Perception of Palestinian Journalists of the Performance of the Palestinian Media in the Coverage of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict

• Al-Ayyam newspaper and Ma’an news agency receive highest grades for performance of their duties.
• Editors in-Chief decide on the form and content of the coverage.
• Preference for obtaining information from Palestinian and Israeli sources.

• The Media Monitoring Unit at the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue & Democracy ‘MIFTAH’ conducted an opinion survey on January 26-March 12, 2007 for Palestinian journalists on the performance of the Palestinian media. The survey included a sample of 102 journalists.
• The media channels that were covered by the survey were: Palestine Television (PBC), Al-Ayyam, Al-Hayat Al-Jadidah and Al-Quds newspapers, Ma’an and WAFA news agencies, in addition to local media institutions and independent journalists.

Survey Summary

On a 1 (most negative)-10 (most positive) scale:

• Palestinian journalists rated the extent to which the media is performing its task in covering the Palestinian–Israeli conflict at 6.35. Among the three local newspapers, Al-Ayyam received the highest grade (6.67), while Ma’an received a higher grade of satisfaction (6.89) than WAFA (6.13).
• The degree of satisfaction of journalists with the coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the media channels in which they work was rated at 6.84 points.
• Although journalists consider local media to be biased in favor of the Palestinian story (6.94), they prefer the media to be critical and objective (7.90).
• Journalists considered that editors in chief decide on the form and content of the media coverage, giving them 7.89 points.
• Despite the low rating given by journalists to the credibility of different sources of news, the Presidency of the PNA received the highest grade, 5.97.
• On covering the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, journalists prefer to get information from Palestinian and Israeli sources (7.28).
• Palestinian journalists consider the coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to reflect the position of the Presidency (6.83) more than that of the Government (5.45).
• Journalists believe that the Palestinian society needs to obtain more information about the issue of Jerusalem (8.28), although they feel that the people need to get more information on the practices of the Israeli Army (8.15).
• 77% of journalists expressed their belief that the presence of a reference including Israeli media persons with whom they would communicate, may help the media coverage of the conflict, while 79% believe that the presence of a Palestinian media reference may enhance the objectivity of the Israeli media coverage of the conflict.
• As for the means to develop and help improve the media coverage of the conflict, the most frequently mentioned were:
  1. Establishing independent television and radio stations, as well as an independent news agency.
  2. Protecting journalists in conflict and wars.
  3. Conducting training at the international level and journalist exchange visits with international media institutions.
• Proposed topics for expert training were:
  1. Modern media techniques;
  2. Electronic journalism;
  3. Languages;
  4. Investigative reporting.

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Foreword

The Media Monitoring Unit at “Miftah” hereby issues its fifth report with the aim of providing both Palestinian and Israeli researchers with a document for comparison between the Israeli media coverage of the illness and demise of late President Yasser Arafat, which has been implemented by the Center for the Protection of Democracy in Israel “Keshev,” and the Palestinian media coverage of the illness of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his loss of consciousness and consequently the end of his role in the political arena.

MIFTAH hopes that this report will contribute to raising the professional standards of the Palestinian media through manifesting the latter’s weaknesses and shortcomings, and at the same time be an incentive for better understanding between the Palestinian and Israeli sides in a manner geared towards ending Israeli occupation and reaching a just and lasting peace.

The News of Sharon’s Illness

On 4 January 2006, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was admitted to hospital due to an acute brain stroke and severe brain hemorrhage, one day prior to a scheduled catheterization to his heart, after a minor heart attack on 18 December 2005.

This news surprised everybody, and attracted broad interest at all levels. Meanwhile, the Palestinian media was preoccupied with two main topics:

First: the Palestinian Legislative Elections

Dates had been previously set for 25 January 2006, and consequently the campaigning had already started on 3 January 2006, and lasted until 23 January 2006. That was an extremely important period for the Palestinian media because of the severe competition between electoral blocs, the participation of Hamas after it had boycotted the 1996 elections, as well as commercial purposes due to the wide advertising spaces that came at the expense of local, regional and international news.

Second: Changes in the Political Map of Israel

The Palestinian media was interested in following up the new political map in Israel, since Sharon had announced his withdrawal from the Likud and the establishment of Kadema, which attracted prominent figures from different Israeli parties and security apparatus, in addition to academics, thus becoming the largest Israeli party according to Israeli opinion polls. The Palestinian people were specifically interested in the political project which this party had been established for implementing, and in which Israel would demarcate its final borders at the expense of the Palestinian Territories occupied since 1967, using the Separation Wall as its borders, after annexing major settlement blocs and Al-Aghwar (Jordan Valley) areas, on the pretext of the absence of a Palestinian negotiating partner. Sharon’s illness came amidst this political and media scene, thus shifting the focus from the media coverage of his illness to the future of Kadema and the political project it represents.

