Thirteen: The crisis is still ongoing and interventions are still possible but we must be careful that these interventions are not only aimed at “scoring a point” for the record. We support and need interventions that leave an impact.
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Mazen Jabari, Director of the Arab Studies Society’s Youth Development Institute in Jerusalem
Introduction Palestinian officials are warning against the Israeli occupation’s new approach against the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem by boosting Israeli municipality-affiliated community centers and allocating millions of shekels to prompt the Palestinian Jerusalemite community into accepting the occupation. Meanwhile, the PA is powerless in assuming an effective and influential role in this regard. Nonetheless, Israel’s policies have failed to force the Palestinians into submission. **First of all, how did these community centers originate and how many are there? These centers were established over a decade ago in some areas of occupied Jerusalem. When they were first established, they offered certain services to the public in areas such as Beit Hanina. At the time, the plan only included a small number of centers, which were concentrated in Beit Hanina. They did not have much of an impact or effect. This changed in 2015. The consecutive uprisings in Jerusalem during this period, starting with the murder of Mohammed Abu Khdeir and then the battle over the electronic gates, prompted the Israelis to reconsider their interventions. Israelis started to feel they were close to losing control over things in Jerusalem, which was not something they ever expected to happen. That is why they did a comprehensive evaluation of most of their policies in Jerusalem to enable them to have a hold on the city and its population. They realized that their hostile policies to subjugate Jerusalemites, including attempts to push them out of the city as part of the demographic struggle, had not been as successful as they had anticipated. This was primarily because Jerusalem residents have a very strong national identity and belonging to the city. On this basis, they adopted a containment strategy in 2017 for dealing with Jerusalemites. This was based on integrating and involving them in Israeli laws so that the population would accept them as an existing reality and eventually accept Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. **What are the measures taken to reach this goal? To realize this goal, they had to make changes and allocate sizeable budgets for this. They also had to be patient and work according to a consistent and ongoing strategy, which they implemented in other occupied areas throughout the Palestinian territories. This process of containment, or in sociological terms, the ‘integration process” relates to the culture of the stronger society, in this case the Israeli occupation. This means the latter is the party that implements the process of integration on the weaker Palestinian Jerusalemite community. In order to achieve this, they had to make changes in the center and at the peripheries of the Jerusalemite community through allocating a large sum of money, much of which was transferred to these community centers set up in Palestinian neighborhoods and under Palestinian management. The goal of this was to give the people a sense of reassurance in accepting the center’s services by being in direct contact with them. They were successful in setting up nine centers in Palestinian neighborhoods and towns: Sur Baher, Essawiyeh, Beit Hanina and Shufat to name a few. In order for these centers to achieve the goal for which they were established, Israel devised new plans and policies for it. That is, after these centers were only offering humble services via the Jerusalem municipality, which serves as an executive branch of the occupation, Israeli authorities opened up broader means of communication with the municipality pertaining to the problems Jerusalemites face, such as the property tax {Arnona} and construction violations. Hence, people frequented these centers much more because they were offering solutions to some of their issues. This was followed by a more advanced role for the community centers, especially in education. Some schools began referring their students to these centers for supplementary educational services and extracurricular activities. What’s more, some schools began depending more on these centers, the goal of which was to normalize them, which is Israel’s overall strategy. This kind of normalization is even more dangerous than Palestinians simply meeting with Israelis because the goal is to change the cultural and socio-psychological dimension whereby Israel’s presence becomes acceptable to the Palestinians. After they succeeded in this approach, they were able to integrate these kinds of programs into the community centers, thus making them a gateway for handling the Palestinian population vis-à-vis their problems with the municipality. The fact is, these community centers were part of more comprehensive programs. After 2017, Israeli occupation authorities established additional social affairs offices and expanded their services to be able to work with Palestinian families, benefiting from the conservative, Muslim, Arab makeup of Palestinian society, largely governed by customs and traditions. The goal of this was to infiltrate society and make the required changes from the inside. They wanted to broaden the jurisdictions of the social affairs offices so they were more involved in the affairs of Palestinian families, which is exactly what happened. Their offices and centers have obtained an extraordinary number of files on Palestinian families, many of which are police-related files given that social affairs is obligated by law to contact the police, in this case the so-called “people’s police”. This is a unit that was aimed at softening the role of Israeli police in the community. Jerusalemites familiar with this unit they say it comprises of police men and women who speak Arabic and who seek to solve problems within Palestinian families. Israel was able to establish a network within local communities that link the centers, the police and schools with the Israeli establishment. In this way, they were able to change the method of intervention with Palestinian society so that the occupation becomes more palatable to them. In other words, the changes Israel could not impose by force had been achieved through “soft” methods, including the method of containment. Ultimately, they wanted to arrive at a situation where there is no clash between Jerusalemites and the occupation. Hence, over the past few years they expanded their programs, especially those targeting minors and youth. For example, the centers’ employees can be seen in certain areas such as Jabal Mukkaber and Tur, monitoring boys between the ages of 14 and 16 to ask them why they are not in school. They later contact the families of these boys to help them resolve their sons’ problems. At the same time, Israeli police arrests boys of this age who are charged with throwing stones for example and transfers their files to the “people’s police” and to social affairs where they and their families are offered help in “modifying” their sons’ behavior. **In addition to these community centers, have occupation authorities worked in other ways to target Jerusalemites? Yes, in addition to the community centers they also worked a lot on education. The tool used for this was Israel’s civil service. As you know, civil service is granted to those who cannot enlist in the army. They introduced this service in Jerusalem in two ways: the first was through Israeli universities by giving the opportunity for Jerusalemite students to enroll in these universities, which opened up many avenues for them, most significantly recognition of the Tawjihi diploma. They offered them incentives as well by exempting them from the first year of tuition and formulated many policies in this direction including enabling second and third –year students to perform civic services in exchange for not paying tuitions that could go up to NIS15,000. The second way was through the community centers and the allocation of huge funds, on the premise that these centers help youths who benefit from their services. Data shows that the money allocated for these services is between NIS12-15 million spent on several activities, including technical and cultural activities as well as in schools. **Does this explain the campaign against Jerusalem institutions since 2000 when dozens were closed and these community centers became their alternative? Israel has a vision that it can change the situation in Jerusalem. As for the occupation, Jerusalemites were always the biggest and most difficult problem. This is because Jerusalemites rise up unpredictably, like during the faceoff over the electronic gates and before that, the confrontations over the murder of Mohammed Abu Kheir. Israel failed in all its measures to break their steadfastness and resolve. After 2000, when Israel closed Orient House and several other Palestinian institutions, it continued its Judiazation and Israelization policies still, but with less consistency. While there were fewer institutions closed after, there were more Israeli interventions in terms of the number and quality of activities. In other words, where it mostly only interfered in political activities and against institutions its accused of being linked to the PLO or the PA, now it intervenes in most activities including sports and art. It even bans Ramadan meals and social events, eventually banning all Palestinian activities in Jerusalem. For Israel, it is not the actual existence of Palestinians that is the issue; its main problem is Palestinian national and cultural identity. That is why Israel is so cautious not to allow any activity that reflects this identity or to allow any Palestinian national symbols in the city. Israel realizes that over all the years of its occupation, it has failed to impose sovereignty and control over Jerusalem and this is a big problem for them. Recently, they have escalated measures against any Palestinian activity in the city, persecuting anyone who works with the PA; this is an ongoing battle. I think now that the ‘Deal of the century’ is out and [US President Donald] Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, Israel will take even broader steps to basically eliminate any Palestinian symbols in Jerusalem. Right now, they are trying to halt the money flow to individuals and institutions in Jerusalem in coalition with European countries. Since the ultimate objective is integration between the Jerusalemite community and Israeli intuitions, I think these measures will only increase and we will have more and more difficulty in expressing our national identity, culture and presence in Jerusalem as Palestinians. **Do you think this policy is linked to the escalation of the demographic battle in Jerusalem manifested in increased settlement takeover within the city’s neighborhoods? For Israel, this has been a fundamental issue since former Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kolleck was in office. They considered the demographic factor a major problem which needed a solution. That is why they expanded the Jerusalem municipal borders and ramped up settlement construction within