It can also be said that given the well established traditions of peaceful succession of government in Israel, Sharon’s illness and his entering into a coma at a later stage, would not have triggered the same kind of questions that accompanied the demise of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, especially if we take into consideration the differences between the Palestinian and Israeli institutions of governance, and the systematic and legal process of government succession in Israel.

Nevertheless, the Palestinian media has expressed a great deal of interest in Sharon’s illness in its beginning and before he entered into a coma that he never awoke from. The nature of this coverage was in general factual, objective and in favor of conveying the reality of his health conditions, and avoid of the incitement that had been monitored in the Israeli media in the wake of the illness and demise of President Arafat. But the newspapers also pointed out Sharon’s historical hostility towards the Palestinians in specific and the Arabs in general, and the Palestinian and Arab perception of him and the prevailing concept in the Palestinian and Arab minds that Sharon is a “murderer, bloodthirsty and war criminal”.

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Foreword

This is the fourth report issued by The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy- Miftah on the media coverage for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in coordination with Keshev- Center for the Protection of Democracy in Israel on monitoring the media coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The goal of the project is to facilitate the development of a bold and professional media, and a culture of tolerance, moderation and understanding between the two peoples, through monitoring, research, advocacy and lobbying activities without infringing upon the freedom of the media and the freedom of expression.

In our previous report, we essentially addressed the type of media coverage through the unilateral disengagement from Gaza Strip and clarified that the Palestinian media had been trapped in the official story and had not attempted at challenging it. We also made a number of recommendations, most notably that in order to diverge from the official story, the media must distance itself from the circle of influence of the Authority and become independent.

In this report we discuss the media coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during the Palestinian Legislative Council Election, specifically the campaigning of the different electoral blocs from 3 January 2006 to 23 January 2006, due to the extreme importance of that period, during which the Palestinian forces sought to win the support of the Palestinian public opinion for their different programs, and during which the ability of the Palestinian media to influence voters and urge them to choose what best suits their interests could be monitored.

Since the launching of the election campaigns, the Media Monitoring Unit at MIFTAH divided the subjects to be monitored into the following categories:

1. Palestinian media coverage of the positions of the different electoral blocs towards Jerusalem: Was the subject raised by the blocs? How was it raised? Under what headings was the Jerusalem issue addressed? For example, supporting the steadfastness of the people of Jerusalem, isolating Jerusalem from its surroundings by the Wall, means of confronting the situation, inviting the people of Jerusalem to participate in the elections, gatherings and demonstrations in Jerusalem if they occurred, special programs on the participation of Jerusalemites in elections; was the limited participation in Jerusalem overlooked and why? What were the policies, if any was drawn, adopted by electoral blocs for enhancing participation. How were these policies presented and what space did they occupy in the Palestinian media?

2. The political programs of the electoral blocs: How did the media present the programs of each bloc; what were these programs, and did they focus on popular, armed or nonviolent struggle? Did these programs propose political plans for resolving the conflict, and what were those plans? Did the Palestinian media seek to highlight the political differences, if they existed, between political blocs? Was there any bias to a certain party and what was the nature of such bias? Did the electoral blocs focus more on internal issues, such as corruption and security disorder, or on the conflict with Israel? Did the blocs address the Road Map, and how did the media present such an issue?

3. Hamas in the media: Hamas participated for the first time in the Legislative Election. How did the media present their political program, or the discourse of its political leaders? Is there any contradiction between participation in the Election and what Hamas maintains regarding its rejection of the Oslo Agreement and its outcome, including the authorities and commitments; how was this presented?

4. The Palestinian political prisoners: How did the media present the process of the participation of prisoners in elections, whether through their presence in electoral lists, or through their denial of their right to vote? Did the media focus on that issue? Was this issue present in the media in the first place, and how was it presented to the public?

5. Israeli closure of Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the practices of the Israeli occupation: How did the media address the fact that Jerusalem was closed against candidates? Did the media highlight the impact of the closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip on candidates, and how did it address the fact that Israeli authorities denied the candidates freedom of movement through fixed, mobile or flying checkpoints? Did the Palestinian media cover the Israeli occupation measures against candidates, lists and voters, specifically those measures that negatively influence the elections process?

It should be pointed out that a large part of this issue overlaps with the two subjects on Jerusalem and Hamas. For this reason we tried to avoid repetition, despite the fact that occupation practices inside Jerusalem may be listed under the subject of Jerusalem, closures or under abusive practices of the occupation against the electoral process as a whole.