the city. Furthermore, to put an additional demographic stamp on the city, they increased their settlement presence in the heart of Jerusalemite neighborhoods by taking over homes and properties. They are thus implementing the “soft expulsion” of Palestinian Jerusalemites until they are able to pare them down to a Jerusalemite community that is accepting of this settlement presence. To this end, they have allocated tens of millions of shekels. Just look at the cost of security guards for settlers in Jerusalem, which is over NIS30 million a year. I think they want a purely Jewish Jerusalem, which is why they focus so much on the demographic component. They also admit to their failure in this to some extent. Right now we are talking about a Jerusalemite population that does not exceed 38% in both sectors of the city. For them, this is a huge problem, which is why they want to decrease this percentage by any possible means. Perhaps the ‘Deal of the Century’ will help them achieve some success in this regard by cutting this number almost in half, which is, as you known very dangerous. ***Does the concept of these community centers coincide with the neighborhood committees which Israel tried to create in the past? At the time, the Israelis focused on the ‘mukhtars’ (community heads) as the main reference points in Palestinian society. They gave them certain privileges with the police. Prior to this, they had given them some authorities pertaining to land ownership as well. Their goal was to give these committees, through their tribal figures, certain authorities for resolving problems. However, the work of these committees was lacking as was the role of the “mukhtars’, which was overshadowed by the community centers. In Sur Baher for example, Israeli authorities established a large, community complex center for the people. Now they are trying to do the same in Essawiyeh by communicating with representatives from families there. ***How have Jerusalemites combated Israel’s attempts to Israelize and Judiaze education through these centers? There are people who are sending their children to international schools as one way of protecting their children from this Israelization, correct? I think some Palestinians have always chosen to send their children to private schools that teach an international curriculum, whether British, American or German, because they want them to go university in these countries. The question is, how many students study the Israeli curriculum? I think the total percentage is less than 10%. However, this is an overall indicator and over recent years there has been a huge increase in the number of students enrolling in Israeli education. This is very dangerous if it continues to rise in the coming years. Israel has both control and money and is currently working on developing its schools so they are more advanced than the others, which will ultimately motivate more parents to enroll their children in schools that teach the Israeli curriculum. **Do you expect more Jerusalemite students will start enrolling in these private schools to avoid Israelization? Is there a suitable alternative? I think these schools have a limited capacity and cannot absorb thousands of students. This is in addition to the curriculum taught, the quality of the students and their educational levels not to mention the costly tuitions for Palestinian families. That is why the current educational system and the level of Palestinian capacities cannot currently stop the Israelization of education. **What do Palestinians at the official and civil level need to do to halt the Israelization of education? I think it will be difficult to go back to where we were. However, we can seek to cut our losses as much as possible and prevent a complete submersion of our education sector. First, we must conduct a comprehensive review of this sector and set realistic goals based on the preservation of whatever is left of the Palestinian education system and curriculum. Second, there needs to be a change in the method of administration of this sector, especially after Israel closed the education directorate in Jerusalem. What I mean is we need a civic pool of experts, representatives from both parents and students and principals to ensure the protection of Palestinian education in Jerusalem. Third, we must reaffirm that teachers are the strategic dimension to any plan and the safety valve that must be safeguarded so can continue to be the front line of defense against any attempts at exclusion. ***What options or alternatives do the Palestinians have to combat these Israeli approaches? To be frank, this is difficult for several reasons. Politically, there is a lack of any desire from official Palestinian parties to combat these Israeli measures in Jerusalem. That is why everything being done here is unorganized and ineffective. Even those who are appointed to positions are just messengers. That is to say, they have no power or authority or even ability to actually confront these approaches; their work is limited to passing on messages to the higher political echelons. Actual confrontation requires jurisdictions and budgets that allow them to really take on these Israeli measures. This has been one of our strategic mistakes in Jerusalem. In the past, we thought the problem was that we had multiple references. I don’t think this is really the problem; we have always needed multiple references. The problem is that in Jerusalem, you cannot go to battle with the occupation and its policies with only NIS20 million. Sometimes we don’t even get the entire amount and this poses a very big problem. At the official level, we have shown that we do not want a confrontation in Jerusalem