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Introduction

In January, 2010, on the eve of the Viva Palestina Life Line convoy's arrival, which was carrying humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip from 17 countries, the Palestinian-Egyptian border became the scene of clashes and confrontations between the Egyptian security forces and Palestinian protestors. The Palestinians were protesting the ban on the convoy entering the Strip, which at the time resulted in the death of one Egyptian soldier and the injury of dozens of protesters. The two sides exchanged accusations over responsibility for the death of the Egyptian soldier and the ensuing clashes and injuries on the Palestinian side. At the time and until today, it has remained unclear which side was responsible for the unrest and the ensuing repercussions, especially the soldier's death. This event was chosen for its significance and its impact on the Palestinian arena including its ramifications regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, especially the Israeli siege on the Gaza Strip.

How did the three Palestinian papers cover this event?

There was a clear discrepancy between the three newspapers in their coverage of this event, whether in terms of where on the front page of each newspaper the news item about the event was placed and the choice of headline. There were also differences in the content and accuracy of the news material. The largest discrepancy was between Al Ayyam on the one hand and Al Hayat Al Jadida and Al Quds on the other.

In Al Ayyam, for example, the news item was the lead headline, placed on the right hand side of the front page, since it was the most significant event of the day. Its headline was comprised of three lines:

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Introduction

Nations embroiled in nationalist conflicts tend to adopt narratives that support the righteousness of their struggle and which accentuate the negative traits and intentions of the other side, as well as its responsibility for the ongoing suffering and for the absence of a solution. This is how the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is covered by media outlets on both sides, often in mirror images, with each side presenting an opposite story. For example, the Palestinian media narrative emphasizes the occupation—whose victims are the Palestinians—and paints the government of Israel as aggressive, opposed to peace and responsible for violent events in the region. On the other side, Israeli media outlets emphasize the violent and terrorist foundations of the Palestinians’ conduct and their unwillingness or inability to reach a solution. The Israelis, in this telling, are the victims of a conflict in which they are not to blame. Beyond these different perceptions and interpretations of reality, essentially similar patterns of coverage can be found on both sides, which de-legitimize and dehumanize the other. These patterns of coverage heighten mutual suspicions in both nations, fan the flames of the conflict and make it harder to find a solution.

Recognition of the media’s profound influence on the conflict has led the Israeli organization Keshev and the Palestinian organization MIFTAH to work together from both sides of the conflict in order to try to change how the conflict is depicted in the media discourse in both nations. This is done in the hope that such cooperation may lead to more balanced, fair and comprehensive coverage and, perhaps, as a result, a better reality.

This practical guide to teaching critical reading of news materials arises from a unique cooperative project that has been carried out continuously since 2004. In this joint project Keshev and MIFTAH each analyze news coverage in the major media outlets on their “own side” and attempt to influence journalists and editors to change patterns of coverage that are problematic and biased.

Two parallel goals have guided the creation of this guide. First, it is designed to instill skills for critical reading, in general. A second goal is to promote critical media consumption in the specific context of the Israeli-Arab conflict. As mentioned above, over the years media on both sides have played a complicated and not always positive role in the conflict’s development. The media has had a central role in defining the conflict and its significance for the Israeli and Palestinian public. Critically reading the messages contained in news coverage can neutralize to some extent the media's ability to shape consumers' perspectives according to short-term media interests and can also neutralize the influence of those elements that exert pressure on the media. It is our hope that this guide will enable media professionals to develop new means of self-criticism that will allow them, in time, to create news coverage that does not perpetuate the conflict, but which might actually contribute to its resolution.

The methodology1 that underlies this guide makes it possible to clearly present the systematic failings in news coverage on both sides. It is based on a distinction between two principal stages in the news-making process – writing and editing.

At the first stage reporters and columnists compose their texts and send them to their news editors. The editors receive other texts as well, from press agencies, public relations firms, and so on.

At the second stage, the editors produce the final product: They determine which texts will appear in the newspaper or broadcast. The editors determine the placement of the text (on the front page or on page 17, at the beginning of the broadcast or after a commercial break); they select the photographs that go with each item; they design the layout of the pages and determine the sequence of items in the broadcast; and they compose headlines (including sub-headlines and photo captions in newspapers, the headlines of television news broadcasts and the words spoken by the anchor).

In the view of most news producers and news consumers the second stage, the editing stage, is mainly technical. According to popular perceptions, the truly important work is done in gathering and writing news material. Editors merely "prepare" this material for print or broadcast. This perception is wrong, for two complementary reasons: First, editorial work determines news messages no less than the work of the reporters, and in some ways even more so. Second, in reading the news media consumers rely on material produced by editors much more than on material produced by reporters. The fact that an article appears on the front page and not on page 17; the specific phrasing of a particular headline; the appearance of a photo beside an article; the words spoken by a news anchor before an item is broadcast – all of these factors have a decisive influence on consumers' understanding of the news. Furthermore, many studies show that media consumers often limit themselves to reading headlines (or viewing the headlines of a news broadcast) and in many cases they do not even get to the texts of the news items (or the rest of the broadcast edition). In such cases, the perception of the news is determined almost exclusively by the work of the editors. This fact has far-reaching significance, since a meticulous review of news material at both stages of the process, writing and editing, reveals that the materials produced at each stage are not parallel. The headlines of newspapers and news broadcasts are not merely short neutral summaries of the news. In most cases, the headlines tell a very different story than that which is told by the reporters. Along with the placement of an item, its graphic saliency, the accompanying visuals, and so on, the headlines tell a story of their own and this significantly influences news consumers.