and we are not working towards halting Israel’s measures in the city. It is ordinary Palestinians who are the ones confronting the occupation’s policies. They have not lost their national and cultural identity. We have seen this proven time and again. **So, the community centers did not succeed in undermining the Palestinian narrative in spite of everything? Absolutely not. Israel is now obsessed with coercing the Palestinians in Jerusalem, encouraging them to accept the Israeli occupier and acknowledging and submitting to its laws. Even though these centers succeeded in expanding, they did not achieve all of their objectives. I expect that in the next two years these centers will try to merge the community in with Israeli laws through holding joint activities with Israeli centers under the guise of coexistence. This is extremely dangerous. If they succeed in these programs, they would have succeeded in what they have failed at so far, which is for Jerusalemites to accept the occupation. Israel is trying to undermine our sense of belonging to Jerusalem. It wants you to be a resident in your homeland but with no national ties or identity, similar to what they did with the Palestinians in the ’48 territories. Israel wants to limit your causes to social and economic causes and to issues of equality. It does not want you to have a sense of belonging to another people. On the role of these community centers … Jerusalemite novelist Jamil Sahlout Everyone knows that consecutive Israeli governments, town councils and all Israeli institutions have not spared any effort to Judaize Arab Jerusalem. This Judaization includes geography, history and culture. Even though the overwhelming majority of Palestinian Jerusalemites boycott Israeli municipal elections, the municipality wants to integrate Jerusalemites into municipal institutions. What’s more, even though the municipality collects the “Arnona” property tax and other taxes from Palestinian Jerusalemites, which amount to 35% of the municipality’s budget, the money it spends on services in East Jerusalem only ranges between 6-7%. As part of its ongoing and accelerated Judaization policy, the municipality resorted to creating these so-called “community centers” in some neighborhoods, under the pretext of improving services. This was an attempt to coerce Jerusalemites into recognizing the annexation of Jerusalem as the “united capital of Israel.” However, Jerusalemites are fully aware that East Jerusalem itself– the heart of the occupied Palestinian territory – is the main problem, not anything pertaining to services. Media and political analyst Rasem Obeidat In the next stage, occupation authorities will adopt several scenarios in order to eliminate any activity or institution that stands in the way of its plans and projects in the city. First and foremost, this includes efforts to turn Jerusalemite neighborhoods and towns into isolated societal units separated from one another, thereby undermining any association based on nationalism between them and limiting their concerns to socio-economic ones. They also want to create alternative local leaderships in place of national leaders and figures in each village where each of these local leaders is granted authorities linked with the Jerusalem municipality, similar to the situation in villages west of the city such as Abu Ghosh, Ein Rafah and Beit Naquba. This means police stations would also have to be set up in each of these towns and villages. In addition to the presence of the so-called “people’s police”, this means they would also have access to schools, give lectures and intervene in problems that happen inside school grounds. They will also coordinate with tribal committees, which would become the main reference for social disputes and quarrels, acting in the capacity of the police and therefore disrupting Palestinian families. They will unravel the social fabric by entering homes and infringing on in their privacy. The police stations will include spaces for the community centers, which will serve as the alternative to Palestinian clubs and centers. A considerable budget will be allocated to these centers so they can hold activities in these neighborhoods and schools. The municipality will create local agents and contractors and allocate budgets to them for holding these activities within their towns. People’s everyday lives and issues will revolve around issues like approval for structural plans, obtaining permits, etc. In order to combat this, we need to formulate a unified strategy in which the PA, the private sector and Jerusalemite institutions participate. Efforts need to be made to establish Jerusalemite institutions and clubs to fill the gaps and be a plausible alternative for the public in terms of services, activities, quality and fees. If this is made available, it will prevent the community centers from becoming the alternative for our students, children and marginalized sectors. The strategy must be to pump real budgets into these youth centers so they succeed in attracting these social sectors.
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George Giacaman: Professor at Birzeit University, political analyst and Board of Directors member of Muwatten Institute for Democracy and Human Rights:
Introduction: Dr. George Giacaman, political analyst and professor at Birzeit University, says Israel effectively obliterated the two-state solution long ago with its expansionist settlement policies in the Palestinian territories. He also says it is highly unlikely that the Israeli right in power will accept the establishment of a Palestinian state on land occupied in 1967. In an interview with “Hosted by MIFTAH”, Giacaman confirmed that one of the objectives of the US ‘Deal of the Century” from the “rational” Zionist perspective is to save the right and save Israel itself by separating the Palestinians from Israel through some sort of political entity, which could be called a state but under Israeli guardianship. The goal of this is to preserve Israel as Jewish state and prevent the one-state solution. He warned that the United States could take measures pertaining to President Mahmoud Abbas on the back of his strong opposition to the deal, by creating some sort of political change like it has done in several other countries in the past. However, this time, the change will not be the same as it was during the time of late President Yasser Arafat. In terms of the PLO, Dr. Giacaman says it is nonexistent, in practical terms. Meanwhile, the PA found itself in a sort of hysteria, which can be called “the statehood narrative”, throughout the course of the Oslo Accords, including when the PLC was dissolved. Some, he maintained, falsely believed this political delusion was a step towards statehood. As per the recent meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, initiated by the Committee for Interaction with Israeli Society, Giacaman says he thinks it is highly unlikely that the Palestinians could greatly influence Israeli public opinion to reach a political solution. He called for a rebuilding of organizational forces in Palestinian society and at the same time ruled out holding elections given the lack of conditions needed to conduct them. Following is the full text of the interview: What is your take on the latest developments following the official announcement of the ‘Deal of the Century” by US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu? As we know, the announcement of the ‘Deal of the Century” was postponed several times; there is the text of the deal on the internet for anyone interested in reading more about it. What’s important is to say that the deal was already underway when the United States recognized all of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The “icing on the cake” was the American recognition of Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. It is unclear whether this recognition was part of the deal or not. Much has been said about the goals of this plan. For example, that it was designed to be rejected. It was also said that the goal of the deal was to help Netanyahu in the elections and also to help Trump himself with right-wing circles in the United States and that it was aimed at eliminating the Palestinian cause. All of the above could be true; however, I think there are other reasons. From a “rational” Zionist perspective, I think the plan was aimed at saving Israel’s right wing and Israel itself. As we know, there are some circles within Israel, especially among writers, who believe the two-state solution is suitable for resolving the conflict. In the past, they warned that the end of the road could result in annexation, which means Israel would eventually become one state with a Palestinian majority. I think one of the goals is to separate the Palestinians from the Israelis to avoid this outcome. However, in the beginning, no one thought that this separation would manifest itself in something called a Palestinian state. For example, in an interview with “Al Quds” newspaper, in June, 2018 [Jared] Kushner spoke about self-rule but did not say anything about a state. Still, the idea of separation was there within the framework of this autonomy. I think that because of the Palestinians’ rejection and in order to apply pressure on the Palestinians, this phrase was switched with the phrase “Palestinian state.” The core of issue however, remained the same, whether regarding annexation or in terms of separating with Israel and finding a framework that from a Zionist standpoint, would fulfill some of what they consider Palestinian political “aspirations” but not rights. Today, there is an Israeli-American committee to discuss which parts of the West Bank will be annexed. I think the American position is that the issue of annexation should not completely be left up to Netanyahu or to any future Israeli government because this will cause problems for their plan. The plan itself does not contradict with the annexation of areas it decided would be part of Israel, but no more than that. Right now, this has been left to negotiations. We are talking about nearly 30% of the West Bank, which is what they agreed on. However, they are not in consensus— at least within the plan’s four-year timeframe plan – over a larger percentage of land to be annexed. Right now, this is the situation. Do you think the Palestinians handled the deal in proportion to the dangers it presents? I think there was a lot of optimism among Kushner’s team, which has been around since 2017. I point to this year in particular because the “deal of the century” was part of a larger plan discussed with several Arab regimes, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. When Trump visited Saudi Arabia in 2017, the plan was already in place. The “deal of the century” included a path to normalization between the two sides. I think at that time, the Trump team was more optimistic than it was later on in terms of the possibility of Arab states putting pressure on the Palestinians. I think the Palestinian position, which was strong and solid under President Mahmoud Abbas, made it difficult for a number of Arab countries to pressure the Palestinians. Evidence of this is the official Saudi position, which is that any political solution must precede normalization. The unofficial position is something else. Hence, the Palestinians are using all the tools at their