To be clear – the problem is not limited to the fact that once in a while the results of editorial work do not reflect the contents of the articles themselves. The point is that the discrepancies between headlines and texts are systematic. A meticulous review of newspapers and television news broadcasts reveals that certain components of reality, which appear in the articles themselves, are systematically marginalized by editors, while others are systematically highlighted.

The techniques that appear in this guide reveal these systematic discrepancies through attention to a series of key criteria.

Further in this guide each criterion will be explained through the use of examples culled from actual media coverage in Israel and in the Palestinian Authority. It is important to note that becoming familiar with these criteria is just a first step toward learning to read media items more critically. The research method employed here is based on attention to a combination of criteria in ways that reveal recurring editing patterns that bias the coverage.

This guide aims to help users identify the tell-tale signs of these patterns, to understand their significance and to learn from them how to read the news in a more profound way; in other words, how to "read between the lines".

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Introduction:

The speech delivered by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday, June 14 at Bar Ilan University's Begin–Sadat Center in Tel Aviv, came in the context of his attempt to respond and deal with a new political situation created by the new US administration and the EU. This new policy is aimed at aborting previous double-standard approaches for dealing with certain aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. On the one hand, the US Administration has always demanded that Palestinians fully commit to the Road Map and its conditions, while it did not request the same level of commitment from Israel. It left Israel to behave according to its own convictions regarding settlements, borders, the wall and checkpoints. This has helped to justify the subjugation of Palestinians through imposing new realities in their daily life. From the US administration's first day in office, the differences in policy from George Bush's Republican administration were apparent. Statements from the new US officials began to address the danger of continuing with settlements in the Palestinian territories, mentioning Palestinians' right to self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state. This change in American policy reached its climax during the speech delivered by US President Barak Obama entitled ''A New Beginning'' for reconciliation with the Arab and Muslim world at Cairo University in Egypt on June 4. President Obama publicly made defined and clear demands for halting settlements and recognizing the two-state solution, demands which mean a compliance with the Road Map.

Prime Minister Netanyahu's speech was more of an attempt at deceit and maneuvering. It was a desperate endeavor to please the US administration and the international community on the one hand and an attempt to preserve his narrow right-wing government, on the other. This was very clear by Netanyahu's many difficult if not impossible conditions which he set as prerequisites for his consent to the idea of establishing a Palestinian state. These conditions will effectively kill any prospect for negotiations on several issues. For example, demanding that the Palestinians recognize the Jewish identity of the state of Israel, the declaration that Jerusalem would remain the unified capital of Israel, the demilitarization of the future Palestinian state and monitoring of its borders, in addition to his total rejection of the right of return, leaves nothing left to negotiate over between the two parties.

Palestinian papers' coverage of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's speech

The three Palestinian papers gave a lot of space on their front pages to Netanyahu's speech as main news items, in addition to local and international reactions to the speech which, as we mentioned before, was full of political pitfalls. The three papers also allocated their regular columns and cartoons to commenting on the speech. As expected, the three papers focused on four issues raised by Netanyahu. From a Palestinian perspective, these issues are the most difficult and dangerous, which are the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, rejection of a settlement freeze, Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel and rejection of the refugee right of return.

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Introduction:

The truce between Hamas and Israel was given broad coverage in the Palestinian media. It lasted for six months starting from June 19, 2008 until December 19, 2009 and included many violations and accusations on who was trying to break it. By the end of the truce, the countdown had begun for the Israeli operation, which many analysts noted was in its advanced stages and had reached the point of no return. Eventually, it took place on December 27, 2008 when Israeli war planes began bombing the Gaza Strip in what was later considered the harshest Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people since the Nakba (Catastrophe). The Israeli government dubbed the operation “Cast Lead” while Palestinian resistance factions coined the term “Oil Spot” for their campaign of rockets launching from Gaza.

The three Palestinian papers dedicated their entire front pages to the Gaza incident. All the news on these pages was related to the Israeli bombing of Gaza, in addition to statements and efforts by Palestinian leaders including President Mahmoud Abbas and the government to halt the Israeli aggression. Furthermore, the statements made by Hamas leaders inside and abroad and by the deposed government, appeared on the inside pages. Devoting the entire front page to news and special reports about what was taking place in Gaza was a sound option in that it reflected the gravity of the situation and the magnitude of the disaster in the Strip.

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