disposal. The main strong point is that one imperative of the deal as a ‘political solution” is the presence of a Palestinian party. If this party rejects it, there is no solution. Of course this is the predicament of the ‘deal of the century’ right now. It might include the annexation of land but not a political solution that will end the conflict like they had hoped. Do you think the Americans will be back to implement their plan? What can we take away from the statements made by Israel’s UN ambassador regarding President Mahmoud Abbas? It is not unlikely that they will come back at some point with this. There are indicators that cannot be completely relied on but for example, what Israel’s UN ambassador said in his speech at the Security Council about peace never happening with Abu Mazen is one. It could be that the Americans are working on a sort of political change like the US has done in many other countries. However, I don’t think this change will be similar to the one taken during late President Yasser Arafat’s time. That is, I don’t think there is a plan in place to eliminate President Abbas even though the Palestinian media considered the Israeli ambassador’s words as a threat on the president’s life. I think this is an exaggeration. The Americans might come back with this plan within the next four years if Trump is reelected or post-President Abbas. Where does Europe stand on these political developments? If we are talking about the EU, there are differences between its countries. At their last meeting at the beginning of February, EU foreign ministers could not agree on rejecting the ‘deal of the century’ or any political initiative because their decision must be unanimous. As we all know, Israel has been able to infiltrate several eastern European countries like Hungary, Czech Republic and Italy as well. They postponed discussion on the subject, which is the problem of any union, including the EU. However, there are positions from other countries that are more encouraging, at least from certain aspects. On other aspects, they are more discouraging. For example, the German government’s position on the issue of the ICC is completely in support of Israel. What about the official Arab position on this deal? We saw Arab delegations participate in the press conference announcing the deal in Washington D.C. Doesn’t this weaken the Palestinians’ position? The Arab delegations that participated in the Trump/Netanyahu press conference are known – the UAE ambassador was particularly pointed out because he is one of the active parties in building relations with Zionist groups in the United States and also in the process of normalization with Israel. These ambassadors reflect the positions of their governments, obviously. However, the majority of Arab ambassadors were not there. For the most part, the Arab countries most eager to normalize are pretty well known. Do you think Israel has been able to infiltrate more than one Arab and Muslim arena regarding normalization? Yes. For example, there is Sudan and Netanyahu’s meeting with Abdel Fattah Burhan. There is a clear Arab division on normalization, which is being driven by several Gulf countries but not by all of them. Look at Kuwait, for example. It has a completely different stance. We saw how the Kuwaiti Speaker of Parliament ripped up the “deal of the century”. True, it was dramatic, but it also had political dimensions. I like to see things in a broader context. If we look at the Arab uprisings, who are the people standing against the change Arab peoples are demanding? There is Tunisia for a start, but especially in Egypt and then Algeria, Iraq, Sudan and Lebanon. There are parties, or what we call the ‘deep state’ that are resistant to change because they fear this wave will catch up to them. These are the parties calling for normalization with Israel. This is the scene we have today. The Arab governments resistant to Arab uprisings and regime change are also those that support normalization. How do you interpret the ICC’s decision to open an investigation into Israeli war crimes and then backtrack later on this decision? To be accurate, the Palestinian media spoke a lot about opening an investigation but in reality, there was no actual decision to open an investigation but to form a committee to look into whether the ICC has legal jurisdiction in Palestine for this purpose. The reason for this is that Israel presented a legal argument claiming the ICC has no legal jurisdiction in Palestine because Palestine is not a state. After the designated time is over for this committee to present its report, then the decision will be taken. What happened is that the ICC Prosecutor announced there was evidence that war crimes had been committed and that an investigation can be opened, contingent upon the aforementioned committee’s decision. So far, there has been no decision to open an investigation. This is an important point, but Palestinian media outlets keep talking about opening an investigation and this is simply not true. We are now facing a battle because the pressures are nonstop, not only from Israel but also from the United States. They claim the ICC does not have any legal jurisdiction in Palestine. This means Palestinian diplomatic action must continue to press in the opposite direction. We are waging a diplomatic battle and will have to wait for its outcome. Israel is very concerned about the issue of the ICC because it will create a problem for it and for many Israeli politicians and officers responsible for war crimes. What is also necessary is for the PA to withstand these pressures because in the past, there were occasions in which the PA folded, like in the case of the Goldstone Report when it decided not to follow up on it. I think things are different now, perhaps because after the ‘deal of the century’ the PA and particularly President Abbas, reached a dead end with the US and Israel in regards to any possibility for any political course. In other words, the Palestinians have nothing left to lose. How is the Palestinian division hindering confrontation of these developments? After President Abbas’ speech at the UN Security Council, we expected that the compass would be redirected inwardly; however, things went in another direction, towards the Israeli arena, supposedly in an attempt to impact Israeli public opinion. No doubt, the topic of the division is an important one. However, I personally think it is not as important as the media makes it out to be. The real question in regards to ending the division is: what does it mean to end it? What does it mean exactly to mend the rift? What it means is to implement signed documents -- that is, the Cairo Agreements, the first of which was signed in March, 2005 and the last in 2011. What followed was the so-called “2017 understandings”, which were partially based on the 2011 agreement. Hence, if we look at the 2011 Cairo agreement, we will find that its main provisions are not implementable and the two sides, Hamas and Fatah that is, know this. Let me point to three provisions in particular. The first is on merging the security services in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which is not possible in the current situation. The second is on holding elections. An attempt was made but I don’t think either side wants these elections; even if they are held, things will go back to what they were eventually. That is, Hamas will be boycotted and it will not be allowed to form a government even if it wins. In other words, the United States will not interact with it nor will a number of European countries in addition to Israel and this will create a new crisis. The third provision, which is an important one, pertains to Hamas joining the PLO. What do you think the outcome will be if it joins? Israel and the United States will declare that the PLO is a terrorist organization once again, which is unacceptable to the PA. It is clear from this agreement then, that it is inapplicable. I say the two sides do not really want reconciliation. If they really want to reconcile, there is something that logically must precede this, which is: what is the action plan for this stage? I think if reconciliation is to happen, it will happen only within the framework of a new national struggle program and not on the basis of a division of shares, which both sides are seeking. What would this program look like? This is the question we need to address post ‘deal of the century”, especially if Israel annexes parts of the West Bank. If there are any “positives’ to the deal of the century, it is that it may convince a lot of people that the two-state solution, according to the Palestinians’ understanding, is over, especially with the continuation of settlement building and the possibility that Israel will annex parts of the West Bank. If the two-state solution is the national endgame, there needs to be a new or renewed national project. This is the open-ended question and what is missing in public discussions. I think this is nothing new. Israel effectively cancelled out the two-state solution years ago; what’s more, the Israeli right is not likely to accept a Palestinian state. They even objected to the wording in this regard in the “deal of the century”. It is unlikely they will abandon their aspirations in terms of stealing Palestinian land in the West Bank, this is clear. That is why I say that after the Camp David negotiations ended in July, 2000 and particularly after the Taba negotiations in Egypt in December, 2001 when Ehud Barak was Israel’s Prime Minister, it was clear that even if an agreement had been reached, Barak was in no place to get this agreement passed in the Israeli Knesset. This is because the right-wing majority was projected to win the lion’s share of seats in the Knesset elections that were to take place even if this did not actually happen. There was an attempt during Olmert’s time in office in 2007 and attempts by former US Secretary of State John Kerry in 2013 and 2014 to reach an agreement. At the time, Kerry was very frank, placing blame for the failure on the Israelis. Where is the PLO on these developments? There have been calls for the dissolution of the PA and others that call for redefining its functions and strengthening its standing, which over the years, has eroded into the PA In practical terms, the PLO is nonexistent. But the topic of the PLO is an important one for the reason that we should not abandon the representative framework of the PLO for all Palestinians inside and abroad. This was one of the most important achievements of the PLO. What happened is that the PLO has become conflated with the PA. That is why we need to rebuild the PLO. What’s more, it must also be within the context of an even more important vision for what the new national project will look like. Within this vision, we must ask the question of whether the PA should continue in its current form or not. What happened during the Oslo era was that the PA was struck by a sort of obsession with what could be called the “statehood narrative” -- ministries, positions and various titles that imply the existence of an actual independent state. In reality, the PA is about autonomy with limited authorities, more like a large municipality to administer the affairs of the population. This must all be reviewed in the context of a renewed national project. That is, the question of whether the PA should be dissolved or not must be viewed within a context of a broader vision about the aspired role of the PA at this stage and the nature of its formation. In a recent speech, President Abbas said the function of the PA may be reconsidered but he did not actually clarify what he meant. I don’t think there is any elaborate thought process on this and I think this question has been lacking for some time, not just now. Do you think there is any point to the Committee for Interaction with Israeli Society? Who is actually capable of impacting Israeli public opinion in favor of a solution with the Palestinians? There is a difference between what is right on principle and what is reality. On principle, in order for us to reach a solution, there must be an Israeli partner who participates in the vision of what a solution would look like with the Palestinians. However, at the same time, what used to be known as the Israeli left has become so weak it has no real political effectiveness anymore. I don’t think the Palestinians have the ability to revive this side of the equation. The Israeli left’s weakness is because of internal reasons; I think the main reason is the success of the Israeli state in neutralizing it in the face of external pressures given its influence in the United States primarily and in other countries as well. Hence, from the perspective of the Israeli right, the Zionist project in terms of the West Bank is one that is moving full-steam ahead. There is no need for them not to move in this direction. This, of course, weakened the Israeli left, especially in regards to normalization, where they thought they had made achievements. That is why I don’t think the Palestinians can have a big impact in this regard. However, this does not mean we should abandon the principle, which is the need for an Israeli side. Nonetheless, the main question in regards to the future is not this; it is what the new national project will be. This is the question that has been absent from public discussion. We must think in a new creative way on more than one level – at the organizational level, at the planning level, to see what can be done. Unfortunately, we are facing a new phase and I think it will be a lengthy one. We need to ask ourselves: what are the sources of Palestinian strength and how can we take advantage of and benefit from them? This is what we need to be thinking about. How do you see the role of civil society and its institutions in the current phase? What is needed from them within the framework of the national project? Many think civil society only means NGOs and this is a big mistake. What civil society institutions means are the organizations that do not belong to the state; that is, those relatively independent of the state. The most important of these institutions are the grassroots ones such as parties and unions of all kinds and not the NGOs, which in reality, are strengthened by these grassroots and popular institutions; adversely, their effectiveness and impact weakens in their absence. I think in the future, we must work on rebuilding these institutions, whether the various labor and vocational unions or political parties. The important thing is to rebuild the organizational power in society, which are all civil society institutions, the weakest of which are the NGOs because, like I said, lack real grassroots power. But when there is an organized strength comprised of unions and parties, NGOs can support these institutions and find the means of directing their own work within the framework of the national project. I think this should be our main task. Do you feel it is necessary to hold elections at this stage? Elections are important, but only under certain circumstances. First, they need to be possible, without any obstacles preventing them from being impartial and representative. Second, there must be a relatively stable political system and not a state of existential conflict like we have now. Both of these conditions are unavailable at this stage. No doubt, the elections are one source of legitimacy in independent political systems, but in the context of this liberation process, the PLO gained its legitimacy, not through elections but through resistance. This is the path Hamas took as well. The question is: at what stage are we now? Anyone who can provide answers to questions about the national project and how to work towards it will gain legitimacy. In any case, we can be excused for not holding elections right now because Israel will not allow Palestinian Jerusalemites to participate and it is inconceivable that elections are held without Jerusalem; this would be conceived as forsaking the city. In what context do the latest funding conditions by the EU fall? They fall within the context of Israeli pressure to neutralize boycott efforts in the form of the BDS movement. Israel fears this movement and is fighting it at every turn, including through these efforts to halt funding to Palestinian institutions that support the BDS. The first order of business for Israel in this regard is to target the institutions providing the ICC with information that will help it open an investigation or put war criminals on trial. Of course the EU will be put under this pressure. However, as we have seen, Palestinian NGOs took a strong position against any political conditions. This must be followed up; it is not enough to merely reverse the EU’s policy up until now. There must be ongoing and increasing efforts in this regard. This is a battle that must be waged and Palestinian representative offices in European countries have a role to play in this regard, which has been weak so